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Introduction
In March 2015, South Africa’s Centre for Competition, Regulation and Economic 
Development (CCRED) partnered with the Zimbabwe Competition and Tariff 
Commission to host the inaugural Annual Competition and Economic Regulation 
(ACER) week at Victoria Falls in Zimbabwe. Much of the success of the week was 
in combining rigorous training led by regional and global experts with a confer-
ence programme that was designed with inputs from authorities in the region 
to make sure it was topical and directly relevant. The discussions were especially 
vibrant and the subject matter of particular relevance to solving the challenges 
of enforcement and growth for agencies in the southern African region and 
beyond. The papers in this volume were selected from those  presented at the 
ACER  conference, following a rigorous refereeing process.
The period since the early 1990s has seen the emergence and consolidation of 
competition and regulation authorities in a number of countries across the con-
tinent. This volume aims to play a role in critically analysing key competition 
issues and in considering the interface of competition and a range of economic 
policy questions. The papers we collected and edited for presentation in this 
volume fit into three clusters: cartel law enforcement, issues in competition and 
regulation, and competition and regulation in reshaping African markets. The 
conclusion, a substantive chapter in its own right, addresses competition and 
regional integration as part of an inclusive growth agenda for Africa.
The areas covered here show that there are complex and interesting develop-
ments in the competition and regulation space within the region. There is thus a 
clear need for an overall assessment and for measures to foster the development 
of a body of knowledge and literature that originates from the experiences of 
countries in the region, rather than relying exclusively on international prece-
dent and learnings. One example of this is Thula Kaira’s discussion in chapter 3 
of the poor translation of cartel findings in South Africa into follow-on inves-
tigations and prosecution in neighbouring countries in the Southern African 
Customs Union and the Southern African Development Community (SADC), 
and ultimately into damage claims based on an assessment of the overcharge to 
consumers across borders.
Jonathan Klaaren, Simon Roberts and Imraan Valodia 
Introduction: The development 
of competition and regulation 
in southern Africa
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The emphasis of this volume, and of what we hope will be similar research 
going forward, is thus on developing African case studies to contribute to the 
international literature in this area, for training and knowledge-sharing pur-
poses. These issues are of interest from both an academic and a practitioner 
perspective. They are particularly relevant in terms of regional economic devel-
opment where countries in the region often face the same challenges of small, 
concentrated markets with barriers to entry that are especially high and where 
the resources to enforce measures against anticompetitive conduct are limited.
Where do competition law, economics and policy 
fit within new development strategies for Africa?
It is worthwhile to identify and interact with some of the broader literature 
within which the chapters in this volume should be viewed. We are particu-
larly  interested in what might be termed the competition–economic develop-
ment interface. Our departure point here is the envisioning work of Eleanor 
Fox (2003). The questions we ask are: How do competition law, economics and 
policy fit within new development strategies for Africa and what strategies, in 
the competition and regulation space, are needed to improve the efficacy of 
these policies to generate improved economic development outcomes? A num-
ber of the  chapters in this volume delve into this issue, especially so in the 
concluding piece by Simon Roberts, Thando Vilakazi and Witness Simbanegavi 
(‘Competition, regional integration and inclusive growth in Africa: A research 
agenda’).
There has been a welcome trend in recent years towards analysis and think-
ing about African development in an evidence-based, critical and globally 
informed yet Africa-located fashion. One example is the volume titled Good 
Growth and Governance in Africa: Rethinking Development Strategies (Noman, 
Botchwey, Stein and Stiglitz, 2012). Analysis in this new vein is based upon 
economic evidence and thinking but is nonetheless capacious enough to attend 
to the institutional and political aspects of economic growth and development 
strategies in Africa that are in our experience both impossible to avoid and 
necessary to understand.
Institutions of economic governance are central to addressing the factors 
affecting and holding back the growth of African economies, including the dis-
torting effects of the apartheid-era management of the growth of the South African 
economy. There are tools, practices and resources from which to work. And, 
there are a set of governance agencies – a number of them prominent among the 
institutions present at the ACER conference – which are dedicated to the inclu-
sive growth of the economies in the region. Indeed, the assumption of ACER is 
that these agencies are capable of playing a more active role in promoting devel-
opment, within their institutional and political constraints.
Mushtaq Khan (2012a, b) has framed these debates in a way that seems rele-
vant for the southern African region. His contribution starts with an appropriate 
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attention to methodological detail, treating one of the most influential contribu-
tions of the market-enhancing economists, the work of Daron Acemoglu, Simon 
Johnson and James Robinson (2001). Their work has particular relevance for 
southern Africa due to its attention to the economic consequences and devel-
opment prospects and pathways of settler and non- settler societies. Acemoglu, 
Johnson and Robinson’s work focuses on property rights and other institutions 
as determinants of growth and is particularly distinctive for its methodological 
innovations, such as the use of mortality rates. Khan argues that their meth-
odological innovations do not justify their assertion that stable property rights 
causally explain the relatively better economic development 100 years after the 
arrival of white settlers. Instead, as he puts it, ‘the transitions here were not 
periods of stable property rights but the absolute reverse. They were periods of 
systematic, widespread and violent destruction of almost all pre-existing rights 
because these rights did not serve the interests of settlers who were setting up 
capitalist economies in their own interest’ (Khan, 2012b, p. 71). Instead of a 
clamour for immediate (and expensive) stable property rights, Khan argues in 
favour of ‘governance capabilities to manage property rights over many valuable 
resources that will remain weakly defined during early stages of development’ as 
well as ‘complementary governance capabilities on the part of the state to man-
age incentives and opportunities for technological catching up, while creating 
compulsions for entrepreneurs not to waste resources’ (Khan, 2012b, pp. 74–75). 
The mining camp that was Johannesburg of the nineteenth century did not 
become Johannesburg aspiring to world-class status in the twenty-first century 
through strict adherence to good governance practices.
These particular prescriptions may be put within a more general  analysis of 
two contrasting (and competing) approaches to the place of governance within 
development and development strategies (Khan, 2012a). One is the market- 
enhancing approach and one is the growth-promoting approach. Those espousing 
the market-enhancing approach argue that ‘the lack of democratic accountability 
and the presence of patron-client politics, extensive corruption and a weak rule 
of law had a lot to do with Africa’s relatively poor performance’ (Khan, 2012a, 
p. 115). The alternative growth-promoting approach at times calls for ambitious 
growth-promoting strategies such as those associated with East Asian economies 
like South Korea (Khan, 2012a).
While the centre of gravity is certainly on the growth-promoting side of this 
divide, the call is itself nuanced – ‘[t]o take account of the limited reform capa-
bilities in real contexts, a targeted approach to developing governance capabil-
ities makes sense’ (Khan, 2012a, p. 115). Khan’s argument is for incremental 
approaches to governance reform. Specifically, this means paying attention to 
addressing market failures affecting investment in new sectors and technologies, 
to enhancing and upgrading labour skills and training, and to identifying specific 
land bottlenecks and developing moderately efficient agencies to address land-use 
problems.
We see our steering comments in this chapter and the particular empirical 
studies of our contributors in the chapters that follow as responding to Khan’s 
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call for specific determinations of what the pathways, agencies and sectors are 
that will allow for dynamic (and as yet unforeseen) economic growth paths. In 
a nutshell, one could call these new-generation strategies of industrial policy. 
This discussion leaves us with the issue of where competition law and pol-
icy fit within the active role for the state envisioned thus far. To explore the 
competition law and policy interface with industrial policy and to do so in a 
regional context, we begin with the work of Eleanor Fox. In general, Fox’s work 
 challenges competition practitioners and researchers to move beyond a narrow 
conception of competition enforcement in terms of the investigation and liti-
gation of cases. Such work should instead be contextualised within the bigger 
picture of  making markets work as tools for giving the poorest people in the 
world access to  fundamental needs and granting people the dignity of partici-
pating and sharing in the economy (CCRED, 2015). As would of course be the 
case with a number of analysts, Fox’s work might be appropriated in service of a 
market-enhancing as well as a growth-promoting approach to governance. We 
are drawn to her pragmatism and her capacity to accept that the ideal institu-
tional arrangements, perhaps of best fit with what she terms ‘pure competition’, 
are not necessarily what is appropriate for limited-capacity states in Africa. In 
this sense, her work complements that of Khan.
Fox’s work talks to the chapters in this volume in understanding how insti-
tutional choices are made and the way they impact on the development of the 
regime of competition and economic regulation within, and across, countries. 
For example, penalising and deterring cartels involves taking on large vested 
interests. While high penalties may be required, it is difficult to impose these too 
early in the life of a young competition regime. It first has to establish its cred-
ibility. Regulation may also be required to nurture effective rivalry and support 
investment, or it might protect incumbents. 
The challenges of competition law enforcement globally are outlined by 
Fox (2003) as a set of futures of international competition law in her article 
‘International Antitrust and the DOHA Dome’. These futures are particularly rel-
evant to the southern African region. Indeed, this region itself has connections 
in particular with the East African Community and is part of the tripartite free 
trade area now in the process of being established.
Fox begins her analysis with economics, detailing four categories of prob-
lems for developing countries with the default institution of nation-by-nation 
enforcement of competition regimes. These problems are: 
(1) Developing countries cannot protect themselves from world cartels, 
and those harms spill over to the rest of the world. (2) Discovery and 
information problems abound; information needed for enforcement is 
beyond reach. While industrialized countries can ease the problems by 
bilateral agreements, developing countries do not have the clout to obtain 
such cooperation. (3) Exploitative and protectionist national industrial 
policies trump antitrust. State action slips through the cracks of the WTO 
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[World Trade Organization]; states ‘privatize protection.’ (4) Nations do 
not have enforcement incentives commensurate with world welfare; 
indeed, nation-to-nation reciprocity can lead to world-welfare reducing 
solutions. (Fox, 2003, pp. 927–928) 
Hers is indeed a big-picture view, albeit one aware of its own place in that big 
picture and alive to the need for collective feasible action.
In that spirit, Fox looks into the feasibility and desirability of adopting some 
form of global competition governance, noting the strong support for such a 
measure. In her view, there are three distinct possibilities:
First, the strong form would establish a complete antitrust [e.g., compe-
tition] regime for matters significantly affecting world commerce, possi-
bly even encompassing a world antitrust enforcement system and court. 
This regime might or might not be integrated with trade; it might be 
‘antitrust on its own bottom.’ A second model would envision a frame-
work measure sensitive to the trade-and-competition context. A third 
approach is a minimal form of the second model combined with cer-
tain ‘on the ground’ tasks such as technical assistance and peer review.  
(Fox, 2003, p. 926)
Putting the identified problems together with the available solutions, Fox dis-
plays vision and pragmatism, recognising that the time of the first model has 
not yet arrived, that the second model is her preferred due to its addressing the 
most pressing underlying economic issue, and ultimately opting for the third as 
within the capabilities of states such as those in Africa. Her preference for the 
second model of a European Union-style framework measure at a global level is 
based on its ability to ‘utilize the trade law concepts that discipline government 
action in restraint of trade [and how it would then] focus on the most critical 
problems of private and public/private transnational restraints that cannot be 
solved horizontally because of nationalistic impulses’ (Fox, 2003, p. 926). The 
working cutting edge in the details of these analyses – Khan’s and Fox’s – perhaps 
lies in the identification of which industrial policy measures are ‘exploitative 
and nationalistic’ and which are feasible and facilitative for economies to play 
catch-up in a globalised and competitive economy. 
Even if there are not such precise prescriptions given, we see evidence, in 
the chapters presented here and elsewhere, of a clear common thread in the 
thinking of practitioners and researchers in terms of leveraging the enforcement 
muscle, reputation and scope of competition regimes to contribute to reversing 
patterns of stagnant economic growth and high barriers to participation that 
have left so many in Africa in a state of dire poverty. In this sense, the research 
covered here aims to respect and fulfil the socioeconomic rights, among other 
fundamental needs of individuals, which are enshrined in the constitutions of 
South Africa and many other countries in southern and eastern Africa.
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Overview of chapters and their relationship  
to the theme question
Below we provide some of the direct linkages between the general points we 
have explored in the previous section and the specific arguments and research 
provided in the next 11 chapters of this volume. 
Cartel law enforcement
The first cluster of chapters investigates the efficacy of the South African com-
petition authority to counter the harmful effects of cartels, which respect no 
boundaries. 
In this vein, chapter 1 by Tapera Muzata, Simon Roberts and Thando Vilakazi, 
‘Penalties and settlements for South African cartels: An economic review’, 
examines the notable success of the corporate leniency policy in uncovering 
cartel conduct in South Africa. They focus on the importance of high-powered 
incentives for colluding firms to break ranks as well as the ongoing extent of 
collusive activity. The chapter sets out how cartel penalties can be understood 
in terms of the basic economic theory relating to deterrence and incentives and 
reviews how the Competition Commission has approached penalties, which 
have mainly been in the form of settlements.
Chapter 2 by Ratshidaho Maphwanya, ‘Cartel likelihood, duration and 
deterrence in South Africa’, studies factors in deterrence through a survey of 
law firms. The analysis factors in durability and duration of cartels from a set 
of uncovered cartels. In each area, Maphwanya replicates international studies, 
enabling comparisons of South Africa with international experience. The abil-
ity to conduct such comparisons allows for both measuring and improving the 
enforcement capability that African competition regimes possess.
Chapter 3 by Thula Kaira, ‘Cartel enforcement in the southern African 
neighbourhood’, reviews cartels uncovered in South Africa with apparent 
regional scope. Significantly, Kaira assesses enforcement in other SADC coun-
tries, noting that for the most part these countries did not investigate or uncover 
the collusion. Mostly, the authorities did not investigate the same markets. As 
Kaira points out, this begs the important question of why not. Various lessons 
are drawn, including the value of countries within SADC having a leniency pol-
icy as well as robust powers of search and seizure. The chapter demonstrates the 
significant yet limited capabilities of African competition authorities. 
Issues in competition and regulation
Chapter 4 by Reena das Nair and Pamela Mondliwa, ‘Excessive pricing under the 
spotlight: What is a competitive price?’, considers the contentious Mittal and SCI 
excessive pricing cases. The chapter ‘test drives’ the Competition Appeal Court 
decision in Mittal on the SCI case, presenting a thorough analysis. It asks the key 
question of whether the price bore a reasonable relationship or constituted abuse 
of dominance. The significance of dealing appropriately with large, powerful, 
state-owned incumbent firms is heightened in a regional context where, as noted 
in the conclusion, the effects of the lack of competition may be significant.
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Chapter 5 by Reena das Nair and Simon Roberts, ‘Competition and regulation 
interface in energy, telecommunications and transport in South Africa’, analyses 
the relationship between competition and regulation through a critical assess-
ment of the work of economic regulators and the competition authorities in 
South Africa in the core areas of energy, telecommunications and transport. The 
authors draw on working papers done as part of an in-depth review of economic 
regulation coordinated by CCRED for national government during 2014. The 
chapter argues that economic regulators should take into account the dynamic 
gains from greater competitive rivalry when setting rules and making decisions. 
It concludes that regulation that is conducive to creating ‘synthetic competition’ 
by ensuring the participation of several competitors has shown positive outcomes 
in terms of the dynamic gains from rivalry in the renewable energy subsector of 
energy and in the ports subsector of transport. The chapter thus continues to 
explore the productive overlap of competition law and policy with economic 
development.
Competition and regulation in reshaping African markets
Chapter 6 by Nicholas Sitko and Brian Chisanga, ‘How multinational investments 
in grain trading are reshaping Zambia’s market’, reviews the trend and impli-
cations of multinational corporations in Zambia in grain trading in terms of 
effects on independent wholesalers, margins and farmers. The chapter finds 
that these investments have proved beneficial, resulting in declining wholesale 
market  margins, increased trustworthiness and professionalism in the sector, 
and enhanced advocacy for predictable agricultural policies. However, there are 
competition aspects to these trade and investment flows that must be taken into 
account in an economic development perspective. If poorly managed, these devel-
opments could spark industry consolidation and a reversal of these positive gains.
Chapter 7 by Anthea Paelo, Genna Robb and Thando Vilakazi, ‘Competition 
and incumbency in South Africa’s liquid fuel value chain’, analyses competi-
tion issues in the liquid fuels industry, especially with respect to the wholesale 
and retail level, in relationship to the oil majors. The authors draw on a recent 
study based on interviews with market participants and on publicly available 
sources to assess the nature and extent of barriers to entry and expansion of 
firms in the wholesale of liquid fuels. Their analysis focuses on access to supply, 
to customers and to key infrastructure, as well as policy and regulatory chal-
lenges rather than the known shortage of skills and finance in the sector. They 
suggest a set of short- and long-term remedies for increasing access and compe-
tition in transportation and storage, as well as wholesaling infrastructure, thus 
 promoting inclusive growth.
Chapter 8 by Gaylor Montmasson-Clair and Reena das Nair, ‘South Africa’s 
renewable energy experience: Inclusive growth lessons’, investigates the inter-
play between economic regulation, competition policy and inclusive growth 
in South Africa, using a case study on South Africa’s utility-scale renewable 
energy sector. Through South Africa’s Renewable Energy Independent Power 
Producer Procurement Programme, the South African government is procur-
ing utility-scale renewable energy-based electricity generation capacity from 
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independent power producers. The scheme was specifically crafted (through 
economic regulation) to promote competitive outcomes and foster inclusive 
growth and the chapter assesses outcomes in the sector through both an eco-
nomic regulation and an inclusive growth lens. The early attention to competi-
tion concerns in the regulation of this sector should serve as a model for other 
sectors within and among SADC member states. 
Chapter 9 by Genna Robb, Isaac Tausha and Thando Vilakazi, ‘Competition 
and regulation in Zimbabwe’s emerging mobile payments markets’, argues that 
mobile money transfer in Zimbabwe has given rise to greater financial inclusion 
but also to potential competition problems. With a 65% market share in the 
mobile network operator market and a market share of over 90% in the mobile 
payments market, the dominant firm is in a strong position to exploit network 
externalities. The situation is similar in other SADC countries. The chapter thus 
concludes by noting the worth of a cooperative approach among Zimbabwe 
regulators. This market is a prime example of one where attention to inclusive 
growth and to dynamic competition can dovetail with efficient market policy.
Chapter 10 by Tatenda Zengeni, ‘Evaluating the competitiveness of 
Zimbabwe’s poultry industry’, also looks at trade and competitiveness issues in 
Zimbabwe. It provides a detailed account of the poultry industry, which is a 
significant one to the Zimbabwean economy. The factors affecting competitive-
ness in this industry include stiff competition from cheap imports, rising input 
costs of maize and soya meal and illegal imports being sold at subeconomic 
prices. Complementing the grain trade focus of the Zambian case study, the 
chapter evaluates these factors and the impact of changing trade protection in 
Zimbabwe. 
Chapter 11 by Simon Roberts, Thando Vilakazi and Witness Simbanegavi, 
‘Competition, regional integration and inclusive growth in Africa: A research 
agenda’, focuses on the interface of competition, inclusive growth and regional 
integration. It considers recent developments in competition economics alongside 
the record of competition enforcement and political economy factors, drawing 
on research on key sectors. Moving beyond the level of detail in this introduc-
tion, the authors explore and emphasise the regional dimensions of anticompet-
itive arrangements stretching across countries, in oligopolistic industries often 
dominated by the same large multinational firms. This points to the  critical need 
for cross-country research and collaboration to understand the arrangements as 
part of an agenda to promote market outcomes for more inclusive growth. 
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1 Penalties and settlements for South African cartels: An economic 
review
Introduction
The South African competition authorities have developed a fairly extensive 
track record in penalising cartels. While the Competition Act (No. 89 of 1998) 
came into force in September 1999, in practice cartels really started being uncov-
ered only after the Competition Commission of South Africa’s (CCSA) adoption 
of a corporate leniency programme in 2004 and the programme’s amendment 
in 2008 (Lavoie, 2010; Makhaya, Mkwananzi and Roberts, 2012). Since then 
there have been a large number of cases (see also World Bank and ACF, 2016), 
and the experience provides interesting insight into the challenges faced in 
making decisions regarding the appropriate penalties. In 2011 and 2012, the 
Competition Tribunal and the Competition Appeal Court (CAC) made a series of 
decisions around the issues and relevant principles for determining penalties for 
collusion. And, from 2012 to 2014, the CCSA undertook an extensive ‘fast-track 
settlement’ process for collusion by construction companies involving lower 
penalties in exchange for an ‘all-in’ settlement of bid-rigging conduct (Roberts, 
2014). With criminal sanctions for collusive conduct coming into force in 2016, 
it is also a good point to assess the penalties under the administrative regime up 
until that point.
The Corporate Leniency Policy’s (CLP) notable success in uncovering cartel 
conduct in South Africa has highlighted both the importance of high-powered 
incentives for colluding firms to break ranks and come forward, as well as the 
ongoing extent of collusive activity. The latter suggests that the combined effect 
of the penalties and the probability of getting caught were previously too low to 
achieve the necessary deterrent effect. In chapter 2 of this volume, Ratshidaho 
Maphwanya addresses leniency and other factors underlying the durability 
of cartels.
We consider the decisions of the Tribunal and CAC through the lens of eco-
nomic principles and the implications for evolving standards for penalties, and 
set out how cartel penalties can be understood in terms of the basic economic 
theory relating to deterrence and incentives. We then review how the CCSA 
has approached penalties, which have mainly been in the form of settlements. 
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Settlement implies a lower penalty in exchange for cooperation and early reso-
lution. Our review includes a brief discussion of the construction settlements. 
We then critically assess the record on determining penalties in settlements and 
contested cases, taking into account evidence on the size of cartel mark-ups in 
South African cases. The concluding section reflects on the evolution that has 
taken place and the guidelines issued by the CCSA in 2015.
Overview of Tribunal and CAC decisions
The first penalty was imposed by the Tribunal for anticompetitive conduct on the 
part of Federal Mogul.1 This was followed by South African Airways2 (SAA), where 
the Tribunal set out its approach to applying the factors under section 59(3) of 
the Act for determining financial penalties together with the weightings for each 
factor. Parties thereafter commonly referred to the ‘SAA tests’ when presenting 
arguments in the determination of penalties, even though the Tribunal noted 
the need to draw distinctions between various types of contravention in terms 
of the factors under section 59(3). In particular, 59(3) indicates that the nature, 
duration, gravity and extent of conduct are relevant considerations, implying 
that different types of conduct can be distinguished for the purpose of penalty.
It seems obvious that prohibited resale price maintenance (as in Federal 
Mogul), failure to notify a merger, cartel conduct and various abuses of dom-
inance (as in SAA) are all different in nature and therefore a single ‘ruler’ for 
determining penalties need not apply for all. Reinforcing this observation is the 
fact that the Act does not provide for financial penalties for some contraven-
tions, even where an effect has to be proven, such as in sections 4(1)(a) and 8(c). 
In other words, notwithstanding anticompetitive effects, a form of safe haven 
from financial penalties is provided for the catch-all categories of conduct not 
separately defined but where the conduct is found to be harmful. By compari-
son, the 4(1)(b) prohibitions on horizontal restrictive practices, where a financial 
penalty is applicable – price fixing, market division or collusive tendering – are 
per se prohibitions without the requirement to demonstrate harm. They are sim-
ply presumed to be harmful.
Internationally, several considerations applying to cartel conduct are now 
widely recognised (Connor, 2001; Motta, 2008; Werden, 2009; Wils, 2006). First, 
there are good grounds for a presumption that the conduct is harmful. Second, 
it is impossible to determine the size of the anticompetitive harm to consum-
ers and to the economy, without extensive data analysis and generally after a 
substantial time has passed following the end of the cartel. Even then, such esti-
mates are likely to be within a wide range, depending on the assumptions made. 
The analysis of harm may be required for damages claims that are brought by 
customers after cartel findings by competition authorities. The assessments are 
also an important area of academic inquiry, generally a substantial period after 
the conduct. Third, the harm includes non-price factors such as collusion under-
mining the beneficial effects of competition in spurring better service and qual-
ity. Fourth, the primary importance of penalties is for deterrence and hence they 
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ought to be self-evidently greater than the expected gain to a firm considering a 
cartel. Fifth, the deterrence effect must take into account that the probability of 
the cartel being uncovered is much less than one.
The Pioneer Foods decision in the bread cartel case was the first penalty 
imposed by the Tribunal in a contested cartel case.3 Pioneer contested its partici-
pation in a cartel (specifically, cartel arrangements nationally and in the Western 
Cape) despite being implicated by the other major producers. Premier Foods 
was granted conditional leniency, and Tiger Brands and Foodcorp reached settle-
ments of R99 million (5.7% of bread turnover) and R45 million (6.7% of bread 
turnover), respectively. Pioneer also argued that such arrangements as there were 
had no effect on the bread price. The Tribunal found that there had been col-
lusive conduct in 2006 in the Western Cape, and across the country from 1999 
to 2006. Penalties of R46 million were imposed (9.5% of bread turnover in the 
Western Cape) and of R150 million (10% of bread turnover nationally, excluding 
the Western Cape).
Section 59(2) of the Act stipulates that an administrative penalty may not 
exceed 10% of the firm’s turnover in, and its exports from, the Republic in 
the preceding financial year. In determining Pioneer’s penalties, the Tribunal 
found that the ‘maximum’ penalty percentage of 10% (confusingly termed 
the ‘threshold’ by the Tribunal) was appropriate for the national cartel, with 
a small discount for the Western Cape where the conduct was shorter in dura-
tion. However, the Tribunal limited the turnover on which the percentages were 
applied to the ‘infringing line of business’.4 The Tribunal’s reasoning was that 
the penalty should go beyond 10% of this turnover only if there was evidence 
that the anticompetitive conduct in one product market was extended or ‘lever-
aged’ into other markets.
In appealing the Tribunal decision, the CCSA argued that it confused deter-
mining the penalty, which under the Act is not in any way restricted to, or 
based on, fractions of 10% of the turnover of the infringing line of business 
(also termed the ‘affected turnover’, as in the Tribunal’s decision in Aveng & 
others),5 and the precautionary cap on the penalty which is explicitly set at 10% 
of total turnover including exports from the Republic.6 A cartel mark-up (the addi-
tional profit margin from the collusive conduct) can easily be more than 10% 
in a single year, meaning it was impossible, with cartels typically existing for 
many years, for a penalty capped at 10% of the turnover of the particular line 
of business for a single year to be an adequate deterrent. For meaningful deter-
rence, the size of the penalties needs to be considered relative to the likely gains 
being made rather than merely making observations that penalties appear ‘large’ 
in rand terms.7 The appeal was withdrawn pursuant to the settlement reached 
between the CCSA and Pioneer on the wheat flour and maize meal cartels.
The Tribunal acknowledged the importance of deterrence in its determination 
of the penalties in the next cartel case, Southern Pipeline Contractors (SPC), regard-
ing cast concrete pipes and culverts.8 This cartel, which had run for more than 
30 years, was uncovered in 2007 following the leniency application of Rocla (a 
subsidiary of Murray & Roberts). The Tribunal set out an approach which followed 
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international practice, including that of the European Commission (EC), which 
takes deterrence as the starting point. This approach uses the turnover of the 
products cartelised but contemplates a starting percentage higher than 10% and 
multiplies by the number of years of the conduct, taking both mitigating and 
aggravating factors into account. The 10% measure is only applied as the cap 
on the total penalty arrived at (as per section 59(2)), as a proportion of the total 
turnover of the firm and not only the infringing line of business.
The CAC, while agreeing with the emphasis on deterrence, found in SPC that 
the harm in terms of the mark-up from the cartel conduct needed to be assessed.9 
The CAC reduced the penalty for SPC to one-half of that determined by the 
Tribunal. In the penalty computation the CAC took only one year into account, 
although it is not clear why, as the CAC recognised the cartel had continued 
over many years. The CAC’s reasons for reducing the fine on SPC included that 
the conduct had been limited to a specific product line and that there was no 
evidence of increases in profit margins, including reference to the fact that when 
costs had increased SPC had not passed on the full increase.10 These reasons 
proved flawed. After the cartel ended, companies entered other product and 
geographic markets, illustrating the impact of the market-division arrangements 
(Khumalo, Mashiane and Roberts, 2014). In addition, a cartel which is effective 
will set prices at or close to the monopoly price. At this price a cost increase will 
not be fully passed through precisely because the price is so high already that 
consumers’ willingness to pay has been exploited relative to their income and 
imperfect alternatives. These two observations demonstrate why the cartel was 
indeed one of the most egregious contraventions, although the CAC had drawn 
the opposite inferences. It is notable that the cartel was of such long duration 
that there was no readily available pre-cartel benchmark to use and it is wrong 
to assume that immediately after the ending of explicit coordination, pricing 
will simply shift to be competitive (meaning the immediate post-cartel period 
should not be used). There are substantial challenges in measuring cartel mark-
ups, especially in a case such as this (Khumalo, Mashiane and Roberts, 2014).
The Tribunal’s decision in the wire mesh cartel (Aveng & others) followed SPC 
and further developed the approach it took. Of the four wire mesh producers 
against which the CCSA referred, BRC obtained conditional leniency and Aveng 
(Africa) Limited, trading as ‘Steeledale’, admitted the conduct and settled with 
the CCSA. Reinforcing Mesh Solutions (RMS) admitted the conduct but con-
tested its extent and the appropriate penalty, while Vulcania Reinforcing denied 
it was part of the cartel although it admitted to attending several meetings with 
its competitors in the cartel.
The Tribunal set out its approach in six steps:
•	 Step one: determine the affected turnover (based on the sales of the products 
or services affected by the conduct which reflects the ‘effect of the cartel as a 
whole’) in the relevant year of assessment based on the last financial year of 
the period for which there is evidence that the cartel existed.
•	 Step two: calculate the ‘base amount’ for the penalty determination. This 
percentage of the affected turnover will be between 0 and 30% (following 
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the EC) and will be influenced by several factors under section 59(3) of the 
Act, specifically under 59(3)(a), (b) and (d): nature, gravity and extent of 
the contravention; loss or damage suffered; and market circumstances.
•	 Step three: where the contravention exceeds one year, multiply the amount 
obtained in step two by the number of years (duration) of the contravention.
•	 Step four: round off the figure achieved in step three if it exceeds the section 
59(2) cap of 10% of total turnover.
•	 Step five: adjust the outcome of step four on the basis of mitigating and 
aggravating factors specific to the firm’s conduct (under sections 59(3)(c), (e), 
(f) and (g)), including its behaviour, extent of cooperation with the CCSA, 
level of profit derived and whether the respondent had previously been 
found guilty of a contravention of the Act.11
•	 Step six: round off the amount derived in step five if it exceeds the cap pro-
vided for in section 59(2) of the Act.12
These steps follow the European approach, cited approvingly by the CAC in SPC, 
while also taking into account the factors in the Act.
The Tribunal applied the steps, deciding on a base penalty in the case of each 
firm, multiplying by the years, which meant the cap was binding in the case of 
RMS, and then applying a reduction of 40% in the case of each firm reflecting 
mitigating factors, such as that they were not instigators and at times disrupted the 
cartel arrangements. It is not clear why the cap applies at both steps four and six.
Notably, in Aveng & others the Tribunal accepted the arguments of both RMS 
and Vulcania that they had profited little from the cartel, in the absence of evi-
dence from the CCSA on this factor. It appears that the Tribunal understands that 
the CCSA should obtain such information in its investigation and should have led 
it in the hearing. This is a complex task. Determining the competitive counterfac-
tual is very difficult. In addition, a cartel may shield an inefficient firm from the 
rigours of competition and thus keep that firm in the market when it would have 
exited absent the cartel. The latter scenario may be harmful to consumer welfare 
even while the inefficient firm does not appear to be making excess profits.13
The Tribunal then applied the six steps again in determining penalties in 
the plastic pipes cartel (DPI & others).14 For MacNeil, Amitech and Petzetakis, the 
Tribunal again determined a base amount of 15%, which was multiplied by the 
number of years of participation in the cartel. After applying the 10% cap of total 
turnover, the Tribunal discounted the penalty by 20, 40 and 80% respectively, 
taking into account mitigating and aggravating factors. In the case of Petzetakis, 
the Tribunal’s 80% reduction in the penalty was due to the managing director, 
Michelle Harding, having unilaterally exited the arrangement following atten-
dance at a conference on business ethics. Harding had informed the group chief 
executive (based in Greece) about her intention, which was endorsed as long 
as it did not compromise ‘the bottom line’.15 Harding was subsequently fired 
although no link can apparently be drawn between this and her decision to leave 
the cartel. Petzetakis had been a ringleader in the cartel.16 However, the owners 
of the firm obtained a substantial reduction in the penalty because of Harding’s 
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decision (a benefit apparently not shared with Harding!). Ultimately, the penalty 
of R9.92 million was just 1.6% of one year of Petzetakis’ affected turnover, for a 
cartel in which they had participated for six years (since acquiring the company).
The Tribunal also applied the six-step approach in the case involving an alleged 
cartel between four firms that manufacture mining roof bolts (RSC & others).17 Of 
these firms, RSC (a subsidiary of Murray & Roberts at the time) filed for corporate 
leniency and Aveng (Duraset) subsequently agreed to a settlement with the CCSA 
where the administrative penalty levied was 5% of Duraset’s total turnover. The 
remaining firms, Dywidag-Systems International (DSI) and Videx Wire Products, 
admitted many of the contraventions, including collusive tendering. However, 
they argued that the practices had ceased more than three years before the ini-
tiation of the complaint and that, in relation to one of the contraventions that 
allegedly fell within the three years, the CCSA’s case was not explicitly brought 
against them in the referral but rather against the two other respondents.
In its ruling, the Tribunal found only one contravention in relation to an Anglo 
Platinum tender and thus considered this as the affected turnover. In the second 
and third steps, the Tribunal determined a base amount of 18% of this turnover 
for one year for what it considered to be the most ‘aggravating’ form of cartel 
contravention (bid rigging). The Tribunal considered mitigating factors to be the 
fact that the primary purpose of the bid rigging was not achieved and the conduct 
related to only a single tender for a single customer. However, the Tribunal also 
took into account the fact that senior management was involved in the conduct, 
and that the firms admitted to several contraventions that were not considered 
(in the turnover) only due to prescription, and thus increased the base amount by 
10%. DSI received a penalty of R1.8 million, and Videx a penalty of R4.7 million.
The preceding discussion shows that the Tribunal’s approach to determining 
penalties in contested cartel cases has evolved over time in a manner that seeks 
to account more explicitly (and predictably) for the factors under section 59(3). 
It has seen potentially more severe penalties, imposing percentage amounts of 
up to 30% of affected turnover (reflecting an understanding of collusive mark-
ups) and taking into account the duration of cartels. This is an important step 
in so far as firms will be better able to evaluate the likely penalty if they lose a 
contested case, and weigh this against the penalty they are likely to be able to 
agree if they approach the CCSA to settle the matter (discussed below). These 
aspects have important implications for the effectiveness of deterrence and the 
incentives of firms.
Deterrence and incentives in determining 
penalties and settlements
The principle of deterrence
Penalties play two roles: punishment and deterrence, with the latter being 
more important (Niels, Jenkins and Kavanagh, 2011; OECD, 2009). To achieve 
deterrence, the likelihood of cartel detection and the resulting penalty (which 
together give the expected penalty) must be sufficiently high when set against 
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the illicit gain from the conduct.18 Very high penalties have little deterrent effect 
if there is no realistic possibility of detection. The size of the expected penalty 
should also be weighed against the harm to society to ensure deterrence of the 
conduct. However, estimating the probability of detection, societal harm and 
illicit gains is not an easy task.
The probability of detection could be estimated as the proportion of cartels 
that are uncovered relative to the total universe of cartels that exist. However, 
due to the secret nature of cartels it is difficult to accurately ascertain the extent 
of this universe and, as such, the probability of detection is difficult to estab-
lish. Of course, the probability of detection is always less than one (and likely 
to be substantially so given that secret cartels are designed to remain hidden), 
which implies that achieving deterrence requires imposing a significantly higher 
penalty than the cartel gain. There is effectively a trade-off between the prob-
ability of detection and the level of the penalty – a lower probability of detec-
tion implies that higher penalties are required. Estimates of the probability of 
detection at substantially below one have been given as one explanation for 
the significant increase in penalties in the European Union (EU) in recent years 
(Ascione and Motta, 2008).
While harm to society will differ from the cartel gains and may be lower than 
these gains, in practice optimal deterrence is best achieved if penalties directly 
reflect the benefits that accrue to firms engaging in cartel conduct (Motta, 
2008; Wils, 2006). This is reflected in the EC’s fining guidelines19 where fines 
are set based on the value of sales in the relevant market and the duration of 
the infringement. Value of affected sales and duration are considered a proxy 
for the economic importance of the infringement, where economic importance 
can be interpreted as the importance to either the economy or to the firms 
involved in the cartel conduct. Accounting for duration of infringement seems 
to acknowledge that the gains from cartel conduct are earned in each period of 
involvement in the cartel. Jurisdictions such as the EU, Switzerland, the Czech 
Republic, Hungary, Italy and Norway use duration as a multiplier, while the US, 
Germany, Russia and the Netherlands account for duration through the turnover 
or volume of affected commerce considered in the calculation of the basic penalty 
(ICN, 2008). The duration of a cartel, while reflecting past harm, is also indicative 
of cartel durability (and hence expected future cartel returns, absent detection).
The EC guidelines indicate that the basic fine is taken as a proportion (up to 
30%)20 of the sales in the relevant market, reflecting an approximation of the 
illicit cartel gains and harm to the economy. The number of years of duration is 
then used as a multiplier.
Some concerns have been raised that large penalties could lead firms into 
bankruptcy and to increased consumer prices as firms attempt to recoup losses 
from penalties (Van Cayseele, Camesasca and Hugmark, 2008). Most jurisdic-
tions, including South Africa, have caps on penalties and some make provisions 
for the presentation of objective evidence demonstrating that the penalty would 
irretrievably jeopardise a firm’s economic viability and cause its assets to lose 
all value.21 In other words, a firm should demonstrate that the penalty leads 
to insolvency, which, in general, is likely to occur if the penalty is larger than 
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the market value of the firm/shareholders’ equity (Niels, Jenkins and Kavanagh, 
2011). The CCSA’s (2015) guidelines on determining administrative penalties 
also reflect these considerations. At competitive prices, there may be ineffi-
cient firms that are not sustainable while efficient firms make healthy returns. 
Inefficient firms could be seen as potentially prone to bankruptcy as a result of 
high penalties. Firms that are too inefficient to compete outside the shelter of 
the cartel would be eliminated by the competitive process even in the absence 
of the penalty (Motta, 2008). To the extent that penalties would lead some firms 
into bankruptcy, it could be argued that competition is lessened because of the 
reduction in the number of firms. It must, however, be noted that competition is 
not simply a function of the number of firms but of how they behave. It would 
be perverse to not adequately penalise a cartel on grounds of sustaining a larger 
number of firms in the market because this could undermine deterrence.
In addition, penalties represent a sunk cost which does not affect the pricing 
and supply decisions of firms. These decisions are essentially about weighing 
up the increased sales from a discounted price against the cost of supplying the 
additional volumes demanded. Increased competition post-cartel also means 
that individual firms cannot profitably raise prices without losing sales to com-
petitors. Leniency programmes which exempt the whistleblower from paying 
a penalty, lower penalties from differential settlements among those firms that 
cooperate with competition authorities, and the higher penalties imposed on 
firms that elect to litigate put firms in asymmetric positions regarding the need 
to raise prices to recoup penalties (Buccirossi and Spagnolo, 2006). Consequently, 
it is unlikely that firms would raise prices to recoup penalties under competitive 
conditions.
Settlements and deterrence
Settlements generally award benefits to a firm (such as a lower penalty or less 
burdensome remedy) in exchange for its admission to the conduct, acceptance 
of penalties and/or remedies and cooperation regarding prosecution of remain-
ing parties (Wils, 2008). Firms have greater incentives to settle when they face 
a high probability of an adverse finding in court, resulting in a penalty larger 
than that on offer in settlement. Firms may also consider the saving in terms 
of litigation costs. Similarly, competition authorities have greater incentives to 
settle when they face litigation costs, resource constraints and continued con-
sumer harm (due to continued anticompetitive conduct) that exceed the cost 
of settling (lower fines and diminished deterrence). In the EU, firms earn auto-
matic discounts of 10% if they elect to settle cases with the EC. In France, this 
discount ranges between 10 and 30% (Lasserre and Zivy, 2008). However, firms 
are unlikely to settle if they believe that the courts will provide larger fine reduc-
tions than the authority’s settlement procedure (discussed later in relation to the 
South African context).
Settlement is separate from a leniency programme in which a firm is granted 
a reduced or zero penalty for providing information and evidence of an infringe-
ment. Settlements free up resources which are then diverted to screening and 
other investigations, thereby increasing the probability of uncovering more 
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cartels (Adelstein, 1978; Landes, 1971; Lasserre and Zivy, 2008; Motta, 2008). 
This is achieved through the early settlement of cases. As such, a successful set-
tlement procedure reduces the time between case inception and final decision. 
Competition authorities should therefore be open to settle with, and extend 
larger benefits to, firms that come forward earlier on in the investigation. In 
the EU, there has been some debate on the time limit within which settlement 
can be explored, with the EC notice limiting this to around the time it issues a 
Statement of Objections (Lasserre and Zivy, 2008).
Counterbalancing the benefits of early settlements is the diminished deter-
rence associated with lower penalties (Miceli, 1996). If, due to a settlement pro-
cedure, the amount of the penalty is likely to be significantly reduced, then 
the cartel profits are more likely to outweigh a possible penalty. Relatively low 
expected penalties under settlements also reduce the attractiveness of leniency. 
Underdeterrence in settlements can be avoided by having harsher overall sen-
tencing, enabling discounts while still having meaningful penalties (LaCasse 
and Payne, 1999).
A review of the CCSA’s approach to settlements
In this section we critically assess the CCSA’s approach to settlements for cartel 
conduct through the lens of economic principles. Section 59(3) of the Act provides 
no guidance as to the relative importance of each listed factor for determining pen-
alties or how they should be considered, whether by the Tribunal in imposing a 
penalty or in confirming a settlement reached between a respondent and the CCSA.
Firms will try to weigh up the penalty that they think the CCSA is likely to 
agree in settlement against the fine that they expect the Tribunal (or higher 
courts) to impose. There is thus a critical interrelationship between the process 
that the Tribunal follows for fine determination and the approach of the CCSA 
in settling matters. If administrative penalties required by the CCSA for settle-
ments are high relative to the expected penalties from the Tribunal then firms 
would look to contest the matter, as in SPC. Certainly the evidence of cartel 
mark-ups (discussed below) indicates that penalties in general should be higher. 
With regard to settlements, we examine whether the CCSA should adopt the 
same approach (applying the factors in the same way) as the Tribunal in deter-
mining a penalty in a contested case, or whether it should maintain its current 
approach based on a case-by-case treatment of settlement.
In the early years, before the inception of the CLP in 2004, the CCSA pros-
ecuted mostly ‘non-secret’ cartels and, typically, the penalties for participants 
were nominal. The arrangements generally did not concern a concealed attempt 
to coordinate market conduct. We therefore draw a distinction between this 
early period and after 2004, where the focus shifted to detecting, penalising and 
hence deterring secret cartels. The post-2004 experience also reveals the effect 
that the CLP had on firms’ incentives to come forward and settle with the CCSA. 
There has been a discernible evolution in the way the CCSA has approached set-
tlement from 2004 to date, towards achieving greater deterrence.
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Following the introduction of the CLP, the CCSA saw a marked increase in 
the initiation and prosecution of ‘hard-core’ cartel cases (Lavoie, 2010). In this 
early period there was a high degree of uncertainty regarding the level of penal-
ties that the Tribunal would impose in a contested hearing. The uncertainty and 
risk could be addressed through settlement, providing a way out for cartelists. 
The CCSA used settlements as a way to induce firms to ‘clean up’ while avoid-
ing litigation of a large number of cases (Makhaya, Mkwananzi and Roberts, 
2012). The settlements thus provide an indication of the firms’ and the CCSA’s 
expectations of penalties in contested cases – penalties imposed by the Tribunal 
would be significantly higher. An interesting feature of the South African experi-
ence is that there were a large number of settlements before the basis on which 
cartel penalties should be determined had been clarified through decided cases, 
and later through the CCSA’s settlement guidelines. This was a result of the 
large number of cartel cases which were uncovered from 2007 to 2009 (and the 
incentives to reach settlements) against the time taken for cases to be heard and 
decided by the Tribunal and the CAC, with the CAC’s SPC decision being final-
ised only later, in 2011.
In the years following the introduction of the CLP, the CCSA’s approach 
evolved as it gained experience in handling the new leniency process and faced 
an increasing number of cases to prosecute, together with firms wishing to settle. 
There were some apparent inconsistencies in the CCSA’s approach during this 
early period, perhaps consistent with the actions of an authority getting to grips 
with a new leniency regime and with setting penalties at consistent and appro-
priate levels. For example, in the bread cartel case, there was apparently over-
lapping leniency for two firms, as Tiger Brands provided information on more 
widespread conduct than the initial CLP applicant, Premier Foods. Thus, Tiger 
Brands received leniency for some conduct and received a penalty of only 5.7% 
of their national bread turnover for the multi-case settlement. This penalty could 
be viewed as being both relatively low for a multi-case settlement and incon-
sistent with the CCSA’s approach, subsequent to 2007, of consistently granting 
immunity to only one applicant in each matter.
As the CCSA followed through on leniency applications, there were increased 
settlements, peaking in terms of number in 2013 (figure 1.1). The CCSA’s pri-
oritisation and investigation strategy led to the uncovering of far-reaching 
bid- rigging conduct in construction. The CCSA adopted a fast-track settlement 
process (see box 1.1) which led to 15 settlements in 2013 alone, just for this 
matter, along with a number of other construction-related matters. There were 
further settlements in 2014 and 2015.
Two further matters led to large numbers of settlements in 2014 and 2015. 
Cycling suppliers and retailers were found to have attempted to coordinate 
around pricing in a number of meetings and through an online forum. It was 
not clear to what extent this had been implemented and the penalties in the 
17 settlements were relatively small, nominal amounts, and not disclosed in 
the confirmatory orders. The CCSA also uncovered an extensive cartel rigging 
bids for furniture removal, which led to 11 settlements, most in the 7–9% of 
turnover range.
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Figure 1.1 Number of cartel settlements confirmed by the Tribunal, 2004–2015
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Box 1.1  The CCSA approach to dealing with collusion in construction: 
The ‘fast-track’ settlement
In September 2009, the CCSA initiated wide-ranging investigations into col-
lusion in the construction sector following leniency applications on specific 
projects and an earlier initiation related to the construction of soccer World 
Cup stadia. The CCSA invited construction firms to come forward and settle 
contraventions of the Competition Act in respect of collusive tendering. The 
invitation also called for full disclosure by a specified date (15 April 2011) in 
exchange for a low, ‘all-in’ penalty (see Roberts, 2014).
Firms that were first to notify the CCSA of particular instances of collusion 
were still eligible for leniency and would enjoy immunity from penalties for 
those instances. Firms that did not opt for settlement risked prosecution and 
penalties for each instance of collusion they were involved in, and for which 
evidence was provided by other cartel members who cooperated with the 
CCSA. Twenty-one firms applied for fast-track settlement, and 300 incidents 
of bid rigging, including the soccer stadiums and major road-construction 
projects, were uncovered.
Given the number of incidents of collusion and that the fast-track settle-
ment offered an ‘all-in’ lower penalty across contraventions that cut across 
different categories of work, as well as potentially multiple instances of col-
lusion by the same firms, there was a need to standardise penalties relative 
to the number of contraventions. Penalties were determined in ranges based 
on category or class of construction project as set out by the Construction 
continued
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In terms of the penalties agreed with firms through 186 individual settle-
ments across more than 50 cartels since the inception of the CCSA, table A1.1 
in the Appendix indicates that penalties can be grouped in four ranges: less 
than 3%, 3–4.9%, 5–6.9% and 7+%. The percentages are of a single year’s turn-
over of the entity involved in the conduct. The following broad observations 
can be made.
Turnover
In settlements, the CCSA has generally expressed penalties as a percentage of 
the total annual turnover of the relevant business entity. At times, a narrower 
turnover has been used, or specific product lines have been excluded from 
the turnover (see table A1.1). The CCSA has not focused on the affected turn-
over, on which there may be some dispute and on which evidence led in the 
Tribunal hearing may have bearing. Instead, it has generally taken the total 
turnover of the relevant entity, whether a firm, division, unit or subsidiary 
‘which controls its decision-making process’ (Lavoie, 2010, p. 144).22 For more 
recent settlements, following the decisions of the Tribunal specifying affected 
turnover and a multiple relating to the years of conduct, the CCSA has used 
affected turnover in some cases and higher percentage penalties have been 
imposed (table A1.1).
When the CCSA used the turnover of the entity or division in earlier years, it 
allowed for the subtraction of lines of business from the turnover of the entity 
Industry Development Board regulations. Penalties were then calculated as a 
percentage of the firm’s turnover in each category or class, as follows:
Category Number of non-prescribed 
contraventions by applicant  
in subsector
Penalty: percentage of turnover 





Source: CCSA (2011, p. 7)
The scale and scope of the collusive practices meant that prosecuting each 
instance of collusion on its own was resource-intensive and a procedural chal-
lenge for a competition authority with limited resources. There were therefore 
mutual benefits to settlement for both the competition authorities and the 
firms involved (‘all-in’ lower penalties). In June 2013, the CCSA concluded 
settlements with 15 firms, amounting to R1.46 billion (± US$150 million) 
in penalties. There were further settlements in 2014 and 2015, totalling 29 
settlements in all, under the fast-track programme (table A1.1).
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where it could be demonstrated that it was not part of the cartelised products. 
For example, in the cartel of cast concrete products manufacturers (of items such 
as pipes and culverts), turnover from a major unrelated project was excluded. 
This in effect reduces the turnover used to an amount closer to the affected 
turnover.
Notwithstanding the possibility of using a base percentage of up to 30% 
of affected turnover, in settlements the CCSA has generally worked off a base 
of 10% of the turnover derived in this way, with most (where the percentage 
is specified) being between 3 and 7% (table A1.1). Indeed, aside from the fur-
niture removals cartel settlements, there have been just 12 settlements in the 
range above 7%. This implies low penalties, especially for those cartels where 
the conduct related to the main business of the entity and ran for a number 
of years.
While the CCSA has argued for higher penalties, the settlement penalties 
appeared high when considered against the Tribunal’s decisions in the contested 
case of Pioneer, where the Tribunal imposed a penalty of only 10% of affected 
turnover on the firm with no multiplier for duration, and this penalty was obvi-
ously only imposed after the time taken for the case to be heard. For settlements 
to be attractive to the firm, they have to be lower than the penalty the firm 
expects will be imposed. A firm settling would take into account the prevail-
ing interest rate in likely paying the penalty several years earlier than if it were 
imposed by the Tribunal following a contested hearing and probably on a wider 
turnover than the affected turnover used by the Tribunal. The considerable num-
ber of settlements reflected the views of respondents that higher penalties were 
going to be imposed.
Size of penalties
Generally, the firms that received penalties of less than 3% were those involved 
in non-secret arrangements, including where the contravention arose from pro-
visions of contractual agreements. A large number was reached in 2007 or ear-
lier. This group includes the collective arrangements of the Board of Healthcare 
Funders, SA Medical Association and Hospital Association of South Africa in 
negotiating private healthcare pricing, which was deemed to contravene the Act 
(settled in 2004/2005). From 2013 to 2015 there were also a number of con-
struction settlements which fell outside of the formal fast track but were still 
concluded on advantageous terms.
Seventeen of the 35 settlements between 3 and 4.9% related to price fixing 
of grain silo storage fees – arrangements which were prevalent throughout the 
industry as part of the regulatory hangover. There were also a number of notable 
settlements in this range where there was significant and material cooperation 
(discussed below), such as Keystone Milling, Afrisam and Apollo Tyres. Most 
settlements in the two lower ranges were also prior to referral.
The 51 settlements with penalties of 5% or more were the more traditional 
hard-core cartels; all but one were after 2007 and the majority were settlements 
post-referral.23 Aside from the furniture removal cartel noted above, these settle-
ments were largely accounted for by the bread and milling, scrap metal, concrete 
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pipes, plastic pipes and bitumen cartels – the types of products in which cartels 
are found around the world (Connor and Helmers, 2006).
A subset can be identified of the highest penalties agreed in settlement, of 
between 7 and 9%. Three of these were settlements of more than one contra-
vention, and, if considered on a per-contravention basis, would fall in a lower 
category.24 The other settlements included cartel ringleaders and settlements 
which were very late and where firms did not cooperate with the CCSA. For 
example, in the case of Aveng (Infraset), representatives of the firm sought to 
mislead the CCSA in the concrete pipes cartel investigation.25 Nonetheless, firms 
in this category still received an implied discount for settling.
Cooperation and firm behaviour
The obvious benefit of a clear leniency policy and creating incentives for cartel-
ists to come forward is that the applicant provides the authority with valuable 
information that helps to reduce the cost of investigation and successful prose-
cution, while the firm benefits from a zero penalty. In cases where there is little 
or no documentary evidence, there is much value in a second firm admitting to 
the conduct and providing useful information when settling. In countries such 
as South Korea this is recognised through an automatic penalty discount for the 
second firm to settle.
The CCSA has favoured and rewarded early and substantial cooperation by 
firms, particularly those that have provided new and relevant information for 
the case, in some instances information exceeding what a CLP applicant can 
provide, such as Tiger Brands in the bread and milling cartels.26
Firms have also been rewarded for making ‘exceptional’ efforts to conduct 
internal investigations regarding anticompetitive conduct. The point is that 
material cooperation is about actions taken and not only expressions of coop-
eration amounting in effect simply to meeting the requirements of the investi-
gation. The penalties for Sasol Chemical Industries27 (SCI) in fertiliser, and Tiger 
Brands28 and later New Reclamation29 as a ringleader in the scrap metal case, 
were mitigated by their efforts to conduct internal investigations to uncover 
cartel conduct within their businesses. However, the SCI penalty was also 
increased to reflect the fact that senior management had withheld information. 
In the cement matter, AfriSam received a lower fine than Lafarge, reflecting 
early cooperation and the provision of extensive information, including witness 
statements obtained through an internal investigation at the firm.30
In instances where respondents failed to cooperate with the CCSA, sought to 
frustrate the investigation or misled the authority, the relevant fine was adjusted 
upwards.31
Duration and extent
Throughout the cases reviewed, the duration and extent of the conduct affected 
the severity of the fine, although to a relatively limited extent and certainly 
not by setting the penalty proportional to the duration. There are several rea-
sons for this. First, at the settlement phase, without all the evidence being led, 
there is likely to be some uncertainty about the duration, especially when the 
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managers involved at an earlier stage of the cartel are no longer employed by 
the settling firm.
Second, there have been long-running cartels where coordination was essen-
tially part of the norms of business, and the CCSA had an incentive to uncover 
all of this conduct through the assistance of the settling firms. There are perhaps 
two main reasons for the extent of collusive conduct. There was extensive reg-
ulation of markets, often by or on behalf of producer groups, under apartheid 
(Makhaya and Roberts, 2013). In areas such as agriculture and cement, it is 
now evident that deregulation simply led to the producers continuing with 
secret cartel arrangements in a range of markets. There are also very tight-knit 
industries in South Africa, with multi-market contacts between firms that facil-
itate collusion. This appears to have been the case with construction products 
such as cast concrete pipes, reinforcing steel and wire mesh, in which the same 
main construction firms have subsidiaries, as well as in construction tenders 
(das Nair, Khumalo and Roberts, 2012). It appears that the CCSA sought to use 
settlements to incentivise firms to examine conduct across different markets 
and make a step-wise change. This is evident first in the baking and milling 
matters, where the initial discovery of a cartel in bread sales in the Western 
Cape (and leniency granted to Premier Foods) led to extensive collusion being 
uncovered at a national level in bread, wheat flour milling and maize milling, 
especially through the cooperation of Tiger Brands as part of its settlement. 
It is also reflected in the leniency applications and settlements following the 
cast concrete products cartel, where Aveng and Murray & Roberts, in particular, 
reviewed their operations across different markets (Makhaya, Mkwananzi and 
Roberts, 2012).
Third, at the time, firms in the very long-running cartels (such as the three-
decade-long concrete pipes cartel) may not in any case have been penalised by 
the Tribunal above a cap of 10% of the turnover of these products (affected turn-
over). This reflected a probable alternative which the CCSA had to consider in 
setting the penalties in settlements.
In summary, while in terms of duration the CCSA’s approach has generally 
been that the longer a firm has been involved in the conduct the larger the pen-
alty, this has not been approached in terms of a multiplier to increase the pen-
alty proportional to the duration. Having addressed a legacy of collusive conduct 
in many markets in areas such as construction products and agriculture, and 
with a much wider awareness in business of what constitutes a cartel, it could be 
argued that it is now appropriate to take a harder line on duration, as reflected 
in the approach of the Tribunal in Aveng & others and in the CCSA’s guidelines.
Other considerations
As might be expected, smaller players in a cartel in terms of influence have been 
penalised less than the ringleader(s). Examples of firms that received larger pen-
alties include New Reclamation, which was influential in the scrap metal cartel, 
and Aveng Steeledale,32 a founding member in the mesh and rebar cartels.
Other things being equal, firms such as Pioneer33 and SCI34 received higher 
penalties for multi-case settlements, although the penalties were favourable if 
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one were to consider all the contraventions separately. There has thus been an 
incentive to settle several cases at once with the CCSA, reflecting cooperation 
on the part of the firm in seeking to identify and settle all the contraventions 
(including those not yet referred), compared to a piecemeal approach.
Profitability and harm
The CCSA has not focused on calculating cartel mark-ups (the increased profit 
margin from the cartel) but has rather taken it as given that cartel conduct 
is profitable for cartelists for the purposes of settlement. Indeed, as discussed 
below, estimating the level of cartel overcharge at the time of investigation is 
particularly onerous and tantamount to pursuing a full excessive pricing case 
in terms of the evidentiary burden, a process which would seem to contradict 
the recognised resource and time savings associated with settling a matter. Only 
recently has the CAC implicitly acknowledged the complexity of using profit 
figures to estimate the effects and profitability of cartel conduct.35
Evaluation
As noted, if the administrative penalties which the CCSA is likely to agree in set-
tlements are believed to be high, then firms are more likely to contest cases at the 
Tribunal. However, when settlement penalties are considered low there is likely 
to be underdeterrence. Firms may also choose to settle partly to avoid the exten-
sive costs and duration of litigation, although this is difficult to assess from the 
Tribunal consent orders given that firms may not state this publicly. This may in 
fact lead firms to settle even where there is only a limited discount on offer for 
doing so, although in general it is understood that legal costs are significantly 
smaller than fines (Motta, 2008).
Generally, the CCSA has agreed higher penalties with ringleaders and 
long-standing cartel members (except in multi-case settlements) and lower pen-
alties in cases where cartel arrangements may have been a legacy of apartheid 
government policy. Within specific cartels, there are differences in the final settle-
ment amounts, reflective of the CCSA having effectively applied the section 59(3) 
factors to each individual firm. This is consistent with step five of the Tribunal’s 
approach in Aveng & others, where mitigating and aggravating factors are con-
sidered. It is more difficult to compare the CCSA’s approach across cartels, given 
differences in the nature of the cartel, duration, measurements of turnover and 
extent of the conduct.
The Tribunal’s approach to penalty determination was initially not in line 
with the CCSA’s approach to settlements in that the Tribunal did not impose 
much higher penalties, as a percentage of affected turnover and accounting for 
duration, than those agreed in settlements by the CCSA. It is only in recent 
decisions that the Tribunal has adopted a basis for determining penalties that 
acknowledges the importance of deterrence, provides greater certainty for firms, 
and allows the methodology of the CCSA to align with that of the Tribunal in 
terms of the actual penalties determined through settlement and/or a contested 
case in the Tribunal.
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Review of penalty determinations in light 
of evidence of mark-ups in South Africa
Estimates of cartel mark-ups serve as both an indicator of the extent of profitability 
of cartel conduct for member firms as well as the potential harm to consumers over 
the period of the cartel. The overcharge is effectively the difference between the 
price charged during the cartel period and the prices that would have been charged 
in a competitive market absent the conduct. In addition, higher prices have the 
distortionary effect of reducing demand. Of course, the primary difficulty with this 
exercise is determining the appropriate counterfactual period, and the price and 
likely volumes sold against which to compare the observed cartel prices. In the case 
of long-standing cartels, such as in concrete pipes, defining this counterfactual for 
the analysis is challenging as there is no ‘before cartel’ competitive period. And, 
prices will not necessarily adjust to the competitive level for a considerable time 
after the explicit cartel ends (Khumalo, Mashiane and Roberts, 2014).
International studies have typically found that cartel mark-ups are approx-
imately 15–25% of the cartel price (Khumalo, Mashiane and Roberts, 2014, 
p. 4). Assessments of the impact of the CCSA’s interventions on cartel conduct 
in several sectors suggest comparable mark-ups. Given this evidence of high 
mark-ups for contraventions in South Africa, there is scope to increase both 
administrative penalties in settlements and those penalties issued by the 
Tribunal. We summarise these findings below.
Precast concrete products
Members of the concrete pipes cartel agreed market shares in the three main geo-
graphic areas, fixed prices and agreed not to compete in the remaining areas. The 
findings in this particular study, in which different counterfactuals were defined 
for the main areas of trade, were that: overcharge in the Gauteng (Johannesburg) 
region was in the range of 16.5–28%; overcharge in the KwaZulu-Natal (Durban) 
region was in the range of 51–57% (Khumalo, Mashiane and Roberts, 2014, 
p. 636). The estimated overcharge for the KwaZulu-Natal region was very high 
when compared to the international studies, but it should be noted that demand 
is inelastic and the market was very concentrated, while in Gauteng there were 
also fringe firms present that were not part of the explicit cartel.
Wheat flour
The CCSA made several interventions in the milling industry, including uncov-
ering a cartel in wheat milling in late 2006. Members of this long-standing cartel 
(many of which were vertically integrated into several levels of the ‘wheat-to-bread’ 
value chain) attended numerous meetings in which they agreed to fix the price of 
milled wheat products; create uniform price lists for wholesale, retail and general 
trade customers; fix the timing and implementation of price increases; and allocate 
customers. One study estimated an average overcharge of approximately 25% on 
both white and brown flour prices to independent bakeries and an average over-
charge on cake flour sold in the wholesale channel of approximately 7% (Grimbeek 
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and Lekezwa, 2013). Another assessment found that in the Western Cape the over-
charges on white bread flour and cake flour were 42 and 32%, respectively, while 
in Gauteng they were approximately 24 and 33%, respectively (Mncube, 2014).
Review of Tribunal and CAC decisions on determining penalties
As part of the debate on appropriate standards for fines and settlement penalties, 
such as would be embodied in guidelines, we revisit the decisions of the Tribunal 
and the CAC in light of the economic framework, incentives and evidence on 
mark-ups.
An appropriate framework for determining penalties creates disincentives 
for engaging in cartel conduct while encouraging firms to come forward. This 
begins with the level of turnover that the firm believes can be affected by either 
a settlement with the CCSA or a penalty determined by the Tribunal. The CCSA’s 
approach has been to focus on the turnover of the relevant business unit within 
which decision making regarding the cartel conduct lies. This is in contrast to 
the Tribunal’s approach in the mesh case (Aveng & others) of assessing the turn-
over from products affected by the contravention. Notably, in either approach 
the turnover considered and the base percentage are interrelated.
The Tribunal in its decisions on concrete pipes, wire mesh, plastic pipes and 
mining roof bolts started with a base for the penalty of 10–30% of turnover. This 
is appropriate given the preference for using the affected turnover. An approach 
that takes the affected turnover but is restricted to a maximum of 10% of this 
turnover will clearly not deter, given that mark-ups are typically higher than 
this and firms earn supra-competitive returns in each year of the cartel. On the 
other hand, an approach that takes the affected turnover but where a high base 
per cent is set (close to 30%), and where this is multiplied by the duration of 
conduct, can still be a deterrent. We emphasise that for deterrence the penalty 
has to be substantially higher than the return earned, given that the probability 
of getting detected is far less than one, and the penalty is paid sometime in the 
future while the cartel returns are earned today. The risk of high legal costs and 
reputational damage can reinforce the effect of a high penalty in some cases, par-
ticularly where legal costs are high relative to the size of the penalty and where 
firms have high visibility in terms of media coverage and publicity (Aguzzoni, 
Langus and Motta, 2013; Günster and Van Dijk, 2011).
The incentive to settle is also enhanced if the penalty likely from a contested 
hearing clearly outweighs the returns from cartel conduct rather than simply 
seeking to balance them. This is so as it provides scope for the CCSA to substan-
tially discount the likely penalty without running the risk that it will benefit a 
firm to collude and then to settle when found out because of the low level of 
penalties under such settlements.
While ideally firms should know with a reasonable degree of accuracy the dis-
count for settling, in reality there will always be uncertainty given the range of fac-
tors to be taken into account and the different views of them taken by the Tribunal 
and the CAC. This implies that, while there may be some convergence in the pen-
alty framework of the CCSA, the Tribunal and the CAC, there are cases where it 
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may still make sense for the CCSA to base the settlement penalty on the (wider) 
turnover of the entity. Such cases will include where there is a high degree of uncer-
tainty about the affected turnover and duration of the conduct. This is therefore an 
alternative approach which can be taken, depending on such uncertainties.
Two further considerations undermine deterrence. First, the 10% total turn-
over cap applicable under section 59(2) may be too low, especially in the case 
of single-product firms. Second, the practice of the Tribunal in recent decisions 
of awarding discounts in steps four and six (see above) may be too expansive. 
These two steps effectively allow a firm whose conduct may warrant a high pen-
alty to have its penalty discounted at both stages.36 In RMS & others (wire mesh 
cartel) the CAC seems to agree that there are concerns regarding the Tribunal’s 
approach of discounting at both steps four and six.37 Furthermore, the practice 
of discounting after the cap has been applied means that a single-product firm 
can contemplate a penalty substantially below 10% of one year’s turnover – a 
penalty likely to be much lower than the rewards from collusion.
This in turn affects the settlement processes of the CCSA. Firms involved in 
the most egregious of contraventions that would otherwise receive high penal-
ties from the CCSA have an incentive to take their chances at arguing for very 
narrow turnover to be used by the Tribunal and for additional discounting. This 
undermines the CCSA’s ability to settle and to obtain useful evidence from set-
tling parties that may assist in prosecuting other cartelists.
A further concern that arises from the Tribunal’s decision in Aveng & others is 
the suggestion that in motivating for a particular penalty in settlement, evidence 
should have been led by the CCSA on the loss or damage suffered, including 
through examining the change in prices after the cartel was exposed. While this 
may be a fair requirement in the context of a full hearing, it seems unduly oner-
ous at the level of settlements with the CCSA. Such evidence is particularly diffi-
cult to compile in the absence of an economically reasonable counterfactual. It 
also reduces the benefits from settling matters at an early stage of investigation for 
the CCSA and for the firm concerned, which may avoid the testing of evidence at 
the Tribunal that demonstrates significant losses suffered by consumers, evidence 
which could motivate for an even higher penalty being levied by the Tribunal.
The evidentiary burden should be different at the settlement stage and the 
wider turnover of the entity should be considered, particularly where there is 
uncertainty about the turnover to be considered and the duration of the con-
duct. In those cases where firms wish to motivate that specific turnover be 
excluded from the calculation of a settlement penalty, the onus should be on 
the firm to clearly demonstrate that the specific turnover should be exempt or 
to refute the presumption in the Act that the cartel was profitable. At the settle-
ment stage, the CCSA has relied on being able to presume the harm and profit-
ability of the conduct, although firms are required to provide sufficient evidence 
about the workings of the cartel to motivate for their own settlement and 
to assist in the prosecution of others. Importantly, the CCSA has considered the 
weight of additional evidence provided by each firm in assessing the level of 
penalty to be agreed in settlement, as described above.
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Greater predictability will improve the incentives of firms to settle with the 
CCSA, particularly if there is also an understanding that the penalties likely to 
be imposed in a contested hearing at the Tribunal are high. In other jurisdictions 
a stated policy of partial leniency for the second and subsequent informants is 
used to enhance the incentives to come forward. In South Korea, under Article 
35(1)(iii) of the Enforcement Decree, a ‘second reporter’ who reports to the Korea 
Fair Trade Commission and cooperates before or after the investigation com-
mences can qualify for a 50% discount on the penalty and partial exemption 
from corrective orders, subject to several conditions (Jung et al., 2010). The EU 
leniency process also sets out conditions for granting a discount on penalties for 
the second and third applicants. In South Africa there may be benefit in explor-
ing such an approach.
As noted, an appropriate framework for determining penalties creates disin-
centives for engaging in cartel conduct. It also provides sufficient incentive for 
firms to come forward for leniency or to settle cases. Firms should believe that 
contesting a cartel case at the Tribunal is likely to result in a high penalty, while at 
the same time they should be aware that settling is not an ‘easy way out’. Together, 
these aspects, and the increasing probability of being caught, create deterrence. 
The threat of high penalties and the concomitant legal and reputational costs 
also increase the level of deterrence. Our review reveals how the competition 
authorities have moved towards an appropriate framework on a case-by-case basis. 
This started from the SAA approach being adopted to per se cartel conduct. The 
much larger number of cartel cases than expected then saw the CCSA evolve an 
approach to settlement, as well as appreciate the importance of deterrence to alter 
the risk and reward calculus of firms considering colluding with their competitors. 
This is in line with international experience that has seen a move towards higher 
penalties. The most recent decisions of the Tribunal and the CAC in this regard 
suggest an increasing recognition that the level of penalties (through settlement 
and contested cases) is critical to deterring future violations of the Act.
Conclusions
The framework for penalties for cartel conduct ought to be fundamentally pre-
mised on deterrence. In this regard, it is important to remember the straightfor-
ward gains to firms from colluding, which underlies why the conduct is a per se 
contravention requiring no assessment of effects. In addition, the harm to the 
economy extends beyond simply the collusive price mark-ups and includes the 
negative effects on quality, service and effort. The low probability of secret collu-
sive arrangements being detected must also be taken into account.
The very large number of cartels uncovered from 2007 naturally led the CCSA 
to appreciate the benefits of settlements. Settlements that reward cooperation 
reveal more information about the conduct and can greatly assist in prosecuting 
the remaining cartel members, especially where there is little documentary evi-
dence of the conduct. Moreover, incentivising settlement also led to other cartels 
being uncovered as part of settling firms’ commitments to cooperation. The CCSA’s 
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approach evolved pragmatically according to these priorities and not along the 
lines of the tests that had been set down by the Tribunal for penalties in SAA.
The reasons for settlements being made at different penalty levels were 
explained by the CCSA on a case-by-case basis in the Tribunal hearings moti-
vating their confirmation. Discounting of settlement penalties to below 6% has 
reflected meaningful cooperation, including proactive early settlement. These 
cartels had all generally run for several years at least and were of relatively tight-
knit groups of firms for whom this had become a norm in the way of doing busi-
ness. Assessing what the competitive counterfactual would have been was nigh 
impossible. The pragmatic approach reflected considerable uncertainty about the 
penalties that would be imposed by the Tribunal and higher courts for this con-
duct. At the same time there was a need to deal with the far-reaching collusive 
conduct, apparently almost a norm in many sectors such as construction products.
After the Tribunal and CAC decisions in Pioneer and SPC, the decisions of the 
Tribunal in the wire mesh, plastic pipes and mining roof bolts cases have set out 
a coherent approach that, while taking the narrower affected turnover, applies 
a high base percentage and multiplier for duration to this. While the guidelines 
issued are an important step towards increasing certainty for firms, the CCSA’s 
approach to settlement could provide clear expectations as to the discounts off 
the expected penalties, with substantial discounts to incentivise early coopera-
tion that assists in the prosecution of the remaining members (along the same 
lines as leniency). Importantly, there should be a progression towards higher 
penalties through the settlement process, given a move by the Tribunal towards 
harsher penalties as well. A misalignment in the approaches of the CCSA and the 
Tribunal will undermine deterrence.
Lastly, we note also that there are coordinated arrangements which do not 
fit clearly into the characterisation of secret cartel agreements while nevertheless 
falling foul of section 4(1)(b). Several of these arrangements are a legacy of exten-
sively regulated markets. This warrants a somewhat different approach, which 
has been reflected in lower percentage penalties.
Notes
1 Competition Commission v Federal Mogul Aftermarket Southern Africa (Pty) Ltd & others, 
case no. 08/CR/Mar01.
2 Competition Commission v South African Airways (Pty) Ltd, case no. 18/CR/Mar01.
3 Competition Commission v Pioneer Foods, case no. 15/CR/Feb07 and 15/CR/May08.
4 Pioneer Foods, paras. 141–142.
5 Competition Commission vs. Aveng & others, case no. 84/CR/Dec09.
6 Notice of Appeal by Competition Commission to Competition Appeal Court of 
Competition Tribunal decision in cases 15/CR/Feb07 and 50/CR/May08, 24 February 2010.
7 The apparently large penalties have led both the CAC and the Supreme Court of 
Appeal to observe that the administrative penalties bear a close resemblance to crim-
inal penalties. Supreme Court of Appeal, Woodlands Dairy v Competition Commission 
2010 (6) SA 108 (SCA). The decision related to what standards to hold the CCSA to 
in exercising its powers in conducting an investigation. The CAC in its decision on 
SPC and Conrite Walls noted that ‘a penalty which is of a criminal nature should be 
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proportional in severity to the degree of blameworthiness of the offending party, the 
nature of the offence and its effect on the South African economy in general and 
consumers in particular’ (para. 9). The Constitutional Court in Senwes questioned the 
Supreme Court’s position on this, case no. CCT 61/11 [2012] ZACC 6, para. 65.
8 Competition Commission v Southern Pipeline Contractors and Conrite Walls (Pty) Ltd, case 
no. 23/CR/Feb09.
9 Southern Pipeline Contractors and Conrite Walls vs. Competition Commission, case no. 
105/CAC/Dec10.
10 The CAC noted (para. 56) that the participation of SPC in the cartel activities had 
been limited to Gauteng and to the specific sale of concrete pipes (and not culverts or 
manholes); that there was little evidence on the record to suggest significant consumer 
losses or the extent of the increased profit that flowed to SPC from the cartel; and that 
SPC had indicated that the increase in costs from 2002–2007 had been higher than 
the increase in return (revenue) over that period. With regard to profits, the CAC 
indicated that the increase in profit could have been determined by a ratio analysis 
based on figures provided in the financial statements. The CAC also found that the 
evidence available could not sustain the Tribunal’s conclusion that this was the most 
egregious kind of cartel behaviour envisaged in the Act (para. 57). However, the CAC 
did acknowledge (para. 58) that penalties should be sufficiently onerous to act as a 
deterrent.
11 This is in contrast to step two where the Tribunal considers the effects of the cartel as 
a whole (which should generally be the same for all respondents) and not the circum-
stances of an individual firm as in step five.
12 Aveng & others, paras. 133–154.
13 See MacNeil Agencies and the Competition Commission, case no. 121/CACJul12, para. 35. 
In this recent judgment involving MacNeil Agencies (implicated in the plastic pipes 
cartel), the CAC notes that collusive firms may operate inefficiently and the harm 
that consumers feel is not related to the collusive firms’ profits but to the amount that 
consumers spend on their products or services.
14 Competition Commission v DPI Plastics & others, case no. 15/CR/Feb09.
15 Para. 219. Petzetakis did not apply for leniency as Harding claimed not to be aware of 
the possibility.
16 It had interestingly also been a subsidiary of Murray & Roberts (as Main Industries), 
which had a ringleader in the concrete pipes cartel, Rocla.
17 Competition Commission v RSC Ekusasa Mining & others, case no. 65/CR/Sep09.
18 Firms may also consider the negative reputation effect of entering a cartel which is 
likely to be uncovered at some point. This depends on the likelihood of detection and, 
as all substantial firms are normally involved in a cartel, does not mean any individual 
firm will necessarily suffer from a poorer reputation than another.
19 European Commission, ‘Guidelines on the Method of Setting Fines Pursuant to Article 
23(2)(a) of Regulation No 1/2003’ [2003] OJ C210/02 (2006).
20 Versus 20% in the US.
21 European Commission ‘Guidelines’. The South African competition authorities have 
also allowed for extended payment terms.
22 See Adcock Ingram, where the operating entity was fined, although it was part of Tiger 
Brands. The turnover was much wider than the affected turnover of the conduct, 
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which was on intravenous drips. In the case of Aveng Duraset’s settlement of the 
mining roof bolts cartel, the fine was levied on Duraset’s turnover. Duraset had five 
divisions reporting to the same managing director, who was actively involved in cartel 
meetings (case no. 65/CR/Sep09). In settlements of the concrete pipes and culverts 
cartel, only World Cup 2010 joint venture turnover was excluded in the case of two 
firms, and the turnover was thus that of all cast concrete products, not only the sales 
of products subject to the cartel arrangements.
23 The only one in 2007 is Tiger Brands, which was in fact settling more than one 
contravention.
24 These are the SCI Sasol Nitro, Aveng (Steeledale) and Pioneer Foods settlements.
25 Competition Commission and Concrete Units (Pty) Ltd, case no. 23/CR/Feb09, hearing 
transcript 31 March 2010.
26 Competition Commission and Tiger Consumer Brands (Pty) Ltd, case no. 15/CR/Feb07, 
hearing transcript 28 November 2007. In its submissions the CCSA stated that Premier 
Foods and Tiger Consumer Brands were both granted leniency partly because the CLP 
was a new policy and the CCSA was more inclined to grant leniency to parties that 
cooperate than to deny it.
27 Competition Commission and Sasol Chemical Industries Ltd, case no. 31/CR/May05.
28 Foodcorp was implicated in the same cartel but received a larger penalty, at least partly 
because they waited until the matter was referred before coming forward.
29 Competition Commission and The New Reclamation Group Ltd, case no. 37/CR/Apr08.
30 Competition Commission and Lafarge Industries South Africa (Pty) Ltd, case no. 23/CR/
Mar12, hearing transcript 28 March 2012 at 11.
31 See Competition Commission & others and American Natural Soda Ash Corporation & others, case 
no. 49/CR/Apr00; Competition Commission and Adcock Ingram Critical Care (Pty) Ltd, case no. 
20/CR/Apr08; and Competition Commission and Aveng (Africa) Ltd, case no. 24/CR/Feb09.
32 Competition Commission and Aveng (Africa) Ltd t/a Steeledale, case no. 84/CR/Dec10.
33 Competition Commission and Pioneer Foods (Pty) Ltd, case no. 10/CR/Mar10 and 15/CR/
Mar10.
34 Sasol Chemical Industries.
35 MacNeil Agencies, para. 86.
36 In RSC & others the Tribunal took a strong position in terms of a high base percent-
age applied at step two. The base amount applied to DSI and Videx was 18%. This 
was increased by 10% at step five due to significant aggravating factors. Despite this, 
because the affected turnover was defined narrowly, the penalty amount constituted 
less than 1% of DSI’s and less than 2% of Videx’s annual turnover.
37 RMS & others, case no. 119/120/CAC/May2013, para. 63.
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Introduction
One of the preoccupations of competition authorities around the world is the 
investigation and prosecution of hard-core cartels. Cartels form when firms in 
a horizontal relationship (one between competitors) cooperate instead of com-
pete. Saved from the burden of rivalry, firms have market power to charge higher 
prices and can collectively constrain supply, which would not be possible under 
conditions of competition. This has a negative impact on the cartel’s customers 
and ultimately on consumers. Cartel conduct is therefore considered the most 
deplorable of all anticompetitive conduct engaged in by firms, reflected in the 
manner in which competition authorities around the world deal with this con-
duct. South African competition law is no different in that cartel conduct is 
outlawed in the Competition Act (No. 89 of 1998, as amended).
Enforcing anti-cartel laws forms the backbone of competition policy world-
wide. A competition authority must put in place measures aimed not only at 
prosecuting cartels, but also at deterring future cartel conduct. Enforcing these 
laws must always be twofold. First, enforcement means detecting and prosecut-
ing existing cartels. Second, the authority must deter future cartels either by the 
same firms (specific deterrence) or by other firms (general deterrence). There are 
several studies dedicated to revealing the immediate impact of prosecuting car-
tels (e.g., Connor, 2014; Khumalo, Mashiane and Roberts, 2014; Mncube, 2013). 
This study focuses primarily on deterring future cartels. 
In studying cartel deterrence, this chapter relies on the cartel decision- 
making equation which shows that firms will be deterred from engaging in cartel 
conduct only if the expected penalty is more than the additional profits and 
other benefits derived from collusion. The expected penalty is the product of the 
actual penalty imposed after successful prosecution and the probability of detec-
tion, taking into account the appropriate discount rate. For a particular penalty 
amount, as the probability of detection increases from zero to one, the expected 
penalty approaches the actual penalty. The value of the penalty and the prob-
ability of detection can be influenced by various factors, some of which can in 
turn be influenced by the competition authorities. Some are straightforward, 
such as merely being seen to be enforcing the available anti-cartel laws, but 
Ratshidaho Maphwanya1
2 Cartel likelihood, duration and deterrence in South Africa
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others require a more concerted effort by the authorities for the desired effect. 
This study seeks to determine whether the competition authorities are using the 
tools at their disposal as efficiently as possible to deter firms from colluding.
Two approaches were employed in achieving this objective. The first was to 
survey competition attorneys. Competition attorneys advise firms on their con-
duct, on whether the conduct constitutes collusion, and on the pros and cons of 
revealing the conduct by applying for leniency to the Competition Commission 
of South Africa (CCSA). The survey provides indicators of firms’ actions and 
 perceptions regarding the different components of deterrence associated with 
competition enforcement in South Africa. This approach is similar to other 
 surveys conducted globally and locally on issues related to cartel deterrence.
The second approach was to compile and analyse a database of discovered 
South African cartels, including data on the duration of each cartel. The data-
base contains the characteristics of these cartels that influence cartel stability, 
deterrence and durability, such as the presence of homogeneous products, the 
number of firms in the cartel, the presence of industry associations as well as the 
tool instrumental in their detection. This replicates international studies and 
allows comparisons to be drawn between the experience in South Africa and that 
of other countries.
From here, the chapter proceeds as follows: I start by presenting a brief 
 literature review on cartel deterrence and the cartel decision-making equation 
before discussing important aspects of the chapter’s methodology. I then present 
the survey results and the results of the cartel data analysis before concluding.
The economics of cartel deterrence
The objectives of competition enforcement concerning cartels must be twofold – 
the detection and prosecution of existing cartels, and, ultimately, the deterrence 
of future cartel formation (Agisilaou, 2013). It is necessary to distinguish between 
general and specific deterrence. General deterrence refers to the deterrence of 
contraventions ex ante by threatening violators with heavy enough sanctions to 
deter contravention in the first place (Buccirossi et al., 2009). Specific deterrence 
refers to the deterrence of a violator ex post by imposing a heavy enough penalty 
so that they do not contravene again (Smith and Gartin, 1989).
The primary objective of a competition policy regime must be general deter-
rence as it allows for the targeting of many more contraventions before they have 
even happened. This allows for significant savings in resources. Nevertheless, 
several jurisdictions, including South Africa, have put in place measures aimed 
at improving specific deterrence. These include consideration of repeat contra-
ventions in calculating penalties. The concept of marginal deterrence must also 
be kept in mind. This refers to ensuring that the sanction is proportional to the 
severity of the conduct so that violators get harsher sanctions for more severe 
violations (Shavell, 1992).
A successful cartel deterrence framework must ensure that the costs associated 
with detection and prosecution outweigh the benefits of collusion (Motta, 2008). 
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A firm will only be deterred from colluding if the costs of colluding expressed as 
the severity of the sanction multiplied by the probability of detection exceed the 
additional profits derived from colluding. The formula in figure 2.1 is a useful 
representation of this.
Figure 2.1 Criminal decision-making equation
Source: Motta (2008)
Where ∆∏ is the additional profits derived from colluding, p is the probabil-
ity of detection and F is the penalty imposed upon detection and prosecution. 
A firm will only be deterred from colluding if (p*F) exceeds ∆∏. The product 
(p*F) can be described as the expected penalty. For a given penalty, as the prob-
ability of detection increases (from 0 to 1), the expected penalty also increases 
and deterrence is strengthened. Below I consider the make-up of this equation. 
The idea is to show from the literature how these variables change and how, to a 
certain extent, they can be influenced by competition authorities. The research 
presented in this chapter focuses mostly on the two variables that make up the 
expected penalty – the probability of detection and sanctions. 
The probability of detection
The probability of detection is the centrepiece of a deterrence strategy. It would 
be useless for a competition regime to put in place harsh sanctions if they are not 
accompanied by a competent detection plan. The expected sanction equals the 
actual value of the sanction times the probability of detection (Landes, 1983). 
As the probability of detection increases, the expected value of the fine for the 
 cartelists equally increases and this leads to a higher level of deterrence. Bryant 
and Eckard (1991) were until recently the only economists to attempt to esti-
mate the probability of detection for firms in a cartel by using data from a sample 
of 184 cartel conspiracies detected by competition authorities in the US between 
1961 and 1998. They ran a statistical model that relied mostly on the duration 
of cartels detected during that period. The results of the model showed that the 
probability of a cartel being detected in any given year was between 13 and 17%. 
Bryant and Eckard noted that these were likely to be upper bounds given that 
they had relied only on data from cartels that had been detected. 
In a more recent study, Combe, Monnier and Legal (2008) relied on the 
model developed by Bryant and Eckard to replicate this research for the European 
Union (EU). They estimated the probability of detection for cartels in the EU to 
be between 12.9 and 13.3% in any given year. It is important to put these num-
bers into context: a probability of detection of 15% in a given year equates to 
approximately 1/7. If we input this fraction into the cartel deterrence equation 
above, it tells us that for deterrence to be achieved given a probability of detec-
tion of around 15%, the level of sanctions must equal approximately seven times 
the gains from collusion.
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The methodology employed by these economists is of great value to this 
research. Nevertheless, due to differences in the stage of development of the 
South African competition authorities it cannot be directly transferred to this 
research. The research in this line of inquiry relied on a statistical birth and 
death model that describes the onset and duration of cartels. The authors then 
use the maximum likelihood method to estimate the model’s parameters. The 
parameters estimated are the number of cartels (active but ultimately caught) 
and the probability of being caught. This methodology is based on a very spe-
cific set of assumptions, including the stage of development of the competition 
regime. The model parameters can only be estimated when T is large, being tan-
tamount to when the competition regime has reached a steady state. This would 
be an unsustainable assumption for the South African competition regime.
Notwithstanding the difficulty in applying these models in South Africa, 
there is still value to be gained from their inclusion. Both studies include (as 
part of their broader research) information on the average duration of cartels 
in their respective jurisdictions. This measure is useful in that it indicates the 
likely survival of a cartel in a particular jurisdiction. This can be considered as 
an imperfect proxy for the probability of detection. The length of time a cartel 
will be able to survive is influenced by a number of things, such as the efficiency 
of the cartel, but, importantly, also the efficiency of the competition authority. 
Bryant and Eckard (1991) calculated the average duration for cartels in the US 
to be 6.25 years. Combe, Monnier and Legal (2008) calculated this average for 
cartels in the EU to be 7.6 years. There are a few other studies that have also 
calculated the average duration of cartels without necessarily calculating the 
probability of detection. Zimmerman and Connor (2005) use a sample of 167 
modern international cartels detected between 1990 and 2004 to calculate the 
average duration of about 6.3 years. Levenstein and Suslow (2006) use a sam-
ple of 72  cartels detected in either the US or the EU between 1990 and 2006 to 
 calculate an average duration of about 7.5 years. 
There are two key points to be noted. Firstly, the research presents results of 
the probability that a cartel ultimately detected would have been detected in 
any given year. This research provides little insight into the ‘global’ probabil-
ity of detection for cartels. Secondly, because competition authorities (but more 
importantly, firms themselves) do not know this ‘global’ probability of detec-
tion, they rely on inferences from signals they receive from the competition 
environment and from the competition authorities in particular.
These perceptions of probability are based on a collection of information 
gathered from observing the market and the competition authorities. Most 
potential criminals are not well versed in the actual efficiency of the justice sys-
tem and hence rely on any signals given out (Cook, 1980). This is important, 
as competition authorities can influence the signal sent out and increase cartel 
deterrence. The most effective signal that competition authorities can send out 
is through enforcing competition law, as firms will respond to this observable 
signal (Besanko and Spulber, 1989). If firms can see the competition authorities 
prosecuting anticompetitive conduct, it is likely that fewer firms will engage in 
such behaviour out of fear of prosecution.
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A tool employed by competition authorities that increases not only the 
global probability of detection but also the perceived probability of detection 
is a leniency policy. Leniency policies allow for firms that participated in cartels 
to confess their contraventions in exchange for immunity from (or leniency in) 
prosecution (Aubert, Rey and Kovacic, 2006). This ‘deal’ is generally done in 
exchange for information that will assist the competition authority in prosecut-
ing the other firms in the cartel. Leniency policies are successful because they 
turn collusion into a prisoner’s-dilemma-type game where each firm in the cartel 
constantly has to consider whether fellow cartelists are going to apply for leni-
ency and whether it should beat them to the door (Harrington, 2008).
Inasmuch as they increase the probability of detection, leniency programmes 
can only work if they are accompanied by a probability of detection greater 
than zero (Harrington, 2008). As firms perceive the probability of detection to be 
increasing, it becomes more likely that they will apply for amnesty. Facing immi-
nent detection by a competition authority, applying for and receiving immunity 
becomes a much more attractive option. Firms are less likely to apply if they 
believe they will not get caught. This is the reason why competition authorities 
may be tempted to exaggerate their effectiveness at detecting cartels, as this cre-
ates the impression of a probability of detection approaching one (Miller, 2009). 
Events such as high-profile cartel busts and dawn raids may increase the percep-
tion that cartel conduct is likely to be detected.
Sanctions
A large enough sanction, coupled with a high probability of detection, will 
increase cartel deterrence (Bishop and Walker, 2002). Fines should be high 
enough to cover the harm that accrues to all the economic actors affected by 
the conduct (Page, 1990). Unless the fines are high enough to make collusion 
unprofitable, they will not achieve their deterrence objective (Cyrenne, 1999). 
The optimal penalty for a cartel should be equal to the sum of the deadweight 
loss and the wealth transfer that occurred from consumers/customers to the car-
tel (Page, 1990). This can be explained as the penalty being equal to the net harm 
imposed by the cartel on everyone except the cartel members (Landes, 1983). 
Certain jurisdictions, South Africa included, apply a cap on the financial pen-
alty that can be imposed on firms that contravene competition laws, primarily 
due to legality concerns. This means that it is not inconceivable that there may 
be instances where the optimal penalty to deter cartels is not within a competi-
tion authority’s reach. A study conducted on a sample of 191 cartels in the EU 
shows that in 37% of the cases, the cartel overcharge exceeded the maximum 
possible fine (Smuda, 2012). In these cases, the optimal penalty to achieve deter-
rence was not within the reach of the competition authorities. This suggests 
that a successful deterrence strategy may have to include other tools, above and 
beyond financial penalties. 
Firms found guilty of collusion may be subject to civil claims beyond the 
fines assessed. Allowance for civil claims by third parties increases the severity 
of the punishment imposed on cartel members and hence increases deterrence 
(Frazer, 1995). In the US, firms found guilty of cartel conduct are subject to treble 
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damages in civil suits. This substantially increases the cost of being in a cartel 
and therefore increases deterrence. Civil claims are not included in the granting 
of amnesty as part of leniency applications in the US, meaning that the threat of 
treble damages is likely to be a strong deterrent (Levenstein and Suslow, 2011). 
This may, however, discourage leniency applications, as firms fear the imposi-
tion of civil damages even after being granted immunity from prosecution by 
competition authorities. The issue is complex and South Africa is no exception.
In certain jurisdictions, executives/employees who are found to have engaged 
in cartel activity on behalf of their firms can be prosecuted in criminal or civil 
proceedings (Kolasky, 2004). Unlike other sanctions, personal liability links 
competition contraventions to the personal well-being of the people involved 
in these activities. By threatening people with possible jail time or heavy per-
sonal fines, competition authorities restrict the ability of company executives to 
divorce themselves from the actions of their firms. This seemingly heavy-handed 
approach is premised on getting at the managers of firms and on the belief that 
explicit cartel conduct is a very serious economic crime (Lipsky, 1991).
In addition to the financial (administrative fines and civil claims) and the 
criminal penalties imposed, the fact and the threat of reputational damage may 
also influence the behaviour of firms. As the sinister nature of cartel conduct 
becomes better known by customers, suppliers, competitors and members of 
the public, it becomes more likely that firms that are prosecuted for cartel con-
duct will suffer reputational damage (Buccirossi et al., 2009). This damage can 
be considered an additional monetary sanction if some of the firm’s customers 
or suppliers are unwilling to continue doing business with a firm that has been 
found guilty of being in a cartel.
The administrative penalties, civil damages and, where applicable, criminal 
sanctions make up the combination of factors that firms must weigh against 
additional profits when making a decision on whether or not to form or join a 
cartel. Competition authorities must therefore ensure that this combination of 
tools is set at a level high enough to discourage anticompetitive conduct. 
Methodologies
This research assesses the state of the cartel decision-making equation for South 
Africa. I have used a few proxies to make findings on certain aspects of the equa-
tion, and, when the results are considered in their entirety, it becomes possible 
to make findings on the state of cartel deterrence in the country. This research 
does not seek to find definitive values for the variables in the equation – it is 
doubtful that any research could do that. However, there is still value in probing 
their likely behaviour as this gives insight into deterrence. 
I employed two distinct methodologies in trying to answer my set of research 
questions. Firstly, I conducted a survey of competition lawyers. Surveys have 
been used in the past to get insight into questions around cartel deterrence 
(see the survey by the Office of Fair Trading [OFT, 2007] and also by the CCSA 
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and the Competition Tribunal [2009]).2 I surveyed competition lawyers as prox-
ies for the firms in the market, and used the survey to examine the behaviour 
of firms in response to the competition authorities and the competition regime 
in general.
The rationale for choosing to survey attorneys was that, as key interme-
diaries, they have insight into how their clients generally respond to various 
competition-related issues. The survey was conducted with the top competition 
law firms in the country3 and asked questions related to cartel deterrence, the 
Corporate Leniency Policy (CLP) and criminal prosecution of individuals for car-
tel conduct. Surveying competition lawyers as a proxy for their client firms is 
not unprecedented. A similar methodology was employed by Feinberg (1985), 
Benckenstein and Gabel (1982) and the OFT (2007). The survey was conducted 
using questionnaires that were sent to respondents via email and a few prelimi-
nary interviews.
The survey generally had a low response rate. However, the responses were 
reflective of views from all the major law firms in the country, which in itself is 
a very small population size. Other research done in this field has also suffered 
from a low response rate, likely due to issues of confidentiality. My survey had 
a response rate of about 18%.4 A survey by Feinberg (1985) on a similar subject 
had a responses rate of 18%. The survey by Benckenstein and Gabel (1982) had 
a response rate of 29.8%.
The second methodology employed was a statistical analysis of a database 
compiled using information on cartels prosecuted in South Africa. The database 
includes information on hard-core cartels that have been detected by the CCSA 
in the years since the introduction of the Competition Act in 1999, as well as 
information about the duration of each cartel and how each cartel was detected. 
I use this database to make certain findings on the state of cartel deterrence in 
the country.
The main aspect of this study is the duration analysis, in which I studied data 
on the duration of South African cartels and calculated an average duration. My 
intention was to compare my results to the results of studies such as those by 
Bryant and Eckard (1991), Combe, Monnier and Legal (2008), Zimmerman and 
Connor (2005) and also Levenstein and Suslow (2006), all of which include esti-
mates of the average duration of cartels in various jurisdictions. This can be used 
to draw inferences on the effectiveness of the South African competition enforce-
ment regime by comparing it to other, more developed competition jurisdictions.
The thinking is that if a competition authority is effective at detecting cartels 
that are active within its jurisdiction then it is likely that cartels will be active 
for a relatively shorter duration. With this in mind, it is also likely that firms 
will know this (as they observe cartels in the economy with a short lifespan) 
and be relatively less inclined to participate in collusion. Although imperfect, 
this analysis can still be used as a fair proxy for cartel deterrence in South Africa. 
Most of the data required for the database were collected from the website of the 
Competition Tribunal,5 where decisions on all completed competition cases are 
published. The analysis was conducted for the period from 1999 to 2012.
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Further, the study considers those aspects of South African cartels that may 
be conducive to cartel conduct. I study the extent to which South African cartels 
have included homogeneous products, whether they were concentrated as well 
as the presence of industry organisations. The impact of these factors on cartel 
deterrence is then considered.
Both of these methodologies – the lawyers’ survey and the duration 
database – although different in application, present key information on the 
state of cartel deterrence in South Africa. It is important to keep in mind that 
cartel deterrence cannot be measured with certainty as there is no unit of mea-
surement. What can be presented, however, is an analysis of the various factors 
that influence deterrence. This kind of analysis provides insight into whether 
firms in the country are likely to be sufficiently deterred or not. It also allows rec-
ommendations to be made on aspects of South Africa’s cartel enforcement that 
can be improved. In the next section I present the main findings of the survey.
Analysis of survey results
Response to competition enforcement
The first group of questions in the lawyers’ survey asked how firms respond to 
competition enforcement. The main question asked the attorneys to estimate the 
proportion of their clients that apply for leniency once given information that 
they may have contravened the Act. While leniency is a complex matter, the basic 
model underlying this question is as follows: prior to seeking external legal advice, 
firms may be uncertain about whether their conduct contravenes the Act. After 
obtaining advice from attorneys, uncertainty no longer exists. Firms now know 
that their conduct violates the Act and they have to decide how to proceed, know-
ing that detection by the CCSA is likely to lead to sanctions. A firm that consid-
ers its cartel decision-making equation at this point and is deterred will probably 
apply for leniency as this saves it from the likely sanction. A firm not deterred may 
choose not to apply for leniency. The survey responses are set out in table 2.1.
Table 2.1 Overall average percentage responses 
for survey question 2
Range (%) Responses (%)
0–50  32
50–60  31
60–70   3
70–80   0
80–90   0
90–100  35
Total 100*
Source: Own survey and analysis
Note: * Percentages do not add up to 100 due to rounding.
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More than 60% of the respondents submit that, of their clients who received 
legal advice that they may have contravened section 4 of the Act, fewer than 
60% applied for leniency. The balance did not apply for the CLP. In fact, only 
35% of the attorneys responded that more than 90% of their clients applied for 
leniency after they had been informed that their conduct contravened the Act. 
The results can be analysed further, using the multiplication rule of probabili-
ties6 (Ash, 2008) to produce probabilities that firms will apply for leniency. This 
reveals a 60% probability that a firm that receives legal advice that it has contra-
vened the Act will apply for leniency. The high number of firms (40%) not apply-
ing for leniency even though they know they have contravened the Act has 
particularly negative implications for the competition authorities. Practically, 
it implies that a substantial number of firms either consider the probability of 
detection to be low enough to make collusion worth the risk, or, alternatively, 
the sanctions that are imposed by the competition authorities, and by society in 
general, are low enough to make collusion worth it. There are undoubtedly also 
other reasons for not applying for leniency.
Factors driving leniency applications
This section considers the drivers of CLP applications. These are the features of 
the jurisdiction that lead to firms applying for leniency. The respondents were 
given a list of ten factors that may influence CLP applications and were asked 
to rank each factor’s importance on a scale of one (not important) to five (most 
important). I used the responses to compute average scores for each factor, pre-
sented in figure 2.2.
Figure 2.2 Drivers of leniency applications
Source: Own survey and analysis
1 2 3 4 5
Fear that other cartel members are likely 
to apply first
Appointment of new management
Impending personal 
liability/criminalisation
Other firms have applied for leniency in 
related markets
Other firms caught for cartel conduct in 
related markets 
Recent awareness that activities are a 
contravention
Focus on specific sector by the media, 
public or government
Merger filing where coordination concerns 
arose
Focus on specific sector/product by the 
Commission
Investigations of the firm in other 
jurisdictions/markets
According to respondents, the factor contributing most to firms applying for 
leniency is the fear that other firms in the cartel will apply first. This is obvious 
vindication for the CLP, as it means that the prisoner’s dilemma effect  mentioned 
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above has a notable impact on firms’ decision making and hence on deterrence. 
Another factor considered important is recent awareness that the conduct is a 
contravention. It is surprising, however, that there are firms still finding out that 
certain conduct is a contravention of the Act, given that it has been in place for 
approximately 15 years.
The presence of a competition investigation of the firm in other jurisdictions 
or markets also appears to be important to firms when applying for leniency. 
This is not surprising, as a firm is likely to consider that a competition authority 
investigation in one market or jurisdiction means the probability of detection 
has increased for all the contraventions the firm is involved in. The fourth most 
important factor is when other firms are caught for cartel conduct in related 
markets. When the CCSA investigates a firm (or other firms) in a related market, 
it is likely that the firm will interpret this as an increase in the probability that 
it will be detected.
An unexpected factor is the little weight respondents gave to focus on a sec-
tor by the CCSA or by the public, media or government. It appears that firms 
do not consider this to increase the probability of detection and hence it does 
not prompt them to apply for leniency. Firms respond to the CCSA detecting 
other cartels but not to the fact that the CCSA has prioritised a sector or indus-
try. The respondents submit that impending personal liability or criminalisation 
has minimal impact on firms applying for leniency. It may be that the delayed 
implementation has led firms to question whether it will ever be implemented. 
It would not be unforeseen to see an influx of leniency applications when the 
date for implementing personal liability is announced and the prospect becomes 
a reality. Figure 2.3 compares these results to the results of the 2009 survey done 
by the CCSA for the ten-year review. 
Figure 2.3 CCSA survey and my survey comparison
Sources: CCSA and Competition Tribunal (2009) and own survey
Note: The factor ‘Existing Investigation by the Commission’ was not listed in my survey, 
but appeared in the CCSA survey.
0 1 2 3 4 5
Fear that other cartel members are likely to apply first
Appointment of new management
Impending personal liability/criminalisation
Other firms have applied for leniency in related markets
Recent awareness that activities are a contravention
Focus on specific sector by the media, public or govt
Merger filing where coordination concerns arose
Focus on specific sector/product by the Commission
Investigations of the firm in other jurisdictions/markets
CCSA survey My survey
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The factor considered most important by respondents to both surveys is the 
fear that other cartel members are going to apply for leniency first. As noted, this 
shows that the CLP acts as a deterrent through the prisoner’s dilemma effect. 
The rank of the importance of the different factors remained broadly the same 
across the two surveys, although the relative importance (average score) placed 
on specific factors by the respondents decreased in my survey. However, whether 
the respondents considered the fear that other firms will apply for leniency as 
‘very important’ as opposed to ‘important’ is less significant than what factors 
drive CLP applications relative to one another.7
Drivers of deterrence
The respondents were asked to rank the importance of a range of factors which 
influence cartel deterrence. Similar to the question above, the respondents 
were given a list of ten factors that may influence cartel deterrence and asked 
to rank each factor’s importance on a scale of one (not important) to five (very 
 important). The results are presented in figure 2.4.
Figure 2.4 Drivers of cartel deterrence
Source: Own survey and analysis
1 2 3 4 5
The likelihood of detection
Administrative penalties
The CCSA’s CLP
Growing company awareness of contraventions
Growing public awareness of contraventions





According to the respondents, the factor that is most important for cartel deter-
rence is administrative penalties. This is unsurprising as profit- maximising firms 
are more likely to respond to sanctions that affect their bottom line. There is 
a question around whether administrative penalties are high enough to actu-
ally deter firms from colluding; the empirical studies cited above suggest they 
are. However, the 10% cap on administrative penalties is likely to further limit 
deterrence. Smuda (2012) shows that in most instances, the penalty that would 
be sufficient to deter firms from colluding is usually not available to the com-
petition authorities due to the cap (in section 59(2) of the Act in the case of 
South Africa).
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Another factor considered important in driving deterrence is the CLP. This is 
to be expected; the literature is clear about the likely impact of a leniency policy 
on cartel deterrence. Other factors that the respondents consider important are 
the growing awareness by companies that their conduct is a contravention and 
the reputational damage associated with being found to be in a cartel. These 
two factors are interesting as they speak to an increased appreciation of compe-
tition law by stakeholders in the economy. Reputational damage must be con-
sidered as forming part of the group of sanctions imposed on firms when they 
are detected.
What is surprising is the low importance attached to the growing public 
awareness that cartel conduct is a contravention, given the high importance 
attached to reputational damage. It may be that firms are more worried about 
reputational damage from the perspective of other firms or the state, as opposed 
to from members of the public
Criminalisation and strengthened deterrence 
The attorneys were asked whether the introduction of criminal prosecution 
for individuals involved in cartel conduct on behalf of their firms was likely to 
improve deterrence. More than half (56%) believe it will increase cartel deter-
rence. This is consistent with most economic literature on the deterrence effect 
of criminal prosecutions. Some respondents gave qualified responses, mostly cit-
ing aspects that may influence its success or failure, such as the CCSA being able 
to operationalise criminal prosecutions as a strong tool through cooperation 
with the National Prosecuting Authority.
Twenty-two per cent of respondents indicated that since the debate on crim-
inalisation was introduced, their clients have asked about it and some have 
requested compliance training and other internal measures to ensure that they 
are compliant with competition laws. This suggests that the impending intro-
duction of criminalisation is already having a deterrent effect.
The attorneys were asked to identify impediments to the CLP and ways in 
which cartel deterrence can be improved in South Africa. On the first question, 
more than half of the responses (56%) cited the lack of protection for leniency 
applicants against follow-on damages as a factor that may dissuade firms from 
applying for leniency. Some respondents noted that this may have more of an 
impact when criminal prosecution is introduced. The risk of further liability out-
side of the competition framework may harm the CLP.
There was very little consistency in the responses on how cartel deterrence 
can be improved. However, an issue that was brought up several times was pro-
tecting leniency applicants from prosecution or follow-on damages. Other sug-
gestions were improved efficiency in dealing with cartel cases by the CCSA and 
also more predictability in how firms will be prosecuted, especially when crim-
inalisation is introduced. Unsurprisingly, none of the attorneys suggested an 
increase in penalties as a way of improving deterrence. 
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Analysis of the database of South African cartels
Duration of South African cartels
Using data from decisions and consent agreements published by the Tribunal, I 
created a database showing the duration of each cartel prosecuted by the CCSA. 
In the period from the introduction of the Competition Act in 1999 until 2012, 
the CCSA completed (i.e., finalised in the Tribunal either through settlement or 
prosecution) 99 cases involving aspects of section 4 prohibited conduct. Of these, 
28 were instances of hard-core collusion. The substantial disparity is because sev-
eral of the cases, although not instances of hard-core collusion, involved other 
prohibited horizontal arrangements. There is also a lot of duplication in that 
firms that form part of the same cartel may be prosecuted through different pro-
ceedings. Table 2.2 presents the main findings of this study.
Table 2.2 Basic statistics on cartel duration
  Results
Cartels 28
Mean  6.7 years (6 years 8 months)
Median  7.3 years (7 years 4 months)
Min.  0.1 years (1 month)
Max. 11.3 years (11 years 4 months)
Source: Own survey and analysis
The mean duration for a cartel – how long it survived on average – before 
being detected and prosecuted by the CCSA is 6.7 years or six years and eight 
months. The median duration is 7.3 years or seven years and four months. The 
cartel that lasted the shortest duration of all the cartels detected by the CCSA 
was the price-fixing arrangement between South African Airways, SA Airlink 
and Comair.8 These firms colluded to fix the introduction of a fuel surcharge 
on the price of tickets for domestic and international flights in May 2004. The 
CCSA detected this collusion in the same month and it hence lasted for less than 
one month. 
Determining which cartel was active the longest is not a straightforward exer-
cise, the main reason being the existence of several cartels prior to introducing 
the Act in 1999. The cement cartel is one example. Before 1996, the cement 
industry was a legal cartel through an exemption dating as far back as the 1940s. 
However, when the exemption was withdrawn in 1995, the industry continued 
to operate in the same manner.9 The precast concrete products cartel had been 
active since the 1970s.10 Several of the cartels in agricultural products stemmed 
from the marketing boards that were set up through the Marketing Act of 1937 as 
part of the government’s broader interventions in the agricultural sector (Roberts, 
2009). When the marketing boards were disbanded in 1996, firms in the differ-
ent markets simply carried on as (now) illegal cartels. It is difficult to measure 
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the duration of these cartels with precision. The Act coming into place in 1999 
suggests there may not be much value in doing so in any event.
Two of the longest-running cartels in the post-Competition Act era are the 
polymers cartel involving Sasol Polymers and Safripol11 and the pelagic fishing 
cartel.12 Both preceded the introduction of the Act and were detected only in 
2010. Other long-running cartels that preceded these two were detected sooner, 
once the Act was in place.
Table 2.3 compares my results to those of other studies that have covered the 
same ground with regards to other jurisdictions. I pay closer attention to the 
studies by Zimmerman and Connor (2005) and Levenstein and Suslow (2006) as 
they were conducted over a similar time frame to mine, and also consider cartels 
from a similar ‘generation’.
Table 2.3 Comparison of various studies’ results
Cartels Period Mean Median Jurisdiction
My results 28 1999–2012 6.7 years 7.3 years South Africa
Bryant and Eckard (1991)* 184 1961–1988 6.25 years 4.7 years US
Combe et al. (2008)* 86 1969–2008† 7.6 years 5.7 years Europe
Zimmerman and  
Connor (2005)
167 1990–2004 6.3 years 4.4 years US and Europe
Levenstein and  
Suslow (2006)
72 1990–2006† 7.5 years 6.0 years US and Europe
Sources: Own survey; Bryant & Eckard (1991); Combe et al. (2008); 
Zimmerman & Connor (2005); Levenstein & Suslow (2006)
Notes: * An average of the results from the two measures of duration applied was used to 
compute one mean and median result for both duration measures. These authors used two 
estimates of duration due to imprecise data.
† The authors did not indicate the cut-off date for their study. Combe et al. noted they 
had considered cartels from 1969 to the ‘present day’ (the paper was published in 2008). 
Levenstein and Suslow noted they had considered cartels from 1990 onwards (the paper 
was published in 2006).
It is remarkable how similar the results of all the studies are. Despite the differences 
in the time periods considered and the jurisdictions within which the cartels oper-
ated, the average duration for cartels that are eventually detected in each of the 
studies is around six to eight years; that is, a cartel will last, on average, between six 
and eight years before it is detected by the competition authorities. This suggests 
that a cartel that will eventually be detected by the CCSA is likely to survive on 
average for more or less the same duration in South Africa as cartels in Europe and 
the US. These results are fairly positive for the South African competition regime, 
if only because it means the CCSA and the Tribunal are in good company. 
Drivers of detection
I also considered the factors that contribute the most to the CCSA’s enforcement 
efforts, in other words, those that have led to the detection of cartels in South 
Africa. The results are shown in figure 2.5.
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Figure 2.5 shows the factors that have led to cartel detections, as reported mainly 
in Tribunal decisions. The factor that has contributed the most to cartel detec-
tion in South Africa is the CLP – 61% of the cartels prosecuted by the CCSA. This 
accords with the results of the survey discussed above and with economic the-
ory (see Motta and Polo, 2003). The other two factors that have contributed to 
cartel detection are the CCSA’s own complaint initiations (21%) and third-party 
complaints (18%), including complaints by rivals, customers, members of the 
public and the government. Figure 2.6 shows a time series of cartel detections, 
highlighting the enforcement tool responsible.
Figure 2.5 Method of detection frequency
Source: Own data

























A majority of the cartels prosecuted by the CCSA through the CLP between 
1999 and 2012 involved conduct detected in 2007 and 2008.13 Moreover, a closer 
look at the dates when these cartels were detected supports the finding that the 
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CLP is likely to be the CCSA’s strongest tool for detecting cartels. The CLP was 
initially introduced in February 200414 and amended in May 2008.15 None of the 
hard-core cartels prosecuted by the CCSA ended prior to the introduction of the 
CLP. Although Lavoie (2010) notes that there were a few cartel complaints prior 
to introducing the CLP, this study’s results reveal that none of these complaints 
led to any kind of finding in the Tribunal.
It is also important to keep in mind the circumstances that may have served 
to support the CLP. As noted, a leniency policy is likely to work if it is accompa-
nied by a probability of detection greater than zero (Harrington, 2008). Activities 
perceived to have increased the probability of detection are likely to lead to more 
firms applying for leniency. For instance, the CCSA undertook a prioritisation 
strategy in 2006/2007 that included a focus on the following sectors: food, agro-
processing and forestry; financial services; infrastructure and construction; and 
intermediate industrial products (CCSA, 2007). In 2007, the CCSA received leni-
ency applications for cartels in bread and precast concrete products in its identi-
fied priority sectors (Makhaya, Mkhwananzi and Roberts, 2012).
This prioritisation of certain sectors (and cartels in general) created a credible 
threat of detection that probably increased the effectiveness of the CLP. The 
CCSA additionally adopted a more proactive approach to cartel enforcement 
involving screening techniques for identifying markets likely to be cartelised 
(Makhaya, Mkhwananzi and Roberts, 2012). In addition, the amendment to the 
CLP in 2008 is likely to have improved deterrence. However, it appears that the 
majority of the CLP applications that led to prosecutions preceded implementa-
tion of the amendment.
Cartel stability in South Africa
In this section, I consider the characteristics of the various cartels detected by the 
CCSA and assess the extent to which South African cartels possess the character-
istics that could influence cartel stability. 
Number of firms in the cartel
It is more likely that firms will reach and maintain an agreement if there are 
fewer firms involved. This does not mean, though, that a cartel cannot form 
when there are numerous firms – cartels can always find ways around the chal-
lenges posed by having numerous members. Table 2.4 shows the number of 
firms involved in the cartels the CCSA prosecuted. 
Table 2.4 Number of firms in cartels prosecuted by the CCSA
Number of firms in cartel Number of cartels Percentage of cartels
2–5 15  54
6–10  6  21
11+  7  25
Total 28 100
Source: Own analysis
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Table 2.5 Number of firms in and duration of cartels











The results do not show the expected negative relation between the number of 
firms in a cartel and the duration of the cartel. Moreover, the cartels with the 
fewest number of member firms (two to five) have the shortest average duration. 
One of the longest-running cartels post-1999 was a two-firm cartel involving 
Sasol and Safripol, but this does not appear to be the trend. 
Industry association
The presence of an industry association can help to solve problems of moni-
toring for a cartel, which makes it easier for the firms involved to maintain the 
collusive agreement (Porter, 2005). If firms are required to submit their mar-
ket information to an industry association, this may make it easier and quicker 
for the cartel to detect when firms are not adhering to the cartel agreement. 
Table 2.6 shows the proportion of the cartels detected by the CCSA that involved 
an industry association in some capacity. 
More than half of the cartels detected by the CCSA involved the participation of 
an industry association. Participation may be passive or active. It is likely that 
the presence of an industry association may be more empowering for a cartel 
with a large number of members. Table 2.7 indicates the link between the num-
ber of firms in a cartel and the presence of an industry association.
The results reveal a positive relationship between the number of firms in a car-
tel and the involvement of an industry association. All the cartels that involved 
over ten firms also involved the participation of an industry  association. As the 
number of firms in a cartel increases, it becomes more of a challenge to monitor 
More than half of the cartels prosecuted by the CCSA involved five firms or 
fewer. Only 25% of the cartels prosecuted by the CCSA involved over ten firms. 
Table 2.5 lists the relationship between the number of firms in a cartel and the 
duration of the cartel. 
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all the firms in the cartel; the presence of an industry association serves to 
 mitigate this challenge. This is likely to increase cartel stability, further increas-
ing the size of the expected penalty necessary to achieve deterrence. 
Product homogeneity
Product homogeneity16 is considered to increase the likelihood of collusion. It 
is easier for firms with homogeneous products to reach agreement on the terms 
of collusion and this will improve cartel stability. Table 2.8 shows the extent to 
which South African cartels involved homogeneous products. 
Table 2.7 Number of firms in cartels with industry 
association






Table 2.8 Product homogeneity  






Table 2.9 Product homogeneity and cartel duration




Over 60% of the cartels prosecuted by the CCSA involved homogeneous prod-
ucts. Table 2.9 shows the relationship between product homogeneity and cartel 
duration. 
The results of the study appear to support a positive link between product homo-
geneity and cartel duration and stability. Cartels that involve homogeneous 
products have on average endured for over two-and-a-half years longer than 
cartels that do not involve homogeneous products.
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Conclusions
The results paint a positive picture of cartel deterrence in South Africa, a juris-
diction still very much in its infancy. The CCSA’s efforts in detecting cartels 
have yielded results across several markets. The work is ongoing, however, as it 
appears firms may still perceive the expected penalty to be low. It is hard to say 
if this is due to a low probability of detection or to insufficient sanctions. In any 
case, collusion is not only ongoing but there are also firms that risk detection 
even after being informed by attorneys that their conduct is a contravention.
The CCSA’s CLP has had great success despite certain challenges. It is diffi-
cult to argue with the number of cases that have been closed through leniency 
applications. However, it is of concern that there are still a large number of cli-
ents that choose not to apply for leniency after being informed that their con-
duct is likely to be a contravention of the Act. Assuming that the clients accept 
their attorney’s legal advice as accurate, these firms have not been successfully 
deterred.
The results of the analysis of cartel duration, however, appear to paint a 
positive picture of the South African competition regime. On average, a cartel 
that is eventually detected by the CCSA survives for 6.6 years or 6 years and 
7 months. Given the harm caused by hard-core cartels, this number will without 
a doubt concern policy makers and consumers alike. However, South Africa is 
in line with international jurisdictions which are much more developed. Given 
the resources that the CCSA has continuously dedicated to the fight against col-
lusion, it is likely that this average may reduce over time as the CCSA becomes 
more efficient and members of the public and the business community become 
more informed about competition law.
Worryingly, the study also shows that South African cartels exhibit character-
istics that are likely to improve cartel stability and hence make deterrence more 
challenging. More than half of the cartels detected by the CCSA involved a small 
number of firms (less than five) and homogeneous products. The cartels with 
a large number of firms appear to rely on industry association. This notwith-
standing, the CCSA appears to have done fairly well in detecting these cartels. 
Improvement can certainly be made, such as higher penalties which are likely to 
increase deterrence, all things being equal. The introduction of personal liability 
is likely to also be a positive step in the fight against cartels in South Africa. 
Notes
1 Ratshidaho Maphwanya is a senior merger analyst in the mergers and acquisitions 
division of the Competition Commission of South Africa. The views expressed in this 
chapter are his views and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Commission.
2 This is mainly because secondary data on firm behaviour when it comes to this aspect 
are by definition not available.
3 This is based on reviews released by the Global Competition Review, http://global 
competitionreview.com/surveys/article/37416/south-africa (subscription required).
4 Bowman Gilfillan indicated a preference to send one response for the firm, which 
means the response rate is actually about 21%.
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5 See www.comptrib.co.za.
6 The proportions of the firms that will apply for leniency are multiplied with the mid-
point of the range and then summed to generate a probability that a firm will apply 
after receiving legal advice.
7 Whether something is ‘important’ or ‘very important’ is a subjective consideration; 
what matters most is which factors are more important than others.
8 Competition Tribunal, case no. 20/CR/Mar05.
9 Competition Tribunal, case no. 93/CR/Nov11.
10 Competition Tribunal, case no. 23/CR/Feb09.
11 Competition Tribunal, case no. 48/CR/Aug10.
12 Competition Tribunal, case no. 50/CR/May12.
13 These numbers are not necessarily reflective of the total number of leniency appli-
cations received by the Commission in this period; in fact, they underestimate the 
overall total. The disparity is due to the fact that the study only considers completed 
cases and hence would not include cases that are still ongoing or leniency applications 
that have been denied.
14 Notice 195 of 2004, Government Gazette No. 25963 of 6 February 2004.
15 Notice 628 of 2008, Government Gazette No. 31064 of 23 May 2008.
16 According to OECD (1993), ‘products are considered to be homogenous when they 
are perfect substitutes and buyers perceive no actual or real differences between 
the products offered by different firms’. In addition to the conventional product 
homogeneity described above, homogeneity within product segments has also been 
considered. For instance, if a product includes variations by quality but there is 
homogeneity within the different quality segments then the product(s) cartelised 
are considered homogeneous. Petrol is an example of this. There is differentiation 
within the broader petrol market (93 octane petrol is different from 95 octane petrol 
though 93 octane petrol is the same across the different manufacturers and the same 
applies to 95 octane petrol). Products with these kinds of characteristics are consid-
ered homogeneous in this study.
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3 Cartel enforcement in the southern African neighbourhood
Introduction
South Africa began to implement its modern competition law in 1998 after a series 
of reforms following the 1994 political transformation. Its successful enforce-
ment against cartels is yet to be replicated in other economically interconnected 
 countries in the Southern African Customs Union (SACU) and the Southern African 
Development Community (SADC). Of the BLNS (Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, 
Swaziland) countries within the SACU community, only Lesotho does not have 
a competition law or enforcement system. The SADC operates on a larger scale 
and has 14 member states: Angola, Botswana, Democratic Republic of the Congo, 
Lesotho, Madagascar, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Seychelles, South Africa, 
Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe. All the SACU countries are members 
of the SADC as well. For the purposes of this chapter, all countries that are 
members of the SADC and/or SACU are neighbouring countries to South Africa. 
Sectors such as mining, petroleum and agricultural products have been a sub-
ject of anticompetitive interest in South Africa, notably in relation to cartel activ-
ity. Despite the high number of cartels that have been unearthed in South Africa, 
there does not seem to be equivalent success in the neighbouring countries. This 
chapter deals with this issue by reviewing selected cartels that have been unearthed 
in South Africa, with possible links to other SACU/SADC member states. It also 
references a survey on selected SACU/SADC member states in relation to their 
cartel enforcement and sectors that have been a subject of cartel investigation in 
South Africa. The chapter ends with an attempt to highlight lessons that other 
competition authorities in the SACU/SADC can learn from the success story of the 
Competition Commission of South Africa (CCSA) in cartel enforcement.
Why neighbours must be worried about 
cartels unearthed in South Africa
South Africa is a key source of direct and indirect investment in sectors such as 
mining, retail and, to an extent, manufacturing. SACU’s BLNS countries’ import 
bill from South Africa has been dominated by petroleum and related products 
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(including bitumen), cement, motor vehicles, iron ore and concentrates. By 
2012, Botswana was the fourth-largest destination for South African exports, at 
5.1% of the exports, which accounted for 91.4% of total intra-SACU imports 
(see SACU, 2012). As for the SADC, the main intra-SADC trade export items 
include petroleum, agricultural products, electricity and clothing and textile 
products (SADC, n.d.).
Competition policy and law in SACU/SADC countries is increasingly empha-
sising job creation, poverty reduction and citizen or small and medium enterprise 
(SME) empowerment. The International Competition Network has recognised 
that these alternative objectives of competition policy go mostly hand in hand 
with the traditional ones (ICN, 2002). The fact is that even the very alternative 
objectives will not be achieved where there are cartels. This is partly why car-
tel enforcement has become an important part of competition policy in many 
countries. Cartel activity has the propensity to stage-manage competition and 
provide a facade of competition when in actual fact there is collusion and a 
reduction in consumer surplus.
Where cartels thrive, there are a number of adverse effects. Business opportu-
nities will remain controlled by cartels. Penetrating markets with cartels becomes 
difficult as cartelists will lower prices when they detect prospective entry, making 
inward investment costly and causing the exit of struggling firms. This in turn 
concentrates job creation in a sector among the cartel members. Cartels affect 
the objectives of regional trade integration and free movement of goods (e.g., 
customer and market allocation), as cartel members may create barriers to entry 
and frustrate the entry and growth of competitors. Cartels do not grow markets; 
they stagnate market growth.
Cartel enforcement in South Africa
Some cartels in South Africa involve markets historically characterised by legal 
cartels. These legal cartels were outlawed in the 1990s, but long-standing market 
relationships appear to have prolonged coordinated conduct in many of these 
markets (Roberts, 2004). An example given by Boshoff (2015) is the bitumen 
cartel. This market is one originally characterised by a legal cartel exempted from 
competition policy until 2000. Subsequently, information exchange continued 
among market participants, allegedly for the purpose of continuing to calculate 
a reference price requested by government and industry (Boshoff, 2015).
In 1999, the then minister of trade and industry, Alec Erwin, emphasised the 
pivotal role that the competition authorities were to play in transforming ‘an 
economy inherited in 1994 that was rigid, protected, locked up in inefficient 
institutions, highly monopolised and concentrated’ (CCSA and CTSA, 2009, p. 1).
There is no doubt that the CCSA has demonstrated a tough stance towards 
cartels, not only by word of mouth, but by clear actions that have removed any 
doubt of the CCSA’s capacity to investigate, get and secure admissible evidence 
and prosecute successfully. The capacity of the Competition Tribunal of South 
Africa to handle referrals has also been demonstrated. However, despite record 
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fines and assured vigorous enforcement, there is little indication that cartels are 
in decline in South Africa (see Planting, 2013). This has led to recent proposed 
amendments to criminalise certain hard-core cartels, including price fixing and 
market allocation. Kelly (2010) notes that the introduction of criminal sanc-
tions is based partly on recognition of how important competitive markets are 
in capitalist economies for maximising consumer welfare, and partly on the 
apparent inability of administrative fines to serve as an effective deterrent to 
cartelisation. 
In a landmark report, the World Bank (2016, p. viii) noted that products 
that have been found to be affected by cartels in Africa include fertilisers, food 
(including wheat, maize and bread), pharmaceuticals, construction materials 
(including cement) and construction services.1 Table 3.1 highlights some key 
cartels with possible overspill into SACU/SADC countries.
Cartel enforcement in neighbouring countries
Cartel enforcement in neighbouring countries has not been as successful as that 
in South Africa. Reasons for this are many, ranging from capacity to lack of suffi-
cient understanding of competition law by enforcers as much as by adjudicators/
courts. Of 14 SACU/SADC countries, 9 have functional competition laws and 
institutional arrangements to deal with the enforcement thereof. A sample of six 
of the nine countries was considered reasonable for purposes of the survey that 
was carried out to review their cartel enforcement activities.
Considering the cartels unearthed in South Africa and the trends in trade 
and investment between SACU/SADC and South Africa, the chances are high 
that a cartel in South Africa is most likely also taking place or has taken place 
in other SACU/SADC countries. In a worst-case but likely scenario, companies 
may discontinue cartels in South Africa but continue in other SACU/SADC coun-
tries where enforcement is weak or non-existent. It is clear from the survey that 
SACU/SADC countries with functional competition authorities have not inves-
tigated, or have investigated but not been successful in gathering the required 
evidence, or the case has been dismissed on appeal in the same cartels that were 
successfully investigated and prosecuted in South Africa.
Table 3.2 summarises the survey results. It shows the cartel legal provisions as 
well as enforcement activities of the six countries in sectors where cartels have 
been unearthed in South Africa. These sectors include bread, flour, construction, 
cement, fertiliser, wheat and petroleum.
Except for South Africa, only Botswana and Zambia have busted cartels using 
dawn raids (none has been through cartel leniency). While no fines have been 
recorded due to appeal challenges on procedural errors, Botswana unearthed five 
cartels in five years: supply of food rations to government; car panel beating (Car 
World & Other); supply of sugar beans to government; and supply of infant for-
mula to government. Three attempted bid-rigging cases were thwarted: supply 
of communication equipment to the Botswana Police Service; stationery to the 
Botswana government’s Central Transport Organisation; and supply of security 
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services to the Companies and Intellectual Property Agency. Attempted bid rig-
ging is not provided for in the Competition Act. 
Except for South Africa, Zambia is the only country that has processed a fine. 
This was a case2 in which 15 car panel-beating garages conspired to collectively 
charge a fixed amount for issuance of quotations to insurance companies. The tip-
off to the case came after an advocacy workshop the competition authority had 
conducted for insurance companies. Top Gear Zambia, the ringleader, was fined 
2% of its turnover while the others were fined 1%. A landmark case on a cartel 
in the fertiliser industry involving Omnia Zambia and Nyiombo Investments,3 
where they were fined 5% of their turnover, has been in the appeal process and 
is yet to be concluded by the Supreme Court of Zambia.
Except for Namibia and Zimbabwe, all the countries indicated that they are 
sufficiently capacitated to deal with cartel enforcement. Namibia and Zimbabwe 
have had their competition law implementation systems peer-reviewed under 
the auspices of the Competition and Consumer Policies Branch of the United 
Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). Recommendations 
to foster enforcement machinery are under implementation, which for Zimbabwe 
include an overhaul of the whole competition law as well as finalisation of a 
national competition policy. 
Lessons from South Africa for other 
SACU/SADC countries 
South Africa’s aggressive investigation and enforcement against cartel conduct 
is unparalleled in any of the SACU/SADC countries. The World Bank (2016) has 
noted that cartels are the most harmful anticompetitive practice, but anti-cartel 
enforcement remains relatively weak in Africa. The Bank noted that between 
2013 and 2014, 42 horizontal agreement cases were completed by 9 authorities; 
of those, 50% were investigated by the CCSA (World Bank, 2016, pp. viii, 15–16). 
While the experiences of South Africa may be unique and not necessarily appli-
cable to or replicable in other countries, competition authorities in SACU/SADC 
countries can derive some lessons for a successful cartel enforcement regime by 
reviewing certain fundamentals that lie behind the enforcement machinery and 
success of the CCSA. These are discussed below.
Corporate leniency and use of settlement agreements 
It has been widely held that the CLP has been the single most decisive factor in 
facilitating a successful cartel enforcement regime in South Africa. The CLP was 
introduced in 2004 but the first application was received in 2007. In December 
2006, the CCSA initiated investigations against Premier, Tiger Brands, Foodcorp 
and Pioneer Foods, all of whom allegedly had been involved in the bread car-
tel (Bonakele and Mncube, 2012). After contested proceedings, the Tribunal 
ruled that Pioneer Foods had engaged in fixing the price of bread products in 
the Western Cape province and nationally, imposing on Pioneer Foods a fine 
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of R196 million. Following this, Pioneer Foods approached the CCSA with the 
intention of settling all the other cases that had been referred to the Tribunal for 
adjudication or that were currently under investigation by the CCSA in which it 
was a respondent.4
From the first leniency application, the initial fine of R196 million showed 
the respondents that the CCSA was serious. Following this, Pioneer Foods set-
tled all the other cases that were under investigation. UNCTAD (2010) has 
observed that CLPs are effective only if cartelists not seeking leniency perceive 
significant punishment to be sufficiently likely. These programmes involve 
a commitment to a pattern of penalties designed to increase incentives for 
cartelists to self-report to the competition law enforcer.5 The UNCTAD report 
highlights the following as necessary conditions for an effective leniency 
programme:
•	 Anti-cartel enforcement must be sufficiently active for cartel members to 
believe that there is a significant risk of being detected and punished if they 
do not apply for leniency;
•	 Penalties imposed on cartelists who do not apply for leniency must be signif-
icant and predictable to a degree. The penalty imposed on the first applicant 
is much less than that imposed on later applicants;
•	 The leniency programme must be sufficiently transparent and predictable to 
enable potential applicants to predict how they would be treated; and 
•	 To attract international cartelists, the leniency programme must protect 
information sufficiently for the applicant to be no more exposed than 
non-applicants to proceedings elsewhere.
The CLP in South Africa was revised in 2008 and was intended to be a policy 
designed to encourage disclosure by offering immunity from penalisation for 
cartel conduct in terms of the Competition Act. It was intended, as leniency 
programmes generally are, to undermine cartel stability by creating a ‘prisoner’s 
dilemma’ – where none is sure whether the other will reveal the cartel and thus 
benefit from reduced fines. It does so by modifying the incentives of cartel mem-
bers and amending the interactions of the system in which they participate. Its 
success has been largely due to the immunity afforded to the whistleblower from 
prosecution and the administrative fine that may be imposed by the Tribunal. 
Lopes, Seth and Gauntlett (2013) posit that at the core of any successful cartel 
enforcement programme is the effective management of incentives. 
Cartels are notoriously difficult to expose due to the fact that they are by 
their very nature secretive and, to varying degrees, incentivised by secured levels 
of profit. To this end, an effective enforcement policy must be able to remove 
or greatly diminish the incentive for parties to collude by imposing penalties 
that have real and serious implications for those firms involved, while concom-
itantly creating an adequate incentive for firms and individuals to disclose their 
involvement in cartel conduct to the competition authorities. Typically, the 
trade-off made by competition authorities in this regard is to offer some form of 
immunity to those firms or individuals that disclose and cooperate in the expo-
sure of cartel conduct (Lopes, Seth and Gauntlett, 2013).
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Dawn raids ignite leniency applications
Dawn raids that pre-emptively assist to obtain relevant evidence go hand in 
hand with any CLP.6 In South Africa, a good number of leniency applications 
were received from firms after they were dawn-raided, and credible circumstan-
tial or other evidence collected by the CCSA, notably in the construction sector. 
Competition authorities thus not only need a leniency programme, but must 
demonstrate that:
•	 They have the power to raid;
•	 They actually carry out raids in a legally enshrined manner (i.e., according 
to the rules of procedure and/or the respective legislation). Where a raid has 
not been carried out according to the legislation and/or rules of procedure, 
the respondent parties will ensure that the case does not see the light of day 
on the merits or substance of the case. Cases will thus be lost on ‘technical 
grounds’ – but technical grounds are and should be considered to be part of 
‘the law’;
•	 When they raid, they can collect information that is relevant, that is, they 
have the capacity to obtain credible records (physical or electronic) which 
will address the issues raised in the charge sheet or search warrant;
•	 When they raid, they will not get cold feet as various influential forces 
launch media or other covert attacks on the institution, its staff and pro-
cesses, resulting in a case being abandoned and/or mysteriously ‘frozen’ in 
its tracks; and
•	 When a leniency application is actually made, the staff dealing with it know 
exactly what they are supposed to do to ensure that leniency processing 
details are followed to the letter.
Transition period of learning and growth
The South Africa Competition Act was promulgated in 1998, following which it 
underwent some teething problems. Its effective implementation was systemati-
cally assisted by increased investment in staff training and exposure at both the 
CCSA and the Tribunal. Learning from established competition authorities such 
as the Federal Trade Commission of the US and those under the Organisation for 
Economic Cooperation and Development assisted the South African competi-
tion authority to move out of the transition phase with a clear focus and  a clear 
enforcement priority scheme. 
The cliché ‘enforcement is the best advocacy’ has proved true for the South 
African competition authorities. While some authorities in the southern African 
region have claimed that they are not ready for enforcement because they are con-
centrating on advocacy, a late entry into enforcement leads to lack of experience 
in dealing with cases such as cartels. Additionally, procedural mistakes are better 
committed early on, in the establishment years. Table 3.3 shows fines meted out 
by the Tribunal only three years after the establishment of the CCSA in 1999. 
Early enforcement warning shots are important to raise public awareness 
about what the competition authority can actually do, as opposed to what it 
says it can do. Thus, by the time the CLP was introduced in 2004, the CCSA had 
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already demonstrated its capability with the cases involving Federal Mogul and 
the Association of Pretoria Attorneys. 
Managing risk of mistakes and emotionalism
It is important not to dwell on mistakes made and also to ensure that those 
mistakes are not institutionalised. Team leaders and their members may make 
tactical and operational errors when dealing with their first cases. This is because 
initial training in cartel investigations is often undertaken by foreign experts 
using their laws and rules of procedure, which the novice investigating officers 
in a developing competition authority may take as applicable in their jurisdic-
tions as well. This is a natural mistake but a lesson for new and developing 
competition authorities is to ensure that they follow the investigating process 
indicated in their laws and/or rules of procedure. The rules of procedure must 
equally be alive to constitutional provisions and precedents set in court deci-
sions. Each country has certain rules of procedure that must be adhered to if the 
merits of a case are to be entertained by the adjudicating bodies or the courts. 
Emotionalism in case selection, investigation, prosecution and adjudica-
tion can be fatal to a case, no matter how well trained and exposed the officers 
may be. This needs to be checked and managed within the relevant processes. 
Declarations of interest must be a part of the process. However, administrative 
bodies such as competition authorities should not see themselves as ordinary 
civil litigants. Unlike ordinary litigants, competition authorities should not care 
about winning at all costs but rather about obtaining the best possible outcome 
for the economy. In this regard, they should remain independent, impartial and 
open-minded throughout their processes. 
Overall, a systematic risk-monitoring and review framework must be in place. 
CCSA key risk-management areas and mitigations are indicated in table 3.4.
An early case that made the CCSA reflect on its procedures was the PPC case, 
where a search and seizure summons was quashed by the High Court primar-
ily because the CCSA alerted the media before the summons was executed. In 
another case, the CCSA’s haste to publicise a cartel prosecution led to the unwar-
ranted disclosure of confidential information relating to the defendant, Reclaim. 
However, the CCSA did not relent in its pursuit of cartels but ensured that a 
similar mistake was not made in other cases.7




2002/2003 Federal Mogul R3 million Section 5(2)
Hibiscus Coast Municipality No penalty Section 5(1)
Patensie Sitrus Beherend Beperk No penalty Section 8(d)(i)
2003/2004 The Association of Pretoria 
Attorneys 
R223 000 Section 4(1)(b)(i)
Source: CCSA and CTSA (2009, p. 42)
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Table 3.4 CCSA risk management and mitigation
Disaster recovery The loss of data, unauthorised access and use of information 
and corruption of the network. An IT security audit took place in 
the 2013/2014 financial year. The findings from this audit were 
addressed during the course of the 2013/2014 financial year. 
Adverse decisions from courts on 
powers and procedures
Court decisions on appeal, which were handed down during 
the period under review, have impacted negatively on the 
Commission’s ability to initiate and investigate complaints 
submitted to it by third parties. The Commission’s response to 
this has been to improve its internal procedures.
Reputational harm The reputation of the organisation might be damaged if the 
Commission executes its legislative mandate, powers and 
duties inappropriately. This risk is being managed by taking 
due consideration of public interest concerns, stakeholder 
perceptions and policy expectations.
Independence undermined The Commission may be subject to external influences in 
executing its legislative duties. The Commission manages this 
risk by ensuring transparency in decision making and justifying 
its decisions on merit within the parameters of the Competition 
Act. It also engages in continuous advocacy with its stakeholders.
Unmanageable caseload The current caseload has placed the Commission’s structure and 
resources under severe pressure and has a negative impact on 
the quality of service delivered. The Commission manages this 
situation by focusing its resources on priority cases and sectors, 
as well as the effective screening of cases. The issue of space 
constraints has been escalated to the minister of economic 
development in order to address the organisation’s inability to 
hire much-needed staff, given the current premises.
Source: CCSA (2014, p. 80)
Collaboration with other agencies
When the CCSA investigated the construction cartel case, other local enforce-
ment agencies were involved as well, due to the multiplicity of legal issues that 
were at play. In this case, the Hawks and the National Prosecuting Authority 
and its Specialised Commercial Crimes Unit were involved. In Botswana, the 
Competition Authority has collaborated successfully with the Directorate on 
Corruption and Economic Crime as well as the Public Procurement and Asset 
Disposal Board in dawn raids. Zambia launched joint dawn raids with the Anti-
Corruption Commission in the fertiliser cartel investigations. It is also possi-
ble to have bilateral cooperation where there are cross-border effects. According 
to Bachmann and Afrika (2011), the benefits of bilateral agreements regarding 
international cartels are clear. They afford the exchange of information and 
assist counterpart agencies that may not have sufficient capacity to deal with 
complex cartels (Bachmann and Afrika, 2011).
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It is worth noting that while competition authorities may not readily share 
confidential information secured through a leniency application, this could be 
overcome by obtaining waivers from leniency applicants or those cartel partic-
ipants who are willing to settle. A competition authority will have to engage a 
counterpart agency formally to have access to such information. The SADC’s 
Heads of State Declaration on Regional Cooperation in Competition and Consumer 
Policies and Laws states that:
•	 Cooperation shall be enhanced by establishing a transparent frame-
work that contains appropriate safeguards to protect the confidential 
information of the parties and appropriate national judicial review;
•	 Member States shall have regard to comity principles, including 
positive comity, as an instrument of regional and bilateral coopera-
tion within the region, including informal positive comity referrals 
among competition enforcement authorities;
•	 Member States shall review those provisions in their laws that stand 
in the way of these cooperative efforts and explore areas where they 
are prepared to enter into binding agreements.8
Competence and knowledge management
Competition authorities must invest in sustainable training of their staff in their 
own substantive competition legislation, rules of evidence collection and han-
dling, rules of procedure for summoning witnesses, interviewing techniques 
and referral. While such training is indispensable, there should be a knowledge- 
application monitoring system in the organisation to ensure that those who are 
trained in a specific area actually apply the knowledge and do not continue to 
seek further training. Practical application and demonstration of knowledge in 
a case is important, develops confidence and achieves the requisite enforcement 
objectives of the competition legislation. The CCSA has invested in an elaborate 
knowledge-management (KM) system through a range of strategies and practices 
that allow it to identify, create, represent, distribute and facilitate the adoption 
of peer learning and the experience of insights and expertise. 
By 2014, the KM system at the CCSA had evolved from primarily a 
 document-management system to a far more integrated one, where users 
actively utilise its workflow capabilities and process automation to further 
enhance the quality of their cases. All cases lodged with the CCSA now go 
through an automated process and supporting documents can be shared with 
users.9 The CCSA is working on KM systems being integrated with the existing 
information technology infrastructure, the organisational culture and proce-
dures and the human resources policy. The CCSA (2014) has recognised that 
culture and user behaviours are the key drivers and inhibitors of internal infor-
mation sharing, and are strategising on ways to stimulate people to use and 
contribute to KM systems.
The KM is assisted greatly by workplace skills plans and annual training 
reports, which other competition authorities, such as that in Botswana, have 
also been producing since 2012.
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Use of temporary and external staff
The engagement and requisite training of temporary and/or external staff (inves-
tigators, inspectors, analysts, etc.) may assist greatly in cases where existing staff 
are overwhelmed with work, or where the need to remain focused on investiga-
tion, analysis and prosecution is beyond the capacity and scope of existing staff 
numbers, skills levels and funding. It may also be necessary to devise effective 
ways to dispose of cases while achieving the key enforcement objectives. During 
2013/2014, the CCSA completed settlements under the Construction Settlement 
Project (CSP), a special dispensation for uncovering bid rigging and settling the 
cases. The process uncovered more than 300 private- and public-sector rigged proj-
ects, including major infrastructure developments in South Africa such as the 2010 
Fifa Soccer World Cup stadia, dams, business/residential buildings, the Gauteng 
Freeway Improvement Project and other national roads (see CCSA, 2014). In addi-
tion to this case, the CCSA had about 30 other cartel investigations going on. 
Where funds permit, it may be necessary to employ specialised legal and 
economic consultants to assist with such a workload. Internal counsel may be 
knowledgeable about a case but other administrative work within the authority 
may divide their time. In cases where internal staff fall prey to high emotional-
ism, which may affect their ability to see the details and could result in derailing 
the case, the use of external counsel may provide the necessary accountability, 
leaving internal counsel to devote time to reviewing external counsel submis-
sions and providing policy guidance.
Political will and support
In various countries and at various times, competition policy has had a num-
ber of other legitimate objectives, ranging from industrial policy and economic 
development goals to economic freedom. But even when it only seeks to enhance 
economic welfare, it has been posited that effective competition policy is inher-
ently deeply political, since it entails the use of political power to constrain or 
even redistribute economic power (Büthe, 2015). Political awareness and com-
mitment to a cause matter a lot, especially in developing countries.
There is clear political will and support in South Africa to see the CCSA being 
as successful as it can be. The minister for economic development in South 
Africa, Ebrahim Patel, has noted that competition policy is particularly import-
ant for South Africa because of the relatively high levels of market concentration 
across the economy. He has highlighted the fact that the exclusive nature of 
apartheid led to dominance by a limited number of companies in many 
industries (CCSA, 2014). 
The relatively small, closed economy and the privatisation of major state 
manufacturing companies in the 1980s added to securing an environment 
replete with monopoly power. In this environment, collusion and rent seeking 
continued as an entrenched culture in even some of the most important and 
productive companies (CCSA, 2014). Patel indicated that competition policy 
must be used to combat cartels and abuse of market dominance, and that this 
must become a greater focus of the authorities in the period ahead. 
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Such well-informed political support has, however, not been given on a silver 
platter – it has been earned over the years by the CCSA. It is the duty of the com-
petition authority to demonstrate its relevance to the political establishment 
by ensuring that its outcomes feed into the national development vision and 
expected deliverables in terms of jobs, poverty, narrowing socioeconomic gaps, 
fighting corruption/cartels and supporting SME growth and sustenance. Political 
will and support should be expressed in the following overt features:
•	 Publicly promulgated, clear and consistent political support for the very 
existence of a competition authority;
•	 Publicly declared autonomy in the operations and processes of the competi-
tion authority as it investigates high-profile cases;10
•	 Reasonable funding of the operations of the competition authority in rela-
tion to government’s expectations of its deliverables;
•	 A clear political message to special interest groups of government’s commit-
ment to the rule of law in commerce and trade, which competition policy is 
envisaged to bring about; and
•	 National consensus on the understanding of the egregious nature of cartels.
Arising from the above, political will and commitment can be used as a chan-
nel to bring to the fore the destructive nature of cartel conduct. Public under-
standing of the nature of cartels and the damage they bring about, not only 
to competition but to society at large, is important. Not only the competition 
authorities but all those involved in business at policy, leadership, entrepreneur-
ial, advisory or operational levels should understand this. This extends to those 
involved in authorising cartel investigations, those who undertake the investiga-
tions, those who analyse the findings, those who adjudicate and those who deal 
with appeals. Where a system is inherently divided and/or at any level considers 
cartels not to be a serious form of anticompetitive activity, business will be quick 
to recognise this and will not undertake to stop their cartel activity. CLP will 
equally not yield much in terms of confessions, as has been the case in other 
SACU/SADC countries.
The right case for the right moment
Finding the right case for the right moment is very important to bring cre-
dence to cartel enforcement. The bread cartel case, for instance, brought 
instant recognition of the work of the CCSA to ordinary South Africans. While 
the case neither guaranteed nor brought about lower bread prices following 
the busting of the cartel, it provided a good platform to launch the CCSA’s 
cartel enforcement programme and to link it to consumers. The steel and con-
struction cases were linked to the World Cup, which event was on the lips of 
every South African. Busting cartels for the sake of it should not be an end in 
itself, but must be seen to have some form of impact in society. A caution here 
is that competition authorities should not lose sight of their role as watchdogs 
of all sectors in the economy while pursuing cases which could earn them 
more publicity.
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Demonstrate benefit of cartel enforcement 
to government and consumers 
The news that a number of South African construction firms were guilty of ten-
der rigging and price fixing to the tune of R30 billion was surely welcomed by 
the Treasury. In 2012, companies paid administrative fines of about R934 million 
for violations of the Competition Act. Most of these fines (R482 million) were 
paid by companies that engaged in price fixing, market allocation and collusive 
tendering in a cartel. Tembinkosi Bonakele (CCSA, 2014) indicated in his state-
ment in the annual report that the CCSA had undertaken a study of the impact 
of uncovering the construction cartel. Using estimates of overcharges as a result 
of the cartel, the study found that consumer saving as a result of the cartel being 
uncovered ranged between approximately R4.5 billion and R5.8 billion for the 
period 2010 to 2013. In addition, there was a noticeable change and dynamism 
in the market, with firms entering territories they had previously not traded in 
(CCSA, 2014). Carrying out such impact studies is an important advocacy tool 
that enhances a competition authority’s value to society.
In the Pioneer Foods white maize meal and milled wheat products cartel 
cases, the benefits arising from the fine included the following (see Bonakele and 
Mncube, 2012):
•	 Pioneer Foods had to pay a fine of R500 million to the National Revenue 
Fund; and
•	 The CCSA, National Treasury and the Economic Development Department 
separately agreed that the Department would submit a budgetary pro-
posal and business case motivating for the creation of an Agro-Processing 
Competitiveness Fund of R250 million, drawn from the penalty, to be 
administered by the Industrial Development Corporation. 
Fines and penalties must be punitive
One school of thought posits that fines and penalties in legislation must be puni-
tive enough to merit the effort of uncovering a cartel. Another is of the view that 
even if the fines and penalties are low, the point is to name and shame – the bad 
publicity and reputational damage (if any) that a company suffers may provide 
some form of deterrence and discipline market behaviour. However, the effec-
tiveness of this will depend on the levels of competition culture in a particular 
economy and on the society’s norms.  
In South Africa, penalties are up to 10% of the previous year’s gross turnover. 
Tanzania has the highest fine and can fine from a minimum of 5% up to 10% 
of global turnover of the companies involved. Namibia has a maximum of 10% 
based on global turnover.11 Botswana has a maximum fine of 10% (domestic 
market turnover) for each year during the currency of a cartel, up to a maximum 
of three years. Zambia has a maximum fine of 10% based on domestic turn-
over, while Zimbabwe has the lowest fine at US$5 000. Apart from South Africa, 
Mauritius and Zambia, none of the SACU/SADC countries have successfully 
meted out any cartel-related fines (see World Bank, 2016). 
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A fine balance is needed between cartel enforcement in terms of high fines 
and discounting penalties to those who cooperate during investigations. Senona 
(2013), a legal counsel at the CCSA, acknowledges the need to discount a penalty 
when determining the appropriate penalty against a cooperating firm. Bonakele 
and Mncube (2012) hail penalty discounting as a remedial tool to take centre 
stage as a competition law remedy.
Attract public attention: Media, legal and academic discourse
The level of public interest, particularly in the media, legal and academic frater-
nity, has brought competition law, in particular cartel enforcement, to the fore. 
Almost all leading legal firms in South Africa have a division solely devoted to 
competition law. Universities have students writing dissertations on competi-
tion law and enforcement. This development is arguably unprecedented in any 
part of Africa. In 2007, a renowned cartoonist captured the nation’s anti-cartel 
sentiments (figure 3.1). 
Develop legal clarity and precedents through 
Tribunal and court decisions 
Through the initial years of trial and error, the South African competition 
authorities and the judiciary provided legal clarity and precedents, with inter-
nationally quotable Tribunal and court decisions. Oxenham (2015) notes that 
within a space of 18 months, South Africa witnessed significant developments 
in the investigation and prosecution of cartel conduct. One of the key develop-
ments was the Supreme Court of Appeal’s confirmation that leniency applica-
tions submitted to the CCSA by a leniency applicant are subject to legal privilege 
unless the CCSA makes reference to the application in a complaint referral to the 
Tribunal12 – in which case it will be taken to have waived privilege. Another court 
held that the Tribunal may make a declaration that it has found the conduct of 
Figure 3.1 Zapiro, Mail & Guardian, 15 November 2007
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an applicant for immunity to be a prohibited practice, even if the applicant is 
not cited as a respondent, provided that natural justice is followed and there is 
a proper factual basis.13 
Such jurisprudence is necessary to develop the law and to streamline legal 
processes accordingly. It also helps to give clearer meaning to the law and pro-
vides for greater consistency and certainty in future case direction for both the 
CCSA and the respondents. 
Efficient and capacitated institutional arrangement
South Africa has an efficient institutional arrangement comprising the CCSA, the 
Competition Tribunal and the CAC. A number of countries, such as Botswana, 
Swaziland, Tanzania and Zambia, have in recent years experienced direct or indi-
rect attacks against their institutional arrangements. The South African system 
provides a clear separation between the investigatory, adjudication and appeal 
functions. This system avoids a situation where case success is frustrated by the 
conflict of roles played by any organ in the enforcement chain. However, this 
does not lessen the fact that operating effectively in all three stages – detection, 
prosecution and penalisation by the CCSA – is crucial to disrupting existing car-
tels and deterring new ones from forming (see Harrington, 2007, in CCSA and 
CTSA, 2009). Most importantly, it appears that the implementing institutions 
(the CCSA, the Tribunal, CAC and the Supreme Court of Appeal) are well capac-
itated to deal with their respective mandates. 
Strong code of ethics and incorruptible staff,  
adjudicators and courts
An institution may have the best system, funds and political support, but if there 
are unethical and corruptible staff and adjudicators, the system will struggle to 
achieve the desired enforcement goals and objectives, especially in cartels. Cartel 
profits are in the hundreds of millions of US dollars and, often enough, it does 
not take much to corrupt a public official. Codes of conduct have been adopted 
by most competition authorities.
Enduring long and costly investigation and litigation processes
Cartel investigations may take years from the initiation of the investigation to 
settlement. A competition authority must brace itself for protracted legal battles, 
interlocutory or points in limine (preliminary points of law) before the substan-
tive merits of the case are heard. The soda ash cartel investigation in South Africa 
was opened in 1999 and took nine years to reach settlement in 2008. The CCSA’s 
investigations revealed a contravention of the Competition Act and the com-
plaint was referred to the Tribunal on 14 April 2000. The American Natural Soda 
Ash Corporation (Ansac) opposed the referral on the grounds that the agreement 
was not a contravention of the Act, but, rather, was integral to the operation of 
a legitimate and transparent corporate joint venture, which existed for the pro-
motion of export sales, generated significant logistics efficiencies and impacted 
pro-competitively on the South African market. Between February 2000 and July 
2008, the case was held up by extended litigation involving points in limine and 
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appeals. In May 2005, the Supreme Court of Appeal decided that the matter 
be heard before the Tribunal. The Tribunal hearings into the merits of the case 
began in mid-2008, and Ansac closed its case within a month. In September 
2008, Ansac and its fellow respondent and South African agent, CHC Global, 
approached the CCSA to discuss a settlement. This case took nine years to reach 
settlement. With the threat of staff turnover and loss of institutional memory, a 
competition authority will need to ensure that there is a system of continuity in 
such cases, in the context of both human resources (proper and easily traceable 
records) and financial resources, in order to effectively sustain them. 
Leadership
There is a need for anti-cartel leadership that is seen to be not only knowledge-
able but also well inclined to undertake sustained action against cartels. Such 
leadership should prioritise resources accordingly and ensure that maximum 
impact is gained from the prioritisation. Leadership will also be expected to 
engage in impactful debates that create awareness of a competition authority’s 
unflinching stance against cartels. This kind of leadership should show examples 
of visible enforcement achievements and not merely play public relations. Such 
leadership should equally ignite the right national debate and interest in the 
work of a competition authority. Leadership must project a visionary dedication 
to the rule of law, transparency and fairness in investigations and prosecutions. 
For instance, Spicer (2009, in CCSA and CTSA, 2009, p. 34) remarked about 
David Lewis, former chairperson of the Tribunal: ‘What has particularly struck 
me about Lewis is the combination of toughness, independent-mindedness, but 
ultimately the fairness of his approach. Business can expect no favours, but it 
can generally be confident that the law will be fairly applied.’
Conclusion
Cartel leniency confessions and settlements in South Africa have not resulted in 
similar confessions in SACU/SADC countries where there are functional compe-
tition authorities. It is unlikely that such confessions will ever be received in the 
absence of the competition authorities actually demonstrating that they have 
the capacity and resolve to detect and punish cartel offences. As useful as it is, a 
CLP is merely a document and in and of itself will not invite confessions from 
cartel participants. Life has to be breathed into CLPs by competition authorities 
going out into the marketplace and getting admissible evidence that can attract 
punitive penalties. To do this, competition authorities must invest not only in 
systems, but also in developing the staff involved in advocacy, cartel investiga-
tions, analysis, prosecution and adjudication to understand investigation proce-
dures, rules of evidence, collection and handling.
It is also worth noting that a number of competition authorities in the SADC 
have been undertaking market studies/inquiries into specific sectors to under-
stand the nature of such sectors and their competition dynamics. This has been 
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done by individual competition authorities at the national level as well as in 
the regional collaborative context under the SADC and the African Competition 
Forum in sectors that include transport, sugar, cement and poultry. Such invest-
ment is timely and will assist the authorities to better understand particular 
sectors and how the cross-regional corporate strategies and linkages can be mon-
itored to ensure that cartels are detected timeously. It will also facilitate the nec-
essary cooperation among competition authorities. 
Notes
1 The World Bank (2016, p. 61) reports, for instance, that cement prices in Africa were 
183% higher on average than the world price of cement at the end of 2014.
2 Case no. CCPC/RBP/009 of 2011.
3 Case no. CCPC/RBP/052 of 2012.
4 See case no. 15/CR/Mar10, Competition Commission vs. Pioneer Foods (Pty) Ltd, 30 
November 2010.
5 ‘The Use of Leniency Programmes as a Tool for the Enforcement of Competition Law 
against Hardcore Cartels in Developing Countries’, Geneva, 26 August 2010, TD/RBP/
CONF.7/4.
6 Utilising powers of search and seizure and market inquiries, the CCSA has demon-
strated a far more proactive and robust enforcement of the cartel provisions in the 
Act. Accordingly, given the more proactive approach adopted by the CCSA, companies 
operating in South Africa need to ensure that internal compliance programmes are 
regularly updated.
7 See commentary by Paul PJ Coetser, head of Competition Department, Werksmans 
Attorneys, then  chairman, Competition Law Committee of the Law Society of South 
Africa, in CCSA and CTSA (2009, p. 34).
8 Paras. 1 (e)–(h).
9 The Swaziland Competition Commission has adopted a similar system.
10 The ICN (2002) has noted that autonomy is generally considered essential to the effec-
tiveness of advocacy work. However, a distinction should be made between formal 
and factual independence. In some countries a high degree of formal independence 
goes together with a certain isolation of the competition authority from the executive 
branch of government, which does not favour the advocacy activities of the agency. 
In other jurisdictions, competition agencies with a low degree of autonomy, forming 
a directorate of a ministry subject to ministerial oversight, claim that their decisions 
are generally respected in an environment of transparency and accountability. That 
is to say, formal independence need not coincide with factual independence and it is 
factual independence that really matters.
11 Excessive fines which take into account turnover not generated in the country where 
the contravention occurred may lack credibility and may be subject to legal chal-
lenges, especially when the turnover generated in the fining country is insignificant 
when compared to the company’s global turnover.
12 Competition Commission v Arcelormittal SA Ltd & Others (680/12) [2013] ZASCA 84, para. 50.
13 Premier Foods v Manoim NO (20147/2014) [2015] ZASCA 159; 2016 (1) SA 445 (SCA); 
[2016] 1 All SA 40 (SCA) (4 November 2015).
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4 Excessive pricing under the spotlight: What is a competitive 
price?
Introduction 
Excessive pricing is arguably the most contentious area of competition enforce-
ment in many jurisdictions. There are diverse views on the need for interven-
tion by competition authorities in dominant firms’ pricing of products and 
services (Evans and Padilla, 2005b; Ezrachi and Gilo, 2009; Motta and de Streel, 
2006; Roberts, 2008). Those arguing against intervention are of the view that 
it is generally unnecessary as prices significantly above a competitive level will 
ordinarily attract new entry, resulting in competition which will in turn drive 
prices down (Calcagno and Walker, 2010; O’Donoghue and Padilla, 2006). Other 
grounds that are often cited for limited or non-intervention are the difficulties 
in calculating the counterfactual or ‘competitive’ price for determining exces-
siveness and that enforcement of excessive prices may deter or chill investment 
(Ezrachi and Gilo, 2010; O’Donoghue and Padilla, 2013). The validity of the non- 
interventionist approach has, however, been questioned, with analyses showing 
that the self-correction argument may not hold in certain situations, particularly 
in small economies with highly concentrated markets and high barriers to entry 
(Ezrachi and Gilo, 2010). The difficulties of the assessment are not unique to 
excessive pricing. Other pricing contraventions, such as predatory pricing and 
margin squeeze assessments, are also highly complex, with the former requiring 
the determination of an appropriate measure of cost. 
These diverse views have resulted in varying approaches by different jurisdic-
tions. For example, the US has no provision in its antitrust policy that prohibits 
excessive prices and it is generally accepted that monopoly prices may be part of 
the dynamic competitive process. The view is that markets can ‘self-correct’ by 
attracting new entry.2 The European Commission (EC) has also adopted a limited 
intervention approach towards excessive pricing and there is a legitimate reluc-
tance to act as price regulators who decide on what the right price should be. 
However, there are instances in which the EC will intervene (discussed below) 
(European Commission, 2016). Several member states’ competition authorities 
are more active than the EC in pursuing such cases. 
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The Competition Commission of South Africa has taken on a few exces-
sive pricing cases under section 8(a) of the Competition Act of 1998. Under 
this provision, an excessive price is defined as a price for a good or service 
which bears no reasonable relation to the economic value of that good or ser-
vice, and is higher than the value. The Act, however, does not define economic 
value and this is a key area of debate in the South African case law. There have 
been at least six cases dealing with excessive pricing in South Africa over the 
past decade in a range of industries, including pharmaceuticals (antiretroviral 
drugs), telecommunications, steel, petrochemicals and fertilisers. The first key 
case in the steel industry, Harmony Gold v Mittal Steel SA (the Mittal case), was 
the subject of Competition Tribunal and Competition Appeal Court (CAC) rul-
ings, and has been written about extensively (Calcagno and Walker, 2010; das 
Nair, 2008; Davis, 2011; Ezrachi and Gilo, 2009; Lewis, 2009; Roberts, 2008). 
The other cases were settled prior to being heard and therefore the authorities 
have not made findings on the determination of economic value that can be 
debated (see Roberts, 2012, for descriptions), or findings were only made based 
on other contraventions, for example in the Telkom case in the telecommuni-
cations sector.
Excessive pricing and the assessment thereof has again come under the 
spotlight in South Africa with the release of the Competition Tribunal decision 
in June 2014, followed by the CAC’s decision in June 2015, in the case against 
Sasol Chemical Industries (SCI). The case referred by the Commission to the 
Tribunal alleged that SCI charged excessive prices for the sale of petrochemical 
products – purified propylene and polypropylene – which are main inputs in the 
plastics sector. The Tribunal found in favour of the Commission and ruled that 
SCI had indeed charged excessive prices for these products. However, the CAC 
overturned this decision, finding in favour of SCI.
As the first excessive pricing case with a ruling since the Mittal decision, 
the CAC judgment in SCI presents an opportunity to revisit old debates and 
engage in new concepts that arose, particularly around the interpretation of 
economic value and the determination of a long-run competitive equilibrium 
(LRCE) as the benchmark for economic value. In this chapter, we explore 
whether, and how, the judgment takes the debates on determining economic 
value forward. We also discuss the pertinent issue of the treatment of special 
cost advantages that a dominant firm has in an excessive pricing determina-
tion and the implications of the CAC’s decision in this regard in the South 
African context. 
The next section evaluates the debates on the need for intervention and sets 
out the South African legislative framework in this light. Thereafter we provide 
a brief background on the SCI case, followed by consideration of whether the 
LRCE as referred in CAC Mittal is a conceptual framework or a new test, and to 
what extent this concept takes the debate on measuring economic value forward 
by providing a coherent understanding and measurement of economic value. 
The treatment of special cost advantages in determining economic value is then 
debated before providing some conclusions.
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South Africa’s legislative framework: 
When is intervention warranted?
The divergence in approaches to excessive pricing can partially be explained 
by the nature of the markets in the different jurisdictions. Different countries’ 
choices regarding excessive pricing reflect decisions about the relative balance 
between risks of over- and underenforcement in the context of their unique 
economic challenges and conditions. The US and the European Union have 
large markets where it is unlikely for a single firm to be able to act truly inde-
pendently and unconstrained by the threat of new entry. On the other hand, 
in South Africa and other smaller economies in southern Africa which are faced 
with overwhelmingly dominant firms and where there are barriers to entry, it is 
possible for firms to extract high rents from their positions. These smaller mar-
kets mean that when there is a need to achieve economies of scale, the industries 
will typically be more concentrated. For example, the scale of sugar production 
by Zambia Sugar, producing approximately double the domestic demand, means 
that there is only one very large firm in Zambia and others of similar size are 
unlikely (Chisanga, Meyer, Winter-Nelson and Sitko, 2014). Similarly, the scale 
of production required for integrated flat steel production is far above the size 
not just of demand in South Africa, but of demand in neighbouring economies 
also. In the case of wheat milling in South Africa, scale economies mean that 
there can only be a few firms, implying that in smaller markets there may well 
be unilateral dominance (Grimbeek and Lekezwa, 2013). In such instances the 
cost of underenforcement is high, particularly where the relevant product is an 
intermediary input into other markets. Recognising that the different jurisdic-
tions have different market characteristics, it is then appropriate that there is a 
divergence of approaches to excessive prices (Evans, 2009). 
In recognition of the risks of overenforcement, economists have identified 
circumstances that may require intervention by competition authorities (Evans, 
2009; Lewis, 2009; Motta and de Streel, 2007; O’Donoghue and Padilla, 2013; 
Roberts, 2008). There has been some debate about the nature of barriers to entry 
that should be adopted in the limiting principles. The requirement for legal bar-
riers to entry (Evans and Padilla, 2005a) would, in a literal reading, exclude a 
number of firms that have entrenched (near) monopoly positions and are not 
subject to regulation. Lewis (2009) argues that in instances where barriers to 
entry were established by historical circumstances, or by technological and com-
mercial considerations, the effect is at least as insurmountable as legal barriers. 
In a similar vein, O’Donoghue and Padilla (2013, p. 775) move away from the 
position on legal barriers to argue that intervention should be limited to those 
industries ‘(1) that are protected by high barriers to entry; (2) where one firm 
enjoys considerable market power; and (3) where investment and innovation 
play a relatively minor role’. In such markets, the high prices that a firm with 
significant market power can charge will not result in new entry, while the dan-
ger of chilling innovation and risk taking does not arise as a legitimate concern. 
The excessive pricing provision should therefore be aimed at pricing that is not 
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‘the legitimate rewards of monopoly power as the fruits of successful investment, 
innovation or efficiency’ (Rose and Bailey, 2013: 10.107). Such pricing might be 
the result of exploitation of market power bequeathed to a firm through state 
support, or current or past exclusive rights.
As noted, although generally cautious about intervention in such matters, 
particularly in innovative industries, the EC intervenes in certain situations. 
A 2016 speech by the EC’s commissioner of competition, Margrethe Vestager, 
highlighted that intervention was necessary in the Gazprom gas case, where 
restrictions on resale between geographic markets resulted in Gazprom charging 
excessive prices for gas in certain countries (European Commission, 2016). There 
is less fear of stifling innovation in a ‘commodity’-type product market like gas 
than there is in more dynamic, hi-tech markets like electronics, computers or 
smartphones.
The formulation of excessive pricing in the South African Competition Act 
broadly follows that of European case law, with the definition of an excessive 
price having been taken directly from the United Brands decision.3 Although the 
European legislation does not directly refer to excessive pricing, the term has 
been a product of case law (Lewis, 2009). Article 82(a) of the EC Treaty prohibits 
a dominant firm from engaging in ‘unfair’ pricing practices, which has been 
interpreted as including excessive and predatory prices.
The South African legislation not only explicitly prohibits excessive pricing 
but has also included a definition of the term. Section 8(a) of the Act provides that 
it is prohibited for a dominant firm to charge an excessive price to the detriment 
of consumers, where an excessive price is defined in section 1(1)(ix) as ‘a price 
for a good or service which bears no reasonable relation to the economic value 
of that good or service’ (aa) and ‘is higher than the value’(bb). The assessment set 
out in the Act comprises the factual determinations of the price of the good or 
service that is alleged to be excessive, and the economic value of that good or ser-
vice and value judgements on the reasonableness of the difference between price 
and economic value, as well as whether the price is to the detriment of consumers. 
As noted, the Act does not define economic value and this is a key area of 
debate in the South African case law. The interpretation of economic value is 
developed through jurisprudence. We argue that economic value must be inter-
preted in line with market conditions prevalent in South Africa and that this is 
what the legislature must have intended by the inclusion of this provision in the 
Act (see also Lewis, 2009; Roberts, 2008). 
The preamble of the Act explicitly recognises the excessive concentrations of 
ownership and control as a result of the apartheid regime and the Act’s objective 
to address the consequences thereof, further reflected in the purpose of the Act. 
This includes prohibiting practices that undermine a competitive economy, and 
promoting outcomes that support employment and equitable participation of 
small and medium enterprises in the economy. Addressing exploitative conduct 
by dominant firms in the form of excessive pricing is an important objective of 
the Act under these circumstances. Other countries that have not had the same 
history and outcomes in their economies as South Africa may have less motivation 
to include the excessive pricing provision in their respective competition laws.
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As a result of the sanctions imposed on South Africa during the apartheid 
regime, the government heavily protected and supported the growth and devel-
opment of state-owned enterprises, often supporting one firm per industry with 
no clear conditionalities on the behaviour of firms. This support extended to 
a range of strategic industries, including steel and petrochemicals, creating 
entrenched dominant firms with significant market power. After privatisation, 
these firms continued to operate as private monopolies and oligopolies facing 
little or no effective rivalry. As the CAC in Mittal noted, ‘a history of such state 
largesse cannot be permitted to subvert competition nor should the market 
power inherited from the erstwhile status as a state enterprise be exerted with 
continued impunity’.4 Thus, at least in the South African context, the competi-
tion authorities ought to be most concerned with pricing in markets with high 
and non-transitory barriers to entry, that is, where the dominant firm’s position 
is entrenched, and where the dominant firm’s position in that market is not the 
result of any innovation or risk taking by the firm but rather due to current or 
past exclusive rights or state support (Motta and de Streel, 2006; Vickers, 2006).
Background to the SCI case
The Commission investigated the case against SCI on request from the 
Department of Trade and Industry (the dti). The dti was concerned about the 
poor growth of labour-absorbing downstream industries, such as plastic prod-
ucts manufacturing. High input prices were identified as a major challenge to 
downstream beneficiation in the plastics value chain for household products like 
buckets, chairs, tables and cooler boxes, and for industrial products such as car 
parts and water tanks.
SCI is a wholly owned subsidiary of Sasol Limited, a previously state-owned 
company that is a vertically integrated fuel and petrochemicals business. The 
complaint against SCI was on its pricing practices for key inputs into down-
stream plastics manufacturing. These included purified propylene, where SCI 
has overwhelming dominance in South Africa, and polypropylene, where SCI 
is dominant in terms of the Act but competes with Safripol. Safripol’s ability to 
effectively compete with SCI in the polypropylene market is limited, given that 
it is principally reliant on SCI for its propylene input and is capacity constrained. 
Purified propylene is made from feedstock propylene, which is produced as a 
by-product from Sasol’s synthetic fuels business, Synfuels, through its coal-to-
fuel and gas-to-fuel processes.
South Africa (and Sasol) has been a net exporter of polypropylene for over 
20 years. South African demand for polypropylene is less than 300 000 tonnes/
annum. In November 2016, Sasol announced an expansion of its polypropylene 
production by 103 000 tonnes/annum to just over 625 000 tonnes/annum, rein-
forcing its strong net exporter position going forward (Van Wyngaardt, 2016). 
It was common cause between the Commission and SCI that SCI is one of 
the lowest-cost producers in the world, with its feedstock propylene costs around 
25–30% lower than typical producers in Europe. Synfuels’ processes mean that 
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it produces more propylene relative to a typical oil refinery. Sasol can, and does, 
convert some of the propylene into fuel. However, there are limitations on the 
extent to which it can do this cost-effectively if it is to meet the country’s clean 
fuels regulations. Sasol acknowledges its very low-cost advantage in propylene 
feedstock, which has underpinned expansions in capacity to serve export poly-
propylene markets, no doubt including its latest 2016 expansion.
Feedstock propylene prices depend on its alternative uses, including keep-
ing the feedstock (or refinery grade) propylene in the fuel pool, or extracting 
and purifying the propylene to chemical grade or polymer grade propylene for 
conversion into various chemical products and polypropylene. Sasol’s pricing 
of polymer-grade propylene did not reflect its actual alternatives, which are 
limited, given the large amounts of feedstock propylene that are produced as 
a by-product. Instead, its polymer-grade propylene prices were linked to local 
polypropylene prices through a pricing formula based on an import parity price 
of polypropylene sold in the local market.
This derived price is in no way reflective of SCI’s very low cost of producing feed-
stock propylene. SCI argued that its low-cost feedstock is a ‘special cost advantage’. 
The SCI case turns, in particular, on how the low costs should be treated, especially 
in the context where those costs are derived from historical decisions which advan-
tage the firm, in this case including policy decisions and extensive support by the 
apartheid state (see below on the treatment of special cost advantages).
While in the mid-1990s polypropylene to local customers was priced at 
export parity prices, Sasol moved to import parity levels in 2002/2003, which 
it has maintained ever since. The costs of importing polypropylene into South 
Africa are not trivial, and include shipping, transport, insurance, wharfage and 
a 10% import duty (although the duty has since been reduced to zero). These 
notional costs of importing were then added to a free-on-board pricing point 
to arrive at an import parity price for local customers. This meant a substan-
tial increase in prices of polypropylene, and, in turn, of purified propylene. The 
impact of this was seen in the declining output of the local plastics industry. The 
price of both purified propylene and polypropylene, as intermediate products 
into plastics production, has significant implications for the price and competi-
tiveness of a range of domestically produced plastic products.
The price charged by SCI to local buyers of polypropylene has thus been sub-
stantially above the prices earned on its actual exports, reflecting the inclusion 
of all the notional costs to import. The price to local buyers competing in the 
domestic market has also been substantially above the prices SCI has provided 
to other categories of customers, such as export customers of polypropylene 
products (who were not allowed to redirect product back into South Africa). 
Determining economic value 
The determination of economic value has been a point of contestation in exces-
sive pricing literature and case law. As the legislation has not defined the term or 
established tests for its calculation, the case law has, over time, developed both. 
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Reviews of literature in this area show that there is no generally accepted defini-
tion of economic value (Calcagno and Walker, 2010; Evans and Padilla, 2005a). 
However, case precedent has been instructive in interpreting economic value. In 
United Brands, the courts defined economic value as the price that would arise 
under conditions of ‘normal and sufficiently effective competition’, while in 
NAPP5 economic value was understood to be determined under conditions of 
‘effective competitive pressure’. In light of these cases, in the literature excessive 
prices have been understood as those which could not be charged under con-
ditions of effective competitive rivalry (Ezrachi and Gilo, 2009; Motta and 
de Streel, 2007). All the definitions given by the case law refer to the counter-
factual to be used in the assessment as the outcomes of effective competition. 
However, the concept of effective competition itself has taken different mean-
ings over time, which has added to the difficulties in assessing economic value.
One understanding is that it is the absence of market power where market 
power is understood as the ability to raise prices above marginal cost in the 
short run and above average total cost in the long run (Mehta and Peeperkorn, 
2007). The reference to the short run is not particularly useful as it suggests a 
requirement of perfect competition. It is unlikely that the intention of the leg-
islature was to characterise any price above marginal cost as excessive. A more 
useful understanding of effective competition is where there is sufficient rivalry 
to ensure that prices are not raised significantly above a measure of average total 
cost. The levels of competition for it to be deemed effective are thus dependent 
on the outcomes it produces rather than the form of competition (Bishop and 
Walker, 2010). The use of comparators in assessing economic value is in line with 
this approach by comparing an allegedly excessive price to the price that is an 
outcome of more competitive, comparable geographic or product markets.
The European case law has established a range of comparators that are com-
monly used as the benchmark for economic value (Motta and de Streel, 2007). 
These comparators can be grouped into two broad sets and have also been 
accepted by the South African courts.6 First, prices of the same firm for substan-
tially the same product in different markets (after correcting for transport and 
related costs in the case of different geographic markets), and/or prices to dif-
ferent customers in the same market can be used as comparators. This includes 
prices of products sold into export markets. Second, prices can be compared 
of same/similar products sold by different firms in competitive or international 
markets. These are typically known as international price comparators. 
Other measures of economic value used in the European case law include 
direct price-cost tests and profitability tests. These are subject to empirical chal-
lenges in measuring costs for an efficient firm, as inefficiency cannot be a justifi-
cation for charging high prices, as well as identifying what are reasonable levels 
of profit and how to measure the relevant asset base. These are challenges that 
economic regulators grapple with. 
The Mittal case was the first case in which the CAC sought to clarify the stan-
dards to be applied in South Africa. In Mittal, the CAC defined the ‘economic 
value’ of a good or service as ‘the notional price of the good or service under 
conditions of long-run competitive equilibrium’. The CAC cautioned that this 
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is not to be understood as a price set under conditions of perfect competition 
in the short run, ‘but rather competition that would be effective enough in the 
long run to eliminate what economists refer to as “pure profit” – that is a reward 
of any factor of production in excess of the long-run competitive norm which is 
relevant to that industry or branch of production’.7
The SCI case was the first time that the precedent set by the CAC in Mittal 
could be tested. Key new questions were added to the economic value debate, 
especially around what LRCE is and what it means in relation to economic value.
In the SCI case, the parties involved interpreted the CAC Mittal definition to 
establish two tests. A distinction was drawn between i) a test based on a price that 
would allow for entry (SCI’s primary test – ‘the LRCE test’), which determines 
the notional price of the good or service under assumed conditions of LRCE, and 
ii) the prices which would be charged if there were existing competitors under 
a notional competitive norm (the Commission’s approach – the ‘effective com-
petitive rivalry’ test). Whether there is indeed a distinction between the LRCE 
test and effective competitive rivalry is dependent on the interpretation of the 
conditions of LRCE. This brings into question whether the CAC intended the 
prices under LRCE as a framework or as a test in itself.
 In the rest of this section, we explore whether the LRCE approach takes 
us forward in determining economic value by considering whether the CAC’s 
reference to the competitive benchmark was intended as an end or as a means 
to an end. This is assessed by testing whether the LRCE test, as interpreted by 
SCI, corresponds to the intention of the legislature and whether it is capable of 
practical application. 
LRCE: A framework or a new test?
The LRCE benchmark obviously turns on how ‘long run’ and ‘competitive equi-
librium’ are understood. On the one hand, SCI argued that it should be inter-
preted as the prices at which firms would enter the market without necessarily 
having access to inputs at the same costs as the incumbent firm in question. On 
the other hand, as the Commission argued, it should be understood as the pric-
ing which would have prevailed had there been established effective competitors 
in the market with similar costs to the incumbent. 
The ‘long run’ can be defined in a textbook sense as where factors of produc-
tion are variable, where there is free entry and exit in an industry, and where 
normal profits, and not ‘pure profit’, are made (Blaug, 1997). In this case, pure 
profit is understood as any profit above the ‘normal’ rate of profit, which includes 
depreciation and return to shareholders. The normal rate of return rewards the 
investor at the opportunity cost of the investment. The conditions of no ‘pure 
profit’ and free entry and exit were at the heart of the debate on what the CAC 
intended by LRCE.
At a return based on the opportunity cost of the investment, investors would 
be indifferent as to which industry they are in and would have an incentive to 
invest in the relevant industry only if the profits were above the normal rate. The 
CAC’s guidance in Mittal was very clear that the meaning of LRCE is that there 
are zero ‘pure profits’. SCI’s interpretation of the LRCE then appears to be at odds 
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with the zero pure profits condition. SCI’s interpretation of LRCE as the costs of 
an entrant necessarily requires that there is some profit above the normal rate to 
be able to attract the entrant in the first place. 
This interpretation is inconsistent with the literature on understanding LRCE 
in the context of economic value. Though there is no agreement on the exact 
interpretation of LRCE, what is consistent across the different contributions is 
that LRCE should be calculated with reference to existing firms rather than to 
new entrants (Calcagno and Walker, 2010; Davis, 2011; Lewis, 2009). Calcagno 
and Walker (2010) understood LRCE to mean the costs of an efficient (not nec-
essarily the most efficient) firm in the long run and proposed that economic 
value can then be calculated by means of a profitability test (as was used by 
the defendant in Mittal). The efficient firm test here refers to the costs of either 
the dominant firm or an (existing) competitor. Davis (2011: 328) held that when 
determining economic value in line with the conditions of LRCE, the assessment 
should consider, among other things, the dominant firm’s production costs. 
In addition to whether to consider the costs of an entrant or those of notional 
established competitors, SCI’s interpretation of the LRCE test also requires 
parameters to be specified in determining this equilibrium, and there could be 
multiple equilibria. As such, a monopoly is a possible equilibrium if the hypoth-
esised market is small relative to scale economies (such as if the existing market 
size is used in the case of a developing country with a relatively small national 
demand). This approach is inconsistent with accepted principles in determining 
economic value. Even in circumstances where economic value is to be determined 
for differentiated products, it has been argued that economic value of the prod-
uct must first be determined by a method which assumes competition between 
producers of the identical product (Petersen, Maenetje and Le Roux, 2008). That 
is, economic value should be determined ‘as if’ there had been competitors pro-
ducing the same product rather than the actual situation where differentiation 
can mean firms produce variations of the product that differ materially (and a 
rival firm would have to invest in making its product a closer competitor to the 
dominant firm in question). However, this may not necessarily arise where there 
is monopolistic competition as, in the long run, monopolistic competition can 
produce outcomes similar to perfect competition where all pure profit is com-
peted away, albeit under specified assumptions (Chamberlin, 1933).
SCI’s interpretation of long run in the LRCE test also means that excessive 
prices would be temporary as entrants would compete the price down to the 
level of zero pure profits after entry. This is not consistent with durable entry 
barriers which are not necessarily specific to the firm – there could well be sev-
eral firms with the same durable advantages over entrants. The idea of free entry 
and exit is rooted in a model which assumes away such barriers and this is often 
inconsistent with reality.
In economic textbook models of the ‘long run’ all factors of production are 
variable and firms can enter and exit. This needs to take into account barriers 
to entry beyond simply making the necessary capital investment, including, for 
example, access to key inputs at competitive prices. In the SCI case, the incum-
bent firm has access to low-cost feedstock that is not available on equal terms to 
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potential entrants. This represents an absolute cost advantage in the sense that 
the entrant cannot secure as low a cost of production as the incumbent firm, 
thus creating a barrier to entry (see Bain, 1956, as cited in Gilbert, 1989). These 
low feedstock costs are a result of a legacy of extensive former state support 
which bestowed SCI its market position and not a result of risks or innovation 
undertaken by the firm (discussed later). 
SCI’s modelled LRCE price outcomes were also set in the very market in 
which the dominant firm is alleged to be charging excessive prices (including, 
pertinently, the size of the market). This fundamentally undermines the entire 
analysis because it disregards the fact that the very basis of the complaint was 
that in that given market there is never going to be more than one firm oper-
ating at scale and therefore there will never be effective competition. Markets 
in which excessive pricing is likely to happen are precisely those where there 
will never be entry and exit by new entrants, as acknowledged by SCI’s eco-
nomic expert.8 This is fundamentally the reason why the Act requires regulating 
exploitative abuses such as excessive prices – because these high prices will not 
automatically result in new entry. 
SCI’s approach is consistent with neither the realities of the South African 
economy nor the purpose of the Act, which has a strong focus on correcting pre-
vious excessive concentrations that resulted from state support. Thus, the CAC 
could not have intended ‘long run’ in the textbook sense but rather under partic-
ular circumstances. The equilibrium price resulting from competition is depen-
dent on the relevant market characteristics and, even in the ‘long run’, the size 
of the market and scale economies are relevant. SCI’s LRCE test was calculated 
with the actual conditions where excessive prices can potentially arise, that is, 
where there is already a quasi-monopoly (or, in theory, given that the dominance 
threshold is 35 or 45%, a duopoly). However, for the CAC in Mittal, LRCE appeared 
to mean that the level of competition was sufficient to compete away all super-
normal/pure profits. This is in line with Alfred Marshall’s (1920, pp. 617–619) 
discussion of the fair or normal rate of profit for each branch of trade under the 
‘long period or true normal results of economic forces’. By definition, this cannot 
include a monopoly price as a possible outcome of the LRCE modelling, or, in 
the absence of restrictive assumptions, a duopoly. In fact, this interpretation of 
economic value may restrict the application of the test in precisely the industries 
where market structure ensures the incumbent has a strong position as the facts 
of the market will mean an LRCE with positive economic profits.
It appears therefore that SCI’s conceptualisation of the LRCE as a test does 
not provide for a coherent analysis of economic value for an excessive pricing 
determination as suggested in the literature. It is necessary for the tests for eco-
nomic value to have practical application. For a new test to take the debate for-
ward, it should have fewer difficulties in application than the currently accepted 
tests for economic value. The LRCE test does not meet either of these criteria. It 
yields prices, and hence economic values, which are a function of the number 
of firms, the size of the market and assumptions as to how the firms compete. In 
short, these are not prices that reflect pure profits having been competed away 
nor are they prices which are cost-reflective.
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SCI’s interpretation of the LRCE divorces the test from the particular firm and 
circumstances. A reading of CAC Mittal in its entirety strongly suggests that the 
reference to LRCE was to provide a broad conceptual framework for the analysis 
of economic value and that it endorsed comparators and price-cost analyses, 
which are widely accepted measures of economic value. This is confirmed by the 
CAC in SCI where it states that in the Mittal decision the Court’s inclusion of 
paragraphs 40 and 43 (defining economic value as prices under LRCE) sought to 
provide a framework to evaluate this evidence and thereby determine whether 
the price so charged was excessive.9
In our view, the appropriate approach to the reference to LRCE by the CAC 
is to consider what pricing would be under conditions of effective competitive 
rivalry between firms with similar costs to the incumbent. Thus, the competitive 
equilibrium concept is a means to an end (effective competitive rivalry) and not 
an end in itself. The Tribunal in SCI also interpreted the reference to LRCE as 
the conceptual framework that should be applied when thinking through the 
assessment of economic value.10 CAC in SCI rejected the modelling of a notional 
equilibrium and, like the Tribunal, used the dominant firm’s economic costs as a 
measure of economic value.11
We propose that the appropriate analysis is based on effective competitive 
rivalry, where effective competition yields cost-reflective prices and the cost of 
a good or service is indicative of its economic value.12 When thinking about the 
counterfactual to determine economic value, one has to imagine a market that 
adds the dimension of effective rivalry to the industry under review using the 
dominant firm’s actual costs as a starting point. However, it is necessary to eval-
uate to what extent the dominant firm’s accounting costs as reflected in their 
financial statements are representative of economic costs and whether there is a 
need to make any adjustments. In other words, the price under LRCE is an out-
come that can be expected when existing firms are competing effectively with 
one another and the costs of the dominant firm are indicative of the costs of the 
existing firms. This interpretation was accepted by the Tribunal in SCI, noting 
that in economic terms effective competition means rivalry between established 
firms in a given relevant market.13 The CAC was unfortunately silent on this.
The implication of adopting effective competitive rivalry as the understand-
ing of LRCE is that the thought exercise should be conducted on the costs of 
the existing firm, given that the existing firm could have plausibly been ‘repli-
cated’ under situations of competition (and not where the position was due to 
firm-specific innovation). As a result, the LRCE and effective competition tests 
would collapse into one test. There is no substantial difference between the two, 
other than the differentiation being a gloss put on by economists. The discussion 
on whose costs are relevant for the analysis then becomes central to this debate. 
The notional entrant approach is also inconsistent with other areas of competi-
tion assessment that employ a counterfactual analysis, such as in cartel damages 
and merger assessment. These also do not involve notional entrants, but rather 
counterfactuals that are based on the facts of the specific firms in the market 
in question. For example, in mergers the consideration of potential entrants is 
within a specific context. Before a potential entrant/expansion can be included 
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in the counterfactual, it must be shown that the entry or expansion is likely to 
occur; that the anticipated entry or expansion is of a nature, scale and scope to 
prevent or reverse the anticompetitive effects that the merger otherwise would 
have; and that the entry or expansion is likely to occur within a reasonable time 
period (ICN, 2006). Similarly, in margin squeeze cases there are two tests, the 
‘as-efficient competitor’ test (relying on the costs of the dominant firm) and the 
‘reasonably efficient’ test (relying on the costs of an existing competitor).
The difficulties in the practical application of the LRCE approach are imme-
diately evident in the SCI case in the treatment of firm-specific cost advantages 
(which it terms ‘special cost advantages’). SCI’s reading of the LRCE approach 
led it to discard the very favourable low input costs of feedstock propylene in 
favour of hypothetical feedstock costs a notional entrant would face (which, 
in SCI’s view, would be considerably higher than its own) (see later for our 
evaluation of this).
Same approach to economic value, different 
answers: The devil is in the detail
Both the Tribunal and the CAC found that economic value could be determined 
through different methods, an approach consistent with the literature and the 
approach in other jurisdictions. The Tribunal evaluated the following methods 
put forth by the parties to determine the economic value of purified propylene: 
price-cost tests (using the dominant firm’s economic costs); comparison of 
domestic prices with prices in other geographic markets; and a comparison 
of SCI’s export prices with domestic prices. Though the CAC emphasised that 
economic value can be determined using a range of comparators, quoting the 
European case law at length, it did not engage with the comparators put for-
ward by the parties as a measure of economic value.14 Instead, the polypropylene 
international comparators were considered only in the reasonableness discus-
sion, which was effectively moot as the Court had already found that the prices 
charged by SCI were not substantially above economic value. In other words, the 
CAC in SCI considered only those disputes relating to the price-cost assessments. 
In determining the dominant firm’s economic costs, the two judgments agreed 
on the valuation of feedstock propylene for the calculation but differed on the 
valuation of SCI’s capital assets, the level of capital reward/return on capital to be 
applied, the allocation of group costs, and the allocation of fixed costs between 
domestic and export sales.
The choices on each of these four factors led the Tribunal and the CAC to 
make different findings. The Tribunal found in favour of the Commission, with 
purified propylene mark-ups over economic costs during the complaint period 
in the range of 25.1–41.5% for sales to Safripol. Regarding polypropylene, the 
Tribunal found the price mark-up over economic costs in the range of 17.6–36.5% 
(which includes both a conservative and a more realistic measure range). SCI’s 
local prices for polypropylene were also found to be 23% higher than average 
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deep-sea export prices, and between 41 and 47% above discounted prices charged 
in Western Europe. 
The CAC found that the average purified propylene mark-ups were between 
12.1 and 14.3% and the polypropylene mark-ups between −28.9 and −24.4%. 
The Court concluded that SCI had not engaged in excessive pricing and over-
turned the Tribunal judgment. 
The implication of the precedent set by the CAC in SCI on these specific fac-
tors is not the subject of this chapter. However, the quantum of the differences 
between the Tribunal’s and the CAC’s mark-ups suggests that South Africa is still 
a long way from having a clear framework for assessing excessive prices. 
The treatment of special cost advantages
Central to the debate on what a competitive price would be in our view is what 
the costs of production are. Although there are fundamental disagreements on 
the determination of economic value, there is common recognition that the 
concept of economic value encapsulates cost considerations. The point of depar-
ture is, as highlighted, on whose costs and what costs.
With regard to whose costs should be considered, the question is whether 
it is the costs of the dominant firm in question, those of a notional entrant or 
costs which would prevail if there were effectively competing firms in the market 
(discussed above).
This section reviews the contrasting viewpoints on what costs should be con-
sidered and whether the CAC’s decision in SCI provided any further clarity on 
how to treat special cost advantages. The key debate is whether all costs should 
be taken into account or certain costs excluded on the basis that they are not 
representative of the ‘notional competitive norm’ or costs that the notional 
entrant would incur, because they confer a ‘special cost advantage’ to the par-
ticular firm in question. This debate emerges directly as a result of the different 
interpretations of LRCE discussed above.
As noted, we do not enter here into other debates raised in the case about the 
inclusion and exclusion of certain cost categories and the measurement of cost 
of capital. Although the latter dispute resulted in significant cost differences, as 
seen in the large differences in price-cost margin calculations, the most funda-
mental dispute was on the treatment of special cost advantages and whether 
these should be excluded when determining economic value. The issue of the 
treatment of special cost advantages is core because it determines how SCI’s low 
feedstock propylene costs are accounted for in price-cost tests or profitability 
analyses. Given SCI’s very low feedstock costs of propylene, price-cost tests tak-
ing into account these low costs result in high margins.
Economic value in relation to costs
It is unclear what the CAC’s final position on special cost advantages is. Its treat-
ment of special cost advantages in the SCI judgment is at odds with its own 
statements in the Mittal judgment. In SCI, the CAC in effect held that special 
c04.indd   109 20-06-2017   09:50:50
110 Part Two: Issues in competition and regulation
cost advantages should not be considered and that the actual price at which 
Synfuels sold its feedstock to SCI should be used in calculations.15 This actual 
price is not the true valuation of the feedstock and the Commission argued that 
it was well above the true fuel alternative value, and therefore had to be adjusted 
downwards.
SCI’s interpretation of the CAC in Mittal was that these costs should instead 
be adjusted upwards as they serve to reduce the dominant firm’s costs below 
the notional competitive norm. In particular, SCI sought to partially use the 
CAC’s approach in Mittal16 in that the relevant costs can be calculated by deter-
mining the costs that would prevail in LRCE.17 The CAC further held that while 
the dominant firm’s costs were an important evidential ingredient in such an 
inquiry, they were not conclusive.18 This is because some of the dominant firm’s 
cost advantages may be ‘unique’ to it, and not available to a notional entrant or 
existing competitor. 
It seems to follow that, in determining the economic value of a good or 
service, the cost savings to the firm resulting from the subsidised loan 
or the lower than market rental – or indeed any other special advan-
tage, current or historical that serves to reduce the particular firm’s costs 
below the notional competitive norm ought to be disregarded. Thus eco-
nomic value is a notional objective competitive-market standard, and 
not one derived from circumstances peculiar to the particular firm. If 
the firm’s price is no higher than economic value, no contravention of 
s 8(a) can arise.19
However, the CAC in Mittal did not suggest that such special cost advantages 
ought to be completely disregarded in an excessive pricing assessment. In fact, 
paragraph 43 goes on to state:
If, however, the firm’s price is in fact higher than economic value so 
determined, the test of reasonableness in respect of the difference 
remains to be applied. The expression ‘reasonable profit’, when dealing 
with economic value, should be avoided. The test of reasonableness 
applies to the excess of price over economic value, and thus only to 
the element of ‘pure profit’ (over and above ‘normal profit’) implicit 
in that price. It is at this stage of the enquiry that circumstances pecu-
liar to the particular dominant firm would rationally come into the 
reckoning.
This brings into the spotlight the consideration of state support. The CAC itself 
emphasised in the SCI judgment that it had, in Mittal, stated that the advan-
tages of state support should be examined at the reasonableness stage of the 
inquiry because ‘it was here that it was appropriate to take into account how 
the firm’s cost affected the reasonableness of its price in relation to the value of 
the good and whether the high price of the good represented a reward for risk 
and innovation’.20
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Yet, the CAC did not take the significance of state support into account even 
at this stage of the assessment in the SCI case, seemingly because (although it 
is not clear in the judgment) the calculated price-cost margins were too low to 
warrant further consideration of special cost advantages.21 The CAC’s approach 
suggests that the reasonableness assessment takes place in sequential steps 
where one first determines whether the mark-ups over economic value based 
on a notional firm are reasonable, and, if they are found to be unreasonable, 
only then does the next step of the inquiry kick in – that is, whether special cost 
advantages, such as those bequeathed by state support, are considered. We argue 
that this is the wrong approach and the SCI case clearly reveals why this is so.
What constitutes special cost advantages?
We begin with what can be considered a special cost advantage. The CAC in 
Mittal provided certain broad examples of what might be special cost advan-
tages. It mentioned benefits flowing to the firm from subsidised loans, long-term 
low rentals or other special advantages which may serve to reduce its own long-
run average costs below the notional norm.22 But as the Tribunal highlights in 
the SCI decision, the CAC did not explain how the examples provided in the 
ruling arose from the particular facts of the Mittal case.23 A number of things 
remain unclear, and the CAC’s SCI judgment has unfortunately not gone any 
further in clarifying these issues for future cases in which they may be relevant. 
The issues include: what exactly does a benefit from a subsidised loan and long-
term low rental refer to and how would these be quantified in practice? If these 
advantages were available to more than one firm in the industry, assuming there 
was competition, would it still be a ‘special’ cost advantage? (See below.) What 
other types of costs could be categorised as special cost advantages under this 
category and can the circumstances of the industry affect the consideration of a 
particular type of special cost advantage (i.e., can a type of cost advantage that is 
‘special’ in one industry not be ‘special’ in another)?
Furthermore, there is no indication of how such cost advantages could be 
‘corrected for’ in an excessive pricing assessment. Sylvester (2014) demonstrates 
that the method of correcting for special cost advantages by simply adding costs 
onto those of the dominant firm’s costs (to bring costs up to the notional com-
petitive norm as suggested by Langbridge and MacKenzie, 2010) results in sev-
eral distortions. He shows that this overestimates costs and prices that would 
result under a competitive market structure and possibly even overestimates the 
cost of the monopolist if it did not enjoy the special cost advantage at all, if 
certain assumptions of the shape of the cost curve are taken into consideration. 
Irrespective of whether the nature of the cost curve in such industries is upward 
or downward sloping, simply adding the ‘special cost advantage’ back onto the 
dominant firm’s costs does not produce the appropriate counterfactual cost level 
(Sylvester, 2014). Considering special cost advantages when assessing reason-
ableness instead, according to the latter part of paragraph 43 in CAC Mittal, 
avoids such challenges of adding back costs. The determination then reduces 
to a value judgement of whether the price-cost margins are justified given the 
source of the special cost advantages.
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Sylvester (2014) also attempts to understand the possible meaning of special cost 
advantages and suggests that the amici curiae in the Mittal case appear to have 
conflated the notions of opportunity costs and costs that occur under the notional 
competitive norm. Sylvester highlights that the amici curiae explained at length 
why accounting and economic costs can differ if opportunity costs are present and 
that any special cost advantage should be valued at the opportunity cost rather 
than the actual amount paid. The amici curiae then reach the conclusion that the 
CAC adopted in its decision at paragraph 43, where, instead of using the wording 
‘opportunity cost’ (following from their descriptions and reasoning), they use the 
wording ‘notional competitive norm’ as the standard to evaluate costs (Petersen, 
Maenetje and Le Roux, 2008, para. 23.1, cited in Sylvester, 2014). Sylvester’s argu-
ment is that these are two different notions, and not just a matter of semantics. He 
argues that the opportunity cost is in fact a firm-specific cost, while the notional 
competitive norm suggests a market-related price which is not firm-specific.
The Tribunal held in SCI that given its specific circumstances, special cost 
advantages could not be assessed according to the general examples provided 
by the CAC in Mittal. Doing so would not take into account a situation where 
pure profit was not as a result of innovation and own risk taking.24 The latter was 
indeed the Commission’s stance on special cost advantages. The CAC’s response 
to this in the SCI judgment unfortunately does not add any further clarity.25
We argue that it is crucial to understand the history of how SCI attained 
its dominant position and whether this was due to innovation and risk tak-
ing or whether it was bequeathed through extensive former state support. Only 
once this is understood can the treatment of special cost advantages be deter-
mined. The Commission led extensive evidence in this regard, including the 
various forms of state support received throughout the history of Sasol.26 The 
Commission’s expert witness highlighted that given the strategic nature of the 
sector, the state ensured that Sasol would not fail, including through extensive 
protection of the fuel industry, which extended to marketing arrangements with 
other oil companies that ensured offtake and marketing of Sasol’s fuel; funding 
of Sasol through revenue from fuel levies;27 support in terms of access to infra-
structure; the strategic inland location of Natref and exemptions from paying 
crude oil transport costs. The state also bore much of the risk during the privati-
sation process. The Commission concluded that Sasol was created and supported 
by the state and that any advantage that it presently enjoys is a result of this 
and not of innovation and own risk taking. Similarly, SCI’s dominant position 
in purified propylene and polypropylene was a direct result of such support. The 
Tribunal found in favour of the Commission in this regard,28 highlighting that 
SCI’s own witness confirmed that Sasol had leveraged its protected position in 
fuel to enter the chemicals business.29 The CAC in the SCI judgment simply did 
not engage in this critical debate.
Special or not? What makes sense in the South African context?
Cost advantages bestowed through extensive state support cannot be separated 
from the technology that SCI employed in its operations and whether this con-
ferred any special cost advantage to it. On this aspect, SCI’s fundamental dispute 
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arose again from its interpretation of CAC Mittal, categorising its low propylene 
feedstock cost as a special cost advantage which, according to its interpretation 
of LRCE in CAC Mittal, ought not to be considered in any calculations. SCI’s 
position was that its Synfuels operations (using the Fischer-Tropsch process) 
were unique and could not easily be duplicated. The resultant low feedstock cost 
advantage conferred on SCI was therefore ‘special’ and not the industry ‘norm’. 
To equate this to the industry norm, its costs would have to be adjusted upwards, 
the effect of which would result in lower price-cost margins.
The Commission’s industry expert witness argued that there was nothing 
‘special’ about the Fischer-Tropsch process and that it was in fact a standard 
technology and production process. The Tribunal also held that SCI’s witness 
conceded the purification process of SCI was not special in that it was not very 
different from US producers in terms of costs, and was in fact a ‘standard distilla-
tion technology’. The witness further conceded that SCI had undertaken limited 
innovation in purified propylene and polypropylene.30
Importantly, the Commission argued that the low feedstock cost that resulted 
from the process was not a ‘unique’ or ‘firm-specific’ advantage to SCI. If there 
was greater competition at the downstream level (in competition to SCI), then 
it would be expected that Synfuels would supply all these firms with feedstock 
propylene at prices that it supplies SCI and it would not then be a ‘unique’ cost 
advantage to SCI only. In this sense, the lack of competition in the domestic 
market should not confer a special cost advantage to SCI (see also Sylvester, 
2014, regarding the facts of the Mittal case).
Furthermore, while SCI commended the CAC’s approach in equating eco-
nomic value to the notional price of the good or service under conditions of 
LRCE, it held that the CAC was mistaken in then suggesting31 that any special 
advantage should be taken into account in considering the reasonableness of 
the relationship between the dominant firm’s prices and economic value.32 SCI’s 
expert witness claimed that taking the special cost advantage back into the reck-
oning at this stage was nonsensical when it had been removed in the first place 
as it did not represent the costs of a notional entrant.33 
Ultimately, the CAC in SCI did not take into account special cost advantages 
at any stage of the inquiry. This appears entirely at odds with the purpose of 
section 8(a) of the Act in the context of South Africa’s history of economic 
development. The Act aims to ensure efficient outcomes in the economy and 
in this sense aims to achieve cost-reflective prices. But equally important in the 
South African context, the preamble of the Act clearly sets out the concerns 
arising from the previous economic and social imbalances of the economy (dis-
cussed above).
The Tribunal concluded, correctly in our view, that SCI’s cost advantage 
ought to be taken into account at some stage of the inquiry.34 The Tribunal 
noted that SCI’s approach instead leads to an artificial result, and that it was 
not practical that if in SCI’s notional exercise prices were found not to be above 
economic value, special cost advantages could never be considered ever again 
in the analysis. The Tribunal’s interpretation of the CAC’s decision in Mittal was 
that a broader and more holistic view, including the realities of the market, must 
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be taken when considering special cost advantages.35 Unfortunately, this appears 
not to be what the CAC itself ultimately employed in its approach in SCI.
The importance of history and how a firm attained its dominant position has 
nonetheless been recognised by Judge Davis in other platforms (Davis, 2011), 
who noted that South Africa’s past industrial policy did not cater for competitive 
rivalry. Motta and de Streel (2007), Roberts (2008) and Evans (2009) also suggest 
that those markets in which monopolies established dominance due to current 
or past exclusive or special rights are the very markets in which competition 
authorities should be concerned about excessive pricing in the first place, as high 
prices are usually merely a rent unrelated to market conditions.
Given this manifest purpose of the Act, the widespread recognition that there 
are circumstances in which competition authorities should intervene in exces-
sive pricing cases, and the circumstances of this case closely fitting these criteria, 
an approach in which special cost advantage should never be considered at any 
stage in an excessive pricing case is entirely at odds with the spirit of the Act. 
Never considering special cost advantages would vindicate exactly the types of 
firms whose conduct could potentially fall foul of this provision and where inter-
vention should occur. These include present and former state-owned enterprises 
that attained their ‘special cost advantage’ not through innovation and own risk 
taking but through state support.
In our view, two general insights on the treatment of special cost advan-
tages can be drawn from the above discussion. First, the history of how the firm 
attained its advantageous position is fundamentally important in an excessive 
price assessment. If it was through extensive innovation and own risk taking, 
then one could argue that the cost advantage that arises from this is indeed 
‘special’ to the firm. In this regard, one could consider, as the Tribunal did, evi-
dence or lack thereof on investments in technology in the affected business. The 
nature of the technology can also be evaluated as part of the broader argument. 
If the advantage is instead because of past and current state support, then this 
should not be considered special, because if a different industrial policy model 
had been employed by the state at the time, more than one firm could have 
potentially benefited from such support. 
Second, what may appear to be a ‘unique’ input cost to a downstream firm 
may not be unique to it at all if there was competition in the downstream market 
and every firm could potentially benefit from the low input in question. 
Conclusions
Excessive pricing provisions are important for smaller markets (such as markets 
in many developing countries) as economies of scale and barriers to entry imply 
a greater likelihood of dominant firms that are not always subject to regula-
tion and that can charge supra-competitive prices. This is the case in the South 
African economy, which is characterised by concentrated industries and an econ-
omy skewed to resource-based and capital-intensive production due to previous 
exclusionary policies. In instances where excessive pricing is of an intermediary 
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product, it can be particularly harmful and the risk of overenforcement needs to 
be balanced against the needs of the economy and the harm from underenforce-
ment. In the SCI case, the Tribunal held that the dominant firm’s conduct resulted 
in missed opportunities for innovation and development for the domestic man-
ufacture of plastic goods downstream. Considering the employment potential of 
a medium-technology industry such as plastics conversion in a developing econ-
omy, South Africa cannot afford these missed opportunities. Though the Tribunal 
decision was overturned, the decline of the downstream sector has been linked to 
the increase in prices following the change in SCI’s pricing strategy in 2002/2003 
(Beare, Mondliwa, Robb and Roberts, 2014; Mondliwa and Roberts, 2014).
Though there has been extensive debate on whether or not it is necessary for 
competition authorities to pursue excessive pricing, there is a growing body of 
literature which recognises the substantial potential impact of an excessive price 
in an economy, and, as such, this literature proposes that different jurisdictions 
should choose paths that are most appropriate for their particular circumstances. 
Otherwise, in countries like South Africa where there is a history of concen-
trated industries, particularly in upstream intermediate input product markets 
like steel and polymers, excessive prices will seriously inhibit the transformation 
and growth path of these economies. We note, however, that it is important for 
authorities to consider the implications of making type one or type two errors. 
False convictions can have the effect of chilling investments while false acquit-
tals can inhibit growth of downstream industries. The growing consensus in the 
literature is that excessive prices should be limited to industries where there are 
high barriers to entry, where the dominant firm has and can exercise its market 
power and where there is little or no innovation. 
Others have taken the argument further by identifying markets that are likely 
to allow a dominant firm to charge excessive prices. These are markets in which 
firms attained dominance due to current or past exclusive or special rights, and 
in which high prices usually reflect a supra-competitive rent (Evans, 2009; Motta 
and de Streel, 2007; Roberts, 2008). 
The controversies in excessive pricing are not limited to whether or not it 
should be pursued as an abuse of dominance but also encompass debates on the 
appropriate assessment thereof. As this chapter highlights, excessive pricing is 
one of the most difficult contraventions to prove given that a central concept 
in its assessment, the determination of economic value, is not defined in most 
jurisdictions. The accepted measures of assessing economic value include price-
cost tests, comparators and profitability analyses. The determination of eco-
nomic value in the CAC’s decision in Mittal would have been further elucidated 
after the matter was remitted to the Tribunal. Unfortunately, the parties settled 
the matter before this happened and these issues were not clarified. The SCI case 
then presented the first opportunity to revisit the definition of economic value 
as the notional price under LRCE. 
While SCI interpreted economic value based on LRCE by modelling the price 
that would allow for notional entrants, we have understood it to be a counter-
factual where there is effective competition. We considered whether LRCE as first 
referred in CAC Mittal was a conceptual framework or a new test and are of the 
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view that the distinction made between effective competition and LRCE is an 
artificial one. As we argued, modelling notional entrants may result in a num-
ber of challenges, some of which may lead to false acquittals. Setting economic 
value at prices which cover high costs of entry (including higher input prices or 
poorer access to inputs) simply defines away the basis for the concern. In such 
models, the equilibrium could be a monopoly if there are scale economies and a 
relatively small market. Monopoly pricing against this benchmark would most 
likely not be found to be excessive. This implies that excessive pricing could 
only be a very short-term exploitation or only due to legal barriers to entry, as 
the market would otherwise be effectively competitive. This approach is at odds 
with the circumstances of smaller economies like South Africa’s.
Given that the purpose of the Competition Act in South Africa includes 
economic efficiency, increased participation and redistributive objectives, the 
CAC’s reference to economic value as the notional prices under conditions of 
LRCE cannot be understood as modelling prices that would allow for notional 
entrants in circumstances where the market conditions do not allow for entry 
and the dominant firm is entrenched. The continued exertion of pricing power 
implies ongoing welfare losses and distortion of relative prices in the economy. 
We have argued that the appropriate interpretation of economic value in CAC 
Mittal, which is also consistent with other passages in the decision, is prices that 
would arise under conditions of effective competitive rivalry.
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6 CAC Mittal, fn 82.
7 Para. 40.




12 See CAC Mittal, para. 51.
13 Para. 70. 
14 CAC SCI, paras. 102–104.
15 Para. 115.
16 Para. 43.
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22 Para. 43.
23 Para. 90. The Tribunal highlights that the CAC didn’t have to explain this as it remit-
ted the matter to it.
24 Para. 90.
25 See para. 172. 
26 See Expert Witness statement of Dr Rustomjee, 2012, chief pp. 3394–5, p. 3399, 
p. 3400, pp. 3403–4m, p. 3406.
27 Tribunal decision, para. 106, drawing from evidence presented by Rustomjee.
28 Paras. 104–108.
29 Para. 116, citing MacDougall of SCI: ‘Sasol is establishing that it is using the Synfuels 
operation as a platform for growth. It is holding Synfuels neutral so that it is not mak-
ing additional profit, but it is not losing anything and then that creates the opportu-
nity to build a significant downstream petrochemical industry.’
30 Tribunal decision, paras. 111–113, citing evidence from MacDougall of SCI.
31 Later in para. 43.
32 CAC Mittal, para. 43.
33 Padilla cross-examination at 2059, 14–2060, 9.
34 Paras. 120, 121.
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Reena das Nair and Simon Roberts
5 Competition and regulation interface in energy, 
telecommunications and  
transport in South Africa
Introduction
Economic regulation is largely about regulating the natural monopoly parts of 
value chains and generally involves the regulation of enterprises that are, or 
were, state-owned. Regulating access to, and pricing of, essential infrastructure, 
key inputs and bottleneck goods and services that cannot be easily replicated is 
considered necessary to ensure that fair access is provided and that monopoly 
prices are not charged (Viscusi, Vernon and Harrington, 1998). Economic regu-
lation is also seen as a mechanism by which significant market failures can be 
corrected, or entrenched dominant positions kept in check. In certain industries, 
such as network infrastructure, the private sector will underinvest as the social 
returns are generally greater than the private returns, given the large externali-
ties generated. In such industries, economic regulation is necessary to ensure suf-
ficient investment. Therefore, the scope of economic regulation is broader than 
just controlling access and pricing. Dynamic considerations such as the impact 
on investment decisions, the impact of infrastructure on the development path 
of the economy, and the creative role of competitive rivalry all need to be part of 
an effective economic regulatory regime. 
While economic regulation is often viewed as the control of market power in 
instances where competition is either not possible or not desirable, competition 
policy is about regulating the potentially anticompetitive behaviour of dominant 
players and addressing structural changes through the merger regime or through 
conditions. In this sense, economic regulation is predominantly ex ante, where 
the rules of the game are set out upfront, while competition law enforcement is 
largely ex post, where past anticompetitive conduct is prosecuted after the fact, 
except for the merger regime where accretions of concentration which could 
potentially lead to anticompetitive outcomes are curbed ex ante. However, this 
dichotomy is imprecise, as even economic regulation mainly uses past conduct 
and data to determine the future course of action and competition policy aims to 
influence future conduct through changing past undesirable behaviour. The two 
are even further interrelated – regulation is required for competition to flourish, 
for instance, to ensure access to essential facilities or inputs. A regulatory regime 
that favours incumbents over new entry hinders competitive objectives and it 
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is important that regulators take into account dynamic gains from greater com-
petitive rivalry in setting the rules of regulation and when making decisions. 
Similarly, it is important that competition authorities appreciate the rationale 
for, and forms of, economic regulation and, at the same time, understand that 
some matters regarding competitive outcomes are more effectively resolved 
through regulatory intervention.
This chapter draws lessons from experiences in three regulated industries in 
South Africa: energy, telecommunications and transport (ports and rail). These 
sectors were selected as part of a national government-funded project aimed at 
building regulatory entities’ capacity (CCRED, n.d.).1 The project reviewed the 
performance of regulators in the wider context of their mandates and powers; 
the challenges they face in terms of regulatory capacity, accountability, credibil-
ity and other constraints, including fiscal constraints; and industry performance 
in terms of pricing outcomes, investment in the sector and allocative and pro-
ductive efficiency. The reviews further assessed whether economic regulation 
in these industries has contributed to, or been in conflict with, other economic 
development mandates aimed at sustainable development and inclusive growth. 
We draw on these reviews to identify important lessons for the interface between 
competition and regulation in these sectors. This is useful for economic regula-
tors in terms of learning from one another, for engagement between economic 
regulators and competition authorities, as well as for policy makers.
The different industries reflect a diversity of approaches from which insights 
can be drawn. In electricity we have an integrated state-owned enterprise (SOE) 
with an independent regulator, and the introduction of new participants in the 
form of renewable energy generators. In rail freight and ports there is an inte-
grated SOE without a regulator until the recently established Ports Regulator. In 
telecommunications, the main operator has long been effectively privatised, and 
there are private operators in mobile telephony, with a long-established regula-
tor and enforcement actions by the competition authorities. 
In the remainder of this chapter, we evaluate the outcomes and performance 
of the electricity, transport (ports and rail in particular) and telecommunications 
sectors of South Africa, highlighting how certain decisions of the relevant regula-
tor encouraged competitive outcomes while others discouraged it. We conclude 
by comparing and contrasting the similarities and differences of each regulatory 
regime and drawing together key lessons learnt. 
Energy
The electricity supply industry (ESI) of South Africa is dominated by state-owned 
utility Eskom, which operates across the entire electricity value chain in genera-
tion, transmission and distribution.2 Eskom generates 95% of the electricity con-
sumed in the country, with independent power producers (IPPs) representing a 
much smaller portion of electricity generation. 
After the corporatisation of Eskom, there were concerns around its dominance 
in the ESI, and around the poor performance on a technical level throughout 
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the value chain.3 Even though Eskom was funded by government, alternative 
sources of funding were needed to invest in and develop the ESI. These factors 
culminated in developing a hybrid model in which, on the one hand, Eskom 
was given the responsibility for immediate new investment, and, on the other, 
private IPPs were given an opportunity to participate in electricity generation. 
However, the industry is still dominated by Eskom in terms of the size of its 
contribution to electricity generation, its ownership and operation of transmis-
sion network services and its role in distributing electricity. Eskom distributes 
around 60% of the country’s power, with municipalities distributing the balance. 
Although Eskom distributes more power than municipalities do, it serves fewer 
end users, focusing on long-term contracts with mining companies and other 
large industry players at more favourable rates.
The ESI has been regulated by an independent regulator since 1995, first by 
the National Electricity Regulator, followed by the National Energy Regulator of 
South Africa (Nersa) since 2005. Nersa is tasked with price determination, licens-
ing, dispute resolution and the compliance of electricity suppliers.
Outcomes in the ESI and the regulator’s role 
The outcomes observed in the ESI, particularly in terms of the supply and pricing 
of coal-generated electricity, are linked to investment patterns in generation 
infrastructure which, in turn, are a product of regulatory decisions. But these 
outcomes have also been influenced by political pressure, Eskom’s market power 
and large electricity-intensive user groups. Policy uncertainty and institutional 
complexity (several players with divergent views involved in decision mak-
ing and no clear energy policy4) have further resulted in certain detrimental 
impacts on the sector and the economy as a whole, particularly during the 2008 
load-shedding crises. However, the success story of the ESI on the generation 
level has been the Renewable Energy Independent Power Producers Procurement 
Programme (REIPPPP) (discussed later). The evolution of the renewable energy 
industry emphasises how challenges can be effectively addressed through proac-
tive regulation that takes into account competition principles.
The key question relating to average and relative prices charged to different 
electricity customers is how the legacy of overinvestment in generation capac-
ity in the 1980s has influenced the structure of the economy and, in particu-
lar, its capital-intensive bias. As discussed below, overinvestment in generation 
capacity led to power stations being built and then mothballed in the 1980s. 
This meant that it was worth selling electricity as long as the price earned was 
above the variable costs of generation and made some contribution to the fixed 
costs. In a sense, the overinvestment in capacity – which could clearly not be 
reversed – created the basis for some buyers to receive a subsidised price. The 
question is which buyers received this advantage. The easiest way to increase 
demand was by incentivising large energy-intensive industries such as smelters, 
which is largely what happened. However, the unintended consequence was a 
skewing of the economy towards a very capital-intensive structure. In effect, the 
cheap electricity amounted to an export subsidy for these types of businesses, 
with the knock-on effect of supporting the exchange rate, which in turn made 
c05.indd   122 20-06-2017   09:51:48
Competition and regulation interface in South Africa 123
other producers of traded goods less competitive. The second key implication 
is that when electricity demand outstrips capacity then new capacity needs to 
be built, and the rationale for the very cheap pricing no longer exists – pricing 
needs to cover the costs of building the generation plant and not just the cost 
of operating the power station. The lack of conditions linking the low pricing 
to availability meant that the economy was rationed in its electricity usage, 
and Eskom had to compensate large energy-intensive users for reducing their 
consumption. 
The result of the historic decisions regarding investment and pricing is that 
there has been a path dependency on relatively cheap and non-renewable elec-
tricity. The adjustment towards new priorities and appropriately priced electricity 
has been slow and riddled with difficulty. In addition, the costs of the new-build 
programme and the electricity prices required for the financial sustainability of 
Eskom demonstrate just how big the effective subsidies have been.
Average real prices declined over the 1980s and 1990s (figure 5.1), although the 
average price conceals the differences in prices to different users. The steep increases 
in average prices coinciding with large infrastructure build are also evident. 
Figure 5.1 Average electricity prices and increases, 1972–2015
Sources: Eskom (Average nominal prices from http://www.eskom.co.za/CustomerCare/
TariffsAndCharges/Pages/Tariff_History.aspx); StatsSA (CPI from http://www.statssa.gov.za/
publications/P0141/CPIHistory.pdf); average real prices: authors’ calculations (2015=100)
Note: The average price is a simple average across all tariffs Eskom charges, calculated by 
taking the total value of sales divided by the number of kilowatt-hours (kWh) sold per year. 











































Suboptimal investment decisions in terms of planning, timing, size and tech-
nology choices of power plant investments have affected the pricing trajec-
tory. Between 1974 and 1978, electricity prices rose steeply in real terms due to 
capacity shortage, along with increasingly frequent load shedding up to 1981. 
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In response, Eskom started a large new-build programme. By 1983, the SOE had 
22.26 gigawatts (GW) of generation capacity under construction or on order 
(Steyn, 2006). Failure to properly plan and oversee investment decisions resulted 
in an excessive capacity expansion programme and inefficiency in investment 
by Eskom (Kessides, Bogetic and Maurer, 2007). To service Eskom’s soaring debt, 
costs were passed on to consumers, leading to steep average nominal price 
increases in the 1980s while the SOE benefited from a monopoly position, gov-
ernment guarantees, open-ended Reserve Bank forward cover and an exemption 
from taxes and dividends.
By the late 1980s/early 1990s, Eskom faced severe political pressure to reduce 
prices as soon as declining debt levels would allow it (Steyn, 2003). Increased 
internal efficiency and huge excess generation capacity (due to the economic 
downturn and the commissioning of new power stations in the 1980s) allowed 
Eskom to reduce real electricity price increases for the following 15 years. 
Moreover, in the 1990s, Eskom entered into a compact with its customers to 
keep its prices low and to reduce the real cost of electricity by 20% over the 
period 1991–1996. A reduction of 16.6% was achieved. This kept prices at a level 
that was relatively low compared to global standards and, as noted, these low 
prices did not adequately cover costs or allow for reinvestment. 
One solution was to increase demand by incentivising large energy-intensive 
industries such as smelters and other heavy users. In the 1990s, Eskom entered 
into favourably priced long-term supply agreements5 with aluminium smelters 
(Alusaf, BHP Billiton’s predecessor) and with ferrochrome smelters6 to ensure 
offtake of excess electricity capacity and to promote downstream industry. These 
pricing structures, increasingly favourable to large industrial users, were not 
amended by Nersa over the years according to changing supply and demand 
balances and economic conditions. When the balance changed and the country 
faced an electricity shortage in 2008, these contracts caused considerable contro-
versy. They were seen to favour big foreign-owned business that contributed little 
to local downstream beneficiation (as they largely exported unbeneficiated prod-
ucts) and to employment, at the expense of the local economy which suffered 
serious electricity shortages and escalating prices. Prices to heavy users of electric-
ity arguably should increase relative to light users in tight supply situations so as 
to discourage the use of electricity and encourage investment in energy efficiency 
and renewable energy. While these selected dominant customers received sig-
nificantly cheaper prices7 compared to households and smaller industry, partly 
due to lower costs to supply/serve,8 there appeared to be few other cost-related 
reasons for these prices. This practice in effect created a path dependency on 
cheap, dirty energy by heavy industry. These decisions further had implications 
for economic participation as they favoured heavy users of electricity and limited 
participation for those who could not secure these favourable rates.
When demand once again outstripped supply the South African govern-
ment, through Eskom, started a massive generation expansion programme in 
2005.9 This reaction to the increased demand on the grid was delayed and not in 
time to prevent the 2008 crisis. Although the programme considered the objec-
tives of the latest Integrated Resource Plan, especially the need to diversify the 
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technology and fuel mix of generation, technology choices were predominately 
influenced by the objective of ‘keeping the lights on’ at the cheapest cost (at the 
time of decision making). Hence, the programme still favoured large coal-fired 
generation plants. 
As in the 1980s, the financing requirements of this colossal investment pro-
gramme contributed to pushing prices up, ultimately resulting in a trebling of 
the average price from 2009/2010 to 2017/2018 (Nersa, 2010, 2013). The repe-
tition of a suboptimal investment pattern (over- and underinvestment) could 
have been avoided through effective (and implemented) policy learnings and 
prudent investment decisions. A proactive strategy for new generation capacity 
based on timely progressive building (rather than lumpy, large-scale build) and 
matching demand trends and forecasts would have delivered a much smoother 
price trajectory.
However, these outcomes were not because of Nersa’s actions (or inactions) 
alone. Government made a number of public statements bypassing Nersa, com-
promising its independence. For instance, government sent out mixed messages 
on whether Eskom should invest in generation capacity or not. Initially, the 
blueprint for a competitive ESI, which included a power exchange, the unbun-
dling of distribution and transmission and a partial unbundling of generation, 
was produced for Cabinet in May 2001. The document recommended that 30% 
of the generation capacity be sold to the private sector, with Eskom retaining 
70% of the market. It was stated that Eskom would not build any additional gen-
eration capacity from 2001, thus transferring this to the private sector (Pickering, 
2010). But this message was reversed when government then announced that 
Eskom should build power stations. This created uncertainty for private sector 
IPP investors about whether or not to invest. Further, with Cabinet approval, 
Eskom bypassed Nersa’s review process of the construction of Kusile power sta-
tion, again compromising the regulator’s credibility.
Regarding unbundling, in 2011 the Independent Systems and Market 
Operator (ISMO) Bill approved by Cabinet envisaged that an ISMO would invest, 
operate and maintain the country’s high-voltage transmission grid separately 
from Eskom to ensure that independent generators would receive fair access to 
the transmission network. The ISMO had the potential to accelerate the devel-
opment of renewable energy and increase participation of IPPs in the country, 
empowering them to sell electricity directly to customers without having to be 
routed through Eskom and allowing for any surplus generation to be sold back 
to the utility or to third parties. The ISMO Bill was stalled in parliament.10 This 
lack of progress in introducing competition can be attributed to vested interests 
in the industry and an attempt to protect Eskom’s dominant position (das Nair, 
Montmasson-Clair and Ryan, 2014). 
At several points, there has been political pressure in the pricing of electric-
ity. In the 1980s and 1990s, there was pressure on Eskom to suppress prices. 
In 2004, the minister of public enterprises announced that Eskom was prohib-
ited from increasing prices above inflation. This announcement questioned the 
independence of the regulator and tarnished the credibility of the administrated 
pricing system. As the actions of the minister contradicted the principles of the 
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legislation, it created a sense of unease regarding ‘the government’s respect for 
the role of independent regulatory processes’ (Steyn, 2003, p. 3). 
During the implementation of the Multi-Year Price Determination (MYPD) 
mechanism,11 Eskom did not always receive the price increase it sought through 
the required revenue pricing mechanism. In some instances, this was because an 
objective of lowest possible electricity prices was prioritised. In other instances, 
it was because Nersa more strictly questioned Eskom’s costs submissions (prices 
were determined based on covering full costs and allowing a rate of return). It is 
argued that not allowing full cost recovery through the tariff mechanism jeop-
ardised Eskom’s ability to finance new generating capacity (Steyn, 2012). Nersa 
has nonetheless made significant progress in reducing uncertainty for customers 
by making different Eskom tariff structures more transparent, user friendly and 
cost-reflective over the years.
The pricing of electricity sold through municipalities has been a further area 
of contention, one in which some headway has been made by Nersa but more 
could be done in terms of ensuring investment in maintenance and repair of the 
distribution system. Municipalities are primarily responsible for distribution and 
retail activities in urban areas, and they purchase power from Eskom for resale to 
consumers within their boundaries. Households and industry have raised seri-
ous concerns that electricity prices are excessively marked up by municipalities, 
over and above Eskom’s tariffs, with no consistency across municipalities. This 
is said to impact negatively on the competitiveness of small industrial end users, 
such as foundries and light manufacturing, supplied by municipalities. Some 
estimates are that municipality mark-ups can be between 50 and 100% above 
the direct Eskom price (Clark and Van Vuuren, 2013), placing those that source 
from a municipality immediately at a competitive disadvantage to rivals sourc-
ing directly from Eskom. 
The reasons for this appear to partly stem from municipality funding mod-
els, where funds generated from electricity sales are used to cross-subsidise 
other municipal activities, creating perverse incentives to inflate electricity 
tariffs through high mark-ups to earn more revenue to fund other activities. 
In addition, there is regulatory uncertainty or misalignment when it comes to 
who is ultimately responsible for regulating municipal activities. The constitu-
tion grants municipalities the executive authority and the right to administer 
electricity reticulation. While Nersa has the mandate to set the tariff at which 
municipalities can price electricity sales, the constitution allows municipalities 
the right to apply surcharges or mark-ups over and above this Nersa-determined 
price for municipal services.12 
One of the biggest issues, however, remains the lack of maintenance and 
investment in distribution infrastructure. Ageing infrastructure operating at 
maximum capacity is overloading the system, resulting in supply interrup-
tions.13 A major refurbishment backlog estimated at R27 billion exists in the 
ESI and continues to grow at an estimated R2.5 billion per annum (Louw, 2012; 
Noah, 2012; Rustomjee, 2013). Nersa could potentially play a much stronger 
role in ensuring that municipalities invest in maintenance and refurbishment of 
distribution infrastructure. 
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The renewable energy experience
The REIPPPP is an interesting case study which highlights ways in which chal-
lenges in the ESI can at least partially be addressed through effective regulation 
which proactively introduces competitive rivalry.14 Gaylor Montmasson-Clair 
and Reena das Nair provide an in-depth assessment of the renewable energy 
experience in South Africa in chapter 8 in this volume.
The evolution of the renewable energy programme has been a learning curve 
for stakeholders. The early programmes to facilitate entry by IPPs were concep-
tualised, designed and administered by Eskom in 2007/2008. In each of these 
programmes15 there were no power purchase agreements (PPAs) between Eskom 
and IPPs. This made the commercial banks reluctant to finance them as it placed 
considerable risk solely on the IPPs. Further, there was also reluctance on the part 
of project developers to participate in the programmes given Eskom’s dual role as 
the dominant industry player and administrator of the process. 
Changing strategy given the poor results of the initial programmes, Nersa 
developed a Renewable Energy Feed-In Tariff (REFIT) mechanism which sought 
to procure power output from qualifying renewable energy generators at prede-
termined prices. Under this programme, IPPs were to sell renewable energy-based 
electricity to Eskom (as the exclusive buyer) under a PPA, and were entitled to 
receive regulated tariffs based on the particular generation technology. However, 
this was also unsuccessful and the feed-in tariff was never implemented as indus-
try considered it to be too low. In 2009, Nersa revised the tariffs to allow greater 
returns on investment, but subsequently lowered them again in line with inter-
national benchmarks. There were significant other teething problems with the 
REFIT programme, where again it was felt that too much risk was allocated to 
IPPs. IPPs, developers and financiers insisted on a PPA underwritten by the gov-
ernment to reduce this risk. Because of this and for a range of other reasons, 
including concerns around Nersa’s ability to coordinate and administer such a 
system16 and conflicts with public finance and procurement laws, the REIPPPP, 
which was a competitive bidding procurement programme, came into being. This 
programme is run by the Department of Energy (DoE) and the National Treasury. 
The auction system designed in the REIPPPP encourages both compet-
itive pricing and local manufacturing, given local content requirements. The 
programme has been hailed a success in many parts of the world and implemen-
tation of the system has been recognised to encourage maximisation of dynamic 
returns of competition.
Bids are evaluated on their price competitiveness (70%) and a set of eco-
nomic development/inclusivity criteria (30%). Economic development criteria 
are designed to advance government policies on socioeconomic development, 
such as job creation, procurement of locally manufactured inputs and commu-
nity ownership of renewable energy project companies. Notably, to secure local 
participation, the project company must comprise 40% participation by a South 
African entity. The localisation requirements and the funding support from the 
Department of Trade and Industry (the dti) to local manufacturers have encour-
aged an important emerging industry in South Africa.
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Further, projects that meet a set of minimum requirements (in terms of 
environmental, land, commercial, legal, economic development, financial and 
technical criteria) are selected as preferred bidders in the REIPPPP. Following 
this, various stakeholders, including the DoE, Nersa, Eskom, commercial banks, 
development finance institutions and IPPs work together to finalise the finan-
cial aspects of the project. Then PPAs between preferred bidders and Eskom are 
signed and underwritten by the National Treasury, which includes details about 
the terms on which the project company sells electricity to Eskom.
PPAs backed by Treasury greatly improved risk allocation, gave much-needed 
certainty to financiers and enabled lenders to provide financing on competitive 
terms to IPPs. Further, the REIPPPP is conducted in a transparent manner, pro-
viding detailed feedback to unsuccessful candidates to improve the quality of 
successive bids. Additionally, the private sector has played an important role in 
supporting the DoE to develop the PPAs and economic development criteria of 
the programme. 
The positive impact of encouraging competition is seen in the falling tariffs 
for various sources of renewable energy in successive bidding rounds (table 5.1). 
In addition to increased competition, this was due to a combination of tariff 
caps imposed by the DoE, reduced price ceilings for wind and solar, increased 
experience of bidders in successive rounds, increased maturity of technologies 
and allocation of a capacity limit for each technology from round 2. The first 
four rounds of the programme were oversubscribed, revealing the interest in the 
programme. In total, over 100 projects have been selected, accounting for more 
than 6 300 megawatts (MW) of nominal generation capacity amounting to close 
to R200 billion.
Table 5.1 REIPPPP tariffs over bidding rounds, in rands per kWh
Technology Round 1 Round 2 Round 3 Round 4
Onshore wind 1.14 0.89 0.66 0.52
Concentrated solar power 2.68 2.51 1.46 n/a
Solar photovoltaic 2.75 1.65 0.88 0.66
Biomass n/a n/a 1.24 1.22
Landfill gas n/a n/a 0.84 n/a
Small hydro (≤10 MW) n/a 1.03 n/a 0.94
Source: Adapted from Montmasson-Clair, Moilwa and Ryan (2014)
The outcomes of the REIPPPP highlight the importance of proactively encour-
aging competitive rivalry between producers, as well as the state’s and the reg-
ulator’s roles in creating a framework conducive to this. This was a deliberate 
and coordinated strategy by relevant stakeholders to design the auction such 
that it introduced ‘synthetic competition’ through the scorecard method (see 
Ginsburg, 2009, on synthetic competition). Further, the REIPPPP is an excellent 
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example of how multiple economic and social objectives can be incorporated 
into energy policy through appropriate structuring of bidding processes. 
Freight rail and ports
The regulation of ports and freight rail (see Baloyi, 2014; TIPS, 2014a) shares 
much in common with electricity in that the provision is under an SOE which 
has been corporatised, and operates within a policy framework determined by a 
line department. There are also similarities in terms of the historic investment 
patterns which were oriented to heavy, mining and energy-intensive industry 
(Fine and Rustomjee, 1996). Rail infrastructure was also developed for grain 
farmers, with rail sidings linked to silos built for the agricultural cooperatives. 
Transport infrastructure exhibits very substantial externality effects, how-
ever, given its network and partial public-good nature. This is why the state has 
constructed the transport infrastructure in almost all countries. The returns from 
the infrastructure investment are realised across the economy in the activity 
that is enabled and thus it is appropriate to finance the investments out of tax 
revenues. 
In competition terms, elements of the transport infrastructure can be consid-
ered essential facilities as they cannot be easily replicated and access is required 
to provide a good or service. The provision of the infrastructure and the terms of 
access are therefore critical to participation in the economy by different groups 
and by location. In South Africa, excellent infrastructure was constructed for the 
prioritised groups under apartheid. To evaluate the regulatory framework and its 
implications for competition, it needs to be considered in light of the historical 
context. How has the regulatory framework taken the inherited structure into 
account and incorporated social returns and incentives for investment? Has it 
opened up opportunities for increased participation and, if so, how? 
We specifically consider rail freight and ports, both of which form part of 
state-owned corporation Transnet. The evaluation is thus how the governance 
framework has impacted on the decisions of Transnet, including the resources 
at its disposal.
The 1996 Transport White Paper envisaged an intermodal transport system 
with a greater role for general rail freight and greater private participation in the 
system as a whole. It was based on the potential gains from a more diversified 
and open national economy. As such, it had to be understood in terms of the 
wider economic and industrial policy goals of the first democratic government.
At the same time, in 1996 the shift in fiscal policy signalled by the Growth, 
Employment and Redistribution strategy meant that funding was not made 
available for investment in transport infrastructure and, indeed, government 
investment in infrastructure overall was cut back sharply (Roberts, 2004). This 
was compounded by the pension fund deficit which Transnet had to cover on its 
own balance sheet for former employees of the South African Transport Services. 
Over the last two decades, the outcome has been that general freight move-
ments have shifted significantly away from rail to road. General freight prices 
c05.indd   129 20-06-2017   09:51:49
130 Part Two: Issues in competition and regulation
have been increased to levels which are above road freight charges (figure 5.2). 
Port charges (discussed below) have been far above international norms for gen-
eral cargo. By comparison, the transport costs for primary commodities such 
as coal and iron ore remained relatively low. The outcomes have thus not been 
consistent with the objectives set out in 1996. 
Figure 5.2 Average revenue per tonne for freight rail and road, 2008–2015
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Transnet is responsible for setting rules on access, tariffs and investments. The 
state, as owner, monitors performance and sets objectives for Transnet, with this 
responsibility lying with the Department of Public Enterprises (DPE). The gov-
ernance of Transnet as a state corporation is the responsibility of the Transnet 
board. The policy framework lies with the Department of Transport, and the 
widespread linkages of transport with economic activity mean there are substan-
tial coordination challenges with, for example, industrial policy. The DPE sets 
objectives through the shareholder compact. These objectives can in principle 
be set with a view to the longer-term economic objectives, which would require 
careful specification and monitoring of non-financial measures of performance, 
alongside consideration of investment plans.
From the late 1990s the main objectives were focused on the financial per-
formance of Transnet. Not surprisingly, this meant that the Transnet focus was 
not on investments which would yield returns in the future, through enabling 
new economic activity, and where the economic returns could not be captured 
by Transnet. Instead, the focus was on where revenues could be earned from the 
existing infrastructure. This implied that the focus on the mining sector was 
effectively increased, rather than being reoriented to more diversified economic 
activities. Upgrades and expansions to the coal and iron ore lines were made. 
The historic investments in the existing coal and iron ore lines naturally 
made incremental expansions more financially profitable, in a simple path 
dependency effect. Cost-reflective tariffs further meant that historically privi-
leged interests locked in their advantages as the costs of these lines were lower 
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given the existing base and the volumes already being transported. Considering 
pricing and investment in a mature rail infrastructure, which simply needs to 
be maintained and upgraded, is different from the investment decisions for 
an industrialising economy where much of the infrastructure needs to be con-
structed with a view to the changing structure of the economy. 
The apparent lack of coordination between the DPE and the Department of 
Transport, greater emphasis on short-term financial measures and lack of public 
finance for investment meant that governance and decision making were not 
consistent with the wider needs of economic development. For example, the 
proportion of citrus moved by rail fell from 80% in 2005 to 5% in 2013 (Baloyi, 
2014, p. 31). Even grain has seen a substantial fall, from 90 to 30%. The one 
sector of manufacturing aside from heavy industries such as basic metals and 
basic chemicals that has seen growth is automotive. It also relies on local and 
international transport for inputs and finished vehicles. While there have been 
some improvements in transport of built-up models, automotive components 
(not contained in completely knocked-down packages) are not well catered for 
by rail freight.
With regard to the pricing of different cargoes at ports, a somewhat different 
picture emerges since 2009. This may be at least partly attributed to the estab-
lishment of a Ports Regulator. 
Outcomes in the ports sector and the role of the regulator
South Africa’s geographic location and size means that access to efficient port 
infrastructure is of critical importance for growth.17 Approximately 96% of South 
Africa’s exports (by volume) are by sea, so the competitiveness of the country’s 
ports has a direct bearing on the competitiveness of its industrial and export 
activities. There have been concerns around the skewed pricing and high tar-
iffs of South African ports, highlighted in recent government economic policy 
documents.18
The ports infrastructure in South Africa is 100% state-owned through Transnet 
National Ports Authority (TNPA). The majority of port operations are run by 
Transnet Port Terminal (TPT). Until 2002, almost all infrastructure and services 
were provided by public sector entity Portnet, owned by Transnet. In 2002, the 
port infrastructure was separated from the services to form the National Ports 
Authority (NPA) and the South African Ports Operator, later renamed TPT, both 
continuing to be owned by Transnet.
As was the case with rail freight, port tariffs were used to improve the income 
of Transnet as a whole, cross-subsidising other activities. However, this had 
serious negative consequences on investments in port infrastructure and com-
petitiveness of tariffs, and has been to the detriment of promoting industrial 
policy objectives. Tariffs in South Africa were higher than those internation-
ally, efficiency levels lower and ports provided fewer and lower quality services. 
Further, the prices charged at the different ports within South Africa, for equity 
reasons, are fairly uniform despite their different locations, demand drivers and 
features. This limits competition between ports, as well as for services within 
ports, and reduces the incentive to invest in infrastructure and increase 
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productivity. Competition between ports remains weak, largely because TNPA is 
the only entity permitted to develop, manage and set tariffs for ports in South 
Africa. Intra-port competition is also low given the dominance of TPT in service 
provision, such as in cargo handling and for highly specialised terminals, and, in 
most instances, traffic volumes are insufficient to support more than one termi-
nal of any type. Competition in container freight/handling is also weak. 
Many of these problems stem from the conflict of interest in Transnet own-
ing both the landlord company (NPA) and the company that is the main user of 
the ports (TPT). That conflict, linked to the approach of Transnet to use the profit 
generated by the ports operation to subsidise other operations in the group, led 
to underinvestment in port infrastructure, again highlighting the short-sighted 
outlook on developing facilities through investments. 
In 2002, the gazetted National Commercial Ports Policy laid out the frame-
work for the role of the different players in the sector, the challenges that needed 
to be addressed and the approach to regulation.19 The policy highlighted the 
strategic importance of ports in contributing to the growth and development of 
the South African economy and put forward key principles for effective ports reg-
ulation. The core of these was the need for the NPA, which was within Transnet, 
to be separated from Transnet and to be established as a new, independent state-
owned corporate entity. This was to ensure that the ports operate in the best 
interests of the country, in line with the mandate spelt out in the legislative 
framework, rather than in the narrower, profit-maximising interests of Transnet. 
The NPA would then report to the DPE.
Recognising the complexity and financial implications for Transnet in setting 
up separate institutions, a National Ports Regulator was established in 2009 as an 
interim measure until the full separation could take place. 
The Ports Regulator has made significant progress in reducing tariffs through 
changing tariff structures to different user groups. This it started implementing 
without a full staff complement or sophisticated pricing mechanisms. While the 
approach taken by the Ports Regulator in the initial years was to limit the tariff 
increases to below or at inflation levels, the 2013 tariff decision saw a significant 
reduction in key tariff lines. This is in contrast with the approach of the regu-
lator in the electricity supply industry, where, although Nersa has tried to keep 
tariffs at cost-reflective levels, it has done little to change the pre-existing relative 
tariff structures to different user groups. The result is that historically prioritised 
industries are still favoured with regards to lower electricity pricing. 
The Ports Regulator decreased the tariff on cargo dues in certain areas. For 
instance, container full export cargo dues were reduced by 43.2% and container 
full import cargo dues by 14.3% (TIPS, 2014a). It also undertook a tariff com-
parator study or benchmarking exercise in April 2012, called the Global Port 
Pricing Comparator Study, which revealed that the total general cargo tariffs 
at the ports of Durban and Cape Town were very high by world standards. For 
instance, TNPA charges US$275 000 for an average vessel, while the global aver-
age is US$150 000. The average cost per vessel call in Durban and Cape Town 
was around US$450 000 compared to around US$200 000 for Singapore. The 
study, which also looked at specific sectors, found that the tariffs for export 
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of primary commodities, mainly coal and iron ore, were well below the global 
average, while the tariffs on containers and automotive were significantly higher 
than the average (table 5.2). A specific study on the automotive sector in South 
Africa was undertaken by the regulator, comparing South African ports to 16 
other ports. It found that Durban was considerably higher-cost than most of the 
others, even after rebates and discounts. This again highlights the historic bias 
towards certain industries, which is at odds with the present-day developmental 
agenda of the country. 
Table 5.2 South Africa’s ports tariffs deviation from the global  
average, 2012
Sector Deviation from  
global average (%)
Containers (total ports authority pricing including cargo dues with rebates) 294 
Containers (cargo dues with rebates) 721 
Automotive sector (ports authority tariffs with rebates) 212 
Automotive sector (cargo dues with rebates) 710 
Coal (TNPA costs faced by cargo owners) −50 
Iron ore (TNPA costs faced by cargo owners) −10 
Source: TIPS (2014a) citing Ports Regulator of South Africa (2012, p. 6)
The Ports Regulator and the National Association of Automobile Manufacturers of 
South Africa engaged with each other regularly to find a solution to high port 
tariffs. The Association highlighted the significance of the automotive sector, 
which contributes 12–15% to South Africa’s manufacturing industry output and 
6% to the country’s GDP (TIPS, 2014a). A reduction in the automotive manufac-
turing sector’s port charges would directly improve the export competitiveness 
of the automotive industry, in turn resulting in increased exports as well as the 
opportunity to secure contracts from within the global operations of their mem-
bers. Improved port tariffs would therefore contribute to the economic develop-
ment objectives of the country to create jobs and increase investment. The Ports 
Regulator continues to consider these submissions seriously. In the tariff year 
2013/2014, it reduced the automotive tariff charges in the tariff book adjustments, 
with motor vehicles exported ‘on own wheel’ cargo dues reduced by 21.1%. 
Although tariffs need to reduce further to bring them closer to international 
levels, this is a positive movement towards aligning tariffs while taking into 
account government economic (and social) policy objectives. According to the 
Ports Regulator, 
It is clear from the data that South African cargo owners and logistics 
operators face significantly higher infrastructure costs than the rest of 
the sample when using containers to move cargo. With the bulk of 
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South Africa’s manufactured goods arguably exported through contain-
ers this is clearly contradictory to current industrial policy aiming to 
incentivise value addition, broadening of the manufacturing base and 
increasing manufactured exports. (TIPS, 2014a, citing Ports Regulator of 
South Africa, 2012, p. 9)
The revised pricing strategy has been in effect since 2015 and has enabled ongo-
ing investments in the maintenance and extension of the South African ports 
system, ensuring cost recovery across all national ports. There is one basic rate 
for cargo dues for each different cargo handling type (i.e., containers, dry bulk, 
break bulk, liquid bulk, automotive), replacing the previous differentiation of 
cargo dues by commodity. Cargoes moving in large shiploads, such as dry bulks, 
continue to pay lower cargo dues per tonne than cargoes using smaller vessels 
such as general cargo ships. Further, deviations from the base rates for cargo 
dues were introduced in line with government priorities for promoting exports 
and beneficiation industries, but these reductions have been determined fairly 
arbitrarily. Beneficiation rebates have also been introduced, where lower tariffs 
are charged for exports produced through the beneficiation of South Africa’s 
natural resources. This is in line with the dti policy objective of increasing local 
value addition. TNPA’s beneficiation contributions for the metals sector are 
that iron ore, a raw material, would receive no rebate, while pig iron would 
receive a 10% discount, rolled steel and pipes a 60% discount, and structural 
steel, machinery and white goods an 80% discount. The broad principles of 
this pricing mechanism are set to continue in 2017, although situation-specific 
variations have been introduced, such as discounts on the cargo dues for maize 
for the first five million tonnes in 2016/2017, given the drought.20 These devel-
opments are due to dynamic and bold steps by the Ports Regulator to increase 
the competitiveness of South African ports and align pricing to support other 
industrial policy objectives. The regulator has achieved this in a short space of 
time and faced with substantial limitations in resources and regulatory capacity. 
Through relatively simple benchmarking exercises and proactive decisions, it 
has reduced tariffs and reversed past asymmetry in a short time period.
The issues in rail and ports are essentially the same and yet changes have 
been made in ports through the introduction of a regulator. However, lest this be 
interpreted simplistically as an argument for regulation, the ports case contrasts 
with electricity where the regulator has not adjusted the relative prices of heavy 
mineral processing and diversified industry to rectify the historical bias.
Another contrast, in the opposite direction, is that the REIPPPP example in 
electricity demonstrated the potential learning from opening up access, even 
while pursuing non-financial objectives. In ports, access to facilities could be 
widened. This is not only about private ownership – some of the terminals are 
private (such as for bulk chemicals) and have been bottlenecks undermining 
competitors. Separating different levels even while maintaining state ownership 
can change the incentives of managers (as was intended with the NPA and con-
templated in the ISMO for electricity).
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Telecoms
Telecommunications is often used as an example of where technology change 
means that what was once a natural monopoly (and in almost all countries 
state-owned, due to the need to invest in a fixed-line network) is no longer so.21 
 Mobile telephony is not subject to the same utility-type cost structure and pro-
vides an alternative to relying on the fixed-line network. It was even proposed 
that the need for regulation would wither as competition took root (Cave, 2006). 
South Africa has followed the orthodoxy in this regard with relatively light reg-
ulation of mobile telephony and an expectation that as this segment expanded, 
coupled with entry into fixed-line, competition would generate efficient eco-
nomic outcomes.22
Reflecting these prior beliefs, regulation has been focused on interconnection 
to ensure that newer participants can link with the existing networks so that 
their subscribers can make and receive calls with subscribers on other networks. 
However, the call termination rates were simply to be set between the parties 
subject to broad principles. There are also provisions for facilities leasing so that 
entrants can gain access to the facilities in existence but, similarly, the terms and 
mechanisms for this were not specified. 
On the face of it, the issues appear to be quite different from those in trans-
port and energy. After reviewing the outcomes and assessing the role of eco-
nomic regulation and the links to competition, we point to areas of common 
concern. In particular, we argue that the South African experience of telecom-
munications regulation points to the need to regulate for increased competitive 
rivalry and participation in the economy, recognising the implications of the 
past state investment. 
Outcomes in telecommunication
In terms of South Africa’s rankings in the information and communications 
technology (ICT) sector, the World Economic Forum’s Network Readiness Index 
ranked South Africa 65th out of 139 countries in 2016, while the International 
Telecommunications Union ICT Development Index ranked South Africa 
88th out of 175 countries. These indices combine a number of measures but 
to a large extent these outcomes reflect relatively poor broadband coverage, 
speeds and pricing. The number of broadband internet subscribers is sub-
stantially below South Africa’s peers (figure 5.3). This could be attributed to 
the very unequal income distribution in South Africa. However, in terms of 
broadband speeds, South Africa has also been falling behind other BRICS23 
countries, aside from India (figure 5.4). Prices for fixed broadband are also sub-
stantially higher in South Africa, and four times those in India (figure 5.5). 
Mobile phone prices have also been relatively high, and above the Southern 
African Development Community (SADC) average until the reductions in prices 
from 2008 (Hawthorne, 2014a). There were larger reductions from 2010 onwards 
following the reductions in call termination (voluntary at first), with the largest 
reductions in 2013 following the imposition of lower call termination charges. 
c05.indd   135 20-06-2017   09:51:50
136 Part Two: Issues in competition and regulation
Figure 5.3 Fixed broadband internet subscribers per 100 people, 2015
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Figure 5.4 South Africa’s broadband speeds compared to those in Brazil, China, 
India, Russia and Turkey
Source: Analysis of Ookla (2015). Accessed from ‘Netindex’, 
http://www.netindex.com (this data source has since been discontinued)
Note: Mbps = megabits per second
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Regulation and competition in mobile telephony: 
Interconnection and call termination
South Africa appears to have relatively strong rivalry in mobile telephony, with four 
operators in 2014. And, there have been three operators for more than a decade 
following the entry of Cell C. Why then have South Africa’s mobile rates remained 
higher than in many other countries which have a similar number of competitors? 
Developments in recent years reveal the importance of strong regulatory action for 
smaller rivals to be effective competitors. It is well established in economic theory 
that a duopoly may well not mean vigorous competition, even without there being 
an explicit collusive agreement. In the case of mobile telephony, the historic South 
African model of two-year contracts and the obstacles to number portability meant 
subscribers were unlikely to switch, dampening price competition (ICN, 2006). 
Cell C’s entry was thus meant to be competitively significant. 
The mobile-to-mobile call termination rates were originally set at R0.20/min-
ute between Vodacom and MTN by their mutual agreement, when the mobile 
operators were licensed in 1993 (Hawthorne, 2014b; Knott-Craig, 2009). Prior to 
Cell C’s entry in 2001, however, the call termination rate had been increased to 
R1.19/minute for peak hours and R0.65/minute for off-peak.24 This effectively 
placed a floor under the price that Cell C could offer to attract subscribers, as 
with a small subscriber base a majority of the calls made by Cell C subscribers 
would be terminating on the networks of other operators. The call termination 
Figure 5.5 Prices for fixed broadband, US$, 2014
Source: Analysis of ITU (2014) 
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charges reinforced network effects, as the charges are obviously not payable for 
on-net calls. When combined with the existing obstacles to switching, Cell C 
remained a marginal player with an insignificant impact. Competition did not 
work in terms of prices to consumers. 
Regulation has an important role to play in understanding these outcomes. The 
interconnection guidelines of 1999, 2000 and 2002 under the Telecommunications 
Act required major operators to set their call termination rates at the long-run 
incremental cost of call termination (Aproskie, Hodge, Lipschitz and Sheik, 2008). 
But, MTN and Vodacom were not declared major operators by the Independent 
Communications Authority of South Africa (Icasa).25 Under Chapter 10 of the 
Electronic Communications Act (No. 36 of 2005) Icasa can, in general, regulate 
prices where markets are characterised by ineffective competition. It is also specifi-
cally empowered under section 41 to prescribe regulations for wholesale intercon-
nection rates. After a public inquiry into interconnection in 2006 and 2007, Icasa 
decided it had to develop regulations for Chapter 10 before it could regulate inter-
connection. This effectively stalled the process until regulations were published 
in November 2010 to come into effect in March 2011. Icasa stipulated that MTN 
and Vodacom would charge call termination rates of R0.40/minute from 1 March 
2013, while Cell C and Telkom Mobile could charge 10% more. 
Actual call termination rates were reduced earlier than stipulated in the regu-
lations. The Parliamentary Portfolio Committee on Communications held hear-
ings in 2009 which led to reductions being agreed by the operators with the 
minister of communications, to reduce peak rates to R0.89/minute (McLeod, 
2009). This political pressure then provided the base for Icasa’s subsequent reg-
ulations. While the agreed reductions in 2009 supported Cell C, in particular, in 
being a somewhat more effective competitor, reflected in increased subscribers 
and some competitive pressure on prices, the really big change in prices towards 
those at the lower end of SADC countries was only in 2013 (figure 5.6), after the 
Icasa regulation came into force.
Figure 5.6 Prepaid mobile prices, US$, 2011–2016
Source: Analysis based on data prepared by Research ICT Africa (n.d.) 
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Subsequent final regulations in 2014 lowered termination rates further and 
increased the asymmetry (figure 5.7). The new regulations also, however, 
lowered the rates that Cell C and Telkom Mobile are able to charge Vodacom 
and MTN, down from R0.44 to R0.31. Cell C subsequently objected to this 
(Paelo, 2015).
A number of lessons can be drawn from the South African experience over 
the past two decades. First, competition requires appropriate regulation. This 
includes incorporating principles related to addressing market power and the 
ability to enforce. Second, competition does not equate to the number of com-
petitors and we cannot be complacent about technology changes meaning 
competition will blossom of its own accord, even while technical natural 
monopoly factors become less significant. Third, entrenched first movers can 
protect their advantages. This motivates for asymmetry in call termination 
between incumbents and entrants, although only for a relatively short time 
(Hawthorne, 2014b). In other words, regulation is required to change the rules 
of the game to foster effective competitive rivalry. Fourth, the de jure indepen-
dence of institutions is less important than their mandate, powers and political 
support. In this case, the change appears closely linked to a shift in the balance 
of interests evident in the portfolio committee hearings. This is possibly linked 
to the interest of Telkom as a new mobile entrant. The change in call termina-
tion certainly contrasts with the developments in facilities leasing where Telkom 
is the incumbent. 
Figure 5.7 Reductions in call termination rates, 2010–2015
Source: Research ICT Africa. Lowest available retail prepaid voice prices (off-net, peak), 






















Q4'10 Q2'12 Q1'13 Q3'13 Q2'14 Q1'15
Quarter
Telkom Mobile Cell C
MTN Vodacom
c05.indd   139 20-06-2017   09:51:54
140 Part Two: Issues in competition and regulation
Regulation and competition: Facilities leasing
If anything, the competition and regulation issues related to the position and 
market power of the fixed-line incumbent Telkom have been longer running 
than those of the mobile operators. They are also arguably more important as 
they underpin the poor ICT performance of the South African economy. There 
have been many reviews of these issues (e.g., Aproskie et al., 2008, Gillwald, 
Moyo and Stork, 2012; Makhaya and Roberts, 2003). The South African fixed-line 
telecommunications utility, Telkom, was incorporated in 1991 as an SOE gov-
erned by the Department of Posts and Telegraphs.26 The privatisation of Telkom 
was presented as a solution to attract investment and to assist a financially ailing 
SOE, through a 30% stake sold to a consortium (Thintana) comprising Malaysia 
Telecommunication and SBC Communications as ‘strategic equity partners’.27 
The privatisation of these entities coincided with the extension of Telkom’s 
monopoly in voice telephony for five years, from 1997 to 2002, justified by the 
imposition of universal service obligations.28 The monopoly period was also 
seen as necessary for Telkom to prepare itself for the onslaught of competition. 
Competition was effectively delayed by a further five years to 2007, due to vari-
ous factors including a protracted licensing process (Horwitz and Currie, 2007). 
The Second National Operator, Neotel, was licensed in 2005, launched in August 
2006 and commenced services in 2007.
As with the entrant into mobile telecommunications, the presence of a 
competitor to the incumbent did not realise apparently competitive outcomes. 
While the competition authorities have taken on a number of matters, these are 
ex post evaluations of past conduct and the rulings are many years after the con-
duct being complained of. They relate to conduct by Telkom which undermined 
downstream competition (see Hawthorne, 2014a; Makhaya and Roberts, 2014).29 
One rationale for this conduct is to inhibit the growth of the upstream rival as 
downstream firms may support and provide custom to the upstream entrant. 
Facilities leasing, on which we focus here, is a more direct challenge for an 
entrant. To address the incumbent’s position, regulators have developed means 
of separating the upstream and downstream divisions of vertically integrated 
upstream incumbents and have developed open access frameworks – local loop 
unbundling (LLU) – for third parties to make use of monopoly inputs. In South 
Africa, the facilities-leasing regulations under the telecommunications legisla-
tion are designed to ensure that new entrants are able to gain access to the exist-
ing facilities in order to build their own infrastructure linked into the existing 
infrastructure and thus to climb the ‘ladder of investment’ (Hawthorne, 2014a). 
The Electronic Communications Act of 2005 makes provision for the leas-
ing of Telkom’s facilities by other parties. However, Telkom declined to con-
clude an infrastructure-sharing agreement with Neotel, favouring a case-by-case 
approach to managing access. In 2007, a policy decision was taken to commence 
with LLU. According to the Ministerial Policy Directive of 2007, Icasa was given 
until November 2011 to publish LLU regulations.30 In 2010, Icasa issued reg-
ulations for general facilities leasing, but not for LLU. By 2011, Icasa had not 
instituted any significant steps to effect the orderly implementation of LLU, 
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save for issuing a discussion paper and holding public hearings into the matter. 
The discussion paper outlined various methodologies to effect the policy direc-
tive on LLU. Telkom raised various objections to this process. In its Findings 
Note,31 issued after its hearings on LLU, Icasa found that the obligation to lease 
facilities applies to all licensees providing electronic communications network 
services. The Findings Note also sets out a timetable for fixed-line LLU, with 
numerous steps including further industry consultation and engagement, a reg-
ulatory impact assessment on the costs and benefits of the various forms of LLU, 
followed by market reviews and the introduction of supplementary LLU regu-
lations. The Department of Communications (DoC) set a deadline for Icasa to 
implement LLU by the end of 2011 but Icasa did not achieve this target and has 
not to date implemented LLU.
In the midst of this vacuum, in December 2011, Neotel made a request to 
Telkom to lease local loop infrastructure at two specific sites. Neotel framed 
this request under the provisions of the Electronic Communications Act. 
Telkom rejected this approach by Neotel on the basis that the regulatory 
framework envisages a separate process for LLU and, in any event, Neotel had 
not framed its request according to the provisions of the Act. Neotel’s sub-
sequent complaint against Telkom32 was referred by Icasa to the Complaints 
and Compliance Committee (CCC).33 The CCC34 is a mechanism for resolving 
disputes. Alternatively, Icasa could impose a remedy unilaterally or negotiate 
with the parties to resolve a matter. The CCC issued an interim order that 
acknowledges that Neotel’s request is legally valid and holds that Telkom’s 
response to Neotel is inadequate. Thus Telkom has contravened Regulation 
3(2) of the Act’s Facilities Leasing Regulations of 2010. However, as a matter 
of practicality, the CCC decided that it would be necessary for the LLU regula-
tions to be in place to enable the leasing of copper infrastructure.35 The CCC 
instructed Icasa to develop terms and conditions consistent with Chapter 8 of 
the Act within a period of three months from its decision, which was taken 
on 18 May 2012. 
The LLU process, and the dispute between Telkom and Neotel regarding the 
leasing of infrastructure, demonstrates the privileges of incumbency enjoyed 
by Telkom and the difficulties faced by an entrant in competing with such an 
incumbent. It also illustrates that the rules have not properly addressed the con-
duct they were meant to, while more attention needs to be paid to the way 
institutions work in practice. 
The actions of the state as owner have been contradictory to its aims as a 
reformer and economic policy maker. Unlike with entities such as the transport 
and electricity parastatals, the government shareholding in Telkom is held by 
the DoC, which is also responsible for the policy framework. This compounds 
the conflict of objectives and adds to the inclination to retard the development 
of Icasa into a strong regulator. For example, Telkom’s long battle to keep com-
petitors from offering voice services was assisted by DoC delays in providing 
clarity regarding the extent to which value-added services providers could also 
provide voice services.36 
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Common lessons drawn: What is the role 
of competition in economic regulation?
The reviews of the different regulated industries expose both similarities and 
differences in the approach to regulation, particularly regarding consideration 
of competition principles in implementing regulatory rules. Important lessons 
from the interface between competition and regulation in these sectors can be 
drawn. These are useful for economic regulators in terms of learning from one 
another, for engagement between economic regulators and competition author-
ities, as well as for policy makers.
There are clear differences in regulator structure, capacity and experience, 
yet some of the most effective decisions which promoted increased participation 
have been made by relatively new regulators with very limited capacity. 
In terms of structure, in electricity the fully integrated and corporatised 
SOE, Eskom, is regulated by independent regulator Nersa. In rail freight and 
ports there is also an integrated SOE but without an independent regulator until 
the recently established Ports Regulator. All operate within a policy framework 
determined by a line department. In telecommunications, the main operator has 
been privatised with a long-established regulator and enforcement actions by 
the competition authorities. 
The industry reviews have shown that entrenched interests have frustrated 
investments in infrastructure that would have otherwise increased participation 
in line with government’s economic and social objectives. Favourable treatment 
of powerful industries and groupings such as mining and metal smelters (justi-
fied by short-term financial performance measures) has resulted in similarities in 
terms of the historic investment patterns which were oriented to these industries. 
Regulators in many instances have not taken into account diversified users’ needs.
An exception is in the renewable energy sector, where a proactive and coordi-
nated approach by the state and the regulator in the REIPPPP led to introducing 
greater participation in electricity generation by IPPs, the benefits of which are 
evident in falling tariffs and encouraging local content. While there are also pri-
vate operators in mobile telephony, the benefits of increased participation have 
not resulted in the desired outcomes. Entrenched market power of the incum-
bent has been protected historically and there is a need to regulate more for 
increased competitive rivalry and participation in the economy.
With regard to rail and ports, many of the problems of underinvestment 
need to be understood in terms of the wider fiscal framework and corporati-
sation of Transnet as owner, user and self-regulator of the infrastructure (until 
recently for ports), along with the governance exerted by the state as owner 
through the DPE. These factors are related to the practice of Transnet using the 
profit generated by the rail and ports operation to subsidise other operations in 
the group, and have led to underinvestment and inappropriate (and uncompet-
itive) pricing, especially for diversified container freight. Unlike with other enti-
ties, the government shareholding in Telkom is held by the DoC, which is also 
responsible for the policy framework. This compounds the conflict of objectives 
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and adds to the inclination to retard the development of Icasa into a strong reg-
ulator in the telecoms industry.
A lesson from this would be to separate regulators from their line departments. 
And although the interim Ports Regulator has still not seen a full separation of 
powers, the benefits of independent regulation in ports are seen in the signifi-
cant progress made by the Ports Regulator in reducing tariffs through changing 
tariff structures to different user groups. This contrasts with the approach of 
the regulator in the electricity supply industry, where Nersa has done little to 
change the pre-existing relative tariff structures biased to historically favoured 
user groups. 
Also markedly different are the different rates of reform in the sectors 
reviewed. Positive and pro-competitive outcomes were achieved much faster in 
renewable energy and in ports compared to rail and telecoms. Further, in the 
case of ports, this was done with limited capacity. Therefore, it is not necessarily 
about the capacity and experience of the regulator – effective decisions can be 
taken quickly with limited capacity.
What is also evident is that there is limited transfer of learning between the 
regulators from their respective failed or successful experiences. For instance, 
useful lessons from the auction system design of the renewable energy pro-
gramme could potentially be adopted in other regulated industries. One way in 
which this transfer could be achieved is to consider merging the regulators into a 
single economic regulator, possibly including even the competition authorities.
It is apparent from the sector reviews that effective regulation is necessary to 
ensure that the competitive space remains open and to govern aspects such as 
access to critical infrastructure. Even in industries where scale economies would 
advocate that only one firm operate, regulation that is conducive to creating 
‘synthetic competition’ by ensuring the participation of several competitors has 
shown positive outcomes in terms of the dynamic gains from rivalry.
Notes
1 All outputs from this project can be accessed at http://www.competition.org.za/
regulatory-entities-capacity-building-project/.
2 The energy sector reviews (electricity and renewable energy) were undertaken by Trade 
and Industrial Policy Strategies (TIPS) on behalf of CCRED – das Nair, Montmasson-
Clair and Ryan (2014) for electricity and Montmasson-Clair, Moilwa and Ryan (2014) 
on renewable energy. There was also a study of liquid fuel, which is not included in 
this chapter.
3 Transmission and distribution losses averaged 20% compared to the global average of 
5%. Eskom was strapped for cash and debt coverage ratios were high. Below-cost tariffs 
significantly contributed to poor technical and financial performance (Eberhard and 
Gratwick, 2008).
4 Some of the many key stakeholders in the ESI include the departments of Energy, Public 
Enterprises, Environmental Affairs and Water Affairs; National Treasury; Nersa; Eskom; IPPs; 
the Energy Intensive Users Group of Southern Africa; the South African Local Government 
Association; the Association of Municipal Electricity Undertakings and municipalities.
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5 Special/negotiated pricing agreements, where prices to the smelters were fixed in 
terms of international aluminium prices and exchange rates.
6 The ferrochrome smelter agreements were terminated, but certain of the BHP con-
tracts are still in effect, even after its aluminium operations were sold off to South32.
7 General industrial customers pay Megaflex rates, which are also cheaper than what 
households pay, although not as favourable as what BHP Billiton pays.
8 There were also interruptability provisions in the contract with BHP that allowed 
Eskom to cut supply to the smelters when the grid was under stress, which was to the 
disadvantage of the smelters – pricing has to reflect this.
9 Valued at R340 billion, excluding capitalised borrowing costs. By 2018/2019, the pro-
gramme will add 17.1 GW of capacity to the 2005 nominal generation capacity of 36.2 
GW (Eskom, 2013). 
10 While the ISMO Bill has been discussed and agreed on by the Portfolio Committee on 
Energy on two occasions at least, it was stalled in parliament, being removed from the 
National Assembly Order Paper twice, in June and November 2013 (Pressly, 2013). 
11 The pricing methodology has historically been, and is currently, one of full cost recovery 
in principle. Nersa currently employs the mechanism of an MYPD method to set elec-
tricity prices. The MYPD is essentially a rate of return method of price regulation where 
price level is set to cover all costs and to allow a fair rate of return on the cost of capital.
12 Through the Municipal Fiscal Powers and Functions Act (No. 12 of 2007). Other legis-
lation governing municipalities includes the Municipal Finance and Management Act 
and the Municipal Systems Act.
13 The international benchmark for distribution losses (as electricity moves through the 
network) is 3.5%. Distribution losses in South Africa’s best-run metros are significantly 
above the international benchmark. In 2011/2012 the most efficient municipality, 
eThekwini, achieved a distribution loss of 5% (National Treasury, 2011), whereas the 
two largest metros in South Africa, the City of Johannesburg and the City of Cape 
Town, achieved 11% and 9.3% respectively (National Treasury, 2011). 
14 This section draws from TIPS (2014b).
15 Pilot National Cogeneration Programme, the Medium Term Power Purchase 
Programme and the Multisite Base-load Independent Power Producer Programme.
16 In fact, the DoE and Treasury considered that Nersa was acting beyond its mandate in 
being the custodian of this programme.
17 This section draws from TIPS (2014a).
18 The New Growth Path emphasises the need to have competitive pricing in ports and 
the Industrial Policy Action Plan states that high ports charges remain a significant 
constraint and a threat to the manufacturing industry and employment. The fact that 
South African ports’ charges are among the highest in the world is also highlighted in 
these documents.
19 Government Gazette, 8 August 2002, Notice 1409, http://www.gov.za/sites/www.gov.
za/files/23715_1.pdf.
20 Record of decision, Tariff Application by the National Ports Authority for the Tariff 
Years 2016/17–2018/19.
21 This section is drawn from Hawthorne (2014a).
22 The Independent Communications Authority of South Africa Act (No. 13 of 2000) pro-
vides for the establishment of the industry regulator, Icasa, as well as for the Complaints 
c05.indd   144 20-06-2017   09:51:54
Competition and regulation interface in South Africa 145
and Compliance Committee. The Electronic Communications Act and the Competition 
Act provide an economic regulation mandate to the competition authorities and Icasa 
in a number of areas, including interconnection and facilities leasing, spectrum man-
agement and universal service and access, and competition and price regulation.
23 Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa.
24 The rates were subsequently increased to R1.25 for peak hours by 2005 (Aproskie et al., 
2008).
25 Cell C made an application to have Vodacom and MTN declared major operators but 
later withdrew it. 
26 As per the Post Office Amendment Act (No. 85 of 1991). Before this, telecommunica-
tion services were provided by the Department.
27 SBC is an American company spun out of the AT&T stable.
28 By the end of the period of exclusivity, there was a net decline in fixed-line and inter-
net penetration (see Makhaya and Roberts, 2003).
29 Tribunal case no. 11/CR/Feb04. See CCSA (2013) for the settlement of the second case.
30 These remained outstanding in February 2014.
31 ‘Findings Note on the Icasa Framework for Introducing Local Loop Unbundling’, http://
www.ellipsis.co.za/wp-content/uploads/2011/11/ICASA-Findings-Note-30112011.pdf.
32 Under s43(5)(c) of the Act.
33 The matter was heard on 16, 17 and 18 May 2012. Case no. 59/2011, Neotel (Pty) Ltd 
vs Telkom SA Ltd. 
34 Established in terms of s17A of the Icasa Act of 2000 as amended.
35 In accordance with s(44)(3)(m) of the Act.
36 Only when Altech brought a case through the courts was it confirmed that under the 
Electronic Communications Act value-added network service providers can convert 
licences into individual electronic communication services and roll out their own 
networks, as there is no legal monopoly held by Telkom. 
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6 How multinational investments in grain trading are reshaping 
Zambia’s market
Introduction 
Multinational capital is flowing into African agrifood systems in ways that are 
dramatically altering how food is produced and consumed in the region. While 
multinational investments in African food systems are not new, shifts in the 
political, economic and demographic landscape of the region have expanded 
the scope and scale of these investments. Over the last decade or so, much of 
sub-Saharan Africa has witnessed rapid urbanisation, sustained GDP growth, 
single-digit inflation and the emergence of an African middle class (Chikweche and 
Fletcher, 2014; Fine et al., 2012; Losch, 2012; Ncube, Lufumpa and Vencatachellum, 
2011). These domestic transformations are taking place within a global context 
of increasing uncertainty over global grain supplies and prices (Dewbre, Giner, 
Thompson and Von Lampe, 2008). The interactions between these domestic, 
regional and global factors have created incentives for multinational investment 
throughout African agrifood systems, from food production to retailing.
To date, research on the transformation of African agrifood systems has 
focused most intently on the rise of supermarkets (Neven, Odera, Reardon and 
Wang, 2009; Reardon, Timmer, Barrett and Berdegué, 2003; Weatherspoon and 
Reardon, 2003) and the growth in demand for African land for commercial agri-
cultural purposes (Cotula, Vermeulen, Leonard and Keeley, 2009; Deininger and 
Byerlee, 2011; Hall, 2011). This research has highlighted important system-wide 
benefits of the corporatisation of African agrifood systems, including improved 
capacity to manage environmental and financial risk, the increased pace of tech-
nology adoption, and supply chain modernisation (Collier and Dercon, 2014; 
Minten, Randrianarison and Swinnen, 2009; Reardon and Berdegué, 2006). 
However, there is considerable concern over the potential ramifications of 
the transformation of African agrifood systems for small-scale producers, who 
continue to make up the majority of the population in sub-Saharan Africa and 
among whom poverty levels remain unacceptably high (Haggblade et al., 2012; 
Weatherspoon and Reardon, 2003). This includes the displacement of traditional 
food markets by supermarkets, which may weaken the capacity of smallhold-
ers to tap into expanding urban-demand opportunities (Reardon et al., 2003; 
Tschirley, Reardon, Dolislager and Snyder, 2014; Weatherspoon and Reardon, 
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2003), and the enclosure of smallholder farming areas by commercial agriculture 
investments (Cotula et al., 2009; Hall, 2011; Jayne et al., 2014). 
Missing in the debates over the role of multinational capital in the transfor-
mation of African agrifood systems is the growth of multinational investment in 
African cereal and oilseed trading and associated activities. Investments in grain 
and oilseed trading in Africa by large multinational firms has been prompted, 
in large part, by the same sets of incentives driving investments in other aspects 
of African food systems, including growing urban demand on the continent, 
increasing uncertainty over global food prices and higher potential profit margins 
relative to global averages. What are the implications of this wave of investment 
interest in African grain and oilseed trading? More specifically, can this investment 
interest be harnessed in ways that are beneficial for smallholders and consumers? 
In this chapter, we use Zambia as a case study to examine the effects of mul-
tinational investment in cereal and oilseed trading. We argue that these invest-
ments are becoming an increasingly important dimension of Africa’s agrifood 
transformation, and, if well managed, have the potential to improve compe-
tition within the intermediary markets that most smallholders depend on; to 
lower margins in food marketing systems; to improve price and supply risk man-
agement throughout grain and oilseed supply chains; to stimulate rural non-
farm opportunities, particularly in grain assembly and transport; and to add a 
powerful voice for free cross-border trade and predictable agricultural policies. 
Yet, our analysis suggests that the potential also exists for a less positive outcome. 
In particular, this investment wave may squeeze out domestic competition in 
the sector, as well as provide a conduit for multinational firms to gain vertical 
control of domestic food markets through ancillary investments in input supply, 
domestic processing and production (Anseeuw and Ducastel, 2013). By high-
lighting the potentially divergent pathways this investment wave can stimulate, 
we hope to provide concrete recommendations to policy makers on how to effec-
tively manage this investment interest in order to maximise its beneficial effects. 
Data sources and methodology
The data for this chapter are predominantly qualitative and were derived from 
multiple sources. To understand the ways in which smallholder grain markets 
function and the effects of multinational investment in grain trading on these 
markets, we carried out interviews with smallholder farmers, small-scale assem-
bly traders and local grain wholesalers in five districts in Zambia (table 6.1). These 
districts were selected because they are high-production areas and have witnessed 
recent investments from multinational firms in domestic grain trading. 
Farmers selected to participate in focus group discussions were identified 
with the help of local Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock extension officers. 
Only farmers who sold grain in the previous year were selected to participate in 
the discussions. During these discussions, farmers were asked to identify local 
traders in their area. This snowball sampling strategy enabled the identification 
of local assembly traders and the primary local wholesaler(s) in each market. 
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To understand how and why multinational firms have begun investing in 
Zambia’s grain-trading markets, we conducted interviews with representatives 
of five of the major firms in Zambia, which we complemented with online 
research of company websites. Both local and multinational wholesalers also 
provided data on trading costs and prevailing prices that enabled us to calculate 
trends in wholesale margins over time. We also interviewed a representative 
of the Grain Traders’ Association of Zambia (GTAZ), who provided key infor-
mant data on broader industry trends and changes in association membership 
composition. 
We supplement this qualitative data with nationally representative survey 
data on production and marketing collected by the Zambian Central Statistical 
Office. We utilise the Crop Forecast Survey in 2012 and 2014, which collects 
anticipated sales volumes from over 14  000 small- and large-scale producers, 
and the 2012 and 2015 Rural Agricultural Livelihoods Survey (RALS), which 
collects actual sales behaviour by small-scale farmers. The RALS captures spe-
cific marketing behaviour. However, it does not effectively disaggregate multi-
national large-scale traders from domestic ones. The survey response for sales 
channel is simply ‘large-scale trader’. Still, there are several reasons why we are 
confident that this market channel is almost exclusively multinational large-
scale traders. First, when we examine sales volumes through different market 
channels by province, we find that the large-scale trader purchases occur almost 
exclusively where multinational firms operate – primarily in Eastern and Central 
Provinces, and, to a far lesser extent, in Southern.1 Second, large-scale domestic 
traders in Zambia focus mostly on the commercial farming sector. To the extent 
that they buy from the smallholder sector, this occurs through small- and medi-
um-scale traders that aggregate for them. A farmer would not recognise these as 
proxies for larger buyers. Finally, only one large-scale domestic wholesaler oper-
ates a buying depot in a rural part of Zambia, and this is located within Lusaka 
Province. Direct purchases by large-scale traders in Lusaka Province accounted 
for a small fraction of total large-scale trader purchases in our data. For these 
reasons, we believe that our data do provide insights into smallholder marketing 
to the multinational sector. 





Farmer focus group discussions with smallholders 25
Total number of farmers 382
Assembly traders 44
Local small- and medium-scale wholesalers 7
Large-scale multinational wholesalers 5
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Substantiating the investment wave 
in grain and oilseed trading 
In Zambia, ten multinational firms of various national origins have made 
substantial investments in cereal and oilseed trading and associated services, 
including input and asset financing, collateral management and post-harvest 
management. While private investments in food crop origination began soon 
after market liberalisation in the 1990s, uncertainty over government trade pol-
icies, coupled with limited tradeable supplies and domestic market opportuni-
ties, pushed most of these initial investors out of the market (Dorosh, Dradri 
and Haggblade, 2009; Nijhoff, Jayne, Mwiinga and Shaffer, 2002). According to 
GTAZ, by 2002 multinational firms played an inconsequential role in Zambian 
grain wholesale markets. Yet this all changed in 2008, in the wake of the global 
food price spike. Beginning in 2008, multinational firms began establishing 
trading operations in Zambia or initiated an expansion of existing agricul-
tural operations into grain trading. The scale of these investments has been 
impressive. 
Using a combination of smallholder household survey data and interviews 
with industry experts, table 6.2 indicates that in the 2011/2012 crop marketing 
season large-scale grain trading firms directly handled approximately 500 000 
metric tonnes (mt) of maize, soybeans and wheat. This amounted to 25% of 
the total marketed surplus for these three crops. Using estimated nominal 2012 
farm-gate prices for these commodities (ReNAPRI, 2015), the purchase value 
amounts to US$260 million spent in direct payments to farmers, of which over 
US$18 million went directly to small-scale farmers. By 2015 these firms were 
handling 621 000 mt of grain, with a significantly expanded presence in the 
smallholder market. Household survey data show that these firms increased their 
smallholder market presence by nearly 178 000 mt. This amounts to US$233 
million in payments to farmers, with US$53 million going to small-scale farmers. 
This national-level picture obscures the significant regional (provincial) 
dimensions of the investment. Multinational investments in grain wholesaling 
from the small-scale sector were almost completely confined to two Zambian 
provinces (Eastern and Central) in 2014/2015. In these two provinces, firms such 
as Cargill, Afgri and NWK Agri-Services all operate smallholder origination oper-
ations. The geographic clustering of these investments is evident from house-
hold survey data. As shown in table 6.3, these two provinces account for 93% of 
all soybean sales to large-scale trading firms and 79% of all maize sales. 
The figures on the share of small-scale sales procured by large-scale traders 
underestimate the scale of these traders’ operations in this sector. This is because 
only direct sales to large-scale traders are accounted for in this estimate. As dis-
cussed in more detail below, small-scale intermediaries that bulk crops from 
small-scale farmers for onward sale frequently sell to large-scale multination-
als, either directly under contract or independently. These small-scale traders 
accounted for 58 and 7% of the total volume of small-scale soybean and maize 
sales, respectively, in 2012. By 2015 this figure had changed to 48% for soybeans 
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and 17% for maize. The declining role of small-scale traders and the increasing 
role of multinational traders in the context of rapidly expanding smallholder 
soybean production are likely due to increased input financing and forward con-
tracting for soybeans by some multinational firms. We return to this point below. 
The timing of the current multinational investment wave in Zambia is not 
a coincidence, nor is it occurring only in Zambia. Interviews with representa-
tives from multinational firms in Zambia suggest that similar investments in 
grain trading are occurring in all major grain-producing countries in eastern 
and southern Africa, including Malawi, Tanzania, Kenya and Mozambique. This 
has been partly driven by increased uncertainty over global grain supplies and 
prices, which has made the region’s historical reliance on cheap grain imports 
from abroad more costly and tenuous. This uncertainty, combined with growing 
and more affluent urban populations, has prompted firms to explore opportu-
nities to tap into domestic production to meet a greater share of domestic and 
regional demand. 
Firms also indicate that margins in Zambia’s grain markets, like those in 
neighbouring countries, tend to be higher than in more advanced markets, due 
to the large number of intermediaries involved in the markets, high transac-
tions costs associated with limited economies of scale and poor infrastructure, 
and limited market information leading to opportunities for rents to be earned 
through asymmetrical market information. Through various marketing network 
arrangements, including diffuse smallholder procurement networks and forward 
contracting arrangements, multinational firms see opportunities to overcome 
some of these transaction costs in ways that enable them to capture higher mar-
gins relative to more established global grain markets.
This wave of multinational investment into trading has occurred along 
three primary paths. The first is through an expansion of existing cash crop 
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operations – particularly cotton in Zambia – into the grain sector. Changes in 
Cargill Corporation’s investment strategies in Zambia, and Africa more broadly, 
reflect this investment pathway into grain trading. Cargill’s initial African 
investments focused on traditional cash crop procurement and processing, 
including tea handling and storage in Kenya, cotton procurement and gin-
ning in Zimbabwe, Zambia and Uganda, and cocoa in Ghana and Ivory Coast. 
As global grain prices began to rise in 2007/2008, Cargill began a ‘process of 
strategic growth into grains and oilseeds’.2 This included expansion into maize 
and soybean origination and trading in Zambia (2010), Zimbabwe (2011), 
Mozambique (2013) and Kenya (2013). 
The second pathway is through an extension of established African opera-
tions into new African markets. This pathway includes the migration of estab-
lished South African firms, such as Afgri and Senwes, into other African grain 
markets, including Zambia. Yet it is not just South African firms moving north. 
Two large East Africa firms – Export Trading Group and the Metl Group – have 
entered Zambia’s grain wholesale markets. These firms are also well established 
in other major production areas in sub-Saharan Africa. 
The final pathway for multinational firms to establish a presence in new 
African markets is through the acquisition of an existing domestic firm or the 
establishment of a new domestic subsidiary. For example, in Zambia, the South 
African firm NWK Agri-Services, in partnership with Louis Dreyfus, acquired 
Dunavant Cotton Company and then subsequently expanded operations into 
grain trading and financing. Other companies, such as Holbud Limited based 
in the UK, have established grain-trading subsidiaries in Zambia, mostly 
trading in wheat produced on commercial farms. In this case, Holbud Limited 
operates in Zambia under the name DomZam. 
It is important to note that many of the firms making investments in 
Zambian and other African cereal and oilseed markets have diverse investment 
interests and expertise, which may have important implications for their broader 
impact on domestic food markets. These include interests in production financ-
ing, input supply, direct food and fibre production and food processing. Their 
diverse areas of interest and expertise enable these firms to generate margins all 
along the supply chain. In some cases this enables the firm to take risks in the 
market that it wouldn’t otherwise be able to take, because losses in one part of 
the chain, for example input financing, can be made up elsewhere, for example 
in cooking-oil processing.
However, this integration raises concerns that by establishing a foothold in 
African grain markets through investments in trading, these firms will seek to 
gain greater control of the production and marketing systems through the vertical 
integration of input supply, marketing, storage and processing, thereby limiting 
competitiveness in the system (Anseeuw and Ducastel, 2013). There are indica-
tions that this process is under way in Zambia. Of the ten multinational firms 
currently operating in Zambia, two have acquired shares or outright ownership of 
grain- and oil-processing firms, two are involved in commercial agricultural pro-
duction in Zambia and other African countries, three offer financing services and 
three are involved in input supply. While this provides opportunities to develop 
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institutional arrangements to overcome persistent smallholder market failures, it 
also raises concerns about smallholders’ loss of control over production and mar-
keting decisions (Key and Runsten, 1999; Kirsten and Sartorius, 2002).
Ultimately, the specific outcome of this investment wave for smallholders 
is contingent on the policy decisions being made today. To guide these pol-
icies, it is critical to examine how these firms are integrating into domestic 
wholesale markets and what this means for the structure and performance of 
the markets. 
Multinational integration into domestic markets
Grain markets in sub-Saharan Africa are often characterised as embedded within 
social networks, where repeated transactions and local reputations enable the 
markets to function in the absence of statutory contract enforcement mecha-
nisms or structured trading platforms (Fafchamps, 2004). Understanding how 
multinational firms, which often lack the local social capital that domestic firms 
enjoy, integrate into these markets is important for assessing their implications 
for domestic and regional food markets. 
The primary comparative advantage that multinational firms enjoy rela-
tive to domestic firms is their ability to access significantly cheaper financing 
than is available in domestic credit markets. In Zambia, lending from domes-
tic banks to the agricultural sector is limited, and interest rates on short-term 
loans can exceed 20% on dollar loans and are even higher for loans in the local 
currency. This high cost, combined with large collateral requirements, makes 
access to commercial credit for domestic actors difficult. Multinational firms do 
not face the same sorts of credit constraints. Due to their considerable scale and 
global reach, these firms can access credit from numerous sources, including 
from within their own corporate structures or from commercial banks outside of 
Zambia that offer significantly cheaper credit terms. Indeed, many of these firms 
maintain headquarters or subsidiary branches in the US, Singapore or Dubai, 
which facilitates access to low-cost lending. 
Access to low-cost financing enables multinational firms to engage in 
grain procurement and storage strategies that are generally not available to 
their domestic counterparts. Multinational firms routinely use their access 
to cheap financing to provide credit to smaller-scale grain buyers in surplus 
regions to buy grain on their behalf. In most surplus regions of Zambia, several 
medium-scale local  traders have traditionally competed for smallholder maize. 
These medium-scale traders have well-established networks of small-scale grain 
assemblers that operate in smallholder production areas. By providing credit to 
these medium-scale local buyers, multinational firms are able to tap into exist-
ing procurement  networks without necessarily establishing a physical presence 
in these regions. 
These grain assembly networks are complex and require substantial amounts 
of local knowledge to navigate. In particular, these networks enable the aggre-
gation of marketable lots of grain from extremely dispersed smallholders with 
limited surpluses to sell and who lack the economies of scale to ferry their 
grain to district markets (Poulton, Kydd, Wiggins and Dorward, 2006; Sitko and 
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Jayne, 2014). The complexity of this aggregation market is a function of the 
prevailing smallholder market participation structure in Zambia. In 2010/2011, 
which was a very good production year, only 40% of Zambian smallholders sold 
maize, though nearly 90% grew maize. Of these, 5.4% accounted for 50% of 
the total marketed surplus, with the other 50% provided by the remaining 35% 
of surplus producers (Chapoto and Jayne, 2011). Thus, the bulk of the maize 
being sold is sold in very small quantities. Without effective grain aggregation 
and intermediation services, most surplus producers in Zambia would find it 
difficult to engage in the market since they lack the economies of scale to justify 
transportation to external markets. 
Data suggest that Zambian intermediary assembly markets are widespread 
and competitive. As shown by Chapoto and Jayne (2011), 75% of maize sellers 
travelled less than three kilometres to sell their grain. When farmers sell through 
these markets, they are paid roughly 82% of the prevailing price in nearby whole-
sale markets (Sitko and Jayne, 2014). Interviews with assembly traders and local 
wholesalers suggest that the influx of multinational capital into these markets 
has enabled both an expansion of the number of assembly traders and greater 
price competition. Sustaining these competitive assembly markets that poorer 
rural households depend on will require continued competition at the wholesale 
level. As Barrett (1997) has shown, competition at the assembly stage of grain 
markets is conditioned by the degree of competition at the wholesale stage (see 
also Sitko and Jayne, 2014). To the extent that multinational capital injections 
into local wholesale markets can continue to drive competition in assembly mar-
kets, this investment will prove beneficial for both smallholders and other types 
of rural non-farm economic activities, including assembly trading and transport. 
However, there is concern that by utilising local traders to buy on their behalf, 
multinational firms may in the medium to long term decrease competition in 
these assembly markets by limiting available downstream markets. Prior to the 
infusion of multinational investment, local traders sold grain to a wide range of 
downstream buyers, including commercial processors and local, informal con-
sumer markets. If the provision of capital to these local traders limits their avail-
able markets, then the effect will be to decrease price competition throughout 
the local market networks. 
While the majority of multinational firms operate their smallholder grain- 
purchasing operations through the sorts of local contractual arrangements 
discussed above, a growing number of these firms have established buying 
points in key production areas. Most of these are firms with established cash 
crop buying operations, such as Cargill and NWK, which have been adapted to 
handle grain trading. For these firms, there is a significant incentive to spread 
the cost of risk of operating cash crop outgrower programmes over a wider range 
of crops, including maize and soybeans. Afgri has also opted to bypass local 
trader contracts and instead source grain from established buying points in the 
major smallholder production regions of Eastern and Central provinces. 
Established local buying points enable these firms to more fully integrate into 
smallholder markets and production systems. In particular, these firms often link 
their buying activities to other sorts of investments, including input credit and 
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extension services. These sorts of linked production and marketing activities are 
primarily being explored by firms with long-standing relationships to smallhold-
ers through cash crop outgrower operations (Chamberlin et al., 2014). Through 
these cash crop operations, firms have already assumed many of the costs associ-
ated with screening potential input-credit recipients. With cheap credit to acquire 
inputs and an established group of farmers with a record of input-credit repay-
ment under cash crop outgrower schemes, these firms have begun exploring 
opportunities for input credit for grains and oilseeds. For example, since 2013, 
Cargill in Zambia has provided nearly US$12 million in input financing for maize 
and soybean to approximately 45 000 smallholder farmers. Cargill is able to use 
various financial instruments to hedge some of the price risk associated with this 
investment and the repayment risk associated with contract non-compliance. 
These risk management tools are not available to local, less sophisticated firms. 
Cheap financing also supports multinationals’ integration into domestic 
grain market structures by enabling investment in grain storage and seasonal 
arbitrage. In Zambia, storage infrastructure has traditionally been concentrated 
in the hands of the state, as part of its Food Reserve Agency (FRA), and the com-
mercial milling sector. Few domestic wholesalers or small-scale traders are willing 
or able to store grain. In rain-fed, unimodal agricultural systems like Zambia’s, 
grain storage is critical for smoothing seasonal price fluctuations and limiting 
crop losses. The lack of domestic investment in grain storage is, therefore, det-
rimental to grain price stability. Due to the high cost of domestic credit, most 
domestic wholesalers utilise their own capital to purchase grain. Obstacles to 
grain storage are further exacerbated by the price uncertainty created by the gov-
ernment’s involvement in maize markets resulting from ad hoc releases of subsi-
dised grain into domestic consumer markets and from trade restrictions (Jayne, 
Zulu and Nijhoff, 2006). As a result of the costs and risk to storage, domestic 
traders rely primarily on earning smaller margins from back to back trades spread 
over as much volume as possible. Yet, as one domestic wholesaler stated during 
an interview, ‘storage is where the money is’. 
Seasonal grain price movements in Zambia are substantial. Figure 6.1 shows 
the average monthly price index for real wholesale maize prices in Zambia 
between 2000 and 2013, with a score of 100 representing the average annual 
price. It shows that wholesale maize prices tend to be their lowest in May, as the 
smallholder maize harvest begins, and reach their peak in January, the middle of 
what is called the hunger period in Zambia. On average, wholesale maize prices 
in Zambia increase by 48% between May and January, representing a substantial 
profit opportunity for firms willing and able to store grain. 
Access to cheap financing enables multinational trading firms to more easily 
assume the costs and risks of storing smallholder grain than their domestic com-
petitors. Moreover, they are capable of utilising their access to finance to enter 
into collateral management arrangements with commercial farmers in Zambia, 
thereby providing production financing to commercial farms and ensuring 
themselves access to grain during the smallholder production season. Through 
these two mechanisms, multinational wholesalers are able to play a beneficial 
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role in Zambia’s grain markets, both in terms of supporting commercial produc-
ers to access inputs and in smoothing supplies in Zambia’s seasonal markets. 
Effects of multinational investment on grain markets
In this section we examine the effects of the multinational investment wave 
on the performance of grain markets in four different ways. First, we explore 
smallholders’ perceptions of how grain markets have evolved as a result of the 
establishment of multinational firms in their areas. Second, we use household 
survey data to examine the extent to which these market channels are available 
to poorer segments of the rural population. Third, we examine how domestic 
wholesalers, both medium and large scale, perceive these investments. Finally, 
we investigate trends in trading margins for maize over the period of multina-
tional firms’ expansion in Zambia. Taken as a whole, these assessments highlight 
both the benefits of multinational investments in grain trading, as well as areas 
of concern. 
Smallholders’ perceptions
Focus group discussions with smallholders operating in regions that have seen 
an expansion of multinational investment in grain trading evidence a broadly 
positive view of this market transformation. Farmers were asked to compare the 
experience of selling to these firms relative to selling to local wholesalers and 
to the parastatal FRA. Smallholders’ responses to these questions were surpris-
ingly consistent. Respondents stated that relative to local market actors, multi-
















































Figure 6.1 Zambian wholesale maize price index, 2000–2013
Source: Central Statistical Office, Price Bulletin Data, Zambia 
(monthly bulletins available at http://www.zamstats.gov.zm/)
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their interactions with farmers. Several key points were repeated: multinational 
firms utilise weighing scales and are more reliable than local traders; they pro-
vide additional services, including SMS-based market updates, input credit in 
some cases and extension advice; and they offer more competitive prices. 
Relative to the FRA, these firms are generally thought to offer low prices, but 
they provide a valuable alternative because farmers are paid cash on delivery, 
while the FRA is notorious for delayed payments due to lack of available funding. 
Moreover, some respondents indicated that accessing FRA markets frequently 
required making payments to FRA depot managers, a problem not encountered 
with multinational firms. 
The enhanced professionalism and efforts to build trust among smallholders 
can be viewed as a broadly positive development for local grain markets. If these 
attributes become sources of comparative advantage, they may force local actors 
and government parastatals to improve the ways they engage with smallholders 
in order to retain market share. However, the accounts described here relate only 
to farmers selling directly to depots operated by these firms. As discussed previ-
ously, many of the firms use local buyers and their assembly agents to purchase 
on their behalf. Moreover, the majority of maize sellers do not enjoy the econ-
omies of scale needed to transport their maize to an established buying point. 
This raises some concern, as the contractual arrangements that exist between 
the firms and local buyers are such that they may actually increase incentives for 
the sorts of unscrupulous market behaviours that farmers frequently complain 
about. In particular, cash advances to local traders are typically for a predeter-
mined quantity of grain, with the local traders’ margins coming from the cash 
remaining after the specified quantity is acquired. In this context, incentives 
exist for local traders to maximise their margins through manipulating weighing 
scales and by offering lower prices than were anticipated in the contract. Thus, 
while focus group discussions were clear that the presence of multinational firms 
in local markets is beneficial to those farmers able to sell directly to their depots, 
the broader impact on smallholder marketing is less clear. 
Market participation: Do the poor participate? 
The influx of multinational capital into small-scale grain and oilseed markets 
raises concerns about its potential effects on income inequality. Given the signif-
icant asset and production heterogeneity and concentration within most African 
smallholder systems, including in Zambia, there is reason to be concerned that 
the potential market benefits described above will only accrue to a minority of 
already better-off smallholders. To determine whether or not poorer households 
are able to engage with these markets directly, we disaggregate the smallholder 
sector into net household income quartiles. In tables 6.4 and 6.5, we use these 
income groups to quantify the share of total soybean and maize sales by market 
channel. 
Several important findings emerge. First, of the total volume of soybeans pur-
chased directly by large-scale trading firms (row %), 25% is supplied by house-
holds in the bottom half of the net income distribution. This is considerably 
larger than the 15% supplied to large-scale traders by the lower-income groups 
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in the maize market. As shown in table 6.4, within the lower-income groups, 
large-scale traders are the second most important market channel behind small-
scale traders (column %). Conversely, as shown in table 6.5, large-scale traders 
are the third or fourth most important market channel for maize sellers in the 
lower-income groups.
Taken together, these data suggest that there is solid evidence that poor 
households do sell directly through this emergent market channel. However, 
the crop context matters. Several important differences exist between maize and 
soybeans, which likely influence market behaviours. First, maize is both a sta-
ple food and a cash crop. As such, poor households will retain the bulk of the 
maize they produce for consumption. This is not the case for soybeans, which 
are grown almost entirely as a cash crop in Zambia (Lubungu, Burke and Sitko, 
2013). Maize market participation is also closely associated with the size of the 
area cultivated, while this relationship is much weaker for soybeans (Lubungu, 
Burke and Sitko, 2013). Thus, poorer, more land-constrained households that 
grow soybeans are still likely to sell. The fact that such a large volume of sur-
plus soybeans purchased by large-scale traders comes from poorer households 
with smaller surpluses to sell also suggests that the sorts of origination networks 
described above are reasonably good at linking to these farmers. This is less so 
for maize. While this is certainly a reflection of the difference between crops in 
terms of volumes sold across income group, the role of the state marketing board 
is important. As shown in table 6.5, the FRA purchases substantial volumes of 
maize, limiting the amount available for private sector actors. 
Local wholesalers’ perspectives
Whether or not multinational investment in grain trading triggers improvements 
in smallholder marketing conditions depends in large measure on the extent 
to which this investment improves competitive conditions in local assembly 
markets. There are two primary ways in which multinational investment can 
affect market competition. The first is through the expansion or contraction 
of wholesale market opportunities within local markets. This comes down to 
whether or not the entry of a multinational wholesaler into a local market serves 
to expand the number of existing wholesalers or whether it leads to consoli-
dation. Although other mitigating factors are also likely at play, including the 
large and unpredictable role of the FRA in smallholder markets, three attributes 
of multinational firms’ integration into local markets suggest that they may 
contribute to local wholesale market consolidation: access to cheap finance and 
larger economies of scale, which enable these firms to operate on smaller mar-
gins than local traders; the use of local traders to procure on their behalf, which 
from a competition standpoint is functionally equivalent to these traders exit-
ing the market; and a seeming preference among smallholders for multinational 
firms over local domestic traders, leading to less trade volume passing through 
local traders’ hands. 
Although we are unable to directly measure changes in the number of small- 
and medium-scale domestic traders in Zambia, we are able to infer how the 
sector has changed by examining their contribution to GTAZ. Membership in 
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GTAZ is required for traders to acquire import and export permits and is the 
primary conduit for licensing a grain-trading firm in Zambia. Thus, changes in 
membership fees likely reflect changes in actual trader numbers. According to 
GTAZ, from 2008 to 2014, the contribution of small- and medium-scale domes-
tic traders to GTAZ dropped from over US$3 000 to less than US$1 000. This is 
indicative of a substantial decline in active domestic trading. This decline is, of 
course, not solely the result of an inability to compete with multinational firms. 
During this same period the FRA substantially expanded its role in smallholder 
grain markets. However, local traders confirm that their business has been placed 
under pressure by multinational entry into their markets, thus limiting tradeable 
volumes and leading to some traders exiting the market. Because this wave of 
investment is in an early stage in Zambia, it is unclear if the apparent consolida-
tion of local trading will prove beneficial to the grain-trading sector by forcing 
out high-margin, inefficient traders, or whether it will limit competitive market 
opportunities for smallholders. 
The second mechanism by which multinational firms influence competition 
in local domestic trading is through their policy advocacy efforts. Trade and 
price policies for agricultural commodities in Zambia are characterised by high 
unpredictability, which increases risks for grain traders and limits incentives to 
develop transparent, structured trading platforms such as commodity exchanges 
(Sitko and Jayne, 2012). While this policy-induced uncertainty can generate 
rents for those with asymmetric knowledge about government’s intentions, the 
overall effect on the sector is to limit investment and willingness to take riskier 
positions in the market. As such, multinational firms have invested consider-
able time and effort into advocating for policy mechanisms that can improve 
the predictability of government trade policies, the scope and scale of the FRA 
in domestic markets, and put in place legislation to enable the creation of a 
functional commodity exchange. To the extent that these advocacy efforts are 
successful, they can enable a more level playing field for all actors in the market 
to participate. 
In 2014, advocacy efforts of large-scale trading firms, both domestic and mul-
tinational, succeeded in convincing the minister of agriculture to sign a statutory 
instrument that enables the trading of warehouse receipts in Zambia. The ware-
house receipts, which will be linked to a commodity exchange, can theoretically 
help both small and large domestic wholesalers to access lower cost financing 
and improve their capacity to store grain. Thus, through their advocacy efforts, 
multinational firms may support the development of more competitive market 
conditions for local traders. 
Trends in grain-trading margins
Thus far we have highlighted the potentially divergent ways in which the mul-
tinational investment wave can affect the performance of domestic grain mar-
kets. Whether or not the effects of this investment are positive or negative for 
the performance of the market can be gauged by examining trends in trading- 
market margins. A decline in trading margins over time would indicate increas-
ingly competitive conditions, which would be beneficial to both producers and 
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consumers. Conversely, an increase in margins would indicate a decline in com-
petitive forces and would reflect market concentration. 
To measure trends in trading margins, we conducted a survey of twelve grain 
wholesalers, five multinational and seven local, drawn from seven provinces of 
Zambia. This survey sought to determine trends in costs and margins in grain 
trading from the 2008/2009 marketing season to the 2013/2014 season. The 
major cost items identified during the survey were labour/handling, fumigation, 
transport and the farm-gate cost of maize grain. Table 6.6 summarises trends in 
the maize costs and marketing margins from the 2008/2009 to the 2013/2014 
marketing seasons. 
Table 6.6 Cost and margin estimates for maize trading in Zambia  
in real US$ per tonne
Cost item in US$ 
per tonne
Marketing season
2008/09 2009/10 2010/11 2011/12 2012/13 2013/14
Labour and handling 14 12 12 12 12 12
Fumigation 1.3 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.3
Transportation 36 30 31 31 31 31
Maize purchase price 192 164 195 203 212 224
Total 243 206 238 247 256 268
Selling prices  
(into-mill price)
312 252 259 284 286 282
Margin 69 46 21 36 31 14
Source: Authors’ calculation 
Between 2008/2009 and 2013/2014, wholesale margins for maize in Zambia 
declined from US$69/tonne to US$14/tonne. Though the decline has not been 
spectacular in dollar terms, it has been in local kwacha terms. The volatility of 
dollar costs and margins is associated with sharp movements in exchange rates 
during this period. The substantial declines in margins are driven by both an 
increase in the price paid to acquire grain, which rose 16% in this period, and a 
decline of 9.6% in average selling prices. Costs associated with storage and trans-
port all remained stable over this period. 
This trend in marketing margins is therefore beneficial to consumers and pro-
ducers, and is indicative of an increasingly competitive wholesale grain market. 
The decline in margins coincides with the expansion of multinational invest-
ment in grain trading. Yet, there is concern that this decline in margins could 
be short-lived. With prevailing margins as low as US$14 per tonne, smaller-scale 
domestic wholesalers suggest it is increasingly difficult to remain in business. 
The concern is that as these margins begin to force smaller volume but otherwise 
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relatively efficient traders from the market, competition within Zambia’s whole-
sale and assembly markets will decline. If that is the case, then the positive trends 
in marketing margins may reverse. 
Yet it is important to note that the entry of multinational capital into 
Zambian grain trading is not the only factor driving declining trading margins. 
Another important contributing factor is government price controls. Over the 
period of interest, the government expanded its role in smallholder grain mar-
kets through its FRA operations, purchasing up to 80% of the smallholder maize 
crop in 2010 (Sitko and Kuteya, 2013). The FRA offers pan-territorial prices and 
therefore tends to pull up average farm-gate prices. Thus, grain wholesalers are 
forced to raise their buying price from farmers in order to compete with the 
government price. At the same time, the government sells maize to millers at 
prices lower than the purchase price in order to maintain the low consumer 
prices of mealie meal (a staple food in Zambia). In order for grain wholesalers 
to sell their grains locally, they have to match the lower government price. The 
net effect is that wholesale margins are squeezed, thus substantially undermin-
ing the capacity of wholesalers, particularly lower-volume local traders, to be 
profitable. 
Conclusion and recommendations
Our analysis suggests that the wave of multinational investment into Zambia’s 
grain-trading sector has thus far proved broadly beneficial to the performance of 
the market. Smallholder farmers who sell grain suggest that the influx of these 
multinationals has provided them with more cost-competitive, trustworthy 
and professional market outlets than before. These are markets that are avail-
able to both rich and poor households. Moreover, some of these firms provide 
ancillary services to farmers, including market price information, input credit 
and extension advice. In addition, these firms are in some cases pumping credit 
into local wholesale markets through contractual arrangements with small-scale 
local traders, which enables an expansion of assembly trading activities. Finally, 
this investment wave has coincided with a sharp decline in marketing margins, 
which is beneficial for both consumers and producers. 
Yet this positive story must be read with some caution. While the sharp 
decline in trading margins has likely helped to improve efficiency in the market 
and forced higher-margin traders out, there is concern that relatively efficient, 
lower-volume traders cannot profitably remain in the market under current con-
ditions. If this is the case, we would anticipate a steady rise in trading margins as 
these traders exit the sector and competition for grain begins to dwindle. 
What can policy makers in Zambia, and other African countries facing the 
same sort of investment interest, do to capitalise on the beneficial aspects of 
this investment while managing its risks? Our analysis suggests that address-
ing differences in the cost of credit for domestic and multinational firms is a 
potentially important point of leverage, which can enable domestic firms to 
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be cost- competitive with multinationals. Addressing these differences requires 
developing strategies to lower both the cost of domestic borrowing and collateral 
requirements for domestic wholesalers to borrow. 
However, in Zambia the opposite is occurring. Interest rates in Zambia are 
high and rising, due in large part to a rapid increase in government borrowing 
from domestic credit markets. Treasury bill yields on 182-day bills increased 
from a low of 2.6 in April 2010 to 17.5 in August 2014. This had the effect of 
mopping up much of the available capital in domestic credit markets and push-
ing up the cost of what remains. Greater fiscal discipline is therefore needed 
to improve the competiveness of domestic lending and to support domestic 
industry growth. 
More specifically to the grain-trading sector, policy makers must provide the 
necessary enabling environment to support the development of a warehouse 
receipt system linked to a functional commodity exchange. While the Zambian 
commodity exchange has languished in recent years, the government recently 
designated a warehousing authority, which is seen as the last legal hurdle to 
implementing a warehouse receipt system (Sitko and Jayne, 2012). Warehouse 
receipts can enable local wholesalers to utilise grain stocks held in certified 
warehouses as collateral to access commercial credit (Coulter and Onumah, 
2002). This has the dual advantage of improving credit conditions for these 
traders and enabling them to store grain in anticipation of higher prices later 
in the season. 
However, while these strategies offer potential instruments to improve lend-
ing to the sector, the effectiveness of these interventions ultimately requires a 
more predictable policy environment. Current state interventions in grain mar-
kets are not only driving down margins in the trading sector, and thus putting 
substantial pressure on smaller-scale local wholesalers, but the unpredictability 
of these interventions also stymies lending to the sector. Banks may be unwilling 
to lend against warehouse receipts, or will only lend a small percentage of the 
current value of stocks held in warehouses if future price uncertainty is high due 
to policy unpredictability. 
Thus, in many ways Zambia’s grain markets, and indeed the grain markets 
of the region, are at a critical juncture. If the policy status quo is maintained, 
Zambia is likely to see industry consolidation and a substantial decline in com-
petition in the grain-trading sector, which will have long-run detrimental effects 
on producer and consumer prices. Yet, if proactive steps are taken to improve 
policy predictably and increase credit availability to local wholesalers, the oppor-
tunity exists for a truly radical and pro-poor transformation in the functioning 
of these markets. It is hoped that by elevating the visibility of this ongoing trans-
formation, this chapter can play a role in informing current policy discussions 
on grain market development. 
Notes
1 During the reporting period only Afgri operated buying centres in Southern Province.
2 See http://www.cargill.com/worldwide/index.jsp#africa.
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7 Competition and incumbency in South Africa’s liquid fuel value 
chain 
Introduction
There is an ongoing debate in South Africa regarding the transformation of the 
liquid fuel sector value chain, which has historically been controlled by a hand-
ful of large multinational oil companies.1 The petroleum sector is strategic in 
terms of its wider impact on consumers, as a provider of inputs into other pro-
ductive sectors of the economy and as an important influence on the trajectory 
of economic development. In South Africa, the sector benefited from substantial 
investments and support from the apartheid government for security of supply 
and national security reasons, particularly in light of widespread sanctions in 
the years prior to the democratic transition in 1994. A favourable policy envi-
ronment over the years has created a sector characterised by a handful of large 
fuel-importing oil companies with refining capacity in strategic port locations, 
as well as a national champion, Sasol, producing fuel inland. Importantly, all 
of the incumbent firms exhibit high levels of vertical integration into activities 
spanning the entire value chain, including importing, refining, production, dis-
tribution and retail. 
Following the democratic transition, greater emphasis began to be placed 
on transforming the sector to be more inclusive at different levels of this value 
chain, culminating in the attachment of the Liquid Fuels Charter as an adden-
dum to the Petroleum Products Act (No. 120 of 1977). The entry and growth 
of new, independent wholesalers as part of this process of transformation is of 
particular importance, as distribution and retail are the activities in the value 
chain with the lowest level of capital requirements for entry. With time, the goal 
should be to allow entrants at the wholesale level to develop capabilities that 
allow for their gradual migration up the value chain, creating competition with 
the incumbent oil companies.
These goals around transformation are not only important for their own 
sake. They fit within the context of a growing global body of literature on the 
significance of inclusive economic growth and broadening economic participa-
tion. A central component of achieving this increased participation is removing 
structural and strategic barriers to new entry at different levels of the economy 
(see Ianchovichina and Lundstrom, 2009; Spence, 2008). In South Africa and 
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elsewhere, research highlights the importance of addressing the market power 
of large and entrenched firms to stimulate economic growth and the key role 
of competition authorities in this process (see Acemoglu and Robinson, 2012; 
Makhaya and Roberts, 2013; North, Wallis, Webb and Weingast, 2007; Roberts, 
2012). South Africa’s National Development Plan and industrial policy framework 
also emphasise the importance of creating a dynamic and entrepreneurial econ-
omy and addressing high levels of concentration in the economy (NPC, 2013).
Barriers to entry, by creating and reinforcing the market power of large firms, 
tend to lead to higher prices, lower levels of innovation and a less competitive 
economy. Incumbent firms have an incentive to lobby and employ strategies 
to retain high barriers to entry and protect their position in the market. Ultimately, 
the focus of policy makers should be on creating a market in which firms compete 
to introduce better prices or products, reduce costs and achieve returns which 
reward dynamism, innovation and effort, rather than trying to maintain their 
position by handicapping potential rivals. In a country like South Africa where 
there are significant unemployment, poverty and inequality challenges, it is par-
ticularly important to understand the nature and extent of barriers to entry in 
the economy in order to ensure that regulatory and policy interventions have a 
meaningful impact on creating inclusive and shared growth.
Progress in lowering barriers to entry and encouraging transformation has 
been limited in the liquid fuel sector. While over 1 000 licences have been issued 
to potential entrants in fuel wholesaling, less than 10% of them are being used 
effectively by firms that have been able to enter and survive in the industry. 
Independent wholesale firms are able to enter the market. However, they are 
typically restricted to supplying less profitable regions and are limited in terms 
of their expansion as they are highly dependent on the major fuel companies for 
supply and access to customers. 
In this context, this chapter aims to unpack the barriers to entry in the whole-
sale of liquid fuels in more detail, in order to understand what prevents new 
entrants from growing into effective competitors to the major fuel companies. 
The chapter draws directly from a recent study by the Centre for Competition, 
Regulation and Economic Development on the same subject. As such, all refer-
ences to industry knowledge and interviews are based on data and information 
from the broader study.2 In the remainder of this chapter, we consider literature on 
barriers to entry before providing an overview of the fuel sector in South Africa 
and the various barriers to entry that were identified by the study. After conclud-
ing, we discuss policy recommendations arising from the findings.
Theoretical discussion of barriers to entry
In economic theory, free entry and exit are important conditions for compe-
tition to prevail. When the likelihood of new entry or expansion by existing 
firms in the market is high, incumbent firms will be constrained by the fear that 
increased prices would lead to actual or potential rivals expanding their output 
(O’Donoghue and Padilla, 2006). However, if it is difficult, time consuming or 
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costly for new entrants to come into a market, incumbents may be able to prof-
itably raise prices without a new firm entering the market and driving prices and 
profits back down. 
There has been a debate over the years about the importance of barriers to 
entry in determining the level of competition in an industry (see Banda, Robb, 
Roberts and Vilakazi, 2015). Recent theories highlight the importance of econo-
mies of scale, imperfect information and strategic behaviour by incumbent firms 
in deterring entry, leading to a lessening of efficiency and overall welfare. These 
theories place particular emphasis on the idea of strategic barriers. Strategic bar-
riers are created when incumbent firms use their dominant position to foreclose 
or exclude entrants in order to undermine competitive rivalry. Other types of 
barriers that exist because of factors inherent in the nature of the market are 
termed structural barriers.
Structural features of the market which influence the ease of entry are sunk 
costs, absolute cost advantages, economies of scale and switching costs. Sunk 
costs are investments that must be made on entry (e.g., in technology, marketing, 
research and development), which the investor will not be able to recoup if the 
firm exits the market. Such costs obviously increase the risk of entry. Whether or 
not a cost is fully sunk may not be clear-cut, but will depend on what portion of 
the value of the investment the firm has a reasonable expectation of recouping, 
should exit occur. 
An absolute cost advantage is present where an incumbent firm has an inher-
ently lower cost of production than an entrant, for example, because it has pref-
erential access to raw materials or technology (Church and Ware, 2000). This 
may be due to a historical advantage in terms of geographic location, rights to 
certain inputs or preferential contracts with input suppliers. 
Scale economies also represent a type of structural barrier to entry. A firm 
enjoys economies of scale in the production (and/or distribution) of a product 
when its average costs fall as output increases (O’Donoghue and Padilla, 2006). 
In an industry where the economies of scale are very high relative to market 
demand, a large incumbent firm will have an advantage over smaller entrants, 
since a new entrant selling smaller volumes than the incumbent will have higher 
costs and make lower margins than the incumbent. If customer switching is low 
due to brand loyalty or long-term contracts, for example, then it may be very dif-
ficult for a new entrant to win customers initially, and, if combined with econo-
mies of scale, this may make it difficult for a new entrant to compete sustainably.
Legal or regulatory barriers may also exist, such as tariffs, licensing require-
ments or weak or badly designed economic regulations. Licensing, for exam-
ple, can raise barriers to entry if it is associated with onerous requirements on 
prospective licensees. Regulatory barriers are an interesting category of entry 
barriers as they can be influenced by policy interventions. Economic regulation 
is particularly important as it is explicitly aimed at dealing with a lack of com-
petition. Access regulations seek to ensure that vertically integrated monopo-
lies provide access to essential inputs or facilities to rivals on fair terms. This is 
usually necessitated when there is a natural monopoly at one level of the value 
chain but competition is feasible at other levels of the chain. Access regulations 
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which are inadequate or poorly enforced can allow vertically integrated domi-
nant firms to leverage their market power to restrict new entry, helping them to 
maintain their dominant position. The other major type of economic regulation 
which can impact entry is price regulation in that it may limit the margins that 
can be earned by a new entrant, which then reduces the incentive for new firms 
to enter the market and makes it difficult for smaller competitors to survive. By 
contrast, effective economic regulation will encourage entry and competition 
wherever feasible.
As noted, when an incumbent firm’s conduct creates barriers to entry, these 
are termed strategic barriers. If the entry of a new competitor is likely to reduce 
the profits made by the incumbent, either because prices fall or its share in total 
output is reduced, the incumbent may have an incentive to try to deter entry 
or ensure that it is unsuccessful. Incumbent firms may employ a wide range of 
strategies to these ends. 
Entry deterrence refers to a situation where the incumbent firm employs a 
strategy in order to make entry seem unattractive to a prospective entrant. This 
type of strategy may take a number of forms – for example, pricing below cost 
or overinvesting in capacity – but always with the aim of persuading the entrant 
firm that it is unlikely to be successful and that the incumbent firm is strong and 
committed to fighting any entrant (see Bishop and Walker, 2010; Cabral, 2000; 
Dixit, 1979, 1981; Motta, 2004). These theories typically rely on the entrant 
firms’ lack of perfect information about the incumbent’s costs. 
Strategic barriers can also arise from the behaviour of firms through practices 
that raise rivals’ costs and/or induce customers or suppliers not to deal with rivals 
(reduce rivals’ revenue). Again, there are a number of ways in which incumbent 
firms can try to create these barriers. They may do so by restricting competitors’ 
access to inputs or to customers. If the incumbent is vertically integrated, it may 
be able prevent the competitor from gaining access to a vital input or charge a 
very high price for it so that the competitor cannot be profitable. Economists 
have shown that the incumbent firm could have an incentive to do this for a 
number of reasons, but particularly if it perceives a threat that an entrant may 
vertically integrate into its monopoly market (Carlton and Waldman, 1998; Rey 
and Tirole, 2007). Another strategy which an incumbent may employ is to tie 
up key customers into exclusive contracts so that an entrant cannot acquire suf-
ficient customers to reach an efficient scale of production. An incumbent may 
employ a combination of these strategies to deter or defeat entry.
Effective rivalry between firms to win over customers that have scarce 
resources encourages firms to produce better-quality goods and offer lower 
prices. This rivalry requires firms to be more prudent in their use of the resources 
available to them by eliminating inefficient use of resources, cutting down wast-
age and thus reducing their costs (Evans and Joekes, 2008). It is therefore not 
surprising that firms will compete aggressively, and at times unfairly, to pre-
vent rivals from gaining a foothold in the market. Firms can choose to com-
pete on the basis of improved product offerings and investments in improving 
their capabilities, in which case efficiency, effort and ingenuity are rewarded. On 
the other hand, firms can compete (unfairly) by leveraging their incumbency 
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and engaging in practices that seek to raise rivals’ costs and ultimately diminish 
the significance of rivals as effective competitors. This can also be described as 
the difference between ‘performance competition’ and ‘handicap competition’ 
(seeking to handicap rivals) (Gerber, 2010).
Strategic barriers to entry are often relevant where there is a vertically inte-
grated monopolist who has an incentive to protect the rents being earned in the 
monopoly market through attempting to frustrate entry at another level of the 
market. This is particularly acute where the incumbent firm or firms have con-
trol over key inputs required by entrants. In these circumstances, the incumbent 
firms may find it profitable to engage in strategies to raise rivals’ costs or reduce 
rivals’ revenues. They may also choose to accommodate entrants but to attempt 
to force them into a particular market niche where they can operate at a smaller 
scale, without threatening the incumbents’ main market. 
Strategic entry barriers are also important in concentrated markets, which 
are prone to coordination among firms. Vertical restraints such as exclusive con-
tracts, exclusive territories, retail price maintenance and restricting supply can be 
used to support a coordinated agreement by preventing downstream firms from 
undermining a collusive agreement (Levenstein and Suslow, 2014). Cartels have 
used vertical restraints to foreclose entrants from access to inputs and to mar-
kets (Levenstein and Suslow, 2014). Close relationships between firms, including 
through historical ties and information exchange, tend to make such outcomes 
more likely. Thus, strategic barriers to entry may be employed by a group of firms 
with joint market power as well as by individual dominant incumbents. 
Strategic barriers to entry are considerably more difficult to evaluate, partly 
because there is often more than one possible interpretation of the observed 
behaviour. For example, exclusive contracts can be an efficient way of incentivising 
investment by suppliers or their distributors, but they may also be intended to deny 
a new entrant access to customers. The nature and effects of the conduct therefore 
need to be carefully assessed and weighed against any efficiencies it generates. 
Although the consideration of barriers to entry in competition law is largely 
technical, the discussion has tried to illustrate the mechanisms by which barriers 
to entry impact on competition and participation in an industry. The following 
case study on the liquid fuel sector in South Africa highlights the ways in which 
these barriers can work in practice.
Case study: Liquid fuel sector in South Africa
In this section we provide background to the liquid fuel sector in South Africa, 
and then discuss the structure of the market and the main strategic barriers to 
entry which illustrate the concepts raised in the literature review.
Overview of the sector
The liquid fuel sector in South Africa presents an interesting case study in that it 
has historically enjoyed protection from the state due to the strategic objective 
of ensuring security of supply in the country. This has created a market where 
c07.indd   176 20-06-2017   09:52:39
Competition and incumbency in South Africa’s liquid fuel value chain 177
there is an established set of incumbent firms and significant barriers to entry 
for newer entrants.
The sector is governed by two main bodies: the Department of Energy 
(DoE) and the industry regulator, the National Energy Regulator of South Africa 
(Nersa). The DoE mostly deals with issues pertaining to licensing and the pricing 
structure. Nersa sets tariffs for petroleum pipeline operations and approves tariffs 
for petroleum storage and loading facilities. The Petroleum Pipelines Act (No. 60 
of 2003) also gives Nersa the authority to compel operators of pipeline, loading 
and storage facilities to allow independents access to unused or ‘uncommitted’ 
capacity, although Nersa is unable to compel the owners or operators to expand 
their facilities. 
The country’s overriding concern in the liquid fuel sector has been to ensure 
security of supply. The DoE’s legislated mandate is ‘to ensure secure and sus-
tainable provision of energy for socio-economic development’ (Department of 
Energy, 2015). This concern was emphasised even more prior to 1994, as the 
apartheid government needed to ensure supply of fuel, particularly during the 
period of sanctions. As such, the government created a protected environment 
where a small number of oil companies were allowed to grow, acquire key infra-
structure such as refineries and depots in strategic locations and thus develop 
considerable market power. This led to vertical integration across all levels in the 
fuel sector, from importing, refining and production to distribution and retail, 
further entrenching the market power held by these few oil companies. The 
industry is thus characterised by seven oil majors – Total, Sasol, Engen, Chevron, 
Shell, PetroSA and BP – that still account for about 70% of the retail volumes of 
fuel sold (Lewies, 2013). The other 30% of the retail volumes sold are by inde-
pendent players in the retail market. However, even the independent players 
source their fuel almost exclusively from the seven major oil companies, which, 
by virtue of their refineries and control of the port and storage facilities, also 
control the supply of fuel at the upstream level. 
Figure 7.1 shows the different levels of the value chain in liquid fuel distri-
bution. The wholesaling of fuel takes place once crude oil imports have been 
refined and distributed (mostly via pipeline) to the different depots and storage 
facilities in the country. The fuel is then sold on a wholesale basis to commercial 
customers through three main channels: the oil company’s own distribution, 
branded marketers and independent wholesalers. Through the first channel, the 
oil companies sell directly to large-volume customers. In the second channel, the 
oil companies first sell the fuel to their branded distributors or marketers, who 
act as contracted agents of the oil companies and sell only in allocated regions. 
The independent wholesalers have supply contracts with the branded distrib-
utors and/or oil companies. However, they do not operate under the brand or 
policies of the major oil companies and are free to distribute fuel to customers in 
different geographic areas.
Market structure and competitive dynamics in the petroleum sector
Of particular interest in this sector is how the major oil companies have come to 
jointly control critical stages of the value chain, and how the vertically integrated 
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nature of their operations has allowed the incumbents to control competi-
tive outcomes not only at the refinery level, but in distribution and retail as 
well. The findings of various competition cases in the past decade illustrate the 
overarching concern regarding the joint market power and intricate bargaining 
relationships which exist between the major oil companies in South Africa.
In 2005, a proposed merger between Sasol and Engen was prohibited by 
the Competition Tribunal on the basis of concerns regarding the market power 
which the merger would likely grant to the merged entity in the context of the 
structure and history of the sector. At the time, Sasol had 82% of the inland 
wholesale supply and was a part owner in Natref,3 whereas Engen had refin-
ing capacity at the coast. The inland region represented over 60% of national 
demand and, through the Main Supply Agreement (MSA), the other oil compa-
nies had been required to purchase Sasol’s product in the inland region but Sasol 
was prevented from entering the retail market. At the downstream level, there-
fore, Engen had a large network of retail outlets which, together with Sasol’s 
extensive inland refining and wholesale capacity, would have led to significant 
control of the inland market in particular. At the time, government was talking 
about deregulating the retail market and the pipeline capacity from the coast to 
the inland region was potentially going to be expanded. In this context, Sasol 
gave five years’ notice of the termination of the MSA in 1998 and subsequently 
entered negotiations with Engen. 
The Tribunal found that there was a credible threat of foreclosure as a result of 
the merger and that Sasol would have the incentive and ability to foreclose com-
peting retailers inland. The Tribunal considered that it would be some time still 
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before increased pipeline capacity came on stream and, in the meantime, Sasol 
could self-supply and exclude downstream competitors in the inland region. The 
other oil companies would not be able to retaliate at the coast as Sasol had access 
to Engen’s Durban refinery. According to the Tribunal, this was likely to result 
in other oil companies ‘suing for peace’ and agreeing not to compete with the 
merged entity. In other words, a coordinated outcome was likely. The Tribunal 
considered that the characteristics of the petroleum industry lend themselves to 
a collusive outcome:
all the conditions for cartel formation and maintenance pertain: the 
structure of the markets is oligopolistic; the products are homogenous 
and technologically mature; entry barriers are very high; cost structures 
of the various oil companies are similar…the rate of growth in demand 
is moderate and demand is highly inelastic; there is no countervailing 
buyer power to speak of; the markets are highly transparent; there is 
an extensive history of co-operation both at the level of the MSA and 
also in a range of joint ventures and ubiquitous swap and hospitality 
arrangements.4 
The close contacts between the major oil companies have also been facilitated 
through various exemption applications, which have enhanced coordination 
between the companies. In 2005, following a period of fuel shortages, a task 
team appointed by the minister of minerals and energy recommended that 
there be increased coordination over issues such as supply lines and shutdowns. 
The petroleum industry was encouraged to apply for an exemption from the 
Competition Act through the South African Petroleum Industry Association 
(SAPIA). An exemption was granted for a period up to 31 December 2015. A 
short-term exemption was also granted in 2010 to coordinate supply for the 
World Cup.
In addition to the fact that these arrangements facilitated coordinated out-
comes in the sector, an information exchange case involving Chevron, Engen, 
Shell, Total, Sasol, BP and SAPIA was referred to the Tribunal by the Competition 
Commission in 2012. The Commission’s expressed reasons for the referral were 
summed up as follows:
The disaggregated sales information exchanged between oil companies 
in the case being referred here removed any element of surprise in stra-
tegic decision making and functioned as a reliable substitute to direct 
cartel interactions insofar as it made monitoring of rivals possible. This, 
together with the history of coordinated behaviour and other charac-
teristics that exist in the petroleum industry, made achieving cartel out-
comes post the exemption period possible. (CCSA, 2012)  
Together, these cases show the effect of state-sanctioned protection on the com-
petitive dynamics in the sector. Furthermore, they describe a market wherein 
incumbent operators, through close contacts with one another, have effectively 
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established a position of joint market power in which rivalry between companies 
is restricted. This is significant when considering the likelihood of entry of new 
companies and their ability to eventually expand up the value chain in direct com-
petition with the incumbents. It is also relevant to the question of whether entry 
at the wholesale level will encourage rivalry between the main suppliers by playing 
them off against one another. We return to this issue in the discussion below.
The Sasol/Engen merger decision also illustrates the significance of the own-
ership of key infrastructure by the major oil companies and how that has con-
tributed significantly to the creation of structural barriers to entry and expansion 
in the sector. The sunk investments made into building the refineries and depots, 
investing in technology, marketing, and research and development reduce the 
returns the incumbents need to stay in the market compared to those an entrant 
needs to invest in entering and successfully competing in the market. The oil 
majors enjoy economies of scale and absolute cost advantages such as preferen-
tial access to fuel and infrastructure, which puts them in a much better position 
than entrants.
Furthermore, entrants at various levels of the value chain face structural barri-
ers in the form of access to finance as well as environmental and pricing regula-
tion, although some of these factors affect all players in the industry in a similar 
manner. It is worth noting that although the pricing regulation is in itself not an 
impediment to entry, it does act as a barrier to growth according to wholesalers 
in the sector. The current system is known as the Regulatory Accounting System 
(RAS). It separates all activities in the value chain with a view to compensating 
investment in all activities by allocating the margins to be earned at each level 
of the chain. While this assures that independent wholesalers in particular earn 
a margin for their activities and investment, they are still required to compete 
with the oil majors, which are vertically integrated at every level of the value 
chain, as well as the branded distributors of these companies. As such, these 
major rivals earn margins throughout the value chain (discussed below).
Strategic barriers to entry in the liquid fuel sector
Strategic barriers to entry arise from the incumbent firms’ reaction to entry, 
which in some circumstances may constitute anticompetitive conduct. As noted 
above, this conduct could take the form of aggressive post-entry behaviour or 
entry deterrence, raising rivals’ costs and reducing their revenues. Our study of 
the liquid fuel wholesale sector found that there are a range of strategic barriers 
which make it difficult for entrants to compete in the sector. These include a 
variety of arrangements relating to access to customers, access to infrastructure 
and facilities, as well as the vertically integrated nature of the sector. This section 
considers the main barriers identified.
Scale, pricing and access to customers 
One of the primary challenges facing wholesalers is that major oil companies 
provide better discounts and payment terms to customers than smaller rivals are 
able to. As incumbents with direct control of the input as well as a bigger bal-
ance sheet, the fuel majors are able to give much more favourable terms to their 
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customers, such as longer periods of credit to pay for the fuel. Related to this is 
the fact that the oil companies also deal with large volumes of fuel, thus enjoy-
ing significant economies of scale in their operations.
While this aspect is characteristic of most industries where entrants need 
to compete with established incumbents, the challenge here is that the major 
companies are vertically integrated and also control the supply of fuel, and so 
it is even more difficult for downstream rivals to compete because in most cases 
they would be competing directly with their suppliers. This is exacerbated by 
the fact that the major oil companies have established relationships and hold 
long-term supply agreements with several of their large customers, so that com-
peting wholesalers, who rely on the same companies for supply, are not able to 
match the terms or discounts in order to compete for these customers. Another 
difficulty is the majors’ supply agreements with branded marketers, which often 
give them exclusive rights to distribute within a given region. Independent dis-
tributors may have to purchase fuel from these branded marketers, introducing 
another layer of cost and making it more difficult to compete for customers. 
Wholesalers have argued that they are left to compete through deriving 
efficiencies in their own operations, offering better service to customers than 
their larger rivals, and offering additional services and support to customers 
as value-added products. While customers can benefit substantially from this 
approach, in the medium to long term the ability of these wholesalers to 
expand their businesses is restricted, at least partly because they may incur addi-
tional costs in providing value-added services, and customers in the industry 
generally remain focused on price as the primary determinant of whom they will 
source their fuel from. 
Control of key inputs (security of supply) 
As noted, rivals’ costs can be raised by incumbent firms through various mech-
anisms. One aspect is through leveraging control of key inputs to increase the 
input costs or reduce supply to downstream rivals, thus potentially foreclosing 
them. In the fuel sector, the main oil companies exercise significant control of 
several key inputs.
The major suppliers generally do not supply product to small new entrants 
as the volumes they require when starting out are considered to be too low. New 
entrants are usually directed to acquire supply from branded wholesalers or to 
first acquire sizeable contracts before they can deal directly with the major sup-
pliers. Once the new entrants establish supply contracts with either the majors 
or the branded marketers, they are still at a disadvantage because during short-
ages they are often the last to get access to fuel after the major operators and 
their branded marketers. The wholesalers generally have limited leverage for 
negotiating with their suppliers and no real possibility of playing one supplier 
off against another because of the very transparent nature of costs and pricing 
in the industry. Information obtained in the study suggests that if a wholesaler 
competes too strongly or presents a competitive threat to an incumbent oil com-
pany, there is a risk that the wholesaler could be foreclosed from supply. Thus, 
independent wholesalers are kept in a particular market niche.
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Control of key infrastructure
The discussion above suggests that wholesalers, and particularly large ones, 
should seek alternative sources of supply. However, one of the main challenges, 
particularly with importing fuel directly, is oil companies’ ownership of key 
infrastructure such as port facilities, depots and storage. The main port facilities 
for landing fuel in Durban are owned by the major oil companies, including 
through part-ownerships of refineries and other facilities. Thus, in order to land 
fuel currently, an independent player would have to negotiate with the major oil 
companies for access to this infrastructure. Similarly, the existing storage facil-
ities in Durban are mainly owned by the major oil companies and there is no 
commercial imperative for them to construct more storage capacity than they 
expect to use. In addition, even when there is apparently spare capacity in their 
facilities, it may not be practical to rent it out to independents since the major 
oil companies need to ensure that there is always sufficient available capacity for 
the arrival of their next fuel shipment. 
Independent storage facilities are available through companies like Vopak. 
However, in general, even the independent facilities are contractually bound to 
the major oil companies. Based on data from Nersa, only 6% of storage capacity 
for petrol and diesel at the port in Durban is currently independent (Nersa, 2014). 
The remaining 94% is owned by the major oil companies. Storage facilities are 
extremely expensive to build and, in order to get financing, storage companies 
are usually required to acquire long-term use-or-pay contracts with customers 
for at least 80% of the capacity to be built. This generally means engaging the 
major oil companies, which would have substantial volume requirements and 
the ability to guarantee volumes for five or six years. Smaller companies, by 
contrast, take on a substantial risk by signing up for a long use-or-pay contract. 
In addition, storage companies sometimes require guarantees to be paid upfront 
while the capacity will only come online in 18 months to two years. This is oner-
ous for a small firm and as a result only 1.7% of storage capacity is currently used 
for independent wholesalers and other rivals to major oil companies, despite 
efforts by Nersa to force facility owners to have explicit allocation mechanisms 
for sharing uncommitted capacity.5 
There has been a recent effort to increase access to independent storage. In 
December 2014, Nersa gave approval for an independent company to put up 
independent storage in Cape Town despite opposition from Chevron. Chevron 
alleged that putting up another facility would result in loss of jobs as there would 
be too much storage. Nersa, perhaps realising the benefit to security of supply, 
approved the construction of the facility (Monteiro, 2014).
Alternatively, independent wholesalers could decide to import fuel from the 
world market on their own but this is very expensive and often fraught with 
complications. First of all, importing fuel is a risky endeavour requiring a large 
balance sheet and well-managed cash flow. A small tanker-load of fuel could take 
at least three weeks to reach the port, in which time currency and oil price fluc-
tuations may have changed the economics of the deal. Once the fuel has landed, 
there are often problems with its quality, which is difficult for an independent 
wholesaler to manage without refining capacity. The major oil companies have 
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refineries in the country and therefore can fairly easily rectify any deficiencies 
or changes in the quality of landed fuel. The view of wholesalers is that even if 
several independents took on the venture collectively, there is still a substantial 
risk in importing fuel directly from the world market.
If an independent wholesaler were to successfully import fuel through the port 
and gain access to storage facilities, it would still need access to the fuel pipeline 
to transport the fuel inland. The pipeline infrastructure is owned and operated 
by Transnet Pipelines which, as part of its mandate, has to ensure access to this 
infrastructure. The pipeline infrastructure is particularly important when con-
sidering that 60% of fuel demand in South Africa is in the inland regions such 
as Gauteng, while the remainder is coastal (Naidoo, 2011). The challenge in this 
regard is that the current pipeline infrastructure is connected to the storage facil-
ities of the major oil companies at the port, which again requires negotiations 
with the major suppliers that carry far larger volumes. Furthermore, once the fuel 
is transported by pipeline to the inland region, storage facilities are required 
once the fuel is offloaded from the various inland pipeline depots. Currently, 
fuel is transported by road and rail from the depots to the storage facilities of the 
main oil companies.
There have been efforts to import fuel through Mozambique and then trans-
port it via rail or road. The quality of this fuel, however, is questionable and the 
channel unreliable. A number of firms have had bad experiences with this chan-
nel of supply, including in terms of the reliability and quality of the product. 
Furthermore, given the costs involved, it is not sustainable to transport this fuel 
to inland regions other than Mpumalanga and Limpopo. 
Pricing and transport 
The issue of transportation is especially important in this sector. For wholesalers, 
the ability to achieve scale in transporting loads of fuel to various customers can 
determine whether the operator is able to make a profit. Given that margins in 
the industry are controlled and that wholesalers do not have the control of sup-
ply or the scale of operations to afford to obtain fuel at heavily discounted prices, 
it is increasingly important to be able to reduce costs and derive efficiencies in 
their operations. Due to changes in the pricing regulation over time, most of 
the major oil companies have given away less profitable wholesale businesses 
in peri-urban and rural areas to branded and independent wholesalers. This in 
fact led to the entry of several firms to the wholesale level of this sector. These 
areas are less profitable primarily because of the distances travelled to service 
customers in these markets. However, wholesalers have argued that RAS, the cur-
rent pricing mechanism, is not calculated based on all the costs experienced in 
servicing customers in distant rural areas and delivery to small customers requir-
ing small volumes. Instead, the mechanism is said to be based on the costs of 
an average operator largely based in urban areas where transport distances from 
depots are less, and demand is higher. 
RAS assumes a benchmark service station through averaging the costs of 50 
depots. Wholesalers have argued that service stations located farther from the 
benchmark station bear higher transport costs, which reduces the margin they 
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can receive. Distributors that are closer to the benchmark station receive higher 
profit margins than those farther away. It is for this reason that the major oil 
companies chose to sell off the less profitable sites that were in the rural areas 
and far from the benchmark station. The major oil companies therefore retain 
the sites with the highest profit margins. This arrangement affects both branded 
and independent wholesalers in so far as branded wholesalers have also been 
allocated less profitable peri-urban and rural areas in accordance with the poli-
cies of the oil company that they are contracted with.
Conclusions
The combined effect of the barriers to entry noted above is that while a large number 
of entrant wholesalers have been licensed, very few are actually operating in the 
industry and still fewer are operating successfully. Even if a new entrant does man-
age to secure both fuel supply and customers for the product, the environment 
remains challenging and most struggle to grow beyond a small scale of activity.
Competition appears to be relatively muted in the industry due to a com-
bination of factors, including the vertical agreements between the major oil 
companies and their branded marketers and retailers, ongoing coordination 
between the major oil companies, cost and price transparency and the nature of 
economic regulation in the sector. The major oil companies have been able to 
coordinate the supply of fuel to different parts of South Africa through various 
mechanisms, including an exemption from the Competition Act. Although in 
theory it is possible for an independent player to import fuel, in practice there 
are a series of constraints which make this very difficult, if not impossible. These 
constraints mainly relate to the availability of storage infrastructure.
This results in a situation where new entrants at the distribution level are usu-
ally accommodated into the industry by existing players, rather than entering 
independently and challenging the status quo. For example, a well- established 
wholesaler may agree to supply fuel to a new entrant if the entrant can deliver 
a new customer that the established player would not otherwise have served, 
but would be unlikely to do so if the new entrant plans to compete for existing 
customers. Similarly, the more established wholesalers do not typically com-
pete with the major oil companies for customers as they are usually tied in to a 
branded-marketer agreement which dictates the area in which they may trade. 
Even where this is not the case, it is difficult for wholesalers to compete with the 
major oil companies for customers when they are dependent on them for the 
supply of fuel. These dynamics would not matter if there were strong compe-
tition between the major oil companies themselves and therefore between the 
different vertical chains present in the market. However, this does not seem to be 
the case. Such competition as does take place is typically based on service levels 
and there is no vigorous price competition in the market.
This may be attributable in part to the economic regulation of the industry. 
The fact that prices are regulated serves as a further disincentive for competition 
in the industry. Even though prices are directly regulated at only one level of the 
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value chain, the price formula includes wholesale and retail margin components, 
which means that the compensation level for the average wholesaler is common 
knowledge throughout the industry. Similarly, the return that the average retailer 
should make is published as part of the formula. The fact that the retail price (of 
petrol) is regulated means that the total rents available are determined by the 
regulator. The major oil companies in turn have control over supply so that they 
generally do not allow wholesalers and retailers any more than these average 
amounts, no matter whether the wholesaler or retailer in question is located in 
a high- or low-cost area to service.
The price regulation system may also explain why wholesalers report that they 
are generally unable to play the major oil companies off against one another, as 
it provides a focal point around which the major oil companies can easily tac-
itly coordinate. Coordinated outcomes in oligopolistic markets are the result of 
repeated games where the market conditions mean that competitors find it more 
profitable to adhere to the collusive agreement (whether tacit or explicit) than 
to compete strongly with one another. For this to be the case, firms must have 
a means of reaching agreement and a mechanism for detecting and punishing 
deviations from that agreement. This suggests a set of conditions in which coordi-
nation is more likely, including high levels of concentration, symmetry between 
firms, transparency in the market and product homogeneity.
As discussed by the Tribunal and highlighted above, all of these conditions 
are met in the petroleum industry. Transparency, in particular, is very high in 
this market as a result of the swap agreements between the major oil companies, 
the pricing formula used by the regulator and the need to coordinate supply in 
the interests of security of supply. Market transparency enhances the ability of 
firms to monitor the behaviour of competitors and detect any deviation from the 
coordinated outcome. The information-sharing arrangement which the major 
oil companies were party to until recently would have further enhanced their 
understanding of one another’s businesses and avoided head-on competition. As 
noted, the transparent pricing formula published by the regulator provides an 
easy means for firms to reach a tacit understanding on price.
In this context, the long-term exclusive contracts which the major oil com-
panies sign with their branded distributors could also be interpreted as a means 
of committing to maintain the agreement, as the agreements effectively prevent 
the firms from undercutting one another to customers and allow them to main-
tain high margins upstream. This may also partially explain the major oil compa-
nies’ decision to disinvest from the wholesale level. Independent wholesalers, on 
the other hand, are prevented from competing effectively by the control which 
the major oil companies hold over supply. They have neither the ability nor the 
incentive to compete strongly on price, as the major oil companies control the 
price at which they receive the product, and the independent wholesalers are 
effectively reliant on them for their existence. Unless the independent whole-
salers are able to access an alternative source of supply, the major oil companies’ 
control of the market and ability to extract the majority of the available rents 
is likely to continue. This ties in with the earlier discussion of strategic barriers 
raising the costs of rivals and reducing their ability to compete.
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The liquid fuels industry is one where there are a number of competing imper-
atives. In addition to stimulating transformation in the industry, DoE is also 
concerned with ensuring security of supply and preventing costly shortages of 
fuel in the country. Furthermore, the goal of ensuring that fuel is affordable 
to consumers across the country could be thwarted if consumers in outlying 
areas had to face the full costs of distributing fuel to these areas, which would 
therefore necessitate some cross-subsidisation. In this environment, competition 
concerns may be relatively low down on the list of priorities. However, the study 
has shown that to a large degree the problems with competition and increased 
participation and transformation in the industry are interlinked, and the con-
straints in wholesaling are in fact directly linked to the broader market structure, 
regulatory environment and resulting constraints to greater competition in the 
industry as a whole.
Recommendations
We consider a set of recommendations, drawn from the study, that not only 
focus on the wholesale level of the market and the barriers discussed, but also 
consider aspects of the sector as a whole that affect the wholesale level.
It is clear that developing alternative sources of supply would undermine 
returns to the incumbent oil companies, which would be expected to adjust 
their competitive strategies in response to this. Significant benefits would accrue 
to downstream operators and consumers if distributors could play oil companies 
off against one another to get better prices and terms. Furthermore, oil compa-
nies would most likely have to compete with one another more aggressively, 
which it appears is not currently happening in the market. In order for this to be 
possible, however, interventions are required at the transport and storage levels.
In this regard, facilitating access for independent wholesalers to storage infra-
structure is critical to enabling alternative sources of supply into the market, and 
hence to allowing for greater levels of competition in the value chain. In the 
short term, Nersa should continue to make efforts to enable independents to 
gain access to existing uncommitted capacity. In the longer term, it is neces-
sary to ensure that there is sufficient uncommitted capacity in the market for 
independents to use. DoE and Nersa could do this by leveraging storage facil-
ity licence conditions to mandate that players set aside a certain proportion 
of capacity for independents to use. Alternatively, investment in new indepen-
dent storage capacity can be facilitated, either through providing guarantees or 
through funding support from the Department of Trade and Industry’s initia-
tives, such as the Black Industrialists Programme. Nersa should also continue to 
promote competition through its regulatory decisions, as was done in the recent 
Burgan vs. Chevron case.6
Some interventions could be made in the short term to assist independent 
wholesalers to be effective competitors. For instance, it does seem that a review of 
the implementation of RAS would be beneficial and could include consideration 
of situations where wholesalers are not receiving the full margins recommended 
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in the RAS pricing mechanism, and the adequacy of the allocated margins over-
all. In addition, increased efforts in terms of capacity building and assistance for 
new entrants could help to address any skills deficiency in the industry, includ-
ing in the management of finances and on strategies to derive efficiencies in 
entrant businesses given the current pricing and cost environment. 
A long-term intervention could be to address the exclusive and long-term 
nature of the agreements between the major oil companies and their branded 
distributors. The agreements between wholesale distributors and the major oil 
companies serve to restrain competition by specifying geographic territories (in 
the case of branded marketers) and, in some cases, the customers which a whole-
sale firm is required to service. In the case of independent wholesalers, the supply 
relationships with the oil companies would probably not exist if the oil company 
thought that those wholesalers threatened to compete with them directly. If 
supply contracts were known to be for a shorter period of time, then it is more 
likely that oil companies would have to compete to retain those wholesalers as 
distributors for them in specific areas and especially those that they would rather 
not service themselves. However, this would potentially be constrained by the 
fact that oil companies would most likely remove their infrastructure from a 
wholesaler’s site if they could no longer supply that wholesaler, for competitive 
and environmental reasons.
It is of course important to keep in mind the issue of security of supply in 
considering interventions that impact on the sector. However, with well-designed 
policies, it should be possible to meet the objectives of competition, transforma-
tion and security of supply simultaneously.
Notes
1 See, e.g., http://www.parliament.gov.za/live/content-mobi.php?C_Item_ID=4777&Item_ 
ID=3536.
2 See http://www.competition.org.za/barriers-to-entry/.
3 An inland crude oil refinery.
4 Competition Tribunal, case no. 101/LM/Dec04, para. 526.
5 National Energy Regulator Application Reference No. PPL.sf.lf.F1/173/2014 and PPL.
sf.lf.F3/174/2014, para. 72.
6 National Energy Regulator Application.
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8 South Africa’s renewable energy experience: Inclusive 
growth lessons
Introduction
As a middle-income country with high levels of poverty, inequality and 
 unemployment, and a legacy of historically skewed economic participation, 
South Africa has been grappling with socioeconomic issues since the demo-
cratic dispensation in 1994 (NPC, 2011). As in many other developing coun-
tries, economic growth, even when sustained for a period of time, has not 
translated into equal opportunity and equal access to markets and resources for 
poor and marginalised groups, perpetuating high inequality levels (see De Mello 
and Dutz, 2012).
This entrenched situation has precluded inclusive growth. The term ‘inclusive 
growth’ is often used interchangeably with ‘broad-based’, ‘shared’ or ‘pro-poor 
growth’, referring to growth which encapsulates both improved participation 
and benefit sharing (Ranieri and Ramos, 2013). Broader, more dynamic perspec-
tives of inclusive growth further include opening up new sectors and harnessing 
existing sectors to produce more value-added offerings. These rely on significant 
investments in productive capabilities and skills (Khan, 2012). 
It is fairly uncontroversial that growth must be broad-based to be sustainable 
in the long run, both across sectors in the economy and across a large propor-
tion of a country’s labour force (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2012; Ianchovichina 
and Lundstrom, 2009; Khan, 2012). While economic growth is a prerequisite for 
poverty reduction, it is well recognised that it does not guarantee that everyone 
benefits equally. South Africa seeks to achieve more inclusive growth as envi-
sioned in the country’s New Growth Path (EDD, 2010). The country’s strategy to 
achieve inclusive growth, particularly increased employment growth and lower 
income inequality, is set out in the National Development Plan: Vision for 2030 
(NPC, 2011). These policy drivers recognise the importance of a competitive, 
diversified and more inclusive economy in improving trade performance, job 
creation and revenue generation (National Treasury, 2013). 
Achieving such inclusive goals requires government intervention through 
appropriately designed, coordinated and implemented policies, with the aim 
of creating new economic opportunities and ensuring greater participation. 
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Intervention, including through regulation, can take the form of removing 
barriers to participation and creating a more level playing field or actively for-
mulating policies that, by their very design, mandate participation by previ-
ously marginalised groups (Ianchovichina and Lundstrom, 2009). As argued in 
chapter 5 in this volume and in Roberts and Mondliwa (2014), a view of regula-
tion which focuses only on existing infrastructure and static considerations of 
efficiency is a narrow one and there is a strong rationale for regulation to actively 
introduce competition, dynamism and transformation into an industry.
Infrastructure development – the procurement of large-scale infrastructure – 
is one area in which the state and economic regulators can, by setting the 
 example, leverage economic regulation to foster inclusive growth. Infrastructure 
development in South Africa, however, has so far not been done in an inclu-
sive manner and the potential of economic regulation has not been harnessed. 
It can be argued that, in order to foster inclusive growth through infrastructure 
development, a change in practice is required, one in which economic regulation 
can play an active role. Makhaya and Roberts (2013) highlight that past policy 
 intervention has largely failed to stimulate effective competitive rivalry and tip 
‘the balance of power’ in favour of new entry and increased participation (see also 
chapter 5, this volume). However, the role that regulation can play in  fostering 
inclusive growth through creating opportunities and removing barriers to entry 
by stimulating competitive rivalry remains largely underresearched.
This chapter investigates the interplay between economic regulation, 
 competition policy and inclusive growth in South Africa, using as a case study 
the utility-scale renewable energy sector. Through South Africa’s Renewable 
Energy Independent Power Producer Procurement Programme (REIPPPP), the 
government is procuring utility-scale renewable energy-based electricity gener-
ation capacity from independent power producers (IPPs). The REIPPPP provides 
a perfect frame to investigate the impact of economic regulation on inclusive 
growth. The scheme was specifically crafted (through economic regulation) to 
promote competitive outcomes and foster inclusive growth. While South Africa’s 
renewable energy experience has been substantially researched (Eberhard, Kolker 
and Leigland, 2014; Montmasson-Clair, Moilwa and Ryan, 2014; Montmasson-
Clair and Ryan, 2014; Papapetrou, 2014), this chapter presents a new prism of 
analysis, assessing outcomes in the sector through both an economic regulation 
and an inclusive growth lens.
In the remainder of the chapter, we first discuss how economic regulation 
can be harnessed to foster inclusive growth through competitive outcomes. We 
then analyse the potential to use economic regulation to spur broader inclusive 
growth outcomes, such as socioeconomic objectives, before concluding.
Harnessing economic regulation for inclusive 
growth through competitive outcomes
The first step in evaluating the capacity of economic regulation to foster  inclusive 
growth objectives is to ascertain its impact on competition-related outcomes. 
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This section reflects on the interplay between economic regulation and compe-
tition policy, highlighting competitive outcomes as one of the core functions of 
economic regulation. It then applies these findings to South Africa’s experience 
in renewable energy, showing strong consistency with historical trends.
Economic regulation, competitive outcomes and inclusive growth
The presence and persistence of a range of market failures is the most prominent 
justification for economic regulation. Market failures arise when resources are not 
allocated or priced efficiently, and when a more optimal outcome would result from 
reallocating resources and altering prices. Market failures, along with other con-
straints, impede the poor and marginalised from accessing markets and benefiting 
from growth, thereby perpetuating inequality and non-inclusive growth (Ali and 
Son, 2007; Ianchovichina and Lundstrom, 2009; see also chapter 5, this volume).
One type of market failure, and a persuasive justification for regulation, is the 
presence of natural monopolies. Typical industries that have natural monopoly 
characteristics and that are commonly subject to regulation include electricity 
transmission, liquid fuel pipelines, telecommunication infrastructure and water 
supply systems. In South Africa, economic regulation has focused on regulating 
the natural monopoly parts of these value chains, which were formerly state-
owned and subsequently privatised (Roberts and Mondliwa, 2014).
Another type of market failure arises from non-competitive markets. This 
can occur when a single firm or groups of firms possess persistent market power 
which results in less than optimal output being produced with higher resultant 
prices. The lack of effective competition could result in dominant firms abusing 
their market power or engaging in collusive behaviour, obtaining rents at the 
expense of consumers and potential competitors. This has negative implications 
for productivity and job creation. Uncompetitive markets also result in lower 
levels of innovation, reduced choice for consumers and poorer quality of goods 
or services. Not only are direct consumers harmed, but the viability of down-
stream industries is affected if the product in question is an intermediate input. 
Furthermore, firms with market power that control essential facilities that can-
not easily be replicated or that control key inputs could abuse their dominance 
by limiting access to their facilities, thereby creating barriers to entry. Regulation 
can be a way to curb excesses in market power by regulating access to infrastruc-
ture as well as other market outcomes, including prices (Viscusi et al., 2000, in 
Roberts and Mondliwa, 2014). 
South Africa’s history and economic policies under apartheid created mar-
kets that are highly concentrated, with a few firms in strategic industries pos-
sessing considerable market power. Economic opportunity only catered to the 
interests of minority groups. The state owned and controlled several strategic 
sectors, such as energy, telecommunications, mining, agriculture and several 
intermediate industrial product markets. Even following the liberalisation and 
privatisation trends of the 1990s, most of these industries continue to be highly 
concentrated while some remain state-owned (Makhaya and Roberts, 2013). 
Participation by new entrants has typically been constrained through structural 
or strategic  barriers to entry (or both). 
C08.indd   191 20-06-2017   09:53:20
192 Part Three: Competition and regulation in reshaping African markets
Barriers to new entry also present themselves if there are political and/or 
vested interests at play that serve to protect the incumbents. While in theory 
increased competition should allow greater and more inclusive economic par-
ticipation, in reality the power and vested interests of large firms and linkages 
to the political economy pave the path in which countries develop and often 
undermine efforts of economic regulators and well-intended policies (Roberts, 
Vilakazi and Simbanegavi, 2014, citing Acemoglu and Robinson, 2012, and 
North, Wallis and Weingast, 2009). 
In South Africa, powerful conglomerates have shaped the development tra-
jectory of industry. Even in regulated industries where competition could be 
actively introduced, such as in energy and telecommunications, broad-based 
participation has remained muted given the presence of structural and strategic 
barriers. Makhaya and Roberts (2013) suggest that it is both the political connec-
tions of the incumbents and the strategic behaviour in these sectors that serve 
to restrict entry, allowing entrenched dominant positions to be maintained. 
This influence extends to the ability to shape the new regulatory frameworks in 
favour of dominant incumbents.
More broadly, Rodriguez and Menon (2010) have argued that, in developing 
countries, blindly promoting competition laws and policies ignores the actu-
alities of prevailing political settlements and institutional realities (in Roberts, 
Vilakazi and Simbanegavi, 2014). Regulators are exposed to lobbying by power-
ful interest groups and outcomes of this may be that the development trajectory 
of the industry is short-sighted.
The clout of such vested interests has critical implications for the pursuit of 
inclusive growth. Khan (2012) and De Mello and Dutz (2012) reiterate the impor-
tance of understanding political settlements when evaluating inclusive growth. 
This is further highlighted by Levine (2012) who, when assessing the financial 
sector, stresses the political economy challenges to the creation of policies that 
would stimulate inclusive growth. Levine explains that powerful individuals or 
circles in society may not want the financial sector to perform well as this would 
empower the previously economically disenfranchised, creating competition 
and potentially diluting the importance of their wealth and political influence 
(De Mello and Dutz, 2012). 
Economic regulation, competitive outcomes and inclusive growth  
in South Africa’s electricity sector
The renewable energy experience in South Africa demonstrates a deliberate 
attempt to harness economic regulation to actively generate competitive out-
comes. The REIPPPP, initiated in 2011, is the first meaningful endeavour on the 
part of  the government to open up the electricity generation market and intro-
duce IPPs alongside the state-owned utility, Eskom, which generates about 95% 
of the country’s electricity.
Structured around successive bidding rounds, REIPPPP started with an initial 
allocation of 3  625  megawatts (MWs) to be procured from IPPs over a maxi-
mum of five bid windows by 2016. In December 2012 and August 2015, the 
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Department of Energy (DoE) published additional determinations, bringing the 
total determination to 14 725 MW. As of September 2016, 6 376 MW of gener-
ation capacity (102 projects) had been approved for total investments of over 
R194 billion, with a collective capacity of 2 738 MW already operational.
While opening the generation market to the private sector constitutes a pos-
itive development, it has had no real impact on competition in the electricity 
market, only introducing competition for the market. This is owing to Eskom’s 
sustained control over the industry through holding most of the generation 
capacity (Pickering, 2010) and the limitation of the role of IPPs to supply through 
government-run procurement programmes only. Nevertheless, the REIPPPP did 
create a precedent and the electricity market is now being opened to IPPs for 
other technologies. Similar IPP procurement programmes for baseload electricity 
from coal, natural gas and hydroelectricity, as well as for co-generation, are being 
rolled out (as of January 2017) by government. 
Through increased competition, the REIPPPP aims to procure renewable 
energy-based electricity at the lowest cost possible while fostering maximised 
economic development outcomes. The evaluation framework of the REIPPPP, 
composed of two clear-cut phases (a prequalification stage and an evaluation 
stage), ensures a fair and levelled playing field for all participants. In a first 
 prequalification stage, bidders have to satisfy minimum threshold requirements 
in six areas: financial, technical, commercial and legal, land, economic develop-
ment and environmental. They must, inter alia, demonstrate the readiness of 
the project (land acquisition, funding, technologies, suppliers, ability to meet 
deadlines, environmental consent, etc.), its financial viability and the arrange-
ments to meet minimum requirements in terms of economic development. 
As a rule, and in order to secure local participation, the project company 
must also comprise 40% participation by a South African entity (Campbell, 
2012). The DoE (via teams of independent experts) requires detailed and com-
prehensive bids. Failure to include all required information, and not having this 
information available on request during the evaluation period, is grounds for 
elimination. 
Bids meeting all these initial requirements are admitted to the second 
stage – the actual auction – where they are assessed on a competitive basis. Bids 
are reviewed based on weighted criteria: 70% for their price offer and 30% for 
their additional contribution to economic development (detailed later).
Stringent criteria also aim to ensure the sustainability of the newly gener-
ated competition by limiting the participation to serious players. To avoid low- 
quality or unreasonable bids and the phenomenon of ‘winner’s curse’, which has 
plagued a number of auction mechanisms, such as the British Non-Fossil Fuel 
Obligation scheme in the 1990s (Mitchell and Connor, 2004), project  developers 
have to pay at bid submission a deposit (reimbursed to unsuccessful projects) 
of R100  000 per MW (Campbell, 2012). Furthermore, successful bidders are 
required to pay a grid guarantee of R200 000 per MW as well as factor into their 
budget a development fee (to be used to run the programme) of 1% of total 
project costs (Campbell, 2012). 
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The REIPPPP and competition outcomes
The REIPPPP has generated substantial positive competition-related outcomes, 
primarily in terms of market entry and pricing. Vested interests have neverthe-
less delayed and limited the scope of the impacts. 
Vested interest in South Africa’s renewable energy journey 
South Africa’s road to large-scale, renewable-energy-based electricity generation 
has been a haphazard and convoluted path, illustrating the difficulty in over-
coming vested interests. From the publication of the 2003 White Paper on the 
Renewable Energy Policy of the Republic of South Africa, which set the objec-
tive of generating 10 000 gigawatt-hours of renewable energy by 2013 (approxi-
mately 4% of the energy mix), to the procurement of the first MW of generation 
capacity in 2011, a long and complex policy development process took place 
in the country. It is intrinsically intertwined with the opening of the electricity 
supply industry to the private sector.
Several initial attempts that were conceptualised, designed and administrated by 
the state-owned, vertically integrated monopoly Eskom, such as the Pilot National 
Cogeneration Programme, the Medium Term Power Purchase Programme and 
the Multisite Base-load Independent Power Producer Programme (see DoE, 2009; 
Yelland, 2009), failed to effectively procure power from IPPs. The National Energy 
Regulator of South Africa (Nersa) then developed a Renewable Energy Feed-In Tariff 
(REFIT) mechanism to procure power output from qualifying renewable energy 
generators at predetermined prices. Faced with political and legal challenges, 
the REFIT policy was abandoned in favour of an auction system (Baker, 2012; 
Creamer, 2011). Following a lengthy transition process, the DoE, with assistance 
from National Treasury’s Public-Private Partnership Unit, launched the REIPPPP in 
August 2011.2 
Unlike previous attempts, the REIPPPP has benefited from a number of key 
overarching success factors on political (e.g., the policy space), organisational 
(e.g., the institutional arrangements) and operational (e.g., the power purchase 
agreement [PPA]) levels.3 
Indeed, only when policy certainty on the role of renewable energy and the 
associated investment strategy (i.e., the role of the private sector) were achieved 
could the procurement framework be successfully implemented. IPP partici-
pation in electricity generation was secured in 2007 with Cabinet designating 
Eskom as the single buyer of power from public and private producers and man-
dating the state-owned enterprise to ensure that ‘adequate generation capacity 
is made available and that thirty per cent of the new power generation capac-
ity is derived from IPPs’ (GCIS, 2007).4 Large-scale commitment to renewable 
energy was achieved in 2010 with the Integrated Resource Plan for Electricity 
2010–2030 (IRP 2010). The IRP 2010 intended for renewable energy technologies 
(solar and wind essentially) to supply 42% of the new additional capacity over 
the 2010–2030 period or 9% of the total electrical energy in 2030 (DoE, 2011).
Institutional arrangements, which were central to the failure of previous 
 programmes, have also been at the crux of the success of the REIPPPP. The 
programme has benefited from effective institutional leadership and political 
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will from the DoE and the National Treasury, and the active participation of all 
relevant stakeholders, from other government departments (such as the depart-
ments of Trade and Industry and of Environmental Affairs) to Nersa, Eskom, 
financial institutions and project developers. Had just one of these vital players 
been missing from the programme design and consultation, the scheme would 
have been less successful. 
In addition, under the REIPPPP, the risk allocation has been adequately 
balanced between all stakeholders. While previous programmes aimed at pro-
moting the development of renewable energy in South Africa largely failed due 
to a risk allocation severely in favour of government and the national utility 
(i.e., pushing most risks onto the private sector), the REIPPPP relies on a more 
distributed risk profile. The PPA, which constitutes the only source of revenue for 
developers and for commercial banks financing IPPs (to ensure debt repayment 
and adequate return on investment), meets international standards, although 
the financial close phase could be improved. 
The PPA is held for 20 years and in local currency, and allocates risk between 
the parties based on investment-friendly terms.5 It guarantees payment of an 
agreed tariff for power generated on a take-or-pay basis (Stemple, 2013).6 The tar-
iff is agreed upon the award of the preferred bidder status and is indexed to the 
rate of inflation over the duration of the contract with Eskom. The agreement is 
underwritten by the National Treasury should Eskom default on the terms. The 
DoE separately contracts with the project companies to offer recourse for project 
investors in the event that Eskom fails to meet its obligations under the PPA. 
The project developer and its financiers are, however, responsible for build-
ing and operating the plant. In the case of IPPs defaulting on supplying the 
agreed amount of electricity due to weather instability or plant degradation or 
destruction, the liability falls on the IPP and the project financiers. Should the 
project company fail to generate the contracted energy, the lenders are asked to 
step in and find a replacement project company, if feasible. If not, the allocation 
for that project could be put up for bid in subsequent rounds (Stemple, 2013). 
Although the above account suggests successful outcomes, vested interests 
in the electricity sector can be argued to have contributed to the slow pace 
of introducing competition. In addition, Eskom remains a vertically integrated 
utility with little incentive to treat IPPs fairly. In 2015, uncertainty arose around 
Eskom’s issuance of budget quotes, which are a prerequisite for IPPs’ bids to reach 
financial close, for the connection of new renewable energy IPPs to the grid. 
Since 2015, the utility has displayed a strong reluctance to provide such budget 
quotes. This can arguably be considered a negotiation strategy to slow the devel-
opment of IPPs and obtain additional funds from the regulator (Slabbert, 2015; 
Tshabalala, 2015). Additional resistance occurred in 2016 with Eskom’s CEO 
publicly indicating its unwillingness to sign further PPAs with REIPPs (Creamer, 
2016).
Further opening of the electricity supply industry is still required to introduce 
meaningful market competition, notably at the generation stage. The opportu-
nity to invest in large-scale renewable energy generation capacity is currently 
limited, outside of the REIPPPP. The passing of the Independent Systems and 
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Market Operator (ISMO) Bill, aimed at introducing an unbundled ISMO (i.e., 
outside of Eskom) to invest, operate and maintain the country’s high-voltage 
transmission grid, was meant to address this blockage (see also chapter 5, this 
volume). It would empower IPPs greatly to sell electricity directly to third-party 
consumers, such as mining and industrial complexes, and provide the platform 
for South African companies to generate their own electricity and sell poten-
tial surplus to the utility and a third party. As of January 2017, the Bill has 
been stalled in parliament since 2011 and is likely to remain so in the short to 
medium term, seemingly owing to vested interests and an attempt to protect 
Eskom’s dominant position.
Reduced barriers to entry and stimulated increased participation
The programme has largely been oversubscribed, a testament to the interest in 
it, and has resulted in committed investment of over R194  billion (DoE, NT 
and DBSA, 2016). As illustrated in table 8.1 and figure 8.1, the number of bid 
responses has increased dramatically with each round, along with a decrease 
in the number of successful bidders, illustrating the growing interest in the 
 programme as well as its increasingly competitive nature. 
On the one hand, the programme’s design has been conducive to market 
entry, considerably widening the number of electricity producers in the coun-
try. The number of bids increased from 53 to 93 across the first three rounds. 
The fourth round saw a stabilisation effect with a total of 77 bids received 
(Creamer, 2015).
On the other hand, a high degree of competitive rivalry has made success 
particularly hard for developers (figure 8.1). In the first round, 53% of received 
bid responses were selected as preferred bidders. This proportion decreased to 
24% in the second window and further to 20% in the third bid window. While 
it originally stood at 17% in the fourth bid window, the additional allocation as 
part of round 4.5 increased the success rate to 34%.
Practically, the programme has also been efficient in mitigating the risk of 
winner’s curse. All projects selected as preferred bidders have so far reached 
financial close and the first REIPPPP project, Scatec Solar’s 75 MW solar pho-
tovoltaic plant, was connected to the grid three months ahead of schedule in 
September 2013 (Clover, 2013). 
As illustrated in table 8.1, over the first seven bid windows (1, 2, 3, 3.5, 4, 4.5 
and 1S2), a total of 6 376 MW of generation capacity was procured.
The success of the programme has been evidenced by the positive response 
received from developers, investors and financiers, as well as local and inter-
national manufacturers, who have actively participated in the programme. As 
such, the programme has attracted a large number of international and domestic 
project developers, sponsors and equity shareholders. Across the first 64 projects, 
more than 100 different shareholding entities participated in the programme. 
Some have been particularly active, with 46 and 25 institutions, respectively, 
participating in more than one project and in three or more projects. South 
African insurance company Old Mutual has been the most active entity, support-
ing 16 projects (Eberhard, Kolker and Leigland, 2014).
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In addition, the existing mechanisms have resulted in some degree of compe-
tition regarding engineering, procurement and construction (EPC) contractors 
and equipment suppliers, with 49 companies servicing the first 64 projects. Most 
companies are involved in more than one project, as the primary or secondary 
contractor. According to Eberhard, Kolker and Leigland (2014), main EPC con-
tractors with three or more projects include South African (Consolidated Power 
Projects, Group Five Construction, Murray & Roberts), Danish (Vestas), Spanish 
(Acciona, Abengoa, ACS Cobra, Iberdrola Engineering and Construction), 
German (Juwi Renewable Energies, Nordex Energy), Norwegian (Scatec), Italian 
(Temi Energia) and Indian (Suzlon) companies. The number of technology sup-
pliers is also fairly diverse. Wind turbine suppliers have included European, 
Chinese and Indian companies such as Vestas, Siemens, Nordex, ABB, Guodian 
and Suzlon. European, Chinese and Korean manufacturers constituted the main 
solar photovoltaic suppliers: Siemens, SMA Solar Tech, BYD Shanghai, Hanwha 
Solar, 3 Sun, AEG and ABB (Eberhard, Kolker and Leigland, 2014). 
These positive achievements were no accident and result from continual pol-
icy and regulatory learnings from previous initiatives, international experience 
as well as the iterations of the current programme (Montmasson-Clair, Moilwa 
and Ryan, 2014; Montmasson-Clair and Ryan, 2014). Stakeholders have com-
mended the extensive due diligence required of developers in their bids and 
the programme’s clarity and reliability. The publication of transparent, consis-
tent and independently reviewed evaluation criteria has emerged as a critical 
condition for the private sector. The evaluation mechanism has contributed to 
creating certainty and ensuring the participation of project developers in the 
programme. Clear and consistent criteria have further enabled fair competition 
in the renewable energy market and the selection of the most competitive bids. 
Stringent criteria have, however, impacted on participation in the pro-
gramme. The rigour required to meet evaluation criteria and each step in the 
Figure 8.1 Bid responses, preferred bidders and success rate in the REIPPPP as of 
September 2016
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bidding process, while welcomed by the private sector, has proven to be extremely 
time consuming and expensive. Key advisors such as legal experts are costly for 
project developers and can represent up to 15% of project development costs 
(Montmasson-Clair, Moilwa and Ryan, 2014). The need to reduce the cost of 
meeting all requirements has arisen for IPPs. Particularly, mechanisms to pre-
vent the winner’s curse phenomenon have constituted a hindering factor for the 
participation of new and/or smaller, previously disadvantaged players. As such, 
the design of the evaluation criteria, particularly their stringency, is reviewed 
between every bidding window, factoring market dynamics and local capabilities.
The design of the REIPPPP has therefore been efficient in lowering the barriers 
to entry and introducing a number of new participants into the electricity gener-
ation market. While further analysis is required to fully grasp the implications for 
inclusive growth, preliminary conclusions nevertheless suggest that market entry 
has primarily favoured established domestic and international companies, with 
limited room for the participation of small and medium-sized enterprises. Notably, 
there has been subdued participation of South African firms, even by means of 
partnerships or joint ventures with more experienced international players. In 
sum, the programme constitutes a noteworthy improvement but further efforts are 
required to widen the spectrum of entities participating in the market.
Substantial reduction in prices
The REIPPPP has resulted in considerable progress over time in terms of prices. 
Tariffs have significantly dropped over the rounds, well below the required 
price ceilings (see figure 8.2). For example, prices fell on average from R2.75/
kilowatt-hour (kWh) to 66c/kWh for solar photovoltaic projects, and from 
R1.14/kWh to 52c/kWh for wind projects. 
Figure 8.2 Evolution of REFIT tariffs, 2008–2011, and REIPPPP prices, in R/MWh
Source: Authors, based on DoE (2013a); Greyling (2012); Nersa (2011); 
DoE, NT and DBSA (2016)
Notes: REIPPPP prices are fully indexed on an April 2011 basis.
Due to a change in tariff structure, prices for CSP in round 3 are not directly comparable 
with rounds 1 and 2. In round 3, projects received a base price for 12 hours every day and 
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In the first bid window, which was utilised in many ways as a round of obser-
vation, prices were relatively high compared to the previous REFIT mechanism. 
No capacity cap (other than the total allocation of the programme) was set, 
price caps were publicly released and new developers were not yet ready to put 
forward competitive bids. These combined factors resulted in a lack of compe-
tition and the absence of pressure on the bidders to reduce their price offering. 
As a result, prices in the first round were high and ended up very close to the 
prescribed ceilings, raising caution with regard to publishing price caps. 
Prices received for the second and third auction rounds were significantly more 
competitive and even lower than expected (Lucas, Ferroukhi and Hawila, 2013). 
This trend was confirmed in the fourth round too. The trend essentially resulted 
from aggressive price competition, project developers being more experienced and 
familiar with the programme, an increased maturity of technologies, reduced price 
ceiling for some technologies, such as wind and solar, and the allocation of a 
capacity limit for each technology from the second round onwards. 
The use of an auction system, with the appropriate risk mitigation mech-
anisms, has reduced the complexity of price setting for the South African 
government and allowed for prices to decrease rapidly as a response to increased 
competition, technology maturity and improved developer experience. This 
success story, resulting from a well-crafted combination of price caps, max-
imum project size and determined allocation, has been one of the REIPPPP’s 
major achievements. Price caps must, however, be set appropriately so as not 
to  prevent participation. Price caps set too low played a part in the absence of 
successful projects in the first two rounds for some technologies, such as landfill 
gas and biomass.
Economic regulation for inclusive growth through 
socioeconomic development outcomes
The second step to evaluate the potential of harnessing economic regulation to 
stimulate inclusive growth outcomes is assessing the role of economic regulation 
in promoting socioeconomic development. 
Economic regulation, socioeconomic development and  
inclusive growth
Proactive economic regulation, including effective competition policy, has an 
important role to play in promoting inclusive growth outcomes through socio-
economic development. Effective competitive rivalry is a means by which partic-
ipation in different sectors in the economy can be widened to be more inclusive. 
Broad-based growth is unlikely to materialise if left solely to the market; the state 
and economic regulators have active roles to play in this regard.
If competition policy as a form of regulation is effectively designed and 
implemented, it can foster inclusive growth (UNCTAD, 2015). Several coun-
tries, including South Africa, have competition policies. They aim to curb 
excessive concentrations in the economy (ex ante through the merger regime) 
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and prohibit anticompetitive conduct resulting in the exploitation of custom-
ers or the exclusion of competitors, ultimately to the detriment of consumers 
and the competitive process (ex post through abuse of dominance and cartel 
provisions). 
While greater economic efficiency (resulting in lower prices, better quality, 
increased choice and innovation) is a key desired outcome of competition policy, 
the South African Competition Act (No. 89 of 1998, as amended) has a broader 
purpose which specifically addresses public interest criteria/goals of greater par-
ticipation and economic and social inclusivity. This is clearly set out in the Act, 
where the purpose includes ‘to promote employment and advance the social and 
economic welfare of South Africans’ and ‘to ensure that small and medium-sized 
enterprises have an equitable opportunity to participate in the economy; and to 
promote a greater spread of ownership, in particular to increase the ownership 
stakes of historically disadvantaged persons’.
The merger regime in South Africa requires consideration of similar public 
interest criteria. It considers the effect of the merger on a particular industrial 
sector or region; the impact on employment; the ability of small businesses, 
or firms controlled or owned by historically disadvantaged persons, to become 
competitive; and the ability of national industries to compete in international 
markets. Mergers that are not found to substantially lessen competition may still 
be prohibited on public interest grounds. 
Economic regulation can also be harnessed to foster inclusive growth through 
socioeconomic development. Economic regulation is largely viewed as ex ante, 
where the aim is to control market power in instances where competition is 
either not possible or not desirable (such as where industries are characterised 
by natural monopolies and certain market failures are present). It aims to do 
this by setting out the rules of the game upfront (see also chapter 5, this volume). 
Economic regulation can also often encompass multiple objectives, of which 
competition may be just one. Others could include economic, environmental 
and social objectives, in addition to core infrastructure functions (Steyn, 2012).
But economic regulation and competition policy are not mutually exclusive. 
For competition to flourish, effective economic regulation is necessary and can be 
designed to create what has been termed ‘synthetic competition’ even in natural 
monopoly situations (Ginsburg, 2009). Indeed, Newbery (2002, p. 28) cautions 
against the mantra ‘competition where feasible, regulation where not’, high-
lighting that even the potentially competitive elements of a network industry, 
such as electricity generation, often still need regulatory oversight so that market 
power is not abused and inclusive outcomes can be achieved. Changing the rules 
of the game, or ‘regulating for competition’ to ensure that the dynamic benefits 
of competition are part of the long-term vision, is necessary to ensure wider eco-
nomic participation and inclusive growth. Actively encouraging investment in 
the energy sector is an area in which previously disadvantaged individuals could 
participate and this requires regulators to design the rules of the game upfront so 
that participation is encouraged. 
It is, however, important to emphasise that competition policy and other 
forms of economic regulation ought to complement, and not be expected to 
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substitute, other government policies in trying to attain inclusive growth objec-
tives. In general, the record of regulatory intervention in telecommunications, 
liquid fuels, rail and electricity supply in South Africa has not yielded the desired 
degree of competitive and inclusive growth.7 
Economic regulation, socioeconomic development and inclusive  
growth in South Africa’s renewable energy sector
The development of renewable energy appears as a key area where economic 
regulation has been (tentatively) mobilised in South Africa to generate socioeco-
nomic outcomes. Competitive rivalry triggered by economic regulation has been 
harnessed to promote inclusive growth. The economic development objectives 
of the REIPPPP have focused on ensuring that South Africans (notably previously 
disadvantaged citizens) participate in, own and benefit from renewable energy 
activities in the country. 
The structure of the REIPPPP has been explicit in facilitating this (although 
economic development criteria remain secondary to price). Traditionally, 
government’s procurement has been based on 80–90% price consideration and 
10–20% for developmental objectives such as black economic empowerment. 
The REIPPPP, in advancing a greater proportion to economic development con-
siderations (30%), has attempted to stimulate socioeconomic goals.
Within the 30 points (out of 100) awarded for economic development, dif-
ferent components are weighted as follows: job creation (25%), local content 
(25%), ownership (15%), management control (5%), preferential procurement 
(10%), enterprise development (5%) and socioeconomic development (15%) 
(DoE, NT and DBSA, 2016). For each category, points are allocated based on 
minimum desired targets, over and above minimum thresholds. In a given cat-
egory, meeting only the minimum threshold translates into zero points while 
reaching the target grants the maximum number of points. From the threshold 
to the target, a linear relationship determines the total points awarded to the 
bid. This system is meant to ensure minimum economic development contribu-
tions from project developers while encouraging them to aim for higher targets 
(Montmasson-Clair, Moilwa and Ryan, 2014). Table 8.2 summarises the qualifi-
cation thresholds for the third bid window, highlighting the diversity of socio-
economic objectives attached to the programme. 
The REIPPPP and socioeconomic outcomes
In line with international experience (see Azuela and Barroso, 2011; Cozzi, 
2012; Del Río and Linares, 2014; IRENA, 2013), South Africa’s renewable energy 
journey illustrates both the difficulty and the possibility of fully harnessing the 
potential of economic regulation to foster socioeconomic objectives. Despite a 
design geared towards promoting local economic and social development, direct 
outcomes have been uneven but generally improving and encouraging. 
Valuable but limited job creation
Job creation accounts for 25% of the economic development criteria embedded 
in the programme (DoE, NT and DBSA, 2016). Three main areas which create 
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direct jobs are equipment manufacturing, project construction and installation, 
operation and maintenance, covering the standard divisions of project life. 
Project developers have committed to noteworthy job creation as part of 
their bids. As detailed in figure 8.3, solar photovoltaic is set to be the technology 
generating the largest number of jobs judging by the successful projects from 
the first four rounds. Solar photovoltaic projects should create a total of 37 307 
employment opportunities, followed by onshore wind and CSP projects. 
Figure 8.3 Committed job creation for selected technologies over REIPPPP bidding 
rounds 1–4
Source: Authors, based on Montmasson-Clair, Moilwa and Ryan (2014); 
DoE (2013a); DoE, NT and DBSA (2016)
Note: Job creation is expressed in 12 person-months and 12 person-months per MW 
capacity of generation procured. Round 3 data exclude the two CSP projects of round 3.5. 
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While project developers have committed to job creation, employment oppor-
tunities in the construction and operation of renewable energy-based power 
plants remain limited. In addition, trade unions have raised concerns about 
the quality and precarious nature of the jobs generated by the projects, with 
most employment opportunities created in the communities surrounding 
projects being for low-skilled security guards (Montmasson-Clair, Moilwa and 
Ryan, 2014). 
The allocation of jobs at the community level also appears lacking in trans-
parency. Skilled employment is generally sourced from the economic centres of 
the country (such as Gauteng), notably owing to the lack of available skills at the 
community level (McDaid, 2014). While deemed local by the programme, these 
employment opportunities do not benefit the community in which the projects 
are located. Although some skills transfer takes place, it appears to be project- 
specific and not common practice. 
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In sum, the contribution of the programme to job creation, while noteworthy, 
remains limited. Employment is primarily short term and low skill and does not 
benefit local communities. While job creation is (rightfully) not the main objec-
tive associated with developing renewable energy, further efforts are required to 
maximise the potential for local job creation and to foster inclusive growth.
Noteworthy (constrained) local industrial development
The design of the REIPPPP aims to stimulate the development of local industries 
through local content requirements. While such requirements internationally 
have generally not had a positive record, local content targets, and accordingly 
the local content share of projects in South Africa, have increased over each bid 
window to encourage further industrialisation, manufacturing and job creation 
(figure 8.4). Local content calculations cover all stages of the value chains, except 
land costs and finance costs. All domestic expenditure qualifies as ‘local’. This 
includes civil works, engineering, project management, assembling imported 
parts, manufacturing some or all components, local technology development 
through innovation and research and development, and technology transfer 
from overseas firms via licensing agreement.
Figure 8.4 Local content requirements and achievements across REIPPPP bidding 
rounds 
Source: Authors, based on Montmasson-Clair, Moilwa and Ryan (2014); Campbell (2012); 
Eberhard, Kolker and Leigland (2014); DoE (2013a); DoE, NT and DBSA (2016)
Note: Round 3 data exclude the two CSP projects of round 3.5. Round 4 data exclude 

























































































Round 1 Round 2 Round 3 Round 4
Actual Threshold Target
For example, the rand value for local content inputs and processes for onshore 
wind increased by 33% from the first to the second round and by 37% from the 
second to the third round. Accordingly, these costs as a share of total project 
costs have risen from around one-fifth to nearly half. The first bidding round had 
set a 25% local content target for onshore wind (DoE, 2012b). 
Most developers found the 25% target easy to meet as the majority of civil 
and electrical activities are undertaken by local companies and a large percentage 
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of local transport is used to achieve this target. However, local content require-
ments increased to 40% in round 3. Turbines, which are generally imported, 
make up 60–70% of project costs, rendering the local content requirements more 
difficult to achieve for developers due to the limited local manufacturing base 
(Vermeulen, 2012).
Looking at solar PV, the local content costs have increased to over half of 
total project costs, while the rand value of these inputs and processes is falling, 
in line with smaller allocation and decreasing local content costs due to height-
ened competition across the entire value chain, from module manufacturers to 
developers (DoE, NT and DBSA, 2016). 
Altogether, solar PV, onshore wind and CSP technologies brought up local 
content of R32.2 billion over the first four rounds of the programme, with solar 
PV (R19.5 million) and onshore wind (R19.0 million) leading the way. With local 
content thresholds increasing progressively for all three technologies, the local 
content costs as a share of total project costs increased accordingly over the four 
bid windows.
However, the industrialisation envisioned as part of the programme remains 
constrained owing to the limited MW capacity allocated per technology (to cre-
ate sufficient aggregate demand for international companies to set up manufac-
turing sites in the country) and the small existing manufacturing base. While 
the existing allocations represent a substantial volume, the overall capacity is 
spread across several technologies as well as numerous competing developers 
and suppliers, thus failing to create enough aggregate demand to encourage large 
investments in local manufacturing. For example, in the absence of critical mass, 
manufacturing wind turbines in South Africa remains challenging as every wind 
turbine model requires a different blade, which means a different mould will 
be needed for each blade (DLA Piper and CD Hofmeyr, 2012). The lack of long-
term certainty about the programme has also hindered the development of local 
manufacturing, leading to some facilities established at the onset of the REIPPPP 
already closing down (such as the SMA plant in the Western Cape). 
Additionally, local content requirements involve short-term trade-offs. 
As the localisation of new technologies raises the costs of goods, local con-
tent requirements can hinder the growth of new sectors if they are not in line 
with the country’s capacity and capability, and impede the decrease in prices. 
The ability of developers to meet local content requirements largely depends 
on whether the local industry can manufacture the components of equipment 
required for their facilities. As such, due to a specific domestic context, all raw 
(unprocessed) steel, regardless of origin, is considered to be 100% local. It is fur-
ther recommended that all raw (unprocessed) aluminium, regardless of origin, 
be considered 100% local (dti, 2013).
Going forward, long-term certainty on the future of the procurement scheme, 
in terms of MW capacity and technology, must be maintained to maximise indus-
trialisation benefits. The publication in November 2013 of an updated IRP, while 
advocating that the current renewable energy programme should be continued 
with additional annual rounds, reintroduced a degree of uncertainty by modify-
ing the allocation per technology included in the IRP 2010 (DoE, 2013b). A new 
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iteration of the IRP was released in November 2016 and is currently going through 
the consultation process.8 While reviewing and updating the country’s electricity 
plan is a necessary ongoing exercise, further certainty on the allocations per tech-
nology must be ensured to provide clarity to the sector (Montmasson-Clair and 
Ryan, 2014). The new allocation of 6 300 MW announced in April 2015 is a step in 
the right direction to establish increased long-term certainty and local investment.
South African companies are also well placed to supply blades, gearboxes, 
generators and controllers for main wind turbines, although they still source 
some parts internationally (Baker, 2012). The programme has triggered some 
noteworthy manufacturing investments which would have been extremely 
unlikely without it. For example, multi-sector company Corporación Gestamp’s 
wind industrial division, GRI Renewable Industries, invested €22 million in a 
wind tower manufacturing facility in Cape Town (Kolver, 2014), while engineer-
ing group DCD Wind Towers built a R300 million wind tower manufacturing 
facility in the Coega industrial development zone in the Eastern Cape (Moodley, 
2014). At least five photovoltaic panel assembly plants have also been estab-
lished in South Africa over the last few years, and some international suppliers 
have used these to achieve localisation targets (Eberhard, Kolker and Leigland, 
2014). These investments have triggered some skills transfer towards South 
Africa at the manufacturing level. 
Failed attempts at spurring community development
Finally, the REIPPPP includes community development as one of its key objec-
tives. To encourage social development in neighbourhoods that surround renew-
able energy projects, community trusts need to be made up of members that live 
within a 50 km radius of the project site (Van den Berg, 2013). This is to prevent 
nepotism over how community beneficiaries are selected, as well as to ensure 
that the surrounding communities, which often bear the unaccounted ecolog-
ical, social and economic costs of the project, benefit from the developments. 
Most communities hold a stake of up to 5% on average, per project, through 
community trusts. These community trusts are fully funded by the Development 
Bank of Southern Africa (DBSA), the Industrial Development Corporation and/
or the Public Investment Corporation, while some are classified as free carry. For 
example, the DBSA provides low-interest financing to community trusts to buy 
shares in the project company. The shares are managed by the DBSA and the 
community trust leadership, and these two parties decide on how the revenue 
is to be spent.
Community trusts are set up with the financial assistance of development 
finance institutions for communities living near the projects to buy shares in 
the project companies. Associated revenues, estimated at R9.5  billion collec-
tively over the first three bid windows, are set aside for community-led projects 
(Montmasson-Clair, Moilwa and Ryan, 2014). 
The management of community trusts established to meet social develop-
ment outcomes has created some unintended consequences. Concerns have 
been raised about the concentration of these funds in a limited number of com-
munities, their monitoring and evaluation, and the capacity of the DoE and 
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development finance institutions to manage the funds and ensure IPPs meet 
their commitments.
In addition, the concern is that many community trusts have been estab-
lished merely to serve the requirements of the request for proposals. Project 
developers and the local development finance institutions have little experience 
in working with communities and municipalities in these areas to ensure that 
development programmes are aligned with community interests and munici-
pal plans. Community participation and ownership aspects of the project can 
indeed promote perverse development by concentrating large funds in commu-
nity trusts, without having well-thought-through developmental objectives. The 
risk is that such community trusts will receive excessive financial flows with 
little knowledge of the communities in which they are working. 
An implementation agreement signed with the DoE is meant to ensure that 
preferred bidders adhere to their commitments. Each bidder is required to report 
to the DoE on a quarterly basis regarding these commitments (DoE, 2012c). 
The REIPPPP awards more points to communities located closer to the renew-
able energy project and does not place a limit on multiple community trusts 
for one community. This results in a small number of communities having 
multiple community trusts assigned to them. The developmental aspects of the 
community trust projects come second to concentrating community trusts in 
lucrative areas. 
Due to the competitively sensitive nature of the programme, developers are 
not able to share their socioeconomic development plans, resulting in several 
developers engaging with similar communities and confusion for all parties. 
In addition, no structured partnership with the local municipality exists and 
local government is only engaged in a fragmented, peripheral and uncoordi-
nated manner. Dissatisfaction is further compounded as a result of the mistrust 
between councillors and community representatives and the lack of transpar-
ency surrounding the selection of socioeconomic projects (McDaid, 2014; Tait, 
Wlokas and Garside, 2013).
Furthermore, some developers have attempted to retain control of the trusts, 
while claiming that they are ‘owned’ by the community. The appointment of 
the trustees and the management of the funds remain problematic and appear 
far from the standards of good governance, with evidence of nepotism, polit-
ical arrangement, elite capture and lack of communication, transparency and 
accountability (McDaid, 2014). The quality and relevance of social investment 
projects have also been questioned at the local level (McDaid, 2014; Tait, Wlokas 
and Garside, 2013).
Social issues such as the rising cost of living, indebtedness and diseases have 
reportedly increased around project sites, notably during construction, because 
of increased employment and the influx of workers. Gender issues are also not 
being considered by the programme as no gender specialist is included in the 
programme team. Preliminary evidence shows that women may not enjoy many 
of the benefits (such as employment), but may bear a disproportionate amount 
of the burden (e.g., an increase in gender-based violence). Overall, little feedback 
is provided to project developers on their social development plans as no social 
C08.indd   209 20-06-2017   09:53:22
210 Part Three: Competition and regulation in reshaping African markets
scientists or labour specialists are present in the team of independent experts 
(McDaid, 2014).
Renewable energy projects have the capacity to generate substantial amounts 
of money for local communities. Clearly, the expectation that these projects, 
unlike projects based on other energy sources, should take on a complex and 
onerous responsibility for community development, has introduced numerous 
unintended consequences. The lack of adequate structures at the local level and 
of monitoring and evaluation at the national level, along with the inexperience 
of project developers in this space, has led to the further marginalisation of, and 
division within, already marginalised and vulnerable communities.
Conclusions
This chapter highlighted the important role that economic regulation could 
have in attaining inclusive growth outcomes through greater participation and 
the promotion of socioeconomic development. This is particularly relevant for 
South Africa, given the country’s history of non-inclusive participation in the 
economy and skewed access to economic opportunities. The importance of 
‘ regulating for competition’ is emphasised, dispelling the notion that regulation 
and competition can effectively function independently of each other. The coor-
dination of the state, independent economic regulators, competition authorities 
and the private sector is essential to reduce barriers to entry and to stimulate 
inclusive growth. However, this should be done with cognisance of the political 
and vested interests at play. 
The renewable energy experience in South Africa highlights the deliberate 
and successful attempt to introduce competition and inclusive growth objec-
tives in the formulation of regulatory policy for the electricity supply industry. 
The REIPPPP has been a success in competitively procuring large-scale renewable 
energy-based electricity generation capacity. Economic regulation has been par-
ticularly efficient in driving prices down in a limited amount of time. It has also 
opened up the market to a large array of new participants in the electricity gen-
eration market, lowering considerably the barriers to entry. Beyond prices and 
market entry, the direct translation of the increase in competition into inclu-
sive growth does not appear automatic, although first results are encouraging. 
Although limited in scope, the REIPPPP provides a first successful attempt at man-
aging vested interests in South Africa’s electricity supply industry. Furthermore, 
while the REIPPPP has had noteworthy positive impacts in terms of job creation 
and industrial and community development, these positive outcomes remain 
limited (and in some cases hampered by unintended consequences), illustrating 
the difficulty of maximising several objectives at the same time.
In line with international experience, the preliminary findings from the case 
study illustrate the potential, as well as the difficulty, in channelling economic 
regulation to stimulate competition for economic development and inclusive 
growth. In this respect, this case study carries substantial lessons for the pro-
curement of large-scale infrastructure in South Africa and other developing 
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and emerging economies. Going forward, the REIPPPP and similar programmes 
could notably strengthen their impact on inclusive growth, particularly in terms 
of local manufacturing and community development, by establishing strong 
monitoring and evaluation frameworks and further capacitating project devel-
opers in meeting economic development requirements. Setting the appropri-
ate instruments to create aggregate demand (required for the development of 
local manufacturing) could further contribute to enabling the type of economic 
development and skilled employment envisioned for such programmes. In the 
short term, however, this is likely to come at the expense of other policy objec-
tives, such as cost affordability, and trade-offs between various objectives must 
be carefully considered to maximise national benefits.
Notes
1 The authors wish to thank the Research Project on Employment, Income Distribution 
and Inclusive Growth (REDI3x3) for supporting the work published in this chapter.
2 See Montmasson-Clair, Moilwa and Ryan (2014) for a detailed analysis of South 
Africa’s renewable energy journey.
3 Many more factors contributed to the success of the programme. See Montmasson-Clair, 
Moilwa and Ryan (2014), Montmasson-Clair and Ryan (2014) and Eberhard, Kolker 
and Leigland (2014) for more details. 
4 Cabinet further specified that over the 2007–2027 period, ‘Eskom will build all nuclear 
power plants in South Africa and the IPPs will build more than 50% of all non-nuclear 
power plants’ (GCIS, 2007).
5 A multitude of risks can be associated with the construction and profitable operation 
of a power plant, from fuel price and supply (this risk is by definition not applicable 
to renewable energy-based plants), foreign exchange, environmental assessments and 
authorisations, the connection to the transmission and distribution networks, reve-
nue collection, to timely and on-budget plant construction and plant operation. 
6 Essentially, this means that irrespective of power demand by the grid, if the power is 
generated by the renewable project, the tariff will be paid by Eskom for each kilowatt 
of energy produced.
7 Nevertheless, the Ports Regulator in South Africa has in recent years made significant 
regulatory decisions with positive impacts on competitiveness. See Reena das Nair 
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payments markets
Introduction
Mobile money has attracted global attention because of its ability to bring peo-
ple from the cash-based, ‘unbanked’ economy into modern systems of ‘book- 
entry money’. This process is commonly referred to in the industry as ‘banking 
the unbanked’ (Klein and Mayer, 2011). It involves the use of mobile phone 
technology to make financial transactions. Generally, this allows users to engage 
in transactions ranging from buying and transferring airtime, to transferring 
funds and making payments from their mobile devices (ITU, 2011). A ‘tradi-
tional’ form of this is where banks have mobile phone applications which allow 
their customers to interact with their bank accounts on their phones. 
As a subset of mobile banking, and of particular interest to this chapter, is the 
ability to transfer money in person-to-person (P2P) transactions, that is, from the 
bank account or mobile operator ‘wallet’ of one person, to the mobile number or 
mobile operator wallet of another.1 These services allow customers to use their 
mobile device to send and receive monetary value – to transfer money using 
their phone, which in some cases includes international, cross-border and/or 
domestic remittance transfers.2 Importantly, these services can be provided even 
when the sender and/or recipient does not have a bank account. In Zimbabwe, 
this led to rapid adoption by users since NetOne and Telecel both launched their 
mobile money transfer (MMT) services in January 2011, followed by Econet in 
September 2011. Users include customers in rural areas where access to banking 
services has been limited and remittance transfers from large cities and abroad 
are an important source of income (Dermish, Hundermark and Sanford, 2012). 
This is especially relevant given the withdrawal of the majority of Zimbabweans 
from formal banking services during the prolonged period of economic distress 
over the past decade, leading to a largely cash-based economy and the use of 
direct, informal cash transfer mechanisms, such as through minibus taxi services 
and travelling relatives or friends (Dermish, Hundermark and Sanford, 2012). 
These aspects of mobile money have important implications in terms of 
competition and economic development. The ability to draw in subscribers that 
are unbanked and marginalised by formal financial services through simple, 
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affordable, convenient and safe platforms contributes to greater financial inclu-
sion (Klein and Mayer, 2011), and facilitates transactions between individuals 
(e.g., remittances) as well as between enterprises.3 However, the gains in wel-
fare can easily be undermined where markets are concentrated and dominant 
incumbents are able to unfairly abuse their strength in adjacent markets, such 
as mobile money services, to bolster their market power in primary markets 
(mobile telecommunication services). This is especially the case where rival oper-
ators face high barriers to entry related to network effects in particular, which 
makes it difficult for as-efficient rivals to effectively compete for customers. In 
the case of the Zimbabwean market, where Econet is the dominant player in tra-
ditional services and MMTs, customers have a strong incentive to use the mobile 
money services of the largest network (primarily due to lower costs and conve-
nience), which requires them to also subscribe to Econet’s traditional mobile 
services offering through purchasing a sim card. This relationship between the 
two markets makes it especially difficult for rivals to encourage customers to 
switch, which has important implications for competition between operators in 
the Zimbabwean market (discussed later). 
This chapter takes a broad look at the competition and regulatory envi-
ronment related to mobile money in Zimbabwe. It explores the nature of the 
mobile payments market in Zimbabwe and theory and literature around net-
work effects and possible competition problems which can arise in this type 
of market, including through international comparisons with the Zimbabwean 
market. It also deals with the issue of interoperability and the conditions where 
it is likely to develop versus situations where regulatory intervention is likely to 
be required. This is then all related to the Zimbabwean context in order to pres-
ent possible ways forward for regulators.  
In the remainder of the chapter we provide a background to the market for 
MMT services in Zimbabwe and its development in recent years before review-
ing the literature on competition and regulatory issues in network industries 
and mobile money markets in particular. Thereafter we assess competition and 
regulatory issues specific to the Zimbabwean market and draw comparisons with 
developments in other countries in South and East Africa. After concluding, we 
provide recommendations for policy making and enforcement through agencies 
such as competition authorities and sector regulators.  
The Zimbabwean mobile money market 
The provision of mobile banking – relying on mobile network operator (MNO) 
infrastructure – by banks, and the provision of MMTs by MNOs, relies on the use 
of the Unstructured Supplementary Service Data (USSD) codes held by MNOs, 
which are issued and licensed by the Postal and Telecommunications Regulatory 
Authority of Zimbabwe (Potraz). This refers to a short code such as ‘*200#’, 
which, when dialled, presents the customer with a menu of functions, including 
the option to conduct a P2P transaction. We include the process outlined for 
Econet customers as an example (box 9.1).
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Box 9.1 Method for sending money over the EcoCash platform
6 Send Money: How do I send money (transfer cash) using my EcoCash 
account?
1. Dial *151*200# and enter your pin to access their EcoCash menu
2. Go to Option 4-Send Money
3. Select either Option 1-Registered Customer or Option 2-Unregistered 
Customer
4. Enter receiving mobile number using the following form at (071xxxxxxx, 
077xxxxxxx, 073xxxxxxx)
5. Enter the amount that they wish to transfer (e.g. 2 for $2 or 2.10 for 
$2.10)
6. You will receive a notification on your screen advising you of how much 
you have said they wish to send and the mobile number you wish to 
send to. From there you can either Select Option 1-Approve or Option 
2-Cancel the transaction.
7. On approval of the transaction, a confirmation messages will be sent to 
both lines with the following details:
•	 Sender: Amount transferred, recipient’s name (if the recipients 
number is registered for EcoCash) or mobile number (unregistered), 
approval code and their new wallet balance.
•	 Recipient: Amount transferred sender’s name and the transaction 
approval code.
8. Keep these confirmation messages as reference and only dispose of them 
when you are certain that you no longer need them and the recipient has 
managed to collect the money
Source: EcoCash (n.d.)
Customers are generally required to register at an outlet of the chosen network 
provider in order to have access to a mobile wallet and the MMT service, by 
simply producing proof of identity, filling in an application form and being in 
possession of an active sim card for that network. Across all MNOs in Zimbabwe, 
recipients of funds are then required to go to an agent of the sender’s network 
operator to collect any transferred funds, unless the recipient is a registered wal-
let customer on the same network, in which case they have the option of retain-
ing the funds received in their mobile wallet. For example, an EcoCash customer 
who is a recipient of funds transferred from another EcoCash customer can go 
to an EcoCash agent to collect the funds in cash (‘cash-out’) or can retain the 
funds in their EcoCash wallet. Recipients on a different network to the sender 
need to present confirmation of the funds transferred to them (the message 
received contains a unique reference number) to an agent of the sender’s net-
work, who will then cash-out to the recipient. As of 2016, Potraz expects MNOs 
to implement interoperability between mobile wallets across networks as well, so 
that subscribers to other mobile money services can send money directly to an 
EcoCash wallet and vice versa. 
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Agents have therefore been a critical part of the value chain for providing MMT 
services. These agents effectively act as the equivalent of bank branches for sending 
and receiving money transfers. Most MNOs operate agent networks that include the 
owners, operators or employees of small retailers or postal outlets (USAID, 2010). 
Some agents are contracted as exclusive or non-exclusive agents of an MNO, whereas 
others, such as postal service branches and large grocery retailers, in most cases can 
be contracted by several MNOs. The Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe (RBZ) issued a direc-
tive in 2014 prohibiting agent exclusivity unless the operator could demonstrate the 
need to have exclusivity over a particular agent.4 Currently, Econet has by far the 
largest network of agents in Zimbabwe, based on data from Potraz (table 9.1). 
Table 9.1 Agents by mobile network operator
MNO 2012 2013 2014 2015
Telecel − − 4 586 6 984
NetOne 32 61 1 612 2 262
Econet 2 301 9 108 17 181 24 013
Total 2 333 9 169 23 379 33 259
Source: Potraz quarterly reports (http://www.potraz.gov. 
zw/index.php/categorylinks/120-quarterly-reports)
Note: For 2014 and 2015, totals for the fourth quarter are used.
The growth of Econet’s EcoCash facility into the leading mobile banking platform 
in Zimbabwe, well ahead of its rivals, was fuelled by the ability to attract pre-
viously unbanked customers. Although a significant proportion of Zimbabwe’s 
population of 13.7 million people do not have bank accounts (around 30% are 
banked), many have access to a mobile phone and are subscribers of one of the 
three MNOs. The total number of mobile network subscribers in Zimbabwe at 
the beginning of 2014 was just under 14 million, according to Potraz, which 
includes multi-simming by customers.5 This had grown to more than 19 million 
by the end of 2015. In addition, Econet’s growth in this area is at least partly 
due to its established position and brand presence in traditional mobile services. 
Based on data from Potraz, the largest share of the market among the three 
players in mobile services (by number of subscribers) (table 9.2) and in MMT ser-
vice provision is held by Econet (table 9.3).6 Rivals to Econet gained market share 
in 2014 and 2015, which may be attributable to their growth in MMT services, 
among other factors. 
As these services grow in popularity in Zimbabwe, banks are looking to 
broaden their offering to enable their clients to not only use traditional banking 
services, including mobile banking, but also to execute MMTs to unbanked peo-
ple directly from their bank accounts. This presents a dynamic growth area in 
the sector. Banks may also perceive a competitive threat from MNOs providing 
MMT services, particularly because a proportion of their traditional customers 
also use MMT services due to their convenience and lower price, for instance. We 
discuss the interactions between banks and MNOs below. 
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The provision of MMT services in Zimbabwe
In terms of the supply of MMT services, MNOs have back-office links to the pay-
ments system through host banks. In Zimbabwe, it is a requirement of the RBZ 
that MMT service providers have to partner with a bank which ‘hosts’ them, at 
least partly because RBZ is not empowered by the National Payments System Act 
(No. 21 of 2001) to supervise MNOs.
Following the introduction of NetOne’s OneWallet (with FBC Bank) and 
Telecel’s Skwama product (with Kingdom Bank) in January 2011, Econet intro-
duced EcoCash in September of that year. The early growth of OneWallet and 
Skwama was much slower relative to that of EcoCash. Telecel subsequently with-
drew its product, which required users to also be clients of the host bank, on the 
grounds that partnering with a single bank limited the potential market size for 
the product as many of its subscribers were also clients of other banks (Kabweza, 
2012). Telecel apparently made a strategic decision to connect its mobile plat-
form to more banks by partnering with the ZimSwitch Mobile platform. NetOne 
has also partnered with ZimSwitch, although Econet has not. 
ZimSwitch is a financial switching company which was formed in 1994 
through a partnership between six financial institutions to connect nineteen 
of Zimbabwe’s banks.7 The company processes domestic card-based automated 
teller machine and point of sale transactions among member financial institu-
tions in real time online. The ZimSwitch Mobile platform enables all financial 
institutions connected to ZimSwitch to offer mobile banking services through 
USSD technology (mobile) via the internet, and also integrates with service pro-
viders such as utility companies (Kabweza, 2011). The platform enables users to 
transfer money through ZimSwitch Instant Payment Interchange Technology, 
Table 9.2 Market shares by number of mobile money subscribers,  
2012–2015
2012 (%) 2013 (%) 2014 (%) 2015 (%)
Telecel* 13.3 14.3
NetOne  0.1  0.5  9.9 11.4
Econet 99.9 99.5 76.8 74.3
Source: Potraz quarterly reports
Note: * Telecel discontinued its MMT platform and relaunched it as Telecash in 2014.
Table 9.3 MNO market shares by number of registered subscribers, 
2010–2015
2010 (%) 2011 (%) 2012 (%) 2013 (%) 2014 (%) 2015 (%)
Telecel 18 17 20 19 22 24
NetOne 17 18 16 17 23 28
Econet 65 65 64 64 55 48
Source: Potraz quarterly reports
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which acts as an aggregator that facilitates transactions when customers look to 
move money to and from their bank accounts for mobile payments.  
By connecting via the ZimSwitch platform, MNOs obviate the need to con-
tract with individual banks or service providers in terms of providing mobile 
financial services (and gaining access to the national payments system) as they 
did before. The fact that both Telecel and NetOne partnered with the ZimSwitch 
platform allowed customers of different banks two options in terms of which 
network to use to access the mobile financial services. In this way, interop-
erability created benefits for customers, although, as noted, the largest MNO, 
Econet, has not partnered with ZimSwitch for P2P transactions. In fact, the sub-
ject of complaints by various banks in Zimbabwe relates primarily to Econet’s 
initial refusal to partner with ZimSwitch and its insistence that banks should 
instead integrate with its own EcoCash platform (for which a fee of $0.30 would 
be levied per transaction) should they want their customers to be able to link 
their accounts to EcoCash and send money using this method (Kabweza, 2014; 
Makichi, 2014). 
Econet followed a different strategy in implementing its mobile money ser-
vices. It acquired shareholding in TN Bank in November 2012 in a transaction 
which was conditionally approved by the competition authority. The condition 
required Econet to ensure that it continues to avail mobile connectivity to other 
competing financial institutions. TN Bank later rebranded to Steward Bank in 
2013. TN Bank served as Econet’s implementing partner or host bank for the 
growth of its EcoCash platform.  
The provision of MMTs has evolved significantly over a short period in 
Zimbabwe. This dynamic in the sector seems to have a great deal to do with 
the model followed by the MNOs in delivering this service. For instance, Econet 
applies what is termed an ‘MNO-led’ model, which means that the MNO is in 
control of the full process of facilitating an MMT, including running the mobile 
network, performing cash-ins or cash-outs, transferring funds and settling 
(USAID, 2010). This is in contrast to bank-led models wherein MNOs are only 
involved at the level of providing the primary network infrastructure for facil-
itating transactions. Importantly, although MNOs still require banks to ‘host’ 
them with regard to accessing the payments system, there has been an evo-
lution in the sector in so far as customers are not required to hold an account 
with a specific bank in order to access these services. Furthermore, the ability of 
Econet to introduce its own rival platform and not partner with banks initially is 
likely to have influenced the patterns of growth in the sector by allowing Econet 
to directly leverage its strength in the mobile services market into the MMT 
environment. 
Econet’s ability to control interoperability with and access to its own plat-
form, which is by far the largest, also places it in a position to drive the growth 
of ‘on-network’ transactions in the context of significant network externalities 
(discussed below). Until recently, there were difficulties in the market relat-
ing to the ability to send money to recipients on other networks, although 
Potraz sought to address this. In the first phase, the regulator required opera-
tors to ensure the ability to send money to the sim or number of a recipient on 
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another network, and in the second phase transfers will be enabled between 
mobile wallets. Technical and contractual issues need to be resolved between 
the operators, including linking of trust accounts, before full implementation 
can take place. 
Competition and regulatory issues in mobile 
money markets: Literature and theory 
Network effects, also referred to as network externalities or demand-side econo-
mies of scale, are the effects that one user of a good or service has on the value 
of that product to other users. In products or industries characterised by network 
effects, the value of a product or service is dependent on the number of others 
using it (Shapiro and Varian, 1999). A number of industries exhibit network 
effects, including telecommunications, where users benefit directly from the size 
of a network as it dictates the number of others with whom they can communi-
cate (Economides, 2010; Srinivasan, Lilien and Rangaswamy, 2004). 
Network effects can be classified into two types: direct (or same side) net-
work effects and indirect (or cross-side) network effects. Direct network effects are 
present when adoption by different users is complementary, so that each user’s 
adoption payoff and incentive to adopt increases as more people adopt based 
on horizontal compatibility (Farrell and Klemperer, 2007). In the case of mobile 
money solutions in Zimbabwe such as Econet’s EcoCash, Telecel’s Telecash and 
NetOne’s OneWallet, the more that consumers use the mobile money solution on 
one side of the network the greater the utility the consumers on the same side of 
the network attain. This is typically through being able to more conveniently and 
cheaply connect with or send money to users that are on the same network and 
mobile money platform versus those that are subscribers to different platforms.
Indirect network effects arise if adoption of the product improves opportunities to 
trade with another side of the market. Markets that exhibit indirect network effects are 
commonly known as two-sided markets. A two-sided platform refers to products and 
services that bring together different groups of users in two-sided networks. Indirect 
network effects imply that customer utility from the primary product increases as 
more customers or suppliers exist on the other side of the market. For example, in 
transaction markets the adoption of MasterCard by consumers depends on the num-
ber of merchants who accept it for transacting. On the other hand, the merchants can 
adopt the card on condition that it has many subscribers using it. Similar indirect net-
work effects manifest in the mobile money sector in that the adoption of a particular 
mobile money system may be dependent on the number of merchants or billers who 
accept it. Mobile money agents and merchants are more willing to adopt a mobile 
money system with a higher subscriber base (Anderson, 2009). 
Network effects can significantly affect competition among firms by creating a 
barrier to entry for new firms that may find it difficult to compete with the incum-
bent’s much larger network. When network effects are present, the firm’s installed 
customer base can be considered a key asset to gain supra-competitive returns 
(Economides, 2010). Network industries are prone to dominance and therefore 
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often associated with the existence of monopolies (Motta, 2004). Due to network 
effects, a firm with a larger number of users will become increasingly attractive 
to existing users and this will attract new users. Network effects may thus create 
winner-takes-all outcomes (Arthur, 1996). Market tipping off may occur, where a 
dominant firm manages to gain advantage in consumer preference, thus becoming 
more and more popular and eventually becoming the dominant solution in the 
market. Network effects can also be deliberately leveraged by a dominant firm wish-
ing to maintain its position in the market and make life difficult for smaller rivals. 
What makes mobile money markets particularly prone to high barriers to 
entry is their close connection to the market for traditional mobile services 
(voice, sms and data), where network effects are also present. Indeed, one moti-
vation for MNOs’ provision of mobile money services is to retain and grow 
market share in the market for traditional mobile services. In this way, a high 
market share in the market for traditional MNO services tends to give an MNO 
an advantage in the roll-out of mobile money services, which can lead to a dom-
inant position in the mobile money market, further strengthening the firm’s 
market position in the original market. This is borne out in practice in a number 
of markets where large MNOs have achieved dominant positions in developing 
mobile money markets.
Economists from the Chicago School have argued that a dominant firm has 
no incentive to leverage its market power into adjacent vertical or horizontal 
markets. This is explained using the One Monopoly Profit theory, which states 
that a firm which has a monopoly in one market can extract all the possible rents 
from its original monopoly position, and will not gain anything from extending 
that monopoly power into related markets (O’Donoghue and Padilla, 2006). This 
theory rests on strong assumptions, however, including that the adjacent market 
is perfectly competitive and the monopolist can credibly commit to charging the 
monopoly price to all customers. 
Post-Chicago economists have since pointed out a number of situations 
where these assumptions are not met and where, consequently, it is possible 
for anticompetitive foreclosure to occur. One such case is where a dominant 
firm is concerned that through allowing entry into a complementary market, 
it may in future face greater competition in its primary market, through entry 
or expansion of the competitor into this market (Carlton and Waldman, 2002). 
Carlton and Waldman’s theory relies on entry into the complementary market 
being costly. However, O’Donoghue and Padilla (2006) note that the incumbent 
may have an incentive to monopolise the complementary good market even 
when entry is costless, provided there are network externalities. In fact, both 
factors are present in the Zimbabwean markets for mobile payments and mobile 
services, as a substantial upfront investment in infrastructure is required to enter 
the market and, as discussed above, network effects are substantial. 
The defensive leveraging theory is particularly strong in industries with net-
work externalities, as the possibility of market tipping in the complementary 
product market (e.g., mobile payments) provides a threat to the incumbent 
monopolist’s position in the primary market (e.g., mobile services), because a 
successful entrant in the complementary product market would then be in a 
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much stronger position to grow in the primary market.8 To remove the threat 
to its monopoly position in the primary market, the incumbent then attempts 
to exclude competitors in the market for the complementary product so as to 
ensure that its product becomes the dominant standard.
One way that a dominant firm in one side of a network market can do this is 
to make its products partially or fully incompatible with components produced 
by other firms. This can be done through actual product incompatibility or 
explicit exclusion or refusal to interconnect with other firms, particularly com-
petitors. If a firm is dominant in one of the markets it has no incentive to allow 
full compatibility of its products with those of its competitors. Compatibility is 
dependent on the intensity of the network effect, that is, the more intense the 
network effect, the stronger the incentive for a firm to make its products incom-
patible with substitutes (Economides, 2010). The decision to choose to remain 
incompatible with the rival ensures that the dominant firm can keep all the 
network effects it creates to itself. As in the example above, the dominant MNO 
has higher chances of attracting more subscribers to its mobile network services 
if it chooses incompatibility on its mobile payment system. 
If, on the other hand, there are a range of smaller firms in the market, interop-
erability is more likely to develop naturally as each player has more to gain and 
less to lose from ‘pooling’ the network effects. In this scenario, interoperability 
should result in a larger overall market as a linked network is more attractive and 
hence attracts larger demand. Therefore, there are gains to all from interoperabil-
ity, but if there is one very large player, its losses due to weakening the network 
effects may outweigh these gains, and hence interoperability is not in its interest.
Mobile money markets are prone to all these features, and in Zimbabwe the 
market structure is particularly skewed, with one firm, Econet, having very high 
market shares in both the mobile services and the mobile money markets until 
recently. This creates concern that barriers to entry and expansion for smaller 
rivals may be difficult to surmount. In most countries, including Zimbabwe, 
interconnection in the mobile network services and compatibility at the level of 
voice and low-capacity data transmission are mandated by law (Nyaga, 2014). 
However, in most developing countries, mobile money is a relatively new devel-
opment which is very dynamic and interoperability has not advanced in most 
markets. Until recently, simple aspects of interoperability, such as the ability of 
mobile wallets to connect across networks, had not been implemented although 
regulators have now instituted measures to address this.
Emerging competition and regulatory issues in the  
Zimbabwean market
How does the theory apply to Zimbabwe?
As the largest MNO in Zimbabwe and by far the largest provider of mobile pay-
ments services, Econet is in a very strong position. As noted, markets for tradi-
tional mobile telecommunications services and those for mobile payments are 
c09.indd   223 20-06-2017   09:53:43
224 Part Three: Competition and regulation in reshaping African markets
strongly interlinked and the provision of mobile payments services can provide 
a way for MNOs to induce customer loyalty and prevent customer switching. In 
this case, part of Econet’s strategy with regard to EcoCash may be to provide such 
a ubiquitous service that most consumers want to use EcoCash, thereby locking 
them in as Econet subscribers. The network effects inherent in both markets 
will tend to reinforce this, as the more subscribers EcoCash and Econet have, 
the more attractive they become to customers (and the less attractive compet-
itors become). Econet’s annual report describes EcoCash as ‘a key value driver, 
subscriber retention and loyalty product’ (Econet, 2014, p. 23). This indicates 
that part of the value of EcoCash is derived from its ability to help Econet retain 
subscribers in the mobile services market and to reduce subscriber switching.
If Econet perceives a threat from Telecel and NetOne to its market power 
in the mobile services market, it may have a further incentive to strengthen 
EcoCash in order to ensure that subscribers stick with Econet in the market for 
mobile services. 
Furthermore, to the extent that Econet expects a dominant standard to emerge 
in the mobile payments market, it may have a further incentive to ensure that 
this is EcoCash, to protect its position in the mobile services market. The banks, 
on the other hand, present a potential threat to the position of EcoCash, which 
is important in itself but also because this could reduce the value of EcoCash as 
a means of retaining and attracting subscribers in the traditional mobile services 
market. With a 65% share in the MNO market and a share of over 90% in the 
mobile payments market, Econet has been in a strong position for many years to 
exploit these network externalities. Subscribers may be reluctant to switch away 
from Econet to a smaller network, although it does appear that rival operators 
have increasingly been able to compete with Econet in traditional services as well 
as in mobile money services through aggressive marketing and pricing in recent 
years. Telecel’s Telecash platform, for example, has grown significantly since its 
relaunch in 2014, which suggests that the operator has been able to draw in 
Econet and EcoCash customers, and, importantly, to draw in new demand as the 
total number of subscribers grows. Multi-simming in the market may also mean 
that customers are increasingly registering as subscribers of mobile money and 
mobile telephony services across different networks.
A competition complaint
In 2014, a competition complaint was laid against Econet by the Bankers’ 
Association of Zimbabwe, which submitted a complaint to the Zimbabwe 
Competition and Tariff Commission (ZCTC) relating to Econet’s conduct with 
regard to its EcoCash platform.9 The complaint raised a number of concerns. Of 
particular interest are the concerns relating to the provision of USSD services 
whereby Econet allowed banks to use the USSD service for the provision of other 
mobile banking services (balance checks, bill payment, bank account to bank 
account transactions, etc.) to banked clients, but not for P2P transactions requir-
ing a link between mobile wallets and bank accounts.
Econet initially refused to allow the banks access to its EcoCash platform 
for P2P transactions, meaning that it was not possible for bank customers using 
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Econet to draw money from their bank account to send money via EcoCash in 
a P2P transaction. In February 2014, Econet finally agreed to grant the banks 
access to the platform. However, this was subject to a number of terms which 
the banks argued to be unfair. The most important of these was the cost for P2P 
transactions, which would be charged at a rate of 30c per session compared to 
5c or zero for all other mobile banking transactions. This was a key aspect of the 
complaint. In contrast, Telecel and NetOne charged the banks a much lower 
amount or zero for using the same USSD facility on their mobile payments plat-
forms. There were also requirements that EcoCash imposed on the banks and 
their clients in terms of the way that the USSD service was to be used, such as 
on session times and supplementary codes, which made the service increasingly 
inconvenient for bank clients. 
The ZCTC did not publish a decision on the matter although certain reg-
ulatory solutions were sought to resolve the concerns based on cooperation 
between the ZCTC, RBZ and Potraz. 
Interoperability in the Zimbabwean market
Until around 2015 there was no interoperability between EcoCash and the 
other mobile money platforms in Zimbabwe. EcoCash customers could not send 
money to the mobile wallet of a NetOne or a Telecel customer, although money 
could be sent to the mobile number (sim) of a recipient on another network. 
Similarly, Telecel customers could not send money to an Econet sim or EcoCash 
wallet. It is therefore significant in terms of the development of the market that 
value can be sent to recipients across networks, albeit not to their wallets. 
A lack of interoperability implied that if customers wanted to be able to be 
sent money by EcoCash customers, which was highly likely given that EcoCash 
held 90% of mobile payment subscribers, they had no option but to also be with 
EcoCash. If they wanted to be able to send money to EcoCash customers, also 
very likely, they could not be with Telecash. Given the network effects in the 
industry, this put EcoCash in a very strong position in the market.
Even if EcoCash customers could send money to the other MNO sim cards at 
the time, customers would still have to cash-out the money at an EcoCash agent. 
If they then wanted to transfer the money to their Telecash wallet or OneWallet, 
they would have to go to a Telecash or NetOne agent and pay the money back in. 
Thus, while this would provide interoperability of a kind, there are transaction 
costs as it would be inconvenient and costly to customers. 
As noted, interoperability is usually beneficial for smaller firms that struggle 
to combat the market power and network effects enjoyed by larger incum-
bents. Incumbents may, however, have the incentive to resist interoperability 
to the extent that it will enable them to preserve their dominance. In a situa-
tion where there are a number of firms of similar size, interoperability is more 
likely to evolve naturally than where there is one dominant firm and other 
smaller players (Andes, 2012). The Zimbabwean market structure obviously 
reflects the latter example quite closely, which suggests that there was a need 
for regulatory intervention to ensure a level playing field for smaller mobile 
money providers. In this regard, the question for policy makers is how best 
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to balance the need to promote competition against the need to preserve the 
incentives to invest.
While Telecel’s fast growth in terms of subscriber numbers suggests that entry 
into the mobile payments market is possible without interoperability, its relative 
size is much smaller than Econet’s and its growth may be constrained in future 
as the market growth slows. To avoid this, the operator would need to develop 
strategies to entice customers away from Econet – unless there was full interop-
erability in the market. This suggests that it is indeed difficult to grow in the 
market without interoperability.
On the other hand, there is an argument that multi-homing or multi- 
simming is common in Zimbabwe and that this effectively means that interop-
erability is not important as customers can simply switch between sims to send 
money to customers of different mobile money platforms. We do not have data 
on the prevalence of multi-homing in this market so it is hard to test this. We 
note, however, that even to the extent that customers have more than one sim, 
there is still inconvenience and cost attached to having to register for more than 
one platform and transfer balances into and out of each wallet. 
The lack of interoperability may be restricting the growth of this new mar-
ket. As discussed above, there is substantial latent demand for mobile financial 
services in Zimbabwe. To the extent that the lack of interoperability limits com-
petition, it will lead to higher prices and less innovative products for consumers, 
which will in turn limit uptake. 
Contrast with other countries in the region
In order to understand why the Zimbabwean mobile money market has evolved 
as it has, we present a comparison with other countries in the region. What is 
striking is that the markets in all countries are highly concentrated and, in all 
countries except Rwanda and Tanzania, the leading firm has more than 50% 
market share (figure 9.1). 
The Kenyan market is particularly concentrated, with the leading firm, 
Safaricom, having a market share of 80%. Zimbabwe also has a highly concen-
trated market, with Econet enjoying a 75% market share. In Zambia there is a 
duopoly: MTN with a 59% market share and Airtel with 41%. In Uganda, MTN 
is also the largest player with 58% of the market, but there are three additional 
competitors, one of whom (Airtel) has a 27% market share. The most compet-
itive markets appear to be Rwanda and Tanzania, where there are three and 
four significant players, respectively: Vodacom (38%), Tigo (33%), Airtel (27%) 
and Zantel (2%) in Tanzania, and MTN (49%), Tigo (35%) and Airtel (16%) in 
Rwanda. These market shares translate into high HHI10 figures in all six countries, 
again with the HHI figures for Kenya being the highest at 6 486 (table 9.5).
In a market with network effects, one would expect that where there is one 
very large player, interoperability is unlikely to develop naturally. In the case of 
the six countries considered here, only one has implemented interoperability. In 
Tanzania, interoperability developed as an industry-led process. In 2014, Airtel, 
Tigo and Zantel agreed to allow their platforms to interoperate. Subsequently, 
the industry worked on a set of standards governing P2P payments across the 
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various networks, and finally, in 2016, it appeared that all four operators, includ-
ing Vodacom, would implement interoperability between their systems. It is 
unsurprising that this development arose in Tanzania, since it has one of the 
least concentrated markets of the countries in the sample and has three signifi-
cant players in the mobile money market. 
As shown in table 9.4, Tanzania also has the least concentrated market for tra-
ditional mobile services (measured in terms of subscriber numbers). By contrast, 
Figure 9.1 Mobile money market shares in Uganda, Zimbabwe, Kenya, Zambia,  
Tanzania and Rwanda (%)
Source: Various online sources including telecommunications and financial regulators 
of the various countries, company websites and publicly available data
Notes: All market shares are measured by mobile money subscriber numbers. It is assumed 
that the figures reflect the total number of registered subscribers and not those that are 
active. The number of active subscribers is not typically reported on by various authorities 
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Kenya and Zimbabwe both have one firm with a much higher market share 
than the others in the MNO market as well as the mobile money market. In 
both cases, the dominant player in the MNO market has been able to establish 
a similarly strong position in the mobile payments market. As discussed, the 
large incumbent firm may have the ability and incentive to protect its position 
in the MNO market through maintaining its dominance in mobile payments, 
particularly if it feels threatened by growing competitors in the MNO market. 
This presents it with an incentive to resist interoperability.
Another way that firms can enhance rather than reduce the network effects 
in mobile payments is to charge a higher price for transfers to unregistered recip-
ients than to registered recipients. This means that to send money to another 
customer of the same mobile money platform is cheaper than to send money 
to someone who is not a customer and may be a customer of a competing plat-
form. Thus customers can send money more cheaply to customers of the same 
network, creating incentives for subscribers to stick with the platform with the 
most users. This is similar to the effect of high interconnection charges between 
MNOs in the market for traditional mobile services.
In order to see how different market structures influence the rates charged 
to send money to unregistered recipients, we calculated the average price to 
send $20 to registered and unregistered recipients in the six countries, for the 
largest player in each country. We then calculated the percentage difference 
between what is charged for transfers to registered and unregistered recipients. 
As shown in table 9.5, there is a substantial difference in cost in all countries, 
with the exception of Tanzania. Transfers to unregistered recipients in 
Zimbabwe and Kenya are 29% and 83% more expensive, respectively, than 
transfers to registered recipients. Tanzanian transfers to unregistered recip-
ients are the same price as to registered recipients. This reflects the differ-
ence in market dynamics in the two countries, where there is an incentive for 
Econet, the largest player in Zimbabwe, to try to make other networks seem 
unattractive. 
Table 9.5 Features of mobile money markets in six countries
Kenya Zimbabwe Zambia Uganda Rwanda Tanzania
Number of players 6 3 2 4 3 4
Market share of 
largest firm (%)
80 75 59 58 49 38
Industry HHI 6 486 5 918 5 170 4 275 3 882 3 266
Interoperability No No No No No Yes




83 29 88 32 25 0
Sources: Market shares and HHI (see figure 9.1); price differential, 
websites of MMT providers listed in figure 9.1
c09.indd   229 20-06-2017   09:53:44
230 Part Three: Competition and regulation in reshaping African markets
The brief country comparison set out above has illustrated that other 
countries face similar challenges to those faced by Zimbabwe in regulating the 
fast-growing mobile payments market. Where there is asymmetry already in the 
MNO market in terms of one player that is much larger than the rest, this seems 
to lend itself to an even more unbalanced market for mobile payments, where 
the network effects in both markets are mutually reinforcing. Zimbabwe, how-
ever, appears to be an extreme case. At the other extreme, Tanzania, where the 
MNOs have more even shares of the market, seems to be developing a more com-
petitive mobile payments market and even moving naturally towards interoper-
ability between the different mobile payments platforms. This suggests that in 
the more asymmetric markets such as Zimbabwe and Kenya, attention needs to 
be given to possible regulatory solutions that will prevent the dominance of the 
main player becoming entrenched and difficult to undermine. In these cases, the 
pressure for interoperability may need to come from the regulator rather than 
the market.
Conclusion and possible policy implications  
for Zimbabwe
The growth of MMTs in Zimbabwe is directly linked to developmental objec-
tives in terms of increasing the access of all individuals in the society to a safe, 
secure and affordable means of transacting. This is consistent with the increased 
emphasis globally on inclusive economic growth which speaks largely to partic-
ipation and the ability of people to play a part in the process of growth as well 
as sharing in its benefits. However, the benefits derived from MMTs to poor cus-
tomers in particular can be eroded over time where MNOs in dominant positions 
can leverage that dominance to make it difficult for rival operators to compete. 
This can take place through various mechanisms, including defensive leveraging, 
which is enhanced where there are market tipping and network effects, where 
the product of the incumbent firm becomes the dominant standard, and when it 
can use its pricing and strategies in both sides of a market to protect its position. 
In this regard, the Zimbabwean market is particularly interesting when con-
sidering the strong position of Econet in the primary market for traditional 
mobile telecommunications services, as well as its strong position in the adja-
cent market for MMTs. The comparisons above of EcoCash with the platforms 
of other providers in the region suggest that as in Kenya, the incumbent firm is 
able to leverage its strong position in the market to charge prices (to unregistered 
users, for instance) that enhance the network benefits of customers switching 
to its platform. Furthermore, through limited interoperability with rival MNO 
platforms, customers face an incentive to join the MMT platform, which they 
perceive to have the largest subscriber base, thus requiring the customer to pur-
chase the sim of that network as well. In contrast, the market in Tanzania has 
tended towards interoperability to the benefit of consumers, as reflected in the 
pricing comparisons.
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This scenario presents some interesting challenges for regulation. In most 
cases, competition law enforcement cannot, on its own, mandate interoperabil-
ity between providers of mobile services generally. Additionally, competition law 
cases tend to be drawn out and litigious, which is a resource-intensive process. 
Instead, there may be a direct role for other regulatory agencies in changing 
the set of rules in the market to encourage greater rivalry, including through 
interoperability. This is through the ability of sector regulators to facilitate and 
stipulate arrangements between players that support smaller operators while also 
encouraging and rewarding investment by large incumbents. One example of 
this is the use of asymmetric call termination rates in the South African telecom-
munications sector (see Paelo, 2015).  
In a 2014 effort to increase competition and facilitate the growth of smaller 
operators in the market, given the strong position of South Africa’s major opera-
tors Vodacom and MTN, the Independent Communications Authority of South 
Africa (Icasa) introduced lower, asymmetric call termination rates. These asym-
metric rates allowed the smaller operators to charge their larger competitors a 
higher price for termination while the small operators pay a lesser fee. Despite 
the mobile operators’ concerns about Icasa’s intervention in setting asymmetric 
call termination rates, the regulation does not appear to have had a damaging 
effect on the market. Instead, consumers have benefited from the lower rates, 
while subscriber numbers and operator profitability have also increased.
In Zimbabwe, recent developments suggest that a regulatory solution is 
being pursued, correctly in our view, to address some of the concerns raised in 
the complaint discussed above. The ZCTC has recently been able to facilitate 
interactions between the RBZ and the sector regulator for telecommunications, 
Potraz, in addressing competition concerns regarding pricing and access in MMT 
services (see The Herald, 2015). The ZCTC identified potential competition con-
cerns as well as issues that could best be resolved by sector regulators. RBZ and 
Potraz have been responsive to this approach and regulatory solutions have been 
arrived at in an expedient manner, suggesting that regulatory coordination is 
important for dealing with restrictions on participation and competition where 
there are likely to also be significant efficiency gains to consumers through the 
strategies and investment of large incumbents. This approach is important in the 
discussion about interoperability, where the authorities need to balance sanc-
tions for abuses of a dominant position in a market against the pro-competitive 
benefits of firm strategies. For instance, regulators need to consider the right of 
firms to benefit from their investments in infrastructure and technology, which 
tend to be substantial in telecommunications markets. If the authority wishes to 
encourage greater interoperability, for instance, then terms need to be reached 
that still reward the innovation and investment of the incumbent firms, such as 
Econet. This may involve some form of compensation being paid by rival oper-
ators to the dominant player. 
Further to this, where there are network effects, consumers do benefit from 
lower fees, for instance, for transacting over the same network as the person 
they are sending money to. This is an important efficiency which accrues to 
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customers that would need to be weighed against the likely medium- and long-
term effects of reduced rivalry in the sector. Other things being equal, regulating 
for a fairer and more competitive environment in the short term is more likely 
to result in sustainable efficiencies, innovation, variety and favourable prices in 
the future.
Notes
1 Mobile wallets are broadly defined as digital or virtual applications that allow mobile 
device users to store money and credit on their phones (see Andes, 2012).
2 Throughout this chapter, we refer to mobile payments, P2P or mobile money transfer 
(MMT) services interchangeably. 
3 The latter takes place through person-to-business payments, business-to-business pay-
ments or government-to-person payments made via mobile phone, although these are 
not the focus of the chapter.
4 See National Payment Systems Directive: NPS 01/2014.
5 Where customers use sim cards from more than one MNO.
6 Potraz cautioned that the estimates are based on the submissions of the operators 
themselves and Potraz currently does not have a mechanism for validating these esti-
mates. See information from Econet’s website stating that the firm holds over 65.3% 
of the mobile telecommunications market (http://ewzinvestor.co.zw/). 
7 See http://www.zimswitch.co.zw/.
8 Econet’s loss of market share in recent years may be related to these effects. 
9 This section is based on information from Kabweza (2014) and Makichi (2014).
10 The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) is a commonly accepted measure of market 
concentration (http://www.investopedia.com/terms/h/hhi.asp).
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10 Evaluating the competitiveness of Zimbabwe’s poultry industry
Introduction
This chapter analyses the competitiveness and performance of the Zimbabwean 
poultry industry in the context of trade liberalisation, given that both poul-
try output and the main inputs (animal feed and breeding stock) are tradeable. 
Poultry is an important product in Zimbabwe as the main source of protein 
for consumers. It also has strong links to agriculture through the production of 
animal feed. The Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO, 2010) notes the rapid 
growth of the poultry sector globally over the last decade. Despite the rise in 
chicken demand over the years as a cheap source of protein, the poultry industry 
in  Zimbabwe still faces a number of challenges, which the government claims 
include stiff competition from cheap imports, rising input costs of maize and 
soya meal and illegal imports being sold at subeconomic prices (Government of 
Zimbabwe, 2012). This chapter evaluates these factors and the impact of chang-
ing trade protection.
Performance of the poultry industry has been affected by trade liberalisa-
tion, which started in 1991 following the adoption of the Economic Structural 
Adjustment Programme (ESAP), in line with most developing countries, as part 
of the Washington Consensus policies (Tekere, 2001). However, Zimbabwe 
maintained a trade surplus in poultry until a deficit started in 2008, due to 
increasing chicken imports over the previous decade, which reached a peak 
of US$29 million in 2009. Understanding the reasons for this performance 
requires evaluating the factors affecting both inputs and outputs, of which 
protection is one. The concept of effective rate of protection (ERP) is used to 
assess the impact of changing tariffs. Non-tariff barriers and agricultural pol-
icies are also considered, such as the ban on imports of genetically modified 
(GM) maize, and the ban on poultry imports from South Africa from March 
2010 until December 2011 due to an outbreak of Rift Valley fever (RVF). The 
impact of growth in regional sources of maize (from Zambia) is also taken into 
account, given the lower transport costs from Zambia. In the 2013 budget 
statement, the government intervened to protect the poultry industry once 
again and increased tariffs on chicken to the current rate of 40% or $1.50/kg 
(Government of Zimbabwe, 2012).
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According to the available trade data from 2000–2014, the Zimbabwean poul-
try industry did not face significant competition from imports prior to 2008. 
Despite formally adopting trade liberalisation in 1991, Zimbabwe continued to 
protect its poultry industry. Tariffs were suspended in 2009 due to the macroeco-
nomic crisis and to boost access to food given the collapse in local production. 
Local production in 2008 fell more than 50% from the previous year. Tariffs 
were then reinstated in 2012. There are also restrictions to protect the industry, 
such as import licences and sanitary and phytosanitary measures. The competi-
tiveness of the poultry industry is closely related to the prices and availability of 
animal feeds, principally maize and soya, and day-old chicks.
Since 2008, the poultry industry has been suffering from stiff competition 
from chicken imports, which have become a threat to its survival under trade 
liberalisation. The poor performance under the reduced ERP is obviously due to 
lack of competitiveness in the face of foreign suppliers. However, it is important 
to assess the possible underlying causes. Poor competitiveness is partly due to 
high feed costs, as this is the single largest input, followed by day-old chicks. 
There are several reasons for high feed costs, including weak agricultural produc-
tion, resulting in reliance on imports; the costs of sourcing imports; and the ban 
on GM maize being grown locally. For instance, in 2014 a tonne of maize cost 
US$364 in Zimbabwe but sold for US$196 in South Africa. Other reasons include 
low competition at the levels of suppliers of feed and day-old chicks, and in 
poultry production itself. In light of this background, the present chapter seeks 
to answer the following question: What is the effect of trade liberalisation on the 
poultry industry, in the context of a concentrated market structure and factors 
affecting the price of animal feed, including bans on GM maize?
In the remainder of the chapter, I review theories of trade performance, in 
particular the Heckscher-Ohlin and value chain theories, before giving a detailed 
background to the poultry industry in Zimbabwe. I then estimate the ERP, anal-
yse the degree of concentration in the sector, review the industry cost structure 
and analyse the ban on GM maize. 
Theoretical framework
This section first briefly considers the orthodox trade framework based on the 
Heckscher-Ohlin factor endowments. The implications for the study of the 
competitiveness of the poultry industry are then considered, given its vertical 
integration with linked investments required at different levels, and the rela-
tively concentrated nature of the industry. The value chain framework is then 
reviewed, as it provides a basis for assessing the interrelationship of factors at dif-
ferent levels of processing, along with questions of coordination and governance 
of the overall value chain and the competitiveness of the end product.
Heckscher-Ohlin theory
The Heckscher-Ohlin theory of comparative advantage, based on factor endow-
ments, is at the core of neoclassical trade theory. This theory is a refinement of 
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David Ricardo’s comparative advantage theory (Todaro and Smith, 2007) and 
explains patterns of trade between countries in terms of their relative endow-
ments of the two factors of production – labour and capital (Sodersten and Reed, 
1994). Following this theory, countries that are rich in capital will produce and 
export capital-intensive goods, while those richly endowed with labour will con-
centrate on producing labour-intensive goods. There are substantial gains from 
global trade as trade allows specialisation in products that are intensive in the 
country’s abundant factor.
However, the theory is based on a number of assumptions, key ones being 
that there are two factors of production, no transport costs, perfect competition 
and a homogeneous production function. In this theory, production functions 
are such that the two commodities produced show different factor intensities, 
and production functions are different between commodities but the same for 
both countries (Sodersten and Reed, 1994). While these assumptions enable the 
theory to work, they are subject to criticism due to the limitations they impose 
and the lack of realism around assumptions like the existence of perfect compe-
tition and of the same production functions in both countries.
According to Todaro and Smith (2007), this theory enables analytical descrip-
tion of the impact of economic growth and trade on trade patterns and on the struc-
ture of national economies. Two main conclusions arise from this theory. First, the 
theory promotes free trade with all countries, as a result of which individual coun-
tries gain and world output increases. Second, under free trade, price ratios tend to 
equalise factor prices across trading countries. Put another way, the theory suggests 
that prices of factors of production will be the same as countries engage in free trade. 
Under this theory, any trade protection reduces welfare as it introduces a distortion – 
meaning that consumers pay more for imports, which affects the exchange rate and 
reduces trade (and the benefits from exchange and specialisation).
Review of literature on effective rate of protection
The ERP measures the protection provided to domestic value added relative to 
value added in international (or ‘border’) prices (Greenaway and Milner, 1993). 
Its calculation depends not only on the tariff on the final product but also on the 
input tariff and input coefficient (Corden, 1966). It is widely used as a measure 
of understanding how nominal tariff rates affect a country’s pattern of produc-
tion (Holden and Holden, 1975). Various studies (Edwards, 2006; Flatters, 2005; 
Holden, 2001; Holden and Holden, 1975) analysing tariffs show that the ERP 
is a useful tool for assessing the magnitude of protection. They conclude that 
effective rates of protection are useful when the structure of tariffs is undergoing 
change. The measure also shows how the industry’s output has been protected 
against its inputs into the production process.
The ERP is a function of three variables: the nominal rate of protection on 
the final good, the nominal tariff on imported inputs and the share of imported 
inputs in the final value of the product (Greenaway and Milner, 1983). It can 
be concluded that, first, if the nominal tariff on final goods is raised, assuming 
that all other things remain constant, then that raises the ERP. Secondly, ceteris 
paribus, an increase in the nominal tariff of an imported input will reduce the 
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value added and therefore the ERP. Last, again holding all other things con-
stant, a higher share or an increase in the share of imported inputs will raise the 
ERP. Greenaway and Milner (1983) also highlight the possibility of a negative 
ERP. This situation arises when the tariff-distorted value added is less than value 
added under free trade, a case in which producers will be penalised by tariff 
intervention by governments. They argue that this situation generally happens 
in developing countries and arises mainly on exportable goods, which are nor-
mally not protected but that rely on imported inputs, which attract duty mainly 
for revenue purposes. The combined effect of zero duty on final goods and duties 
on inputs results in a negative ERP.
The concept of ERP is better than nominal rate of protection as it allows 
analysis of the net protection conferred to a production process rather than to an 
industry’s output (Greenaway and Milner, 1993), and directs attention to the full 
range of interventions affecting a given production process. These interventions 
also include the prices of non-tradeable inputs like electricity cost, subsidies that 
can be offered to the industry by governments and exchange rates in the calcu-
lation of ERP to give a more realistic picture of the overall protection accorded 
to the industry. Of note is that high effective rates of protection tilt resource 
allocation in favour of that sector against other sectors. The ERP analysis can be 
a useful input into the process of policy appraisal in both evaluating past policies 
and assessing the possible impact of policy changes.
The treatment of non-tradeable inputs in calculating the ERP has been anal-
ysed in the literature, with two main authors coming up with different proposals. 
Balassa (1965) argues that the best way to treat non-tradeable inputs is to assume 
that their price is insensitive to protection. This implies treating non-tradeable 
inputs as if they are traded inputs, but applying zero tariffs (alternatively, with the 
imputed effect of other distortions estimated). Corden (1966) proposes that the 
value added in non-tradeable inputs can be aggregated with all other value added. 
There has not been a generally agreed way of dealing with non-tradeable inputs 
in calculating the ERP. As such, different authors use either of these two methods.
In a world where transport costs are significant, where there are vertically 
related levels of production with investment decisions at each level and where 
there is imperfect competition, the Heckscher-Ohlin theory is at best too sim-
plified to explore the factors affecting industry performance and the impact of 
different shocks and distortions.
Value chain theory
The value chain is defined as the full range of activities that firms and work-
ers perform to bring a product from its conception to final use (Gereffi and 
Fernandez-Stark, 2011). It therefore involves understanding all the different 
stages of manufacturing, including intermediary phases which a product goes 
through until it becomes a final product ready for consumption.
The value chain approach to analysis allows one to understand how an indus-
try is organised by examining the structure and dynamics of different actors 
involved in that industry (Gereffi and Fernandez-Stark, 2011). Its methodology 
is mainly based on investigating in an industrial context the connections and 
c10.indd   237 20-06-2017   09:54:40
238 Part Three: Competition and regulation in reshaping African markets
linkages within the industry. Theoretically, it raises questions of governance and 
power, which are significant to the operation of an industry or a sector. Three 
basic components of value chains are important in recognising the concept of a 
value chain as an analytical tool: value chains are repositories for rent, effectively 
functioning value chains involve some degree of governance and effective value 
chains arise from systematic as opposed to point efficiency (Kaplinsky, 1998).
In terms of governance, the value chain framework of analysis argues that 
there are key actors in the chain. Gereffi, Humphrey, Kaplinsky and Sturgeon 
(2001) define governance as the non-market coordination of economic activity 
within the chain through the influence of lead firms along the production chain. 
For instance, through governance structures, firms can take decisions that may 
directly or indirectly influence the whole production process. Gereffi et al. (2001) 
identify four main features of governance in the value chain analytical frame-
work. First is the idea that within value chains coordination can take different 
forms, which can be explained as inter-firm networks. In this case, relationships 
exist among different firms along the chain. There can also be quasi-hierarchical 
relationships between powerful lead firms and independent but subordinate 
firms in the chain; this might be a situation where lead firms control an import-
ant raw material or intermediate product. Governance can also take the form 
of vertical integration within firms. Some firms can decide to invest along the 
chain and have enterprises that support one another.
The second feature of governance largely shows how the lead firms assume 
control in the chain. Basically, how lead firms derive their power within the 
value chain stems from two traits: market power, which is measured in terms 
of market share, and the degree of concentration. The other crucial aspect is 
the positioning of such firms in the value chain, which enables them to create 
and appropriate high returns. Kaplinsky (1998) argues that these two sources of 
power stem from the barriers to entry that are in force in that particular chain.
The third characteristic of governance arises due to the need for coordination 
within the chain. First is the coordination that arises as more companies are 
involved in specifying the products that their suppliers have to make. The more 
involvement, the more they are likely to create governance structures to coor-
dinate supplier activities (Gereffi et al., 2001). The other component concerns 
how these companies are exposed to risks as a result of supplier failures. The 
more that firms are exposed to supplier failure, the more they will intervene to 
coordinate and monitor the supply chain. 
Last, governance involves the ability of one firm to influence the activities of 
other firms in the chain. This position is attained through lead firms defining the 
products to be produced by suppliers and specifying processes and standards used 
in the production process. Gereffi et al. (2001) further argue that chains also vary 
with respect to how strongly governance is exercised, that is, how governance is 
concentrated in the hands of one firm and the number of lead firms that exercise 
governance over other chain members. This brings in another aspect of importance 
in the governance of a value chain – power asymmetry. The form of governance in 
the chain changes as an industry evolves and matures and governance patterns also 
vary from one stage to another within the same chain (Dolan and Humphrey, 2004).
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In terms of barriers to entry and rent in the value chain, Kaplinsky (2000) 
argues that economic rent emanates from a situation of differential productivity 
of factors and barriers to entry, which basically reflects scarcity. Economic rent 
is mostly dynamic and can be eroded by the forces of competition. In the case 
of producer rent, it is transferred into consumer surplus through the process of 
competition. Competition allows for innovation and new ways of organising 
production. As competition increases within the chain, it may lead to improved 
efficiency and a reduction in barriers to entry and economic rent. 
The final analytical element of the value chain framework is the systemic effi-
ciency that is inherent in analysing a sector as one chooses such an approach. It 
moves the focus of attention from a point to the whole system, enabling under-
standing of the different stages that a product has to pass through and the weak-
nesses associated with each stage. This affords analysts and policy makers an 
opportunity to reflect on possible policy interventions and to identify the par-
ticular stage to target. Such an approach results in appropriate decisions being 
made, ensuring the long-run success of the whole sector.
Background to Zimbabwe’s poultry industry
Zimbabwean poultry industry production relies on both indigenous and 
imported poultry strains for breeding stock (Faranisi, 1995). As in many devel-
oping countries, chicken production in Zimbabwe comprises both large- and 
small-scale producers (Mapiye et al., 2008). Commercial breeding of poultry is 
based on imported strains, while the indigenous strains are for small-scale pro-
ducers, largely in rural areas. Large-scale production is characterised by intensive 
management, mechanisation and specialisation and dominated by large compa-
nies, while small-scale production includes semi-intensive and extensive farm-
ing. This section starts by mapping the poultry industry through a value chain 
analysis before looking at the trade balance of the industry by analysing industry 
exports and imports. Industry production levels are then analysed, as well as the 
prices of chicken.
Market structure
The structure of the Zimbabwean poultry industry has evolved substantially over 
the years, especially after the country’s economic recession. The harsh macroeco-
nomic environment between 1999 and 2008 saw traditional chicken-producing 
firms (Irvine’s1 and Suncrest) nearly collapsing and led to increased vertical inte-
gration within the value chain as a means of survival. At the same time, how-
ever, new companies entered the sector: Drummonds in 2004, Lunar Chickens 
in 2007, and Surey Huku, among many other small-scale players.
Broiler production in Zimbabwe is broadly undertaken in four categories: 
large-scale, fully integrated operations; large-scale, semi-integrated; medium 
and small-scale (Sukume, 2011). There are two main large-scale producers of 
chicken – Irvine’s and Ostrindo – since the closing down of Suncrest and Lunar 
Chickens in 2013 and 2015, respectively. Irvine’s and Ostrindo are based in 
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Harare and Bulawayo, respectively. These companies have scale economies asso-
ciated with their size. The companies are also highly integrated in the poultry 
value chain. This gives them advantages over medium- and small-scale produc-
ers, and ensures the availability of feed and day-old chicks, most likely at lower 
prices. Irvine’s imports breeding stock from Britain and Ostrindo gets its parent 
stock from Irvine’s and Hubbard, since they are the only importers of breeding 
stock in Zimbabwe. The large-scale, semi-integrated class includes Drummonds 
Chicken, Soloza Chicken and Hukuru, among others. These companies are 
semi-integrated in the value chain, do not own breeding operations and some-
times operate small feed mills and slaughter facilities (Sukume, 2011).
The medium-scale producer class produces a cycle2 of 2 000+ broilers. They 
are operated by individuals, some of whom are contracted by the large-scale 
producers. They source their inputs from the open market, including the large-
scale producers for day-old chicks. Small-scale producers produce between 50 
and 1 500 broilers and also source their raw materials from the open market. 
Small-scale producers have become increasingly important and are estimated to 
contribute two-thirds of total production (Ncube, Roberts and Zengeni, 2016). 
Poultry value chain
A value chain approach assesses the linkages that exist in an industry. A value 
chain simply describes the full range of activities required to bring a product 
or service through the different phases of production, including physical trans-
formation and inputs from various producer services (Kaplinsky and Morris, 
2002). Stockfeed manufacturers lie at the heart of poultry production. Poultry 
feed is a key raw material in production and feed stock is produced in relation to 
the different stages that chickens pass through, from day old to six weeks. The 
subsector produces three main types of feed: starter, finisher mash and broiler 
concentrate. The raw material for stockfeed manufacturing is mainly maize and 
soya (the composition of these in the feed is discussed later). Nationally, stock-
feed manufacturers’ interests are represented by the Stock Feed Manufacturers’ 
Association and the poultry industry’s interests are represented by the Zimbabwe 
Poultry Association.
Second in the value chain are the grandparent – the pure lines of day-old 
chicks – importers (Faranisi, 1995). There are two grandparent importers in 
Zimbabwe, Irvine’s and Hubbard. Hubbard, which is part of the Crest Poultry group, 
imports the Hubbard breed from France. Irvine’s imports the Cobb 500 breed from 
the UK. Grandparents are used to produce parent stock. The parent stock is used to 
hatch eggs that produce day-old chicks, which are then sold to poultry breeders. 
Irvine’s and Hubbard are still the main producers at this stage but there are also 
some small hatcheries, such as Super Chicks and Hukuru, that import fertilised 
eggs to produce their own day-old chicks. Currently, Zimbabwe has nine3 registered 
hatcheries which produce day-old chicks that are distributed evenly around the 
country. Some of the hatcheries import parent stock from South Africa.  
Contract farming arrangements exist in which day-old chick producers pro-
vide small producers with chicks, feed and chemicals. The small producers rear 
the chickens and sell them back to the producers in return for a financial benefit. 
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After rearing, the chickens are taken to abattoirs where they are slaughtered and 
dressed (processed) in preparation for selling to wholesalers, supermarkets and 
fast-food outlets. All the day-old producers mentioned have abattoirs for slaugh-
tering chickens. Figure 10.1 maps the poultry industry value chain.  
Contract growers
Primary breeders
Licences from multinationals: great-
grandparent & grandparent
Broiler growers
Fast foodRetail/wholesale: fresh, frozen
Animal feed pre-mixers
Feed mills




Figure 10.1 Poultry industry value chain
Source: Bagopi et al. (2013)
Of note is that grandparents are imported from Europe. As a major raw material, 
it is important to analyse the tariffs being levelled for all imports (discussed 
later). I turn now to the trade balance of the poultry sector. 
Trade flows
As noted, Zimbabwe has opened its economy to international trade. It is there-
fore important to analyse the trade performance of the sector. Zimbabwe is 
engaged in both bilateral and multilateral trade agreements with its trading part-
ners. Zimbabwe is a member of the Common Market for Eastern and Southern 
Africa (Comesa) and the Southern African Development Community (SADC) 
free trade areas. In addition, it is currently negotiating under the tripartite trade 
agreement between the SADC, Comesa and the East African Community to 
form a free trade area. The effect of these trade agreements has been to reduce 
trade barriers, especially tariffs, which impacts on trade flows. Figure 10.2 shows 
chicken4 imports for the sector.
As figure 10.2 indicates, between 2000 and 2007 the sector faced hardly 
any competition from imports. However, there was a sharp increase in imports 
in 2008. This was due to hyperinflation in Zimbabwe, which affected local 
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production, as well as the launch of the SADC free trade area. Government inter-
vened in 2009 as a result of food shortages and waived duties on all basic goods 
as a measure to combat the shortages facing the country. There was thus an eco-
nomic shock in terms of the macroeconomy and falling agricultural production, 
and then a reduction in protection as the government temporarily removed all 
duties. In March 2010, the government imposed a ban on chicken imports from 
South Africa after an outbreak of RVF. This saw overall imports reduce somewhat. 
It also resulted in increased production from local players as they sought to meet 
the demand which had been covered by imports. In 2012, the government 
reinstated the duties on all South African chicken imports, which continued 
to decline. In 2012 they stood at US$1.4 million, and government intervened 
further by increasing customs tariffs for all chicken imported from outside the 
SADC region from 40% to $1.50/kg or 40%, whichever was higher (Government 
of Zimbabwe, 2012). Imports started growing again between 2012 and 2014. A 
large component of these imports was frozen cuts and chicken offal, under tariff 
line 0207.4000. 
Chicken production
This section looks at the industry’s performance in relation to production levels. 
Figure 10.3 shows dressed broiler production from 2007 to 2015. Chicken pro-
duction plummeted to a record low of 4 296 metric tonnes in 2008. This was the 
period of hyperinflation and the general macroeconomic environment was not 
conducive to business due to the political crisis. Imports also increased during 
this period.
From 2009 there was a steady increase in production until 2014. During 
that time, and especially beginning in 2010, there was strong lobbying by the 
Zimbabwe Poultry Association for government to provide protection to the local 
industry. In March 2010 a ban was imposed on all chicken from South Africa. 
Local production increased during that period (2010–2011) to fill the import gap 















































Figure 10.2 Trade balance: Imports and exports, 2000–2014
Sources: Zimstats (2013a) trade data from 2000–2012; 
Trade Map data from 2013/2014
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Chicken prices
The chicken market in Zimbabwe, as with all other products, operated under an 
open market from 2009 to 2011 due to the suspension of duties as a result of 
shortages. During that period chicken prices were set by imports owing to import 
penetration. However, since duties were reinstated in 2012 and further increases 
were implemented in 2013, prices have been largely determined by local supply. 
Changes in the prices give insight into how price-competitive the sector was in 
the years in which it experienced high import volumes. This was especially the 
case in 2008, when local production nearly collapsed. Prices increased in 2012, 
consistent with higher levels of protection and a sharp decline in imports.  
As figure 10.4 shows, prices generally increased marginally after the intro-
duction of the multicurrency in 2009. They fell slightly from US$5.13 in 2009 
to US$4.94 in 2010, but monthly price data show that prices in 2010 started 
increasing from March. This was a result of the ban on imports from South Africa 
after the RVF outbreak in 2010. South Africa had accounted for a large share of 
Figure 10.3 Chicken production, 2007–2015
Sources: ZPA (2012, 2015); LMAC (2014) 
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Figure 10.4 Chicken prices per 2 kg, US$, 2009–2015
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the cheap imports before this ban, reflected in higher average prices in 2011. 
Prices reduced from US$6.54 in 2013 to US$6.17 in 2014. 
In summary, the industry is highly organised, with the Zimbabwe Poultry 
Association at the apex representing the entire subsector at the national level. 
The industry has been subject to a number of shocks, some of which relate to 
macroeconomic conditions. Others relate to trade policy, including the removal 
of protection in 2009 to meet consumer needs, the ban on South African imports 
in 2010 and the increase in tariff protection in 2012. Since the inception of the 
ban on South African imports, there was a switch to new sources of imports from 
Argentina, Brazil and the US, showing the sector’s lack of competitiveness. 
Assessing the competitiveness of the  
poultry industry
Analysing the competitiveness of the sector involves measuring the ERP, the 
levels of competition in the value chain, specifically in the breeding sector, the 
impact of low agricultural production and the need to import maize. I look at 
the cost structure of the sector, giving a detailed analysis of industry cost along 
the value chain. Thereafter I analyse the ERP accorded the sector. This includes 
considering the impact of different tariffs on imports from various countries, 
and assessing the impact of factors affecting the cost of animal feed in addition 
to tariff protection. I conclude the section by analysing the levels of competition 
in the sector, specifically in the breeding subsector, and compare prices of day-
old chicks with comparable countries in the region.
Industry cost structure
The cost build-up of the poultry industry is an important factor to consider in 
assessing the competitiveness of the industry. I analyse the cost structure of the 
whole industry along its value chain in order to evaluate the level that contrib-
utes the biggest share of the cost. This enables deeper enquiry into the factors 
affecting these costs.
Table 10.1 shows the cost structure of producing a dressed two kilograms of 
chicken. The cost build-up was obtained from the Zimbabwe Poultry Association 
and compiled as an average for the industry for 2012.
The producer price for a dressed two kilograms of chicken was US$4.80 in 
2012, while the total production cost was $3.68. Feed is the largest cost in pro-
ducing chickens, constituting 64.4% of the total. The second major cost (20.4%) 
is for day-old chicks. These two costs contribute 84.8% of the total. Wages con-
tribute 2.8% while charcoal adds 6.8% to the total cost of producing the whole 
bird. (Charcoal is used as a substitute for electricity in fowl runs to warm the 
birds since the country is experiencing power shortages.) Note that capital costs 
are included in the producer margin, but transport costs are not measured as 
these are prices at the factory gate, not delivered to retail outlets.
Given that stockfeed constitutes 64.4% of the total cost of producing a 
chicken, it is imperative to understand what determines the costs of the main 
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Table 10.1 Cost structure per 2 kg dressed bird, US$, 2012
Basis of escalation Cost per bird







Chick price 0.75 0.75 20.4
Stockfeed
800 g starter crumbs 0.57 0.57
1 100 g grower pellets 0.76 0.76
1 500 g finisher pellets 1.04 1.04 64.4
Veterinary costs
D78 two doses/bird @ $8.60/1 000 doses 0.02
Clone 30 one dose/bird @ $4.40/1 000 doses 0.00
Stress pack 100 g per 200 litres for first 
five days
In five days 1 000 birds consume 250 ml water 0.00
Medication allowances 35% of vaccine cost 0.01 0.03 0.8
Litter
Seven bales per 500 birds 0.01 0.01 0.3
Gas – BOC/BP prices or charcoal
100 g × price per kg gas BOC/BP 0.00 0.00 0.0
625 g × price per kg charcoal 0.25 0.25 6.8
Subtotal 3.41
Other costs – statutory
Wages and salaries/electricity/other 0.10 2.8
Fuel 0.07 1.9
Processing costs per bird
Packaging – Bag $0.32/Polyprop bag $0.00/12
birds per bag
0.00 0.0
Rentals per bird housed 0.10 2.6
Total costs 3.68 100
Producer price per bird 4.80
Producer margin (% above cost) 30 30
Source: ZPA (2013)
components of feed. Maize is by far the largest single cost, estimated to account 
on average for 70% of the cost (Dhliwayo, 2011). The determinants of the maize 
price are thus very important. In this regard, the effect of low agricultural pro-
duction, meaning that maize prices are at import levels, needs to be considered. 
The reasons for the need to import maize go to the debates about the effect 
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of land reform and the continued ban on GM maize and soya in producing 
stockfeed.
Assessment of maize prices
Since 2002, low maize production in many years has resulted in substantial 
imports of maize (Zengeni, 2014). The trade deficit has meant that the price of 
imports has effectively set the local Zimbabwean maize price. Maize is also the 
staple food of Zimbabwe and as such is one of the most important food crops. 
There are various reasons for poor maize production, including agricultural pol-
icy and land reform. The issues around GM maize are part of the explanation to 
the extent that utilising GM maize would have meant higher production. Still, it 
seems doubtful that GM production would have eliminated the trade deficit. In 
any event, we can treat the trade deficit in maize as resulting from distortions, 
whether the ban on GM production or the impact of land reform on output 
levels. Zimbabwe has historically been self-sufficient in maize (as in 2000) and 
should be again when production fully recovers. 
Zimbabwe’s reliance on maize imports since 2002 to cover the deficit in sup-
ply is potentially hugely significant for the poultry industry, given the impor-
tance of maize as an input. The cost of the local maize deficit imposed on local 
poultry producers depends on the costs of imported maize compared to an inter-
national price (or the price being paid in the source country of poultry imports). 
The cost of imports depends on where the maize is sourced from, and the rel-
evant prices and transport costs. Trade data reveal a switchover from 2009 to 
2012 in the main source of maize imports, from South Africa to Zambia, with 
the big change happening in 2011 (table 10.2). While 74% of maize imports in 
2010 came from South Africa, 77% came from Zambia in 2011 and 99% in 2012.
Table 10.2 Maize imports in tonnes by country, 2009–2012
2009 2010 2011 2012
South Africa (t) 430 990 178 478 24 179 8 732
Zambia (t) 1 621 42 471 373 620 1 217 532
Malawi (t) 643 6 410 82 563 85
Other (t) 1 314 14 520 3 848 586
Source: Zimstats (2013a)
From 2008 to 2010 the Zimbabwe maize price was set by the maize import prices 
from South Africa. As indicated in figure 10.5, this meant costs at South African 
prices plus a substantial amount added, presumably reflecting transport and 
related costs. From 2008 to 2015, Zimbabwe maize prices were between US$90 
and US$168 higher than the prices in South Africa, more than 40% higher in rel-
ative terms. In 2011 and 2012, however, much smaller price differences (just $12 
in 2012) with South Africa were recorded, consistent with the switch in sourcing 
imports from Zambia. Table 10.3 shows the price differences. 
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Table 10.3 Maize prices in US$ per tonne, Zimbabwe and South Africa, 
2008–2015 
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
South Africa 
(US$/t)
232 187 172 264 283 234 196 202
Zimbabwe (US$/t) 362 344 262 304 295 349 364 295
Price difference
(US$/t)
130 157  90  40  12 115 168  93
Sources: SAGIS (www.sagis.org.za/); FAOSTAT (www.faostat.org) 
Figure 10.5 Comparison of maize prices, US$ per tonne, 2009–2015
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From 2011 to 2015 there was a relatively consistent mark-up over Zambian prices 
recorded. This is significant, as the poultry import competition was not coming 
from Zambia but from South Africa or from deep-sea sources (likely imported 
through South Africa).
The impact of sourcing from Zambia in 2011 and 2012 was substantial com-
pared to what the prices would have been if the same mark-up on South African 
prices had been sustained. Prices in Zambia were lower than in South Africa in 
those years and transport costs appear lower, as the Zimbabwe prices were only 
around $53 higher than those in Zambia. This meant that in 2012, Zimbabwe 
maize prices were almost the same as those in South Africa. There was hence no 
disadvantage from this input for poultry producers in Zimbabwe compared to 
those in South Africa by 2012. In 2013, however, Zambian prices rose once again 
compared to South African prices but were lower in 2015. 
Despite Zambia sharing the same policy with Zimbabwe on banning the pro-
duction of GM maize, it is clear from figure 10.5 that its prices have been lower 
than Zimbabwe’s, reflecting Zambia’s increasing production and net exports to 
Zimbabwe (Haggblade, Jayne, Tschirley and Longabaugh, 2008). South Africa, 
which allows the production of GM maize and which is also the main source of 
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chicken imports into Zimbabwe, has lower maize prices than Zimbabwe for all 
the years, giving a competitive advantage to the South African chicken producers. 
Studies done on GM maize yield per hectare show that net returns are higher 
than on conventional maize (Mutuc, Rejesus, Pan and Yorobe, 2012; Yorobe and 
Quicoy, 2006). This is mainly due to lower use of labour and chemicals, which 
increase the cost of producing maize. This has resulted in the prices of GM maize 
being generally lower than for conventional maize. In the case of Zimbabwe, a 
government policy prohibits the importation of GM maize and the inability to 
produce enough maize has led to reliance on importing maize from neighbour-
ing countries, mainly Zambia. 
Effect of higher maize prices
The higher maize price in Zimbabwe than in South Africa has a substantial effect 
on the competitiveness of Zimbabwean poultry producers. I consider this effect 
by examining the yearly percentage mark-up of Zimbabwean maize prices com-
pared to South African maize prices as if it was a nominal tariff – the increase 
over international, or border, prices (table 10.4).
Table 10.4 Maize prices in South Africa and Zimbabwe, 2009–2015
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
South Africa
(US$/t) 187 172 264 283 234 196 202
Zimbabwe
(US$/t) 344 262 304 295 349 364 295
Price difference
(US$/t) 157  90  40  12 115 168  93
Mark-up (%)  84  52  15  4  49  86  46
Source: Author calculation based on SAGIS and FAOSTAT price data
Table 10.4 shows that from 2009 to 2015 maize prices in Zimbabwe were higher 
than in South Africa. The average mark-up of Zimbabwean prices over South 
African maize prices was 38%. However, the gap declined sharply in 2011 and 
2012 due to the imports from Zambia. In 2014 the margin was high due to the 
bumper harvest in South Africa, which led to prices falling.
Assessment of day-old chick prices
Day-old chicks are the second largest cost in producing poultry. These are pro-
duced locally through the breeding operations of vertically integrated poultry 
producers, as well as other firms that import fertilised eggs. These breeders sell 
the day-old chicks to independent broiler producers of different sizes, and also 
use the day-old chicks in their own broiler production.
The breeding subsector of the poultry industry is highly concentrated, with 
the two main companies, Hubbard and Irvine’s, controlling 70% of the market 
(table 10.5). Hubbard and Irvine’s import grandparents from France and the UK, 
respectively. This gives them a firm position in the value chain as they are the 
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main producers of the primary raw material of the whole industry. However, 
the subsector has witnessed the entry of new companies such as Hamara and 
Hukuru, as well as Lunar Chickens in 2007 (which has since closed, in 2015). 
Hukuru imported fertilised eggs from South Africa for its breeding operations. 
The subsector is a highly concentrated market with both the CR4 and the 
HHI higher than 75% and 1 800 respectively when estimated using actual sales 
in 2013. Despite the entry of new players, Irvine’s remains the biggest player, 
with a market share of 58% in 2013. The impact of high concentration is assessed 
below by comparing prices in regional markets. 
Regional comparison of day-old chick costs
This section analyses the impact of a highly concentrated breeding subsector on 
the competitiveness of the whole industry. Using 2012 and 2015 industry data, 
I compare the prices of producing day-old chicks in Zimbabwe against other 
countries in the region – Botswana, South Africa and Zambia – to estimate the 
cost difference (figure 10.6).
Figure 10.6 Regional day-old chick prices in four African countries, 2012 and 2015



















Of the countries analysed, in 2015 Zimbabwe had the highest day-old chick 
prices and Botswana the second highest. However, important to the analysis is 
the cost of a day-old chick in South Africa, since it is the main source of chicken 
import competition into Zimbabwe. The price of day-old chicks in Zimbabwe, 
as a cost to broiler producers, was double that in South Africa in 2012. This 
improved marginally in 2015. Since day-old chicks constitute 20.4% of the total 
cost of producing a chicken in Zimbabwe, this finding partly explains why South 
African chickens are competitive in Zimbabwe.
There are various reasons for this, of which competition is an important one. 
South Africa has more producers in this stage of the value chain and the low 
prices might be a result of rivalry among competitors (Grimbeek and Lekezwa, 
2013). There may also be cost differences, although South Africa, like Zimbabwe, 
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has to import the genetic breeding stock as grandparents or great-grandparents 
from multinational companies (Bagopi et al., 2013).
In the next section, I consider the higher day-old chick price as resulting 
from imperfect competition by including an imputed nominal tariff (103%) on 
day-old chicks equal to the difference between Zimbabwean and South African 
prices for 2012. 
Trade tariffs and the poultry sector
Zimbabwe regulated foreign trade prior to the 1991 adoption of economic 
structural adjustment programmes spearheaded by the Bretton Woods insti-
tutions (Tekere, 2001). Import substitution was pursued during the Unilateral 
Declaration of Independence period (1965–1980), during which time domestic 
industry was protected using high tariffs, quantitative restrictions and embar-
goes (Rattsø and Torvik, 1998). Zimbabwe’s adoption of ESAP led to trade liber-
alisation in the multilateral context of the World Trade Organisation and in the 
regional framework under SADC and Comesa, as well as to the signing of bilat-
eral trade agreements with its trading partners (Tekere, 2001). Both SADC and 
Comesa have attained free trade status. These developments have influenced the 
poultry sector, as both inputs and outputs are affected by import competition. 
Below, I present tariff levels on all imported raw materials used by the poultry 
sector. I then assess the nominal tariffs applying to feed components and to out-
puts (poultry) to gauge which ones are applicable.
Raw materials
Raw materials used by the poultry industry fall into two categories, those directly 
linked to the sector and those indirectly linked. Table 10.6 lists raw materials 
directly used by poultry breeders: breeding stock, feed and vaccines. The rates 
indicated have remained the same since 2009 and have not been affected by the 
government’s tariff changes.
Stockfeed attracts the highest rate of duty (40%) under the MFN (most 
favoured nation) rate. The higher duty is due to the need to protect local pro-
ducers, although impacting negatively on the poultry industry. Under the 
SADC trade agreements, it still attracts a 15% rate of duty, also to protect local 
producers. Grandparents, however, attract a 5% rate of duty despite not being 
available locally. This may be due to the government’s need to raise revenue 
through customs collections. The bilateral trade agreement between Zimbabwe 
and South Africa and the Comesa trade agreement allow all these raw materials 
to be imported duty-free.
Maize and soya cake, the two key raw materials, attract duties of 0 and 10% 
respectively under MFN. The duty on soya is to protect local farmers. Maize 
is imported duty-free since it is also the staple food, hence the need for it to 
be cheaply available when farmers fail to meet demand. Zimbabwe has been 
importing grain in the past years to supplement domestic supply, which has not 
been able to meet local demand.
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Table 10.6 Tariffs on poultry raw materials

















5 0 0 0 0
23099010 Poultry feed 40 0 0 15 15
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veterinary medicines
0 0 0 0 0
1005.9000 Maize 0 0 0 0 0
2304.0000 Soya meal 10 0 0 0 0
2301.1000 Poultry meal 0 0 0 0 0
Source: Zimra (2013)
Note: MFN = most favoured nation
Tariff rates applicable to chicken imports
Tariffs applicable to chicken imports fall under five different trade regimes which 
Zimbabwe is party to. The duties for all five categories remained unchanged from 
2000 to 2008. In 2009, government suspended duties on chicken imports, a 
measure taken to boost food security after the hyperinflation the country expe-
rienced in 2008 (Mudzonga, 2009). The suspension was lifted in 2011 and duties 
were reinstated at 40% (table 10.7). 
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Under the World Trade Organisation, MFN rates are still very high on all tar-
iff lines, at 40% or $1.50/kg, whichever is higher. However, the bilateral trade 
agreement between Zimbabwe and South Africa means that the sector is fully 
liberalised as chickens are imported duty-free. It must be remembered, though, 
that Zimbabwe banned South African poultry imports from March 2010 until 
December 2011. 
Complicating matters further is that duties were suspended on all poultry 
imports in 2009 and 2010 due to the economic crisis and the need to make 
food available to the population. This means that while South African poultry 
imports were banned in 2010, imports from other sources came in duty-free 
(i.e., the MFN tariff did not apply due to the duty suspension). In 2011, the ban 
on South African imports was still in place but the suspension had been lifted, 
meaning that the 40% MFN duty applied. In 2012, there were once again duty-
free imports from South Africa.
Under the SADC free trade agreement, applicable Zimbabwe poultry tariff 
rates are still at the 15% level, indicating that Zimbabwe classified its poultry 
industry as a sensitive sector.5 However, this is not material as the imports within 
SADC of poultry products come from South Africa and are subject to the bilateral 
agreement between the countries. 
Effective rate of protection of the poultry sector
This section measures the ERP of the whole poultry sector to see how it is pro-
tected. The ERP measures the protection provided to domestic value added rel-
ative to value added in international (or border) prices (Greenaway and Milner, 
1993). As discussed, different factors can be considered in addition to nominal 
tariffs which increase prices above border prices and hence impact on domestic 
value added. In particular, I do calculations to take into account the imputed 
effect of low agricultural production on the maize input price (for animal feed) 
and estimate the effect of low competition in breeding stock on the price of day-
old chicks.
I use the formula below to calculate the ERP of the poultry sector, as well as 
data from the Zimbabwe tariff handbook for the tariffs on raw materials and 




Where ERP is the effective rate of protection, aji is the number of units of 
j required per unit of i under free trade and ti and tj are the tariff levels for 
output i and j respectively.
Data 
Tariffs were obtained from the 2012 Zimbabwe tariff handbook and data on the 
industry cost structure were obtained from the Zimbabwe poultry industry. In 
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estimating the ERP, the treatment of non-tradeable goods was also considered. 
In the literature, there are three main ways to deal with this. The first method, 
proposed by Balassa (1965), assumes that the price of non-tradeable goods will 
not change if the system of protection is removed, thus meaning their nominal 
tariff is zero. Thus we treat non-tradeable inputs as tradeable inputs with zero 
tariffs. The second method, proposed by Scott and Godley (1980), assumes that 
the non-tradeable goods tariff is equal to the average traded goods tariff. The 
third approach assumes that non-traded goods are just part of the value added of 
the manufacturing activity employing them, meaning that their values become 
domestic value added and traded inputs (Corden, 1966).
This study takes the Corden approach, which is appropriate, given that trade-
able inputs are the most significant and the object of focus. Non-traded inputs 
include a range of small costs like labour, litter and gas. The study does not 
adjust for exchange rates as Zimbabwe is currently using a multicurrency system 
after the dollarisation of the economy in 2009.
ERP estimates, without adjusting for maize and day-old chicks
The assessment in this section takes account of the source of import competition, 
given the duty suspension in 2009/2010 and the ban on imports from South 
Africa in 2010/2011. This means that the MFN rate applied in 2011. The duties 
on inputs are, however, not affected in the same way and are zero throughout, 
as import competition comes from the region and South Africa in particular. In 
table 10.8, ‘weight’ is the value of inputs in 2012 prices. The following section 
introduces measures of imputed nominal tariffs to take account of the effects on 
maize and day-old chick prices considered above.
Table 10.8 Effective rate of protection without adjusting for inputs
Weight 2009 (%) 2010 (%) 2011 (%) 2012 (%)
Poultry 0 0 40 0
Day-old chicks 0.75 0 0 0 0
Poultry feed 2.37 0 0 0 0
ERP 0 0 224 0
Source: Author calculation
The ERP for the sector was 0% for all the years except 2011 (table 10.8). The zero 
rate recorded for these years was due to the zero nominal tariffs on both inputs 
and outputs. However, in 2011 the 40% duty on poultry resulted in the ERP for 
the sector increasing to 224%. This was because inputs were still zero-rated. At 
the same time, the assumption made of maintaining constant prices for chicks 
and feed while accounting for non-tradeable inputs as part of value added might 
also explain the high level of protection. Interestingly, for the period under 
review, the highest production was recorded in 2011, the same year with the 
highest rate of protection, but production fell by 7% as the ERP fell again to zero 
in 2012. 
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ERP estimates, adjusting for maize and day-old chicks,  
and links with performance
For poultry producers, the effect of higher day-old chick prices from low lev-
els of competition can be considered as if there was a higher import tariff on 
day-old chicks equivalent to the percentage by which day-old chick prices are 
above international prices (in this case, South African prices). The following cal-
culations were made before calculating the ERP. I used 2012 cost data to calcu-
late the prices of day-old chicks and feed backwards up to 2009. The impact of 
the uncompetitive supply of day-old chick tariffs is calculated as the percentage 
of the cost difference between the Zimbabwean and South African prices. The 
imputed tariff on maize is calculated as 70% of the cost of feed, factoring in the 
price changes in the South African prices.
As can be seen from table 10.9, in 2009 there was a negative ERP of −40%. 
This was due to the high level of nominal tariffs on day-old chicks (103%) and 
the effect of cheaper maize from South Africa (46.9%). In 2010 the industry 
again had a negative ERP (−36%) as a result of higher nominal tariffs on day-
old chicks (103%) and the impact of cheap maize (31.7%). The output was 
zero-rated as a result of the ban on chicken imports from South Africa. During 
this period the industry experienced a surge in imports, further confirming the 
low levels of protection noted earlier. The ERP increased to 85% in 2011 due to 
an increase in the nominal rate of protection on the output, from 0 to 40%, 
combined with the effect of lower maize prices relative to South Africa. Maize 
prices in 2011 in Zimbabwe were just 15% higher, which translates into a lower 
imputed nominal tariff on feed of 10%. This substantially higher effective protec-
tion is consistent with the increase in production in 2011. In 2012, the ERP was 
once again negative (−21%), which can be explained by the removal of duties on 
the output as the ban on South African chickens expired. This is supported by 










Poultry 0 0 40 0
Day-old chicks 0.75 0 0 0 0
Poultry feed 2.37 0 0 0 0
Effect of maize imports (as higher Zim 
price compared to SA price) as imputed 
feed tariff
2.37 46.9 31.7 10.1 2.9
Day-old chick (SA) impact of 
uncompetitive local supply
0.37 103 103 103 103
ERP −40 −36 85 −21
Source: Author calculation
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the fact that during the same period, chicken production also declined as local 
producers were once again subjected to stiff foreign competition.
The low levels of competition among breeding producers also suggest influ-
ence over the value chain as they are able to charge what appear to be relatively 
high prices for day-old chicks. In addition, the importance of this product for 
consumers was evidenced by the government’s decision to suspend all duties 
in 2009 and 2010 in order to ensure that consumers could access food imports 
cheaply. A further dimension, which this study has not assessed in detail, is 
the changing competition landscape in South Africa and its possible effects on 
the Zimbabwean poultry industry. As assessed in Bagopi et al. (2013) and in 
Grimbeek and Lekezwa (2013), levels of competition in South Africa increased 
substantially from 2009. This is reflected in the operating margins of the South 
African poultry producers, which fell in 2012 and 2013 (with the financial year 
2013 overlapping from 2012) (figure 10.7).
Figure 10.7 Operating margins by company, South Africa, 2001–2015
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Conclusion
This overview of the poultry industry in Zimbabwe has illustrated the importance 
of key inputs in the form of stockfeed and breeding stock, as well as the structure 
of the industry, including the importance of vertically integrated producers. 
The study showed that the ERP calculation is complicated by the different 
trade regimes that exist. If the main international competition is from South 
Africa, then the existence of the bilateral agreement between Zimbabwe and 
South Africa means that the poultry sector has not been protected. More recently 
(2010/2011), the industry felt the effects of the two-year ban on South African 
imports due to disease, for one year of which the higher MFN tariff was relevant 
given that deep-sea imports from Latin American countries became the main 
source of imports. In fact, although in 2009 the government suspended duties 
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on all chicken imports due to the inability of local producers to meet domestic 
demand, there had already not been any protection against imports from South 
Africa. The ban on South African imports increased the ERP of the sector from 
South African producers and the overall rates of protection in 2011 as the sus-
pension of duty was lifted that year.
The nature and impact of protection on inputs and outputs required by the 
ERP raised a number of questions about what determines the prices of the key 
inputs relative to prices in South Africa (as the international price used here). 
The price differences in the main stockfeed component, maize, are substantial, 
leading to the question of why Zimbabwe imports maize so that the prices are 
set by imports, which, given transport and related costs, are much higher than 
in the country of origin. 
The study showed that the breeding subsector is characterised by high con-
centration and that Zimbabwean prices for day-old chicks are above those of 
comparable countries in the region, such as South Africa. However, it was not 
possible to evaluate the conduct of the two breeding firms due to data restrictions 
at the firm level. It is also the case that effects from uncompetitive behaviour at 
the breeding level are likely to be smaller than the impact of factors relating to 
stockfeed.
The study highlighted that Zimbabwe has been relying on maize imports since 
2002 as it is not able to meet its national requirement. Maize constitutes 70% 
of stockfeed, thus making it the major cost contributor. Prices for GM maize used 
in South Africa are substantially lower than Zimbabwean prices. There are dif-
ferent reasons, however, for the higher Zimbabwean maize prices. An important 
reason for the need to import is the declining local production with the imple-
mentation of agricultural policies, in particular land reform. While the ban on 
GM maize likely meant lower production than would otherwise have been the 
case, this ban did not represent a change during the period, unlike the agricul-
tural policies. In addition, the study found that reliance on imports depends on 
the source of those imports, which influences the price. In particular, the exam-
ination of maize imports by source country found a shift in 2011 to imports 
from Zambia. This resulted in a lower mark-up of Zimbabwean maize prices than 
when sourced from South Africa, as Zambian prices were relatively cheaper in 
2011 and 2012 and transport costs lower. Zambia, however, also has a ban on 
GM maize but has been able to be a net exporter at competitive prices, at least 
in some years. 
The study explored the effects of treating the differences in the key input 
prices between Zimbabwe and South Africa as being caused by distortions that 
can be measured as an imputed nominal tariff. In the case of day-old chicks, this 
reflected the possible impact of low levels of competition at the breeding level. 
In the case of maize, this was due to falling production for the reasons identified 
above. The calculation of imputed tariffs on the inputs allowed a calculation 
of the ERP from 2009 to 2012. This was negative in all years except 2011. The 
large negative ERPs calculated in 2009 and 2010 were mostly due to the very 
high price of maize in Zimbabwe and the substantial proportion it accounts for 
in the inputs to poultry production. In 2011, the difference in the maize price 
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was much smaller (due to imports from Zambia) and the 40% MFN tariff on 
outputs applied, given the ban on South African poultry imports. In 2012 there 
was a negative ERP once more as imports from South Africa (with zero duty) 
were again allowed. The negative ERP was lower than in the earlier years as 
the maize price difference was very small. The difference in the day-old chick 
price was available only for 2012 and this disparity was used for the imputed 
tariff over the four years.
Notes
1 Irvine’s Zimbabwe Private Limited is part of Innscor Zimbabwe Limited, a diversified 
group which has a business interest in milling and manufacturing, distribution, and 
wholesale and retail.
2 The production cycle is between four and six weeks for a bird to reach 2 kg.
3 All Avian, Irvine’s Day Old Chicks, Crest Poultry Group (Hubbard), Lunar Chickens, 
Nature Best (Strindo), Bulawayo Chicks, Charles Stewart Day Old Chicks, Masvingo 
Chicks and Chinyika Chicks.
4 Chicken here covers the following tariff lines, representing all forms under which 
chicken is imported using HS 8: 0207.1100, 0207.1200, 0207.1300 and 0207.1400.
5 This sector is given a longer phase-down period of its tariffs before it is opened to 
free trade as it is considered to be in need of some protection to enable it to become 
competitive.
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11 Competition, regional integration and inclusive growth in Africa: 
A research agenda
Regional integration and inclusive growth: Does  
competition matter?
In recent years there has been increased attention, once more, on regional 
integration and its potential contribution to African economic development. 
However, there are very different emphases and perspectives. On the one hand, 
regional integration is essentially viewed as removing tariff and non-tariff bar-
riers to trade; in essence, a second-best to unilateral liberalisation. It is also 
advocated as part of ‘defragmenting Africa’ – overcoming the legacy of colo-
nial borders – adding the reduction (or even removal) of border controls to the 
agenda of tariff liberalisation. Other perspectives emphasise the constructive 
measures required for more meaningful and deeper integration, ranging from 
investments in improved transport infrastructure to developing effective institu-
tional arrangements. This can include provisions for collaboration on a regional 
industrial policy, to build capabilities and regional value chains.
A key aspect in the different perspectives is the extent to which natural mar-
kets and the behaviour of firms are understood as regional in scope. As firms 
are internationalised – including through ownership relations, strategic partner-
ships and distribution arrangements – a regional perspective to firm decision 
making, such as regarding investment and location of production, is necessary. 
Given scale economies and relatively small national markets, firms make deci-
sions across countries. However, when trade barriers are raised, firms can protect 
their market power within countries, which would otherwise be undermined by 
competition at a regional level. 
It is evident that the market power of large firms, whether exerted unilater-
ally or through coordination with each other, harms economic development 
and low-income groups. Such power means higher prices for goods and services 
and distorts the development path of economies where it relates to the pricing 
of important inputs (such as the effect of fertiliser costs on farmers). The nature 
of competitive rivalry, and the power and interests of large firms and their own-
ers, is thus at the heart of how countries develop (see Acemoglu and Robinson, 
2012; North, Wallis and Weingast, 2009). The decisions of large firms shape the 
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economy as they can make the investments required in productive capacity, 
provide the upstream inputs and services required by smaller businesses and, 
in many areas, are also the main routes to market. In crude terms, it is critical 
whether these firms extract rents through market power, or whether the returns 
reward effort, creativity and entrepreneurship.
Anticompetitive arrangements can have a regional and international scope. 
For example, cartels have operated across southern Africa in cement, concrete 
products and fertiliser (see Makhaya, Mkwananzi and Roberts, 2012; Roberts, 
2013). There is thus a close relationship between more competitive outcomes 
and regional integration. Firms seeking to increase their market power, whether 
through collusion or abuse of monopoly power, are likely to be better able to do 
so in smaller national markets.
This points to a critical insight, namely, that the gains from regional integra-
tion are much greater when the implications of imperfect competition are taken 
into account. The gains from trade in models which assume perfect competition 
are the effects of specialisation and exchange – and there are thus smaller gains 
from trade between countries that have similar endowments and productive 
structure. However, with imperfect competition there are potentially very sub-
stantial gains from integration of similar economies. Under scale economies a 
wider market implies lower costs of production as larger-scale production is pos-
sible together with more competition (if the market is big enough to support 
several producers and assuming firms do not collude, or if the market is highly 
contestable). With differentiated products, integration will mean intra- industry 
trade and greater variety. There are also dynamic gains from regional trade and 
competitive rivalry between firms, which stimulate improved products and 
 services and greater management effort.
Harm from low levels of competition (more likely in protected national econ-
omies) and the sustained earning of supra-competitive margins also includes 
the exclusion of rivals – typically smaller firms and entrants who are attracted 
by the margins to be made but whose increased participation would undermine 
the anticompetitive arrangements. Anticompetitive arrangements thus typically 
involve entrenched ‘insiders’ protecting their position. This has the effect of 
undermining participation in the economy and stifling the dynamism which 
comes with it, which goes far beyond simple effects on prices. Active rivalry 
means improved service, product offerings and ongoing improvements in the 
capabilities required to deliver these. In other words, effort and ingenuity are 
rewarded rather than incumbency. This can also be described as the difference 
between ‘performance competition’ and ‘handicap competition’ (seeking to 
handicap rivals) (Gerber, 2010). 
Competition, properly located, therefore means considering the dynamic 
process of rivalry which has positive dimensions in the form of the ability to 
develop productive capabilities (such as accessing finance and key infrastruc-
ture, investing in skills), as well as the typically considered negative dimensions, 
such as barriers due to exclusionary conduct by large firms or regulatory barriers. 
The importance of building and expanding capabilities has been highlighted as 
being at the centre of a country’s economic development (Hausmann, Hwang 
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and Rodrik, 2007; Page, 2012; Rodrik, 2007; Sutton, 2004). Inclusive growth 
therefore has a competition dimension and, for this to be properly understood, 
it needs to be viewed from the perspective of regional integration. The links 
between the fields of competition, trade and regional integration, and inclusive 
growth have, however, not generally been well developed in the literature.1 In 
terms of policy, there are critical insights as it implies choices about competition 
enforcement across countries relating to the competition regime and the insti-
tutional framework.
This final chapter draws on a range of work stretching beyond the chapters 
in the volume to propose a research agenda which incorporates competition 
and regional integration as part of an inclusive growth agenda. It builds upon 
the competition and economic development concerns and themes covered in the 
Introduction to this volume but homes in on and elaborates the regional eco-
nomic dimension. As reflected in the contributions to this volume, competition 
policy and competition enforcement are closely intertwined with the development 
of industries, regulation and the structure of markets. The focus cannot be on com-
petition policy for its own sake, but on its role as an important microeconomic tool 
which should form part of broader industrial development strategies.
In the remainder of the chapter, we review the available literature on the 
linkages between competition, regional integration and inclusive growth. 
Thereafter, we consider recent empirical evidence on the regional dynamics 
of competition in the context of southern and East Africa before concluding 
and making recommendations on the key elements of a new research agenda 
which incorporates competition and regional integration as part of an inclusive 
growth agenda.
Competition, regional integration and  
inclusive growth
We focus here on three main areas where there is an interface between compe-
tition, inclusive growth and regional integration. We start by briefly sketching 
recent developments in competition economics and reflecting on the implica-
tions for economic development in African economies, as a foundation for our 
discussion of questions of inclusive growth and regional integration. The second 
area considers the relationships between competition and inclusive growth, par-
ticularly focusing on the ways in which different interests influence the eco-
nomic policy agenda and shape the nature of economic outcomes. This points 
to the important role that research can play in identifying the costs of anticom-
petitive arrangements protected by political influence, and those groups within 
society that bear the costs. 
The third area is the consideration of regional integration, regional trade and 
the nature of rivalry, especially dynamic rivalry where firms’ strategies seek to 
shape markets and the impact that this has on investments in productive capa-
bilities. Much of the theoretical literature focuses on the static effects of com-
petition, yet competition evidently relates to the ability of actual and potential 
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market participants to bring improved products and services to the market, and 
whether effort and creativity are rewarded or whether rewards largely reflect 
incumbency. Exporting more sophisticated and diversified higher-value products 
has been highlighted in the trade literature as being a central driver of  economic 
growth. Through drawing on the existing literature, we examine the ways in 
which the development of capabilities depends on the stimulus of competitive 
rivalry in the domestic or regional market. 
Developments in competition economics and implications for  
African economies
Empirical studies have shown that a fall in concentration leads to a fall in prices 
and in price cost margins (see Schmalensee, 1989). The results with regard to 
profits, taking into account returns on initial investments made, are much 
weaker, however. Cross-industry regressions find scale economies to be a strong 
explanatory factor for concentration (Sutton, 2006). Other things being equal, 
smaller markets relative to the minimum efficient scale (MES) of production in 
an industry mean that concentration will be higher. Most empirical studies have 
focused on manufacturing. 
Other characteristics put forward to explain concentration include the 
intensity of advertising and research and development (R&D), although R&D 
has typically been found to be uncorrelated with concentration (Sutton, 2006). 
Additionally, these are not exogenous but are part of firms’ strategies. Imperfect 
information and consumer brand loyalty can underpin marketing strate-
gies linked with (exogenous) distribution scale economies to raise the costs of 
entrants, even where the MES of the actual manufacture of the product is not 
very large.
Regarding services, network effects have been found to be very important, 
depending on the industry in question. Where the value to a consumer of a net-
work service depends on how many others are part of the same network, there 
are substantial first-mover advantages. The impact of these effects also depends 
on whether there are regulatory interventions to mandate interoperability and 
interconnection.
The features of an industry, together with market imperfections associated 
with imperfect information, are now recognised to provide scope for strategic 
behaviour (Vickers, 2005).2 Dominant firms can lock in advantages through a 
range of strategies (Rey and Tirole, 2006; Whinston, 2006). Models can explain 
possible anticompetitive exclusion with either scale economies or imperfect 
information (in real-world markets both may well be present). In addition, a 
dominant firm does not necessarily engage in a single strategy but can adopt 
multiple and mutually reinforcing strategies. Of course, there are also possible 
efficiency rationales for conduct, such as exclusive dealing, which means a case-
by-case analysis is necessary. Whether there should be presumptions depending 
on considerations such as market conditions, the extent and durability of dom-
inance and whether the position was the result of innovation is an important 
question to which we return. 
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It is now also increasingly recognised that strategies which appear different 
on the surface may be equivalent.3 For example, targeted, individualised loyalty 
rebates can amount to de facto exclusive dealing. A vertically integrated firm 
with a monopoly in an indispensable input which engages in a margin squeeze 
over its non-integrated rival through a higher input price is effectively refusing 
to supply. In the latter case, the downstream firm may well lodge an accusa-
tion of predation if it perceives the downstream price to be below its costs. This 
has implications for attempting to ‘pigeon-hole’ conduct, as the South African 
Competition Act does.
The Chicago critique asked why a dominant firm would have the incen-
tive to foreclose, even where they may have the ability to do so. An upstream 
monopolist, vertically integrated into the downstream market, can earn the one 
monopoly profit through its upstream pricing and does not need to foreclose 
downstream rivals. However, this ignores the fact that an entrant upstream – 
to undermine its monopoly position – may be much more likely if allied with 
a downstream firm which understands the product and consumer characteris-
tics. Similarly, there may be an anticompetitive rationale for tying and bundling 
where entrants are likely from adjacent markets. 
These theories of exclusionary conduct can explain why dominant firms may 
be able to protect their position. This is different from concentration, as such. 
Persisting dominance of the incumbent suggests that effort and creativity are 
not being rewarded but rather the legacy position. As Geroski and Jacquemin 
(1984: 22) caution: ‘when, however, small asymmetries can be solidified into 
dominant positions that persist, the inequities they create become institution-
alized, creating long-term problems in the performance of the economic system 
which cry out for policy attention’.
The likelihood of entrenched dominant firms depends on the country 
 conditions and history. This implies a different balance in enforcement from 
country to country, as has been reflected in comparisons between the appropri-
ate priorities and standards in North America and Europe, as well as comparisons 
with Asian countries such as Japan and South Korea (Evans, 2009; Fox, 2002, 
2003; Hur, 2004; Vickers, 2007). 
What are the implications for developing economies and African countries, 
in particular? There are reasons why the durability of dominance is greater. Scale 
economies are more significant given the smaller size of markets; information is 
likely to be poorer; and the costs of building brand awareness, advertising, distri-
bution and marketing may be higher relative to sales. The first movers in many 
countries are likely to have gained their position either through state support 
and ownership (even if now privatised) or by being a subsidiary of a multina-
tional corporation that established its footprint under colonial rule. However, 
while the effect of scale economies is well established, we should be cautious 
about generalisations in other areas, instead seeing these issues as important 
ones for future research. There is a growing field of work on the appropriate com-
petition policy for developing countries (see Brusick and Evenett, 2008; Dabbah, 
2010; Gal, 2003, 2009) but relatively little regarding African economies.
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While greenfield entry by a new investor appears less likely, the learning from 
models and cases suggests that entry may also be more likely from adjacent geo-
graphic markets if the market conditions are similar, and the firm can leverage its 
existing capabilities. This has implications for regional integration. In addition, 
there are links with development policies. As highlighted below, Hausmann, 
Hwang and Rodrik (2007) find that productive capabilities migrate – a firm 
which has developed capabilities in one product such as cutting machinery for 
forestry (in the case of Finland) can more readily develop capabilities in cutting 
machinery for other materials. This suggests that at the regional and country lev-
els we need to consider how the ‘optimal level of competition’ can be fostered, 
which links to capabilities development (Amsden and Singh, 1994; Singh, 2004).
Competition, political economy and inclusive growth
Competition is a key component of inclusive growth (in Acemoglu and 
Robinson, 2012) or ‘open access orders’ (in North, Wallis and Weingast, 2009).4 
Competitive markets as an existing state mean markets with many participants, 
low barriers to entry and returns which just reward the investment made and 
cover the costs of production. But, a country does not arrive at this state by 
magic. Indeed, it seems obvious that market power, imperfect competition and 
market failures, which can reinforce positions of market power, are intrinsic 
features of economic life. We therefore need to understand how the process of 
evolving competitive rivalry is related to the nature of economic opportunity 
and outcomes. 
At the heart of North, Wallis and Weingast’s assessment is the combined 
importance of competition in both the economic and political spheres. Indeed, 
they argue that ‘[b]y studying democracy in isolation of markets, political scien-
tists have missed these forces [competitive markets] of political stability’ (2009: 
129). By this they mean that competitive markets generate long-term prosperity 
and allow for dynamism in terms of different social groups and interests, which 
feeds into politics. Conversely, they contend that distortions, such as from rent 
seeking, impact on relative prices which, in an economy with competitive mar-
kets, generate a response from forces in society that recognise the economic costs 
that are imposed. But, why and how will such competitive markets arise? 
North, Wallis and Weingast (2009) believe that progress towards an open 
access order involves competition-eroding rents, and that this involves liberali-
sation and independent institutions. However, this fails to recognise the import-
ant role that industrial policies and tariffs have played in industrialising countries 
and does not take us forward in understanding how interests are aligned with 
the policy frameworks that are adopted (see Khan, 2006). The construction of 
markets and the main participants reflect a country’s economic history. How 
does competition law and policy then relate to moving towards meaningful 
increased access? 
It has been argued that the vigorous promotion of competition law for devel-
oping countries disregards political and institutional realities – in simple terms, 
because institutions are weak and concentrated business interests are too strong 
(Rodriguez and Menon, 2010). The strength of those behind anticompetitive 
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arrangements such as cartels simply means that they subvert the competition 
regime where enforcement is attempted (Mateus, 2010). But, a competition 
agenda has been supported in different countries and we need to understand 
where competition fits within the changing influence of different interests. 
It is evident that, while economic regulations are meant to correct for market 
failures and natural monopolies (entrenched dominant firms), they also respond 
to lobbying. The balance of power between different interests in a country thus 
determines the regulatory arrangements which are part of the wider ‘political 
settlement’ (Khan, 2006). In evaluating the regulatory regime, including as it 
relates to competition, we can distinguish between where rents are conditional 
on productive investment (an implicit quid pro quo) and where short-term rents 
are maximised and protected. In the former situation, the elite interests have 
taken a longer-term view in that they recognise the need for sharing returns and 
for the growth of public infrastructure and capabilities, as this underpins the 
long-term sustainability of the economy and hence the value of their stake in it. 
An evolution towards a more rules-based and less personalised system for allo-
cating access is part of such a trajectory. By comparison, an orientation towards 
extraction of maximum short-term rents means allowing the unfettered exercise 
of market power, not disciplined either through regulation or promoting compe-
tition, and even while it is evident that there is long-term harm to the economy. 
It is perhaps more appropriate to understand these as tendencies whose 
weight depends on many factors. For example, if a business can relocate with 
ease, then there is less need to consider the long-term effects. Similarly, if elite 
interests are able to take rents out of the country without fear that a future 
regime can take action to recover them, then they will have less of a stake in 
the future. This is likely where personal relationships can be used by incum-
bents to block rivals (e.g., through regulations, licence permissions, arbitrary 
judgments). On the other hand, where buyers are important and have organ-
ised interests, they will push for discipline on market power. In the case of the 
antitrust law in the US, a key constituency promoting its adoption was farmers 
who were being subject to high input and transport costs due to the power of 
the trusts. Urban consumers can also be an important pressure group and new 
entrants are possible sources of support. Research can also play an important role 
in demonstrating the harm caused by concentrated interests that have been able 
to undermine competition (see Makhaya and Roberts, 2013). 
In assessing the evolution of arrangements governing competition, we con-
sider competition policy and the competition regime to extend beyond the 
law and mandate of any competition authorities. It includes the links with the 
regulatory provisions as well as the host of other laws and actions that impact 
on entry and effective competitive rivalry (das Nair, Mondliwa and Roberts, 
2012). Indeed, it is unlikely that competition enforcement by a young competi-
tion authority will succeed in disciplining powerful interests. Instead, regional 
integration, which means greater rivalry from neighbouring countries, might 
be more effective. Entrants may come from firms in adjacent markets or in an 
upstream or downstream relationship. Industrial policies may support such 
entrants. This is where the contribution of the case studies (discussed later) is 
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important. Changing the structure of the economy requires a competition pol-
icy which actively opens up participation, including through the enforcement 
of competition law but also through a wider set of interventions in terms of the 
regulatory framework, the provision of economic infrastructure, development 
finance and industrial policy.
Dynamic rivalry and regional integration
As argued above, regional integration can potentially increase both trade and 
competition, thus enhancing the welfare of the community’s citizens. Regional 
integration brings with it both static and dynamic gains. Static gains from trade 
under orthodox models, which assume perfect competition, are generally small, 
with gains from trade creation balanced with gains from trade diversion (Robinson 
and Thierfelder, 2002; Schiff and Winters, 2003).5 Generally, a regional integra-
tion agreement (RIA) allows free trade among partners to the agreement. That is, 
import tariffs are reduced to zero for products produced by partner countries.6 
A RIA is said to ‘create’ trade when the reduction/elimination of import tariffs 
among RIA partners allows low-cost producers from a partner country to replace 
production by a high-cost producer within the RIA (Schiff and Winters, 2003). 
In other words, trade is created when production is reallocated from a high- to 
a low-cost producer within the RIA, thus allowing for efficiency gains. On the 
other hand, trade is ‘diverted’ if reduction/elimination of import tariffs among 
RIA members allows high-cost producers within the RIA to steal market share 
from more efficient third-party suppliers who continue to face import tariffs. In 
this case, trade is diverted from a ‘third-party’ supplier to a producer within the 
RIA by virtue of membership of the RIA, and not superior efficiencies.
In practice, however, firms typically possess market power owing to prod-
uct differentiation and/or scale economies. In this case, the question is whether 
and how regional integration affects rivalry among firms in the RIA, and how 
this ultimately impacts welfare. As noted, models of trade factoring in imper-
fect competition have much larger gains from trade, especially between simi-
lar economies. Trade between similar economies often takes the form of trade 
within the same industries – so-called intra-industry trade. In this case, firms 
derive market power from the fact that consumers perceive their products to be 
different (non-homogeneous), implying that each firm faces a downward-slop-
ing demand curve. The question, however, for most RIAs in Africa – e.g., the 
Southern African Development Community (SADC), the Common Market for 
Eastern and Southern Africa (Comesa), the West African Economic and Monetary 
Union – is whether this channel (product differentiation) will yield large enough 
gains from integration. If countries within the RIA trade according to compar-
ative advantage (typical of developing countries), then product differentiation 
will have a smaller contribution to gains from integration.7
Regional integration can potentially overcome a number of factors negatively 
affecting the competitiveness of small economies, including a small domestic 
market size8 and high concentration.
Firstly, small domestic market size can potentially limit the expansion of 
domestic firms to reach the MES of production, resulting in failure to realise scale 
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economies. By opening up the regional market to domestic firms, integration 
potentially relaxes the market size constraint, allowing producers to move down 
their cost curves and thus enhance competitiveness. 
Secondly, small domestic market sizes tend to limit the number of firms 
that can profitably/optimally operate in the domestic market, and thus tend 
to cultivate monopolies/oligopolies. High industry concentration reduces firms’ 
incentives to enhance efficiencies, to the detriment of consumers and broader 
national welfare, particularly when these monopolies operate under tariff and 
other protectionist measures.9 Similarly, a small domestic market may limit 
incumbent firms’ incentives to escalate competition by incurring high fixed/
sunk costs owing to the small potential returns from such investment (Sutton, 
1991, 2006). A RIA can mitigate the inefficiencies associated with the monopoli-
sation of domestic markets by opening up these markets to competition, at least 
from within the enlarged market. For example, consider three adjacent countries, 
each with a ‘monopoly’ producer of cement and applying tariffs to protect their 
domestic markets. With integration, the tariffs will fall away and the enlarged 
market will now feature rivalry between three firms, likely resulting in improved 
x-efficiency and allocative efficiency.10,11 Thus integration potentially reduces 
the exercise of monopoly power, promotes competition and enhances welfare.12 
As a corollary, therefore, integration also enhances competitiveness vis-à-vis 
third-party producers, thus generating long-term gains for the community.
While a RIA will in all likelihood increase competition, the effects on mar-
ket structure are ambiguous. Market enlargement due to integration could lead 
to new entry and thus reduction in concentration, provided fixed and/or sunk 
costs are exogenous. If, however, these costs are endogenous, concentration may 
actually increase (Sutton, 1991). It is quite plausible that as competition intensi-
fies due to the enlarged market, and especially where products are differentiated, 
incumbent firms will invest in either quality enhancement, brand image or cost 
reduction to not only increase their market shares but also to deter entry (Sutton, 
1991; Tirole, 1988). If these strategies are successful, a larger market could result 
in higher industry concentration (but not necessarily less competition). 
Realising the potential gains from integration, however, is dependent on a 
number of factors, including geography, transport costs and exertion of market 
power – unilateral and/or coordinated. Geography has an important influence 
on trade. If the population in the RIA is dispersed over a large area, then the nat-
ural tendency is to create market regionalisation through small and isolated local 
markets within the RIA, which favours concentration of industry (Gal, 2001). 
This will naturally militate against realising the gains from integration. The 
effects of geography will be exacerbated by weak transport infrastructure and 
non-competitive logistics sectors. Transport infrastructure and costs are import-
ant for trade facilitation. Transport costs can consume away the benefits of tariff 
reduction, resulting in integration failing to significantly affect trade flows. This 
suggests that economic and trade infrastructure, particularly transport infra-
structure and costs, should be viewed as part of regional integration discussions.
As noted, exerting market power can negate the potential gains from inte-
gration. Competition can produce both static gains (allocative efficiency and 
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productive efficiency) and dynamic gains (investment and innovation). Because 
competition can produce winners and losers, incumbent firms can lobby their 
governments for protectionist measures, such as regulatory barriers, to defeat 
competition arising from integration. Domestic distortions such as subsidies and 
regulations can distort resource allocations within the RIA, thereby negatively 
affecting trade creation. It is therefore imperative that government industrial 
policies within the common market area are harmonised, and non-tariff barriers 
to trade done away with (Peridy and Ghoneim, 2009). National industrial pol-
icies can support local entrants, for example by removing regulatory and other 
entry barriers, and increase competition in the region, but not through under-
mining integration.
Equally important, governments within the RIA need to harmonise their 
competition policies, and competition authorities need to standardise their 
applications of competition policy to create an environment conducive to 
fair competition. Countries with effective competition policies tend to grow 
faster than those without because they produce companies that can compete 
in the local and international markets (Porter, 2002). Recognising the potential 
dynamic gains through productivity improvements, the objective of competi-
tion policy should go beyond the narrow standard of short-term consumer wel-
fare (low prices).
Regional integration, by creating a larger common market, not only benefits 
incumbent firms within the RIA. A larger market creates opportunities for new 
entry from within the RIA, and is also likely to attract foreign direct investment. 
Large third-party suppliers stand to gain from locating production in the RIA 
and avoiding import tariffs rather than supplying the enlarged market subject to 
tariffs. At least two benefits come with new entry.
First, new entry intensifies competition within the RIA, thus promoting 
allocative and productive efficiency, including through its impact on innova-
tion and dynamic effects (the so-called creative destruction) (e.g., Porter, 2002).13 
However, there is also an optimal level of competition, which partly depends on 
market size (Amsden and Singh, 1994). Many studies have investigated the rela-
tionship between competition and innovation (e.g., Aghion, Bloom, Blundell 
and Howitt, 2005; Aghion, Braun and Fedderke, 2008; Blundell, Griffith and 
Van Reenan, 1999; Peneder and Woerter, 2013). These studies find an inverted-U 
 relationship between competition and innovation. Vives (2008) provides a theo-
retical foundation for this relationship. In particular, monopoly/low competition 
is associated with low innovation, while at the other extreme ‘high’ competition 
is also associated with low innovation. This points to the fact that some market 
power is necessary to induce competitive rivalry, and thus innovation.
Second, and even more important, new entry brings employment opportuni-
ties, thus contributing to inclusive growth in the region. Even in models where 
concentration increases with market enlargement, it turns out that output (and 
its quality), and thus employment (and its quality), increases with size of the 
market.
To realise these gains, however, a RIA should do more than just liberalise 
trade. In particular, infrastructure and trade logistics need to be enhanced, and 
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regulatory and other non-tariff barriers done away with. Countries need to coor-
dinate such investments to ensure maximum economic impact. For example, 
having a good road network on one side of the border and poor infrastructure 
on the other side will do little to realise the benefits of trade liberalisation within 
the RIA. In essence, there is need for broader economic and political coopera-
tion (i.e., deeper integration) in order to fully exploit the benefits of regional 
integration.
Assessing the record on regional competitive 
dynamics: Insights from southern and East Africa
Overview and insights from cartels uncovered  
in South Africa
The regional economic communities (RECs) incorporating countries in south-
ern and eastern Africa each recognise competition as an important part of cre-
ating more dynamic regional markets and include competition in their articles. 
In 2009, SADC member states signed the Declaration on Regional Cooperation 
in Competition and Consumer Policies. It derives from the SADC Protocol on 
Trade which requires member states to implement measures to constrain unfair 
business practices and to foster competition (SADC, 2012). Similarly, the prom-
ulgation of the East African Community (EAC) Competition Act in 2006 and 
the launch of the Comesa Competition Commission in 2013 speak to a growing 
realisation that the active enforcement of competition law forms part of achiev-
ing the broader goals of increased economic participation and development. This 
also relates to a central theme of this chapter – that anti-competitive conduct can 
have effects which transcend political borders, and greater cooperation between 
countries is needed to address those aspects of firm behaviour that undermine 
common developmental goals.
The adoption of competition law in most REC member states is an acknowl-
edgement that market structure and disciplining the exercise of market power 
matter for achieving inclusive economic growth. However, most authorities, 
although active, are severely underresourced and their role poorly under-
stood by decision-making government departments and business and political 
leaders. In 2016, 17 of the 26 countries forming part of Comesa, the SADC, 
the Southern African Customs Union (SACU) and the EAC had active competi-
tion law regimes (see Bowmans, 2016; GCR, 2013; Gouws, 2013). Despite these 
challenges, substantial progress has been made across jurisdictions towards 
greater enforcement of competition law, particularly regarding abuse of dom-
inance cases. Typically, merger control remains the primary activity of many 
authorities. Less progress has been made in terms of prosecuting cartel conduct, 
which is perhaps directly linked to the low adoption of leniency programmes 
and the resource constraints facing authorities. Even less work has gone into 
understanding and dealing with anticompetitive conduct which has regional 
dimensions despite the interdependence of most economies across southern 
and East Africa. 
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This last aspect is important. The regional scope of anticompetitive conduct is 
perhaps best demonstrated through examining the record of cartel prosecutions in 
South Africa. A number of cartels which have been prosecuted by the Competition 
Commission have affected neighbouring SACU countries in particular (either 
directly or as a secondary market for South African products) (table 11.1). 
Table 11.1 Cartels with cross-border effects prosecuted in South Africa
Cartelised 
product
Main firms Countries affected
Scrap metal* Cape Town Iron and Steel Works, National 
Scrap Metal, New Reclamation, SA Metal & 
Machinery Company
Namibia, South Africa
Construction** Aveng Africa, Basil Read, Group Five, Murray 
& Roberts, Stefanutti, Wade Walker




Aveng (Africa) incl. Aveng (Infraset), Rocla, 
Swazi Fyfe
Botswana, Mozambique, Namibia, 
Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia
Cement† Lafarge, AfriSam, PPC Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, 
South Africa, Swaziland
Pilings†† Grinaker-LTA (Aveng (Africa)), Esorfranki, 
Rodio Geotechnics, Dura Soltanche Bachy, 
Geomechanics, Diabor
Lesotho, South Africa, Swaziland
Steel products††† Trident Steel (Aveng (Africa)), Macsteel, 
Highveld
Exports to ‘Africa Overland Market’, 
South Africa
Industrial gases∞ Air Products South Africa, Sasol Chemical 
Industries
Southern African region
Source: Compiled by authors
Notes: *Consent Agreement between Competition Commission and National Scrap Metals 
(Cape Town) (Pty) Ltd, case no. 51/CR/Aug10.
**Consent Agreements between Competition Commission and Aveng (Africa) Ltd, case no. 
2009Feb4279/2009Sep4641; Competition Commission and Murray & Roberts Ltd, case 
no. 2009May4447; Competition Commission and Stefanutti Stocks Holdings Ltd, case no. 
2009Feb4279/2009Sep4641.
***Consent Agreement between Competition Commission and Aveng (Africa) Ltd, case no. 
2008Mar3595.
†Consent Agreement between Competition Commission and Lafarge Industries South 
Africa (Pty) Ltd, case no. 23/CR/Mar12.
††CCSA (2011).
†††Consent Agreement between Competition Agreement and Trident Steel (Pty) Ltd, case 
no. 114/CR/Dec12.
∞CCSA (2013).
Perhaps the most striking feature of these cartel arrangements is the extent to 
which they pertained to key industrial products and inputs, including for large 
infrastructure investment projects. The bottom line is that affected governments 
and private entities, and taxpayers in particular, have overpaid for a number of 
important projects that have been affected by anticompetitive arrangements. 
Recent evidence on the extent of cartel overcharge in South Africa, a measure 
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of the profitability of cartel conduct, suggests that cartel mark-ups are consis-
tent with and in some cases higher than international benchmarks of between 
15 and 25% (Khumalo, Mashiane and Roberts, 2014). For example, in concrete 
pipes the overcharge was estimated to fall in the range of 16.5–28% in Gauteng, 
and 51–57% in KwaZulu-Natal (Khumalo, Mashiane and Roberts, 2014). In the 
South African flour cartel, which lasted from 1999 to 2007, mark-ups to inde-
pendent bakeries were estimated to be in the range of 7–42% (Mncube, 2014).
It is well understood that cartels form in order to maximise the joint profits 
of their members. The same applies in cartels that operate across the region – 
through allocating geographic areas to one another and/or agreeing on pricing, 
they are able to maximise joint profits. To sustain themselves cartels need to 
block new entrants, such as by making it difficult to access key inputs. In the 
present context, through allocating country markets, regional cartels appear to 
have been able to sustain arrangements to prevent further entry and share rents.
In most cases referred to in table 11.1, markets were effectively allocated to 
different cartelists and prices to be charged were agreed. To our knowledge, there 
have not been many follow-up investigations in these neighbouring countries, 
nor have there been claims for damages. This suggests a significant gap in the 
extent of cooperation between competition authorities as well as in the under-
standing of the adverse impact of these types of arrangements. Conducting 
impact assessments on the effects of these regional arrangements and their pros-
ecution would be an important first step in generating support for increased 
cooperation and allocation of resources towards detecting and prosecuting 
them. There may be a significant role for RECs in this regard.
A final point regarding cartel conduct in the region is that some of these 
arrangements, such as in cement, flour and scrap metal, originated from pre-
vious interactions between government departments and industry players as 
part of industry development strategies. For instance, in the scrap metal case, 
the Department of Trade and Industry in South Africa had a role in encourag-
ing downstream beneficiation and value addition, and in affecting domestic 
pricing in the metals sector, including facilitating certain interactions between 
competitors and consumers in the scrap metal industry since 1995.14 This 
speaks to the interrelation of government policy and strategies with compe-
tition policy, which we discuss as one of the main themes emerging from the 
recent African Competition Forum (ACF) studies in sugar, cement and poultry 
industries. 
Review of recent studies on regional competitive dynamics
Recent studies do not directly estimate the damage caused by regional arrange-
ments but provide an indication as to the extent of barriers to greater compet-
itive rivalry within the eastern and southern African region. The ACF studies 
involved research collaboration between competition authorities in six countries 
(Botswana, Kenya, Namibia, South Africa, Tanzania, Zambia)15 to understand the 
regional competitive dynamics in the sugar, cement and poultry sectors. The find-
ings of this pilot research project have highlighted some important cross-cutting 
themes that affect competition between firms in the region, and patterns of trade 
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and investment. We briefly review the regional structure of each market and draw 
out the main themes and areas for further research.
Highly concentrated, oligopolistic markets with high structural barriers  
to entry
The regional industries in sugar, cement and poultry are highly concentrated, 
reflecting the need to achieve economies of scale in small domestic markets. 
This is reflective of the fact that both cement and sugar are high-weight, low-
value products that are costly to transport. In poultry, economies of scale in 
production are critical at the grandparent stock and processing/abattoir levels 
of the market, which is linked, in part, to the high capital outlay required at 
these levels. This also reflects the pattern of development of the industries in 
the region, with large multinational firms being present at multiple levels of the 
value chain.
In cement, many of the same large firms operate and hold controlling interests 
across the different countries in the study and among smaller independent opera-
tors. For instance, in three of the countries, one producer (or group of historically 
associated producers) accounts for more than 50% of production capacity. In 
Zambia and Kenya, companies associated with Lafarge through cross-sharehold-
ing account for the majority of capacity. In Namibia, recent entrant Ohorongo 
is effectively the only local producer. Historically in South Africa and the SACU 
region, three cement firms, Lafarge, Holcim/AfriSam and PPC, have controlled 
most of the production, including through cross-border cartel arrangements. 
In Tanzania, the three major firms – Heidelberg (Tanzania Portland Cement), 
Holcim (Tanga Cement Company) and Lafarge (Mbeya Cement) – are linked to 
some of the world’s largest producers and account for the majority of production. 
Botswana is largely served by imports from South Africa in addition to small 
local producers. In the sugar industry, the four countries have highly concen-
trated markets, with the highest level of concentration by far in Zambia, where 
multinational firm Zambia Sugar (associated with Illovo Sugar from South Africa, 
and now owned by Associated British Foods) has a share in excess of 90% of 
production. In Tanzania, two firms account for 70% of domestic production (not 
including imports), with the largest being Kilombero (55% owned by Illovo), 
and Tanganyika Plantation Company, which is owned by Sukari Investments 
that has interests in Kenya as well. In South Africa, three companies out of six 
in the industry (Illovo, TSB, Tongaat-Hulett) account for 80% of the market. In 
this context, Illovo is a regional leader in sugar production with operations in 
other countries, including Malawi, Mozambique and Swaziland. In Kenya, the 
four largest producers account for 78% of domestic sugar production although 
there are more than ten sugar millers in the industry overall. 
Finally, the regional poultry industry also consists of a small number of com-
panies operating across all three countries in the study. The main groupings are 
Astral/Tiger (in South Africa, Botswana, Zambia), Pioneer/Tydstroom/Bokomo/
Brink/Irvine’s (in South Africa, Botswana, Zambia), Rainbow/Zamchick (in South 
Africa, Zambia) and Country Bird/Dada/Ross Africa (in South Africa, Botswana, 
Zambia). Namibia has historically relied on imports. However, Namibia Poultry 
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Industries is being developed under infant industry protection. In each case, the 
firms are vertically integrated into various levels of the value chain, including 
animal feed, primary breeding (including exclusive domain over genetic breeds 
sourced from international firms), parent stock farms, the production of day-old 
chicks, growing broilers and processing or abattoirs. It is therefore difficult for 
independent firms wishing to enter the market and compete at one level of the 
value chain to do so, given that they often rely on inputs from the vertically 
integrated multinational firms and on significant capital outlay. 
Market structure and poor competitive outcomes reflecting poor  
policy choices 
In each industry under consideration, governments have had a significant role to 
play in terms of dampening competition in favour of increased investments and 
infant industry development. While competition policy and industrial  policy 
can be complementary, this requires that the right incentives are given to firms 
in a manner that encourages effective local entry but stimulates competition as 
well (Brooks, 2007; Roberts, 2010). 
Government policy objectives have been instrumental in shaping the mar-
ket structure of industries, particularly in cement and sugar. For instance, the 
cement cartel mentioned above has its roots in industry practices which were 
condoned by the South African government from as early as the 1920s until 
1996. These practices effectively then continued in different forms following the 
change in legislation regarding these practices. Similarly, the South African sugar 
industry is widely viewed to operate as a legislated cartel, with the Department 
of Trade and Industry being party to maintaining the regulatory arrangements 
that dampen competition by protecting the market from import competition. 
It is expected that large firms will lobby for regulation which suits their needs 
in the market, and are more likely to be heard by regulatory and government 
agencies (Mateus, 2010). While these practices can lead to well-developed indus-
tries over time, they also have the effect of dampening competition to the 
detriment of consumers. 
There is therefore a trade-off between the short-term effects of concentration 
and low levels of competition which harm consumers, and the development of 
firms through industrial policy strategies. The unfortunate outcome is that in the 
long run, once firms are established, it is in their interest to protect their position 
in the market and as such raise strategic barriers to new entry (Mondliwa and 
Roberts, 2014). The case of the Zambian sugar industry is illustrative. 
Zambia Sugar benefited from high levels of investment in capacity in the 
mid-2000s, encouraged by certain government tax and investment incentives, 
and protection. Perhaps more than any other firm in Zambia, the company 
has managed to leverage these incentives to establish a position of significant 
market power. It is widely accepted that private enterprises, particularly in devel-
oping countries, require reasonable and stable rates of profit to sustain their 
propensity to invest (Singh, 2002). This has been beneficial in terms of the high 
levels of investment and employment introduced (Zambia now produces more 
than double the requirements of the local market). However, despite being 
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considered one of the more cost-efficient producers in the region due to invest-
ments in new technologies, the prices of sugar in Zambia are relatively high, 
which has led to recent investigations into excessive pricing against Zambia 
Sugar. This position of market power is entrenched by a combination of other 
trade barriers and restrictions put in place by government which prevent foreign 
firms and imported sugar from competing away the high returns in this market. 
This is akin to the effect of the brining restrictions in poultry in Zambia, for 
example, where policies to prevent brined chicken imports mean that import 
competition is restricted. Due to the scale of investments required in the sugar 
market, and possibly the high thresholds for firms to qualify for investment 
incentives, it does not seem that any of the other firms in the market have been 
able to provide effective competition.
It is clear that the protection of domestic industries is important; indeed, it is 
this same form of protection which has allowed the South African sugar industry 
to grow over the years. In Kenya, the government has sought to encourage new 
entry and provide import protection in sugar. The liberal issuing of licences has 
led to a market consisting of more than ten millers. However, new entry has 
not been supported in terms of agricultural policy to develop input markets as 
well – sugar-cane supplies are extremely poor, resulting in high input costs for 
millers and high sugar prices which rose even above those in Zambia for several 
years (Gathiaka and Vilakazi, 2014). This speaks to a miscoordination of policy 
strategies, which results in harm to consumers and means that entrants cannot 
become effective domestic and regional competitors. 
This is exacerbated by high trade barriers whereby governments control the 
influx of cheaper sugar to protect domestic producers. Dynamic gains from trade 
cannot be realised where trade policy conflicts with agricultural and industrial 
policy objectives. The case of the Tanzanian sugar industry illustrates the fact that 
managing the price of sugar domestically in the short term is just as important as, 
and can operate alongside, objectives to invest in the domestic industry. Tanzania 
has made significant investment in sugar milling and sugar-cane farming capac-
ity and aims to become a net exporter in the next few years. However, the coun-
try has also allowed imports, in a controlled manner, into the domestic market to 
regulate domestic pricing, which has seen the sugar price stabilise in recent years. 
The poultry industries in Namibia, Zambia and Botswana follow a similar 
path in terms of policy to develop the local industry, although each country 
remains reliant on imports due to limited domestic capacity to produce. There is 
potential in the industry for firms to gain from cross-border entry and to leverage 
comparative advantages in key inputs. For instance, the Zambian industry has 
grown on the back of comparative advantage in a key agricultural input, animal 
feed. This led, in part, to the entry of Rainbow into the Zambian market through 
the acquisition of Zamchicks, although this may increase patterns of consolida-
tion in the regional market. Similarly, Country Bird leveraged their access to the 
Arbor Acres breed to enter South Africa (from their base in Zimbabwe) and com-
pete vigorously. There are therefore gains from trade for firms being able to lever-
age their advantages in one market into another. Of course, this cannot happen 
if the same firm is present in each neighbouring market, as demonstrated in the 
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cement case study where Lafarge in Zambia has excess capacity. However, they 
do not seem to export to countries where they already have a presence. In sugar, 
Zambia Sugar has excess capacity but there have been limited exports to other 
countries in the region in which they have a significant presence. This speaks 
to the role of firms as critical agents in the process of stimulating or restricting 
greater trade and competition within the region.
Prices reflect low levels of competition and barriers to entry
Competitive outcomes in terms of prices reflect a regional market in which there 
are clear constraints to greater competition. In each sector, there is evidence of 
prices which lie above competitive benchmarks. In sugar, although there may 
be disputes about the factors which constitute costs, prices in both Kenya and 
Zambia (particularly with a more efficient producer) seem to reflect the con-
straints imposed by poor choices in terms of industry development policies and 
policies which have entrenched the market power of incumbent firms, respec-
tively. Estimated ex-factory prices in these countries for 2012 were in the range 
of 50–100% above world market prices and 30–70% above those in South Africa, 
which in the context can be considered a reasonable competitive benchmark. 
Given levels of protectionism and limited competition in the South African mar-
ket, these differences could be even higher at an ex-factory level. It is important 
to caution, however, that world market prices in sugar are depressed prices due 
largely to a legacy of agricultural subsidies in Europe and other large markets. 
Cement prices also indicate concerning differences. Notwithstanding the car-
tel which operated across the whole of SACU until 2009, prices in Zambia and 
Kenya have been substantially higher than those in South Africa (figure 11.1). 
This appears to reflect very low levels of competition in these countries, where 


























Figure 11.1 Estimated ex-factory cement prices, 50 kg bag, US$
Source: Amunkete et al. (2016)
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Levels of effective new entry have remained low in poultry, although there is 
evidence that where there has been entry, such as by Country Bird in the South 
African market, there have been benefits in terms of increased competition, as 
reflected in a significant drop in margins. In the Namibian cement industry, the 
entry of Ohorongo as a competitor to AfriSam in December 2010 led to a sub-
stantial reduction in price in 2011 in nominal currency terms, as well as relative 
to other countries. In Zambia, the entry of Scirocco Enterprises in 2005 and 
Zambezi Portland Cement in 2009 saw slight reductions in prices in the follow-
ing years. However, the positive effects of entry were muted by the fact that these 
firms entered at very low levels of production capacity to be able to effectively 
challenge the incumbent, Lafarge Zambia. 
Finally, although unrelated to the ACF studies, there is further evidence of 
the positive effects of new entry in the Zambian and Tanzanian fertiliser indus-
tries. Fertiliser markets in the region are largely oligopolistic and dominated 
by international giants such as Omnia and Yara International. A recent study 
into competition in the road transportation of fertiliser in Zambia, Malawi and 
Tanzania shows that new entry into the Zambian fertiliser industry following 
the uncovering and prosecution of a fertiliser cartel, which lasted from 2007 to 
2012, has led to greater price competition. Following the cessation of the cartel, 
the Export Trading Group, which has grown its share of fertiliser markets in sev-
eral African countries, brought greater price competition to incumbent  cartelists 
(Nyiombo Investments and Omnia). The growth of the firm in Tanzania has 
also seen it capture an estimated 20–40% market share, in competition with the 
dominant incumbent, Yara (Ncube, Roberts and Vilakazi, 2016). Interestingly, 
in South Africa the same major producers of intermediate fertiliser products, 
Omnia and Kynoch (then owned by multinational Yara), were found to have 
engaged in cartel conduct along with Sasol (CCSA, 2010).
These examples highlight the potential for further research into understand-
ing the effects of regional anticompetitive arrangements as well as the impact of 
entry on domestic and regional markets. Through benchmarking across coun-
tries, it becomes possible to quantify the losses and gains to society from compe-
tition, or a lack thereof. Importantly, research of this nature can pave the way for 
motivating, to policy makers and governments in particular, the importance of 
competition policy as a developmental tool, especially in so far as these arrange-
ments affect key consumer goods and inputs. 
Transport and physical barriers to integration
Trade flows are linked to the production and location decisions of firms 
and the trade policy environment in the region. As discussed, regulatory con-
straints to trade, including through trade instruments other than tariffs, can 
sustain the market power of incumbent firms. While the liberalisation of trade 
through customs unions and the reduction of tariff barriers has increased the 
scope for greater cross-border trade and competition, a number of constraints 
remain, such as those relating to rules of origin which require levels of domestic 
production that underdeveloped countries cannot meet (Edwards and Lawrence, 
2010). Furthermore, the experiences in the sugar industry, especially in the cases 
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of Kenya, Tanzania and Zambia, reflect the fact that trade policy affects compet-
itive outcomes in the region in terms of prices and entry. Import quotas are a 
significant restraint to imports in Kenya, and in Tanzania imports are managed 
by the state. 
In poultry, the available evidence suggests that it costs more to import maize 
for animal feed from Zambia than from Argentina. Similar concerns were raised 
by sugar importers in South Africa. This speaks, in part, to constraints in terms of 
transport infrastructure, the harmonisation of regulations in transportation, as 
well as delays and costs of transit at border posts. For instance, the study on com-
petition in the transportation of fertiliser in the southern and eastern African 
regions found that Zambia, as a landlocked state, had improved the levels of 
competition in its freight sector (and stabilised prices) by improving domestic 
regulatory measures and increasing efficiency to allow for increased competi-
tion in the sector, including from cross-border operators from South Africa and 
Zimbabwe in particular (Ncube, Roberts and Vilakazi, 2016).
This example illustrates the significance of transportation as an enabler of 
greater cross-border rivalry. Cross-border competition relies on customers across 
the region being able to access substitutes in a timely and feasible manner so as 
to prevent the exercise of market power in a narrow geographic market often 
delimited by national borders. To take the example of cement, prices in Tanzania 
are relatively lower than those in neighbouring markets and while the Mbeya 
Cement (Lafarge) plant is in Tanzania, it is situated just on the border with 
Zambia, while other plants in Zambia are located further away, nearer to Lusaka. 
Other things being equal, and absent colonial borders and restrictions, cement 
produced in this area should serve as a competitive alternative to Zambian 
cement. However, prices remain vastly different between these areas, which may 
be due to the fact that Lafarge is also present in Zambia, as well as trade and 
transport constraints.
These examples illustrate the linkages between trade policy, transportation 
costs and the strategic location decisions of firms, and the need for further 
research in this area. Regional integration cannot be achieved where conflict-
ing trade policies across countries, inefficiencies in transportation and the 
strategic behaviour of firms undermine rivalry between firms across political 
borders. 
Some conclusions and key elements of a  
research agenda
The competition cases and recent research reviewed above, together with liter-
ature on competition and regional integration, highlight a number of key areas 
for further research.
Firstly, there is strong evidence that anticompetitive arrangements can have 
a regional dimension. Indeed, cartel arrangements have operated across several 
countries in key input sectors with high overcharges, which is not unique to 
the region (see Connor, 2014). There are therefore likely to be significant gains 
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to greater cooperation between competition authorities and further research in 
detecting these anticompetitive arrangements and quantifying their regional 
effects. Particular emphasis could be placed on the market behaviour of large mul-
tinational firms, including South African players, and their strategic behaviour 
throughout the region.
Secondly, the research shows that markets in the region are oligopolistic and 
often dominated by the same large multinational firms operating in small, con-
centrated markets. These firms have entrenched positions of market power by 
leveraging close relationships with governments and controlling the location of 
their production facilities, as well as through ‘favourable’ trade and physical bar-
riers, such as poor transport networks and regulatory barriers between countries. 
Thirdly, strategic and structural barriers have led to poor competitive outcomes 
in the respective countries and sectors, and in the region more generally, resulting 
in low levels of new entry as well as limited trade flows. There is therefore scope 
for new research into the relationships between these different areas of policy 
and firm conduct towards increasing the potential for greater regional rivalry and 
integration. 
Fourthly, besides understanding regional industrial structures, more studies 
are needed on industrial and market structures at country and sectoral levels. 
While there have been several studies on South Africa, for instance, there is still 
a dearth of studies on the structure and competitiveness of the major industries 
of most countries in the region, in part because most of the competition author-
ities in these countries are still young. There is a need for studies that document 
the nature of competition in these sectors and the welfare costs of anticompet-
itive arrangements at country and sectoral levels, not least to demonstrate the 
importance of competitive rivalry for economic development within countries. 
Such studies could focus on the growth, employment and consumer welfare 
impacts of anticompetitive conduct by large firms in the respective countries, 
and would help to strengthen the hand of competition authorities and policy 
makers.
Finally, the wide acceptance and adoption of competition laws in most coun-
tries is a good platform. Quantifying the gains from increased regional rivalry 
and the losses from anticompetitive arrangements can help to build a case 
for greater resourcing of competition authorities and RECs to deal with these 
matters. This will also  provide motivation for greater coordination between 
country policy makers on industrial development and trade policy as they relate 
to competition. In addition, issues around harmonisation of competition laws 
and their application across jurisdictions within the RECs is an important area 
for future research.
Notes
1 For example, North, Wallis and Weingast (2009) highlight the importance of competi-
tion in moving to what they characterise as ‘open access orders’ as opposed to ‘limited 
access orders’, but do not analyse the key factors in competitive or uncompetitive 
outcomes in oligopolistic markets, implicitly assuming that in the absence of artificial 
barriers to entry markets will approach perfect competition. 
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2 This is the ‘post-Chicago’ synthesis. 
3 Massimo Motta, lectures.
4 This section draws from Makhaya and Roberts (2014).
5 In perfect competition models, trade is primarily driven by comparative advantage, 
that is, differences in productivity and/or factor endowments. This trade is also known 
as inter-industry trade. Orthodox models of regional integration assume perfect 
 competition and homogeneous products. There is hence no rivalry among firms.
6 We abstract here from issues such as ‘rules of origin’ that may result in tariffs on goods 
partially produced within the integrated market.
7 Peridy and Ghoneim (2009), in their study of the effects of the Greater Arab Free Trade 
Area (GAFTA), find small effects from imperfect competition, owing to the fact that 
most intra-GAFTA trade involves inter-industry trade, with little intra-industry trade. 
In his study of the growth effects of RIAs, Berthelon (2004) concludes that north–
north agreements yield unambiguous and significant positive growth effects while 
south–south agreements yield ambiguous growth effects, where ‘north’ is a mnemonic 
for developed country and ‘south’ for developing country.
8 It should be noted, however, that a globally competitive industry could develop not-
withstanding the small domestic market size. An example is the experience of Nokia 
in Finland.
9 It is worth pointing out that monopolisation per se is not the evil, but rather the 
‘lack of contestability’. Lack of competition has negative implications for growth, as 
it affects incentives to invest, innovate, etc. Indeed, high concentration (monopolisa-
tion) could be an endogenous outcome of competition itself (see Sutton, 1991).
10 We say ‘likely’ for at least two reasons. First, firms could potentially collude and divide 
the market among themselves, thereby defeating the objective of intensifying compe-
tition within the RIA. Second, integration must be completely embraced by the parties 
and fully implemented. Half-hearted implementation of the RIA provisions may not 
significantly enhance competition. For example, there is little regional trade in input 
and final goods markets (e.g., cement, sugar) within the SADC and Comesa RIAs, due 
at least partly to regulatory barriers and inconsistencies in the support for and enforce-
ment of competition law frameworks.
11 In addition, the enlarged market will now feature differentiated cement products, 
giving consumers a choice. Consumers will then vote with their purses, forcing a 
reallocation of production among the three firms (productive efficiency) within 
the RIA.
12 Integration thus potentially solves one of the major challenges facing competition 
authorities in small economies – balancing the need to ensure firms are large enough 
and integrated so as to enjoy economies of scale and ensuring robust rivalry among 
the firms to ensure allocative and productive efficiency (Gal, 2001).
13 A number of studies find positive growth effects of RIAs. Henrekson, Torstensson 
and Torstensson (1997) test the growth effects of European integration, namely the 
European Community (EC) and the European Free Trade Agreement (EFTA). They 
find that EC/EFTA membership increases growth by about 0.6–0.8 percentage points. 
Similarly, Berthelon (2004) finds that RIAs largely have positive growth effects.
14 Consent Agreement between Competition Commission and New Reclamation Group, 
case no. 37/CR/Apr08.
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15 The cement study included all six countries; the sugar study looked at Kenya, South 
Africa, Tanzania and Zambia; and the poultry study assessed the industry in Botswana, 
Namibia, South Africa and Zambia. See Bagopi et al. (2016); Chisanga et al. (2016); 
Amunkete et al. (2016).
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